
Qass V 

Book 



THE DIPLOMATIC 
HISTORY OF THE WAR 



THE DIPLOMATIC 

HISTORY OF THE WAR 

INCLUDING A DIARY OF NEGO- 
TIATIONS AND EVENTS IN THE 
DIFFERENT CAPITALS, THE TEXTS 
OF THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF 
THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS, THE 
PUBLIC Sx^EECHES IN THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENTS, AN ACCOUNT OF 
THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF 
THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED 
AND ORIGINAL MATTER ^ j* 



^: EDITED BY 

Uf P; PRICE, M.A. 

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 



NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
597-599 FIFTH AVENUE 



Hsio 



First Published November igi4 



/ / .. 



PREFACE 

THIS War is by universal consent the greatest catas- 
trophe of modern times. To dwell upon its social 
ravages and economic ruin is not my present purpose. 
While we are engaged in a struggle for national existence 
the responsibility for the mischief may be hidden or 
disguised by passion, excitement, Press censorship, and 
martial law. But the time will come when the record of 
historical facts which led all Europe to this fate will have 
to be examined and the blame apportioned. A duty is 
therefore imposed upon some of us to collect these records 
before they are covered with the cobwebs of time, to 
co-ordinate them, and to set them forth for the judg- 
ment of a wider public. 

Meanwhile, as we wait upon the course of military events 
and economic exhaustion, we may with profit study the 
work of the great European diplomats whose skill and 
competence have hatched Armageddon out of the 
Serajevo egg. 

Personally, I believe that the judgment of mankind on 
the War will depend more on its consequences than on 
its origins, and that in this way the truth of the Greek 
philosopher's words, " By suffering we learn," will be 
realized in due course of time. Nevertheless, in the 
recollections of the past we can always find a guide to 
the future, and therefore it seems to me a duty to collect 
and collate such diplomatic and political facts about the 
causes of the War as have already come to light. 



vi THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

I have therefore sought in a preliminary chapter to go 
back and examine why this conflagration has spread from 
Eastern Europe, and to uncover the methods by which 
the diplomacy in the different capitals has worked, leading 
Europe to the inevitable and disastrous end. For this 
purpose I have first glanced at the history of the relations 
of the European Powers to each other for the last twenty 
years, in order to bring before our minds the state of affairs 
in Europe at the time when this crisis developed. Then 
I have given as complete an account as I have been able 
of the course of the negotiations and the events that took 
place each day in the important capitals in Europe for the 
fourteen days before the outbreak of war. For this purpose 
I have dissected the English White Paper and placed all 
the facts related therein in chronological order. With this 
I have fitted in similar material from the German Denkschrift, 
the Russian Orange Book (from my own translation of the 
Russian text), the Belgian Grey Book, the Austrian White 
Paper, and other material. Thus a record is obtained of 
all the relevant events in chronological order. There is 
included also an account of the military preparations and 
mobilizations in the countries concerned, largely based 
on the reports of Press correspondents. 

From the above material I think the reader will be able 
to see concisely and consecutively what was passing 
through the minds of the diplomats of the now belligerent 
Powers, and what efforts they made for peace. It will 
be possible also to see how the guardians of the peace 
of Europe were being daily frightened and stampeded by 
fear and distrust of each other or by anxiety for their own 
prestige, and how they were finally overborne by the 
military party in each country. In the running comments 
which I have added I have taken it upon myself to indicate 
where blame or praise seems justly to be deserved. 

In some later chapters I have added a number of 



PREFACE vii 

official documents which do not appear in any of the 
Government publications hitherto issued ; also texts of 
the Treaties bearing upon certain points of importance, 
Parliamentary speeches, and some of the more important 
Press correspondence, the sources of which have been 
duly acknowledged. Amongst the Parliamentary speeches 
I have myself made or have obtained translations of the 
declarations on the outbreak of war by the statesmen and 
public leaders in France, Germany, and Russia. The 
similarity of the sentiments in all these speeches is almost 
as noteworthy as the support which has been obtained by 
all from the official exponents of Christianity, art, science, 
philosophy, and letters. Each Foreign Minister or spokes- 
man of his Government claimed that his country worked 
for peace, but was forced to take the sword through envious 
and hostile neighbours who were attacking it. Each said 
the War was only in self-defence and asked for national 
unity, while the Sovereigns appealed to the Deity to bless 
their arms, and the Churches, under the inspiration of State 
policy, have declared it to be a " Holy War." On the other 
hand, the Social Democrats or advanced Left parties of 
all countries declared that they had no quarrel with the 
workers of other lands, and denounced the War as a war of 
capitalists and bureaucrats ; but, when once the die was 
cast, they agreed to follow their Governments in the 
defence of their national existence. With such irony as 
this the history of the last few days of peace is filled. 

My special thanks are due to my friend Mr. Dudley 
Ward, who afforded me great assistance in compiling 
and arranging the material, and whose knowledge of the 
course of diplomatic proceedings in Berlin was of the 
utmost value to me. 

M. PHILIPS PRICE, 
TiBBERTON Court, Gloucester, 
October 19, 1914. 



CONTENTS 



PREFACE ....... 

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION .... 

DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EVENTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
CAPITALS ...... 

SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EVENTS 

MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS 

THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK . 

EXTRACTS FROM THE AUSTRIAN WHITE PAPER 

BELGIAN GREY BOOK 

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 

TREATIES . 

PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 

MANIFESTOES 

PRESS CORRESPONDENCE . 



PAGE 

V 

I-I5 



16-89 

90-93 
94-114 

II5-I55 
156-196 

197-202 
203-248 
249-269 

270-283 

284-323 
324-327 
328-339 



INDEX 

ENGLISH WHITE PAPER 



• 341-344 

End of book 



THE DIPLOMATIC 
HISTORY OF THE WAR 

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 

IT had long been regarded as a possibility that the 
internal affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire might 
lead to a European war. The task of balancing the in- 
terests of the three principal races that comprise Austria- 
Hungary, Teuton, Magyar and Slav, has been one of the 
great political problems of Europe. The Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and the Ottoman Empire, while in Europe, had 
one feature between them in common. Both possessed 
within their borders hostile racial elements, whose whole 
social and political aims gravitated towards neighbouring 
States. Austria, as inheritor of the Holy Roman Empire, 
has struggled to maintain her temporal leadership of Latin 
Catholicism against the Orthodox Slavs, who have inherited 
the traditions of Greek Christianity and of the Eastern 
Empire at Constantinople. Russia, upon whom fell the 
mantle of political leadership of Orthodox Slavdom, became 
thus the arch-enemy of Austria, and the rivalry of each 
for political influence in the Balkans has been one of the 
chief sources of unrest in Europe. For Russia it was 
a great religious duty to protect and secure the develop- 
ment of the Southern Slavs. Her ignorant and super- 
stitious but intensely religious peasantry were easily 
influenced by Pan-Slav ideals and dreams of a Slav 
Empire from the Arctic to the Adriatic. But Russia's 
foreign policy is always unstable. During the last half 
of last century her attention in the Balkans was confined 
chiefly to Bulgaria, while she allowed, under the Treaty 

2 » 



2 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

of Berlin, the Servians to fall under the influence of 
Austria. But Bulgaria refused to remain a protege of the 
great Slav Power in the North, and on the rise of the 
" Stambolovists " Russia's relations with Bulgaria became 
less cordial. 

After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1908 and the German threat of " shining armour," Servia 
came again into favour with Russian diplomacy. Austria, 
on the other hand, dreaded the rise of the political power 
of the Southern Slavs, which inevitably drew many of 
her people away from Vienna and Budapest towards 
Belgrade and thus threatened her very existence. Indeed, 
the Balkan Alliance is said to have been founded at the 
instance of Russia, and to have aimed originally at Austria. 
It was to have included Turkey in a great Serb-Bulgar- 
Graeco-Turk confederation. (See articles in the Times on 
the Origin of the Balkan War, June, 191 3.) But Turkey 
would not come in, and so the Balkan States had to settle 
accounts with her first. Thus came the Balkan War of 
1912 and the first obstacle to Slav dominion was removed. 
In the following year the Balkan Alliance broke in a 
fratricidal strife. For the disruption of the Alliance the 
cause is still obscure. Russia accuses Austria of having 
sown seeds of dissension among the Allies (see M. Sazonof's 
speech in the Duma, August 8, 1914^), while on the other 
hand Germany accuses Russia of having done the same 
(see Chancellor's speech in Reichstag 2). Servia was 
now greatly increased in power. She had waged two 
successful wars and had recovered her old kingdom in 
Macedonia. According to some authorities 3 she was 
looking eagerly forward to the coming trial of strength 
with the Austrian power in the North. These ideas were 
fostered by societies in Servia who had ramifications 
in the Slav provinces of Austria- Hungary, and some of 
their activities are set forth in the Austrian White Paper 
(see p. 197). Although this document is doubtless highly 

' Parliamentary Speeches {d). 

' Ibid. (b). 

s See Mr. G. M. Trevelyan's letter in the Times, September i8th. 



HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 3 

coloured, there is enough to prove the existence of a 
political movement highly prejudicial to the Dual Monarchy. 

Meanwhile in Austria there had been for some years 
past a school of political thought, headed by the Archduke 
Franz-Joseph, which aimed at reconciling the Southern 
Slavs of the Dual Monarchy by creating an independent 
Slav political element within the Empire to counterbalance 
the Magyars, and thus form a Trial Monarchy. This 
naturally aroused on the one hand the hostility of the 
Magyars, who regarded the South Slav Provinces as within 
their own exclusive sphere of influence, and on the other 
hand the bitterest hatred among the Servians of the 
kingdom beyond the Danube, who realized in the recon- 
ciliation of the Southern Slavs to the Austrian Empire the 
end of their aspirations for expansion northwards. At the 
hand of one of these two forces the Archduke fell a victim. 
The official Austrian view is that the murder was the result 
of Pan-Serb political propaganda in Bosnia and Croatia, 
inspired from Belgrade.^ From other sources it is sug- 
gested that the instigators to the murder came from within 
the Monarchy itself.^ Be that as it may, the death of 
the Heir to the Hapsburg Throne at the hands of a Bosnian 
assassin was Austria's excuse for settling accounts with 
Servia. This she proceeded to do in drastic fashion. 

During the weeks that elapsed between the Serajevo 
murder and the presentation of the Austrian Note on July 
23rd, Europe waited in suspense to know what Austria would 
do. Matters had come to a pass, and she was bound to 
act at last. Ominous hints from the Austrian Press during 
the first few days of July warned observers that she would 
probably act drastically. The first signs of the coming 
storm were to be seen in the scarcely veiled threats of 
Austria which were issued in an official communique 
published in the Pester-Lloyd for July 5th. In it Servia was 
reproved for lack of courtesy to her neighbour, and the 
hint was thrown out that she had better be reasonable 

' See Austrian White Paper, p. 199. 

= Leading article in Temps, July 25th, and White Paper 30. See 
Press Correspondence (i). 



4 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

in the coming discussion with the Austrian Government 
about her relations with the Dual Monarchy. A firm 
attitude was meanwhile taken by Count Tisza in his 
speeches in the Hungarian Chamber on July 9th and 
15th, which pointed to the "clearing up" of Austria's 
relations with Servia, and to a determination to combat 
the Pan-Serb propaganda. From July 20th onwards the 
diplomatic and Press campaign against Servia increased 
in intensity, and caused considerable unrest and anxiety 
in Berlin, which was not allayed till the day before the 
issue of the Note. 

On the evening of July 23rd the Austrian Note was 
presented by the Minister at Belgrade to the Servian 
Government.' Briefly, it demanded an official apology 
from Servia for the Pan-Serb propaganda which had been 
going on within the Empire, the suppression of certain 
newspapers and societies, the dismissal and punishment 
of certain officers concerned in the murder, and lastly, 
the collaboration of Austrian along with Servian officials 
in executing these demands. A time limit was fixed, giving 
this demarche the character of an ultimatum. 

The Austrian official attitude is explained in the Frem- 
denhlait for July 24th.2 It dwelt upon the danger of the 
"system of mines which had been laid from Servia 
outwards into the heart of Austria's southern Slav pro- 
vinces." It described the influence of the great Servian 
propaganda from Servian sources outside the Empire 
which was covering Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia with 
a network of societies subversive of Austrian political 
unity. This, it was said, could not continue, and the time 
had come to settle accounts. Dr. Dillon, in his telegram 
to the Daily Telegraph on July 24th, viewed the situation 
somewhat in this light, when he described it as the first 
symptom of a " gigantic struggle, which is bound to make 
itself felt throughout Europe, between Slavs and Teutons, 
between the nations who are content with the territory they 
possess and those whose aim it is to annex the possessions 
of neighbours." 

' See English White Paper 4. - See German Denkschrift. 



HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 5 

This was the position on July 23rd, when Austria made 
a stroke on the success of which her very existence de- 
pended. It is reasonable to ask, however, how this action 
on the part of Austria affected her partner Germany and 
what were the circumstances in which the latter was placed 
by the action of her ally. To understand the relationship 
between the two countries it is necessary to go back to the 
Austro-German Treaty of Alliance which was concluded 
in 1874, but not published till 1888. ^ The two important 
clauses of this Treaty bind either country to go to the 
assistance of the other in the event of an attack by Russia, 
If the attacking party should be a Power other than Russia, 
the country which is not attacked is bound at least to 
maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality, and if the 
attacking party be assisted by Russia the first part of the 
Treaty comes into force, binding the one to assist the other. 

Now, as I explained above, Russia has, as part of her 
traditional foreign policy, assumed the role of protector 
of the southern Slavs, and in their cause has more than 
once in the course of history taken up arms. 

This fact must be considered in realizing the situation in 
which Germany is placed and the causes of her foreign 
policy. For .since Russian policy is always bound up with 
the southern Slav, there is always the possibility of Russian 
intervention to prevent what it might rightly or wrongly 
consider to be an infringement of the independence and 
liberty of a southern Slav State. Austria, as champion of 
the Teutonic races in the South of Europe, and Russia as 
protector of the Slavs, might easily pick a quarrel over a 
country like Servia, which lies within the fringe of the 
influence of both Empires. This quarrel might, by the 
terms of the Triple Alliance, involve Germany, and for just 
the same reason that Russia would refuse to allow a 
southern Slav State to be crushed, so Germany, for motives 
of pure self-interest, would refuse to see Austria crushed. 
Germany's position was explained by the Daily Telegraph 
correspondent in Paris in his telegram for July 28th, when 
he said that in a " Russian invasion of Galicia Germany 
' See Treaties (/). 



6 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

would be compelled, not only by Treaty but in self-defence, 
to take up arms on behalf of Austria." ^ 

Now, Germany's strategical position places her at no 
inconsiderable disadvantage to her neighbour Russia, who, 
with vast resources of raw human material, can menace her 
eastern frontiers and wear down in course of time the more 
highly trained but limited forces of the German Empire. 
Moreover, the vast size of Russia makes her virtually in- 
vincible. But that is not all, for another factor in the situa- 
tion would arise as soon as a Russo-German quarrel found 
its military expression. The terms of the Dual Alliance are 
not publicly known, but it is an open secret that in a Russo- 
German conflict France is bound to co-operate with her 
ally and engage the attention of Germany on the western 
frontiers until the slow-moving armies of Russia are able 
to move in the east. There is thus a complete link in the 
chain. Austria's life -and -death struggle with the forces 
of Slavism in the Balkans forms the first link. Russia's 
religious sympathy for her southern Slav brothers is the 
second. Germany's political self-interest, embodied in the 
terms of the Triple Alliance, in maintaining the Teutonic 
Power against a circle of hostile Slav States is the third. 
France's unknown, but apparently unlimited obligation to 
Russia is the fourth. 

Thus it would appear that so far from Germany's interests 
lying in the direction of instigating an Austro-Russian 
quarrel, her safety depended upon preventing such a 
situation arising. A large number of statements have 
been made, however, that Germany was the instigator of 
this quarrel, and these views find expression in certain tele- 
grams between the Chancelleries of St. Petersburg, London, 
and Paris between July 24th and 31st, and also various 
telegrams from Press correspondents in Paris and St. Peters- 
burg during that time. All these sources represent Germany 
as the power standing behind Austria, uncompromising in 
her attitude, preventing a peaceful solution.^ On the other 

' See Press Correspondence (xiv). 

' See English White Paper 6 and 95, and Times correspondent 
in Berlin. Press Correspondence (xv), (xviii), also (v). 



HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 7 

hand, there is evidence to the effect that during the negotia- 
tions after the Austrian Note to Servia, Germany, how- 
ever stupidly and supinely she handled the Austro-Servian 
dispute, was fully alive to the danger to Europe of a Russo 
Austrian conflict. Thus the telegrams passing between the 
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Paris Foreign Offices 
show that although Germany refused Sir Edward Grey's 
suggestion of a Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in 
London, nevertheless she supported the mediation of Four , , . , 
Powers not immediately concerned at Vienna and St. Peters- I f A^.>fis^>J 



burg, with a view to inducing Austria and Russia to come 
to terms with each other. Indeed, Germany was on more 
than one occasion the means of conveying to Austria pro- 
posals concerning the need of moderation in Vienna and ^ 
about the guarantees which Servia could reasonably be 
expected to give.^ The pressure brought to bear on Austria 
by Germany during the last few days of negotiations is also 
seen in the German Denkschrift and in the Westminster'>' 
Gazette correspondent's telegram of August ist.^ In addition 
to these, numerous British Press correspondents in Berlin 
and St. Petersburg, between July 25th and 30th, show that 
Germany, so far from being an instigator, was doing all she 
could, having regard to the difficult position in which she 
was placed, to make her ally come to terms with Russia. 3 

Germany's great initial blunder was that she refused to 
regard the Austro-Servian dispute as one that concerned 
any other but those two countries, and would not 
recognize the claim of Russia to be consulted about the 
fate of Servia. Hence her interpretation of Four Power 
mediation was not the same as Russia's. She wanted 
mediation to aim at securing for Austria a "free hand." 
Russia wanted mediation which would give her a 
chance of settling the Servian question according to her 
ideas. 

Thus we see from the above how the European Powers 

\y English White Paper 18, 95, and 98. 
" See Documents (a). 

3 See Press Correspondence (ii), (iii), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (xii), (xvi), 
(xix). 



8 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

would automatically group themselves as soon as a Teuto- 
Slav crisis in South-eastern Europe arose. It was part of 
the tragic necessity which arose out of the nature of politics 
in Eastern Europe and which caused the Powers on the 
Continent to form themselves into two opposing groups, 
through a network of alliances and counter-alliances. 

But what was the position of England in relation to these 
Powers ? To understand this it is first necessary to trace 
roughly the history of her foreign policy for the last twenty 
years. During the last decade of the nineteenth century 
England stood in splendid isolation. It was the policy of 
Lord Salisbury to keep England free from all Continental 
alliances, whether open or secret, to create no special 
friendships, to contract no partnerships which implied 
hostility to a third State, and to avoid the European system 
of Power-balances. At the close of the century new ideas 
began to appear, and the speech of Mr. Chamberlain in 
1899 was the forecast of a change in British foreign 
policy. But the P'ashoda incident was still fresh in people's 
minds, and the Russian danger in the East was still for- 
midable to the British Empire in Asia. Friendships 
were sought in other directions, and in 1899 Mr. 
Chamberlain, reflecting no doubt the feeling of the 
Government, proposed the alliance of England with her 
next-of-kin upon the Continent, Germany. But Germany 
was at that time in no mood for alliances. She was 
gradually consolidating her position as a Great Power, 
her industries were making rapid strides, her navy had 
begun to show the world that she meant to protect her 
over-sea commerce and also to gain for herself a legitimate 
voice in the councils of Europe. England was at this 
time engaged in the Boer War, and feeling against her 
on the Continent was hostile. Moreover, her relations 
with Russia in the Far East were strained. Germany, at 
the outset of her career as a European Power, felt that 
she could not afford to jeopardize her position by becoming 
drawn into the orbit of England's policy and by running 
the risk thereby of losing her independence and perhaps 
of bringing down upon her the hostility of other powerful 



HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 9 

Continental neighbours. Nor would she join in a Con- 
tinental alliance against England in the Boer War for 
similar reasons. Germany's position at that time can be 
studied in Bulow's " Imperial Germany." ' In the part 
dealing with foreign policy, he explains that Germany 
" could not be guided in her decisions and acts by a policy 
directed against England, nor could she for the sake of 
England's friendship become dependent upon her ; in her 
development as a sea power, Germany would not reach 
her goal either as England's satellite or as her antagonist." 
This short-sighted policy of Prince Bulow was to a 
large extent responsible for the ill-feeling which soon 
after developed between the two countries. It was perhaps 
explicable on the grounds that a young industrial nation, 
when it is expanding and growing, is jealous of its position 
and fears being brought under the tutelage of others. 
It had nevertheless a most injurious effect upon the sub- 
sequent relations of the two countries. 

England had meanwhile broken her traditional policy and 
had entered into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with a view to 
preserving the status quo in the Far East, maintaining the 
integrity of China and opposing Russian designs. The 
recent revelations in the " Memoirs of Count Hayashi/' the 
Japanese statesman who was Ambassador in London at the 
time, showed that while the negotiations for the conclusion 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were in progress there was 
a proposal for the participation of Germany in a new kind 
of Triple Alliance for the maintenance of the above-men- 
tioned objects in the Far East. The proposal failed, the 
alliance was concluded a deux, and the circumstances 
which prevented the participation of Germany are still 
shrouded in mystery. It may be that the responsibility 
rested in Berlin, and that Germany thought she saw designs 
on her diplomatic independence ; it may have lain in 
London, owing to the fear of the German navy, or it may 
have been thwarted in Tokio by the young Eastern Power, 
who feared that she would be unable to use as much 
influence on two European Powers as on one.^ 
' Bulow's " Imperial Germany," p. 30. ^ " Memoirs of Count Hayashi." 



lo THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

England, having broken her poHcy of splendid isolation 
by the Japanese Alliance, and finding Germany disinclined 
to respond to any further overtures, turned to France. The 
relative naval and military strength of France as compared 
with Germany was declining, and France was therefore more 
open to negotiations with England than she had ever been 
before. There had been long-standing friction between the 
two countries. Some of the causes of this friction, such as 
the Newfoundland Fisheries, Siam, Madagascar, and the 
Hebrides, had already been partly settled during the 8o's 
and 90's. But the problem of Egypt and Morocco was 
untouched, till in 1904 the Anglo-French Convention ^ 
cleared up all these outstanding questions and laid the seeds 
of what ultimately developed into a general diplomatic 
alliance. The understanding over Egypt and Morocco was 
as follows : In the Convention England declared she had 
no intention of altering the political status of Egypt, and 
France declared that she would not ask for a time limit to 
be placed upon the British occupation. France also 
declared that she had no intention of altering the political 
status of Morocco, while England recognized France's right 
to preserve order and exercise influence over the internal 
affairs of Morocco. The equality of commercial facilities 
was guaranteed in both countries, and a number of other 
minor matters were disposed of. In addition to this, how- 
ever, a number of secret articles were added, which never 
appeared till 191 1. These articles allowed England and 
France, if they were " strained by force of circumstances, to 
modify their policies in Egypt and Morocco," and they 
agreed that if it became " desirable to introduce reforms 
tending to assimilate the legislative systems" of Egypt and 
Morocco respectively, neither country would set any 
obstacles in the way of the other.^ But the Convention 
ignored Germany's growing and not inconsiderable economic 
interests in Morocco, some of which carried with them also 
a semi-political character. England notified Germany about 
the Convention, but France failed to do so, and when, in 

' See Treaties (g). 

" See "Morocco in Diplomacy," by E. D. Morel. 



HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION ii 

addition to this, it became known to Germany that there 
were secret clauses to the agreement, the latter felt that she 
had not been consulted about the future of a country in 
which she had large economic interests. With customary 
clumsiness she forthwith intervened in Paris in 1905 and 
demanded a conference on the affairs of Morocco. This 
conference resulted in the Act of Algeciras in 1906, and set 
up a system of internal organization for Morocco, in which 
the French and Spanish obtained special rights over some 
of the public services, while International control was intro- 
duced into others and the integrity and independence of 
the Sultan of Morocco was affirmed and recognized. During 
the diplomatic negotiations which resulted in the Act of 
Algeciras, British diplomacy, bound by the clause in the 
Convention, worked side by side with France, and thus the 
Morocco question was settled for a period of five years. 

In the following year, 1907, England made another move, 
which was to some extent a corollary of the Anglo-French 
Convention. She settled her great outstanding disputes 
with France's ally, Russia. By the terms of the Anglo- 
Russian Convention ^ Great Britain and Russia agreed 
to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia, 
Afghanistan, and Thibet. In the last two countries the 
status quo was to be maintained, but in Persia the country 
was divided into a Russian, a neutral, and a British sphere. 
In the Russian sphere Russia was allowed to have the 
preference for all economic works of a public nature, such 
as railways, roads, banks, telegraphs, etc., and a similar 
privilege was given to England in the English sphere. In 
the neutral sphere the two countries were to have equal 
rights. In none of the three spheres was the right given to 
either country to interfere with the internal affairs of Persia 
or to meddle with its system of government. 

Thus we see that neither the Anglo-French nor the 
Anglo-Russian Convention assumed the form of a definite 
alliance, but both were rather of the nature of agreements on 
special points of colonial policy which had divided hitherto 
the three Empires. Indeed, actual diplomatic support was 
' See Treaties (g). 



12 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

only entailed in the case of the Anglo-French Convention. 
It was this, however, which largely led to the crisis of 191 1. 
In the spring of that year France had sent a military expe- 
dition to Fez to put down disorder and rebellion. The 
expedition, necessary no doubt, was nevertheless, on the 
basis of the Algeciras Act, illegal without the participation 
of Germany. Germany, after saying nothing for some 
months, acted clumsily again when all Europe thought she 
was going to say nothing ; the Panther was sent to Agadir, 
and the second Morocco crisis arose. In the resulting 
Convention the whole of the public law of Europe relating 
to Morocco was altered and finally settled, but not without 
considerable friction and misunderstanding between England 
and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, 
which during August of that year nearly led to war. In 
November, 191 1, the Franco-German Convention was signed, 
which turned Morocco into a French Protectorate. France 
added over 20,000 square miles to her colonial Empire, 
giving in return a guarantee to Germany for equality of 
commercial opportunity in Morocco and exchanging the 
large slice of territory in the French Congo for a similar 
piece in the German Cameroons. Thus a difficult problem 
which had caused much friction between England, France, 
and Germany, and in the settlement of which the Anglo- 
French Convention played no small part, was solved. 
Throughout both Morocco crises England and France 
rendered mutual diplomatic support to each other, but 
beyond this diplomatic support no other liability on the 
part of England was at that time made public. 

Sir Edward Grey's speech ^ in the House of Commons 
on August 3rd, however, threw fresh light on England's 
liability to France during these years of the Morocco con- 
troversy. It now transpires that during the first Morocco 
crisis of 1905-6 Sir Edward Grey was asked by the French 
Government whether England could give armed support 
to France in the event of a Franco-German conflict. Sir 
Edward Grey replied that he would not bind England in 

' Sir Edward Grey's speech, August 3rd, Hansard, and id. edition 
of White Paper. 



HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 13 

advance, but that if France were forced into a war through 
a dispute with Germany which arose out of the Anglo- 
French Convention, public opinion in England would 
probably rally to the material support of France, There- 
upon the French Government proposed that if that was 
the case it would be as well that French and English 
naval and military experts should consult about the best 
means for taking measures in co-operation if needed. 
Sir Edward Grey agreed to this on the understanding that 
these conversations did not bind the British Government 
to decide its course of action. In the second Morocco 
crisis the same situation arose, and the attitude of England 
to France remained the same as in the first crisis of 1905-6. 
It was not until 191 2, however, that the attitude of England 
became more clearly defined. The question of the naval 
and military conversations was then brought before the 
Cabinet, and it was decided that there should be a definite 
understanding in writing. This was effected in November 
of that year, when in an unofficial letter to the French 
Ambassador Sir Edward Grey agreed that in the event 
of an attack on France by a third Power threatening 
European peace, the British and French Governments 
should at once discuss what measures they would take 
in common. Not long after this unofficial understanding 
the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean, 
leaving the northern shores of France undefended. It was 
to this fact that Sir Edward Grey appealed in his great 
speech in the House on August 3rd, when he held that 
England was morally bound to support France because, 
after the unofficial understanding contained in that letter, 
England had tacitly acquiesced in the concentration of the 
French fleet in the Mediterranean. For Sir Edward Grey's 
public statements on the point prior to the crisis of last 
July, a study of Hansard is interesting.^ 

Thus we trace the development of the Anglo-French 

Entente. Arising out of a Convention for the settlement 

of Colonial affairs, it developed through naval and military 

conversations into a strategic understanding, which though 

' See Treaties (/) and (;). 



14 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

unofficial in character and unknown to Parliament, was 
held to carry with it a moral obligation to support the 
Dual Alliance. 

It still remains to refer to the alleged naval agreement 
which was said to have been carried out between England 
and France's ally, Russia. Early in 1914 the Berlin news- 
papers published information from Paris and St. Petersburg 
sources to the effect that naval conversations were in 
progress between England and Russia. Some excitement 
was caused in Berlin at this announcement. In England it 
was felt that the close relations existing between England 
and France made it quite conceivable that conversations of 
this nature were going on with France's ally. No definite 
information on this point, however, is at present obtainable. 
A statement, however, was made by Sir Edward Grey in 
answer to a question by Mr. King on June nth in the 
House of Commons as to whether a naval agreement had 
been concluded between England and Russia.^ In reply, 
Sir Edward Grey denied the existence of any such agree- 
ment and said that none was likely to be entered upon so 
far as he could judge. This statement, as the Manchester 
Guardian pointed out a few days later, did not preclude the 
possibility of conversations having taken place of a similar 
nature to those which had gone on between England and 
France in 1906, and which may have carried with them 
similar moral obligations. 

Meanwhile Anglo-German relations, which had been 
embittered by diplomatic tension during the 191 1 Morocco 
crisis and by naval rivalry, improved after the Balkan crisis 
of 1913, when the two countries worked together for the 
settlement of the Albanian problem. An Anglo-German 
agreement over the economic spheres of interest in Asia 
Minor and the Persian Gulf was, moreover, being prepared 
and was to have been signed in the autumn of 1914. Such 
an agreement would have settled all outstanding difficulties 
between the two countries in the East and might have laid 
the foundation for a closer understanding still. But the 
antagonism between Teuton and Slav in Eastern Europe 
• See Treaties (k). 



HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 15 

dominated European politics. In the Balkans the rivalry 
between Russia and Austria grew ever keener, while in 
Poland, Russia and Germany were rapidly arming against 
each other. Russia had during the last year increased her 
standing army and improved her lines of communication, 
while Germany made a special levy after the Balkan War of 
191 2 to strengthen her fortresses on the East Prussian 
frontier. In the spring of 19 14 there was a war scare based 
on an article by a St. Petersburg correspondent in the 
Cologne Gazette about Russian preparations, and although 
the storm did not burst till the autumn the tension between 
the two Empires remained almost at breaking point. 

Thus we see how England became involved in this great 
European conflict, and how by a series of alliances and 
secret obligations the quarrel between Slav and Teuton in 
Eastern Europe was allowed to grow till it came to involve 
British support for Slav influence in the Balkans. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EVENTS 
IN THE EUROPEAN CAPITALS 

WITH SUMMARY 

July 23 

AUSTRIA 

AT 6 p.m. on July 23rd the Austrian Minister at Bel- 
grade presented a Note containing the demands of his 
Government concerning the Pan-Serb agitation in Austria. 
The text is given in full in the English White Paper ^ and 
also summarized in the Introduction to this book, p. 4. 

ENGLAND 

On the same day the Austrian Minister in London had a 
conversation 2 with Sir Edward Grey, in which he explained 
privately to the latter the nature of the Austrian demands. 
In the absence of the text of the Note Sir Edward Grey was 
only able to comment upon the time limit, the first and 
most obvious point, namely, the limited time given for the 
Servian reply, which, as he pointed out, might seriously 
inflame public opinion in Russia and lead to serious com- 
plications. Count Mensdorff, of course, tried to excuse the 
time limit by suggesting that on Servia rested the responsi- 
bility for not having instituted the inquiry into the causes 
of the murder on her own territory. In view of the fact 
that the murder took place on Austrian soil, it is difficult to 
imderstand how it could be expected that the Servian 
Government could trace the causes of the murder to their 
source. This attitixie of the Austrian Government repre- 
sentatives, as indeed is suggested in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's 
dispatch 3 to Sir Edward Grey, points to the fact that the 
Austro-Hungarian Government neither expected nor desired 

' White Paper 4. = Ibid. 3. 3 cd. 7596. 

16 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 17 

the acceptance by Servia of the Austrian demands. At the 
conclusion of . the interview ^ with Count Mensdorff, Sir 
Edward Grey said he hoped that if there were difficulties 
Austria and Russia would discuss them directly with each 
other. This was the first proposal of an informal nature 
made by Sir E. Grey that the matter should become the 
subject of negotiations for other countries besides Austria 
and Servia. 

On the same day 2 also the Servian Minister saw Sir 
Arthur Nicolson at the Foreign Office, and told him that his 
Government were very disquieted at the Austrian demands. 
He said that Servia was willing to take the necessary steps 
to give satisfaction, but could not abandon " certain poli- 
tical ideals," or be dictated to by Austria. He added that 
both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects, 
and that one of them had been the subject of complaint by 
the Servian authorities, who had desired to expel him from 
Servia. The Austrian Government, however, had protected 
him. 

July 24 

AUSTRIA 

On the day following 3 the presentation of the Austrian 
Note to Servia Count Berchtold received the Russian 
Charge d'Affaires, M. Kudashef, and passed the remark 
that Austria felt her very existence to be at stake. 

From German sources 4 it also appears that M. Kudashef 
declared at the same interview that Austria had determined 
to put a stop to Serb intrigues within the Monarchy ; that 
she had no desire for conquest ; and that she was far from 
intending to bring about a change in the balance of power 
in the Balkans. 

Meanwhile, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, who left 
for Russia that morning, is reported in Sir Maurice de 
Bunsen's telegram 5 to Sir Edward Grey to have said that 
if Austria intended to humiliate Servia, Russia would not 
remain indifferent. 

' White Paper 3. ' Ibid. 30. 3 ibid. 7. 

" German Denkschrift, Exhibit 3. s White Paper 7. 

3 



i8 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

GERMANY 

The German Government meanwhile was acquiescing, at 
any rate oflicially, in the policy of the Austrian Government. 

The statement in the ofBcial Denkschrift,^ that " we gave 
Austria an entirely free hand as against Servia but did not 
participate in her preparations," shows that German felt at 
one with her ally in the necessity of putting a stop to 
a political movement which, as it seemed, threatened the 
existence of the Dual Monarchy. Germany, in fact, was 
ready to allow Austria to do as she liked in the settle- 
ment of her quarrel with Servia at this stage of the 
crisis. 

This attitude is further explained in the official com- 
munique of the German Government through its Ambas- 
sadors in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 

The communique ^ said that Servia was responsible for 
having allowed the propaganda to go on, knowing that it 
would have dangerous consequences to Austria. It held 
that Austria should be allowed the choice of means to deal 
with the problem, and that it must be settled between 
Austria and Servia alone. The interference of another 
Power, it added, may lead to " incalculable consequences." 
This Note — the tone of it was apparently understood in 
London and St. Petersburg — was the subject of considerable 
comment in Paris. According to official telegrams and 
Press correspondence in Paris, the German Ambassador 
in this capital is described as having used threatening 
language to France.3 

It is evident, of course, that in taking this extreme non 
possumus attitude Germany was running grave risks of 
precipitating a European war. That her diplomats were 
not aware of the danger they were running is evident, as we 
see later from the desperate attempt they made to force 
Austria to recognize the necessity of consulting Russia over 
her dispute with Servia. 

' See German Denkschrift, p. 117. 

* White Paper 9. 

3 Press Correspondence (iv) and (v). 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 19 

BELGIUM 

The Belgian Foreign Minister to-day ^ sent to the Belgian 
Ministers in the different capitals a Note, saying that the 
international situation was grave ; that the possibilities of 
an international conflict had to be reckoned with, and 
measures had been taken to ensure the observation of 
Belgian neutrality. 

SERVIA 

On the receipt of the Austrian Note Servian thoughts were 
at once turned to Russia, the guardian of the Orthodox Slav 
States of South-east Europe.^ The Crown Prince tele- 
graphed to the Tsar of Russia complaining that the Austrian 
demands were not consistent with Servian independence ; 
that some of the demands would mean the change in the 
legal system ; that while she was willing to accept those 
demands consistent with Servian integrity she could not 
accept them in toto, and she finally appealed to Russia for 
help and advice. 

The British Minister in Belgrade also informed Sir 
Edward Grey to-day 3 that the Servian Government found it 
impossible to accept the Austrian demands, and hoped that 
England would make Austria moderate them. 

The same story is told by the Russian Minister in Bel- 
grade to M. Sazonof.4 M. Pashitch, he says, proposed to 
answer the Austrian Note and also to appeal to the Powers. 
After that, he says, if war is inevitable Servia will fight. 

RUSSIA 

On the morning of the 24th M. Sazonof, the Russian 
Foreign Minister, asked Sir George Buchanan to meet him 
and the French Ambassador and discuss the terms of the 
Austrian Note and the situation that arose therefrom. 5 He 
began by expressing the opinion that Austria's conduct was 
both provocative and immoral, and suggested that Germany 
was at the back of Austria, instigating her to make this 

' Belgian Grey Book. * Orange Book 6. 

3 White Paper 8. * Orange Book 9. s White Paper 6. 



20 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

attack. He foreshadowed an early mobilization of the 
Russian army, and then along with the French Ambassador 
made a bid for England's support, attempting to tie her 
down unconditionally to back the Dual against the Triple 
Alliance. He hoped, in fact, before anything was done in the 
way of mediation and negotiations among the Powers that 
England would declare her solidarity with France and Russia, 
and so overcome the force of the Triple Alliance. ^ Sir 
George Buchanan, however, said he saw no reason to 
suppose that Great Britain would declare solidarity. This 
action was approved of by Sir Edward Grey in a telegram ^ 
on the following day. The attitude of England in St. 
Petersburg, therefore, was undefined and vague during this 
stage of the crisis. It is possible indeed that if at this 
stage England had either given her unconditional support 
to France and Russia, or else had absolutely refused every- 
thing except strict neutrality, the dispute would never have 
gone beyond this stage. 

That afternoon, according to Reuter's correspondent in 
St. Petersburg, a Cabinet Council was held which lasted 
four hours. Reuter's correspondent also adds that " Russia 
will immediately intervene in the Austro-Servian crisis, and 
will ask Austria to prolong the period allowed in the ulti- 
matum for Servia's reply." 

After this Council meeting M. Sazonof sent a telegram 
to the Russian Embassy in Vienna asking Austria for an 
extension of time limit to Servia, while to the Russian 
Embassies in England, Germany, Italy, and France he 
wired asking them to support in these countries Russia's 
step in Vienna.3 

The Russian Government attitude is further reflected in 
the German Denkschrift,4 where, in a telegram from the 
German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the German 
Chancellor, M. Sazonof is said to have used " unmeasured 
complaints" against Austria's action, and said in definite 
terms that Russia could not allow this dispute to be decided 
between Austria and Servia alone. 

' Compare also Orange Book 17. " White Paper 24. 

s Orange Book 4 and 5, White Paper 13. 
♦ Denkschrift, Exhibit 4. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 21 



FRANCE 

On the 24th two Notes were communicated to the French 
Government. The one from the Russian Government ^ 
asked France to support Russia's step in Vienna, while 
the one from the German Government ^ was presented by 
Baron von Shoen, and communicated the contents of the 
Austrian Note, saying that Austria might have to use 
pressure or even military measures against Servia. He 
added that the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Servia 
must be localized. 

According to the Daily Telegraph correspondent in 
St. Petersburg,3 however, the German Ambassador is said to 
have added that " dangerous friction " might arise between 
the Triple Alliance if the struggle were not localized. 
Moreover, the communication of the Ambassador was 
interpreted in Paris as a threat to France, although the 
reasons for regarding it as this are obscure, since similar 
language was used in London and St. Petersburg. 

The words used in the communication 4 to the British 
Government were "incalculable consequences," and their 
use created no sensation in London. 



ENGLAND 

On the 24th a copy of the Austrian Note was handed by 
Count Mensdorff to Sir Edward Grey.5 The latter expressed 
his regret that the time limit should have been insisted upon 
in the Note, and pointed out that Article 5 of the demands 
was quite out of keeping with the independent sovereignty 
of Servia. Count Mensdorff, however, stated that if Servia 
had held out her hand to Austria after the murder the present 
situation would not have arisen. 

Sir Edward Grey then had a conversation ^ with the 
French Ambassador, M. Cambon, in which he told him 
what he was going to say to the German Ambassador later 

■ Orange Book 5. " Ibid. 8. 

3 Press Correspondence (v). * White Paper 9. 

s Ibid. 5. ^ Ibid. 10. 



22 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

in the day. He would say that if Russia took the view 
which any Power interested in Servia would be expected 
to take of the Austrian ultimatum he was powerless to exer- 
cise a moderating influence. He then expressed the opinion 
that the only chance of mediation was that France, Italy, 
and Great Britain should act simultaneously in St. Peters- 
burg, but that it was essential for any such proposal that 
Germany should join in. This was the first definite pro- 
posal for the settlement of the dispute in the South-east of 
Europe along the lines of a European concert. M. Cambon 
expressed his doubts whether this plan was feasible if once 
Austria had moved into Servia. He thought the best thing 
was to gain time by mediating in Vienna. 

In the afternoon Sir Edward Grey saw Prince Lich- 
nowsky,' who communicated to him the German Note (White 
Paper 9). Sir Edward Grey said he feared the attitude 
of Russia towards this dispute, and made the above-men- 
tioned suggestion, namely, that the Four Powers not directly 
interested in the dispute should work together for moderation 
in Vienna and St. Petersburg. But the German Ambassador 
gave no definite answer to this proposal. He had received 
no instructions, and apparently Germany's attitude was 
still that no one should interfere in the private affairs of 
her ally. 

Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey telegraphed 2 to the British 
Legation in Belgrade, saying that Servia should express 
regret for the murder and promise the fullest satisfaction 
if Servian officials were proved accomplices. 

Thus England on the first day showed her anxiety to 
localize the dispute by creating a form of European con- 
cert. It was met at first by poor response from Germany, 
and, moreover, as the sequel shows, the system of European 
Alliance and Ententes based on opposing Power-balances, 
had become such a feature of European diplomacy that, 
when this crisis arose, it was exceedingly difficult to form 
an effective concert. 

' White Paper 11, ^ Ibid. 12. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 23 

July 25 

AUSTRIA 

On receipt of instructions to-day from M. Sazonof 
asking for an extension of time limit to Servia, the Russian 
Charge d Affaires in Vienna saw Baron Macchio/ in the 
absence of Count Berchtold, who had gone to Ischl. 
M. Kudashef communicated M. Sazonof's request, but was 
refused. 

The request was backed by Sir Edward Grey,^ who had 
given Sir Maurice de Bunsen permission to support the 
Russian demand in Vienna. Austria thus remained im- 
placable and would not recognize Russia's right to take 
interest in the fate of Servia. 

SERVIA 

Meanwhile the British Minister in Belgrade informed 
Sir Edward Grey 3 that the Servian reply was going to 
be couched in the most conciliatory terms, and that 
Austria could not but be content unless she definitely 
wanted war. 

The Servian Government 4 then communicated its reply 
to the Austrian Note to the Austrian Ambassador at 
Belgrade. The reply commenced by saying that Servia 
had always tried to live on good terms with her neighbour 
and discountenanced these movements, which injured 
Austrian prestige. On the other hand, she could not be 
responsible, she said, for articles in the Press, manifesta- 
tions of a private character, or the peaceful work of 
societies. She was pained and surprised to hear that 
officials of the Servian Government were implicated in the 
murder of Serajevo, and was ready to hand over for trial 
any officials against whom evidence could be brought. 
She disapproved of and repudiated all attempts to prejudice 
the internal affairs of the Dual Monarchy. The Servian 
Government, moreover, undertook to introduce into the first 

' Orange Book 12. ^ White Paper 26. 

3 Ibid. 21. t Ibid. 39. 



24 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

sitting of the Skuptchina a provision of the Press law 
providing punishment for all incitements to hatred and 
contempt of Austria, and to alter the articles in the 
constitution which would enable them to do so. It was 
agreed to dissolve the " Narodna Odbrana," in spite of the 
fact that as yet no proof of its complicity in the attack on 
Austria was given. They further undertook to remove from 
the military service all who had taken part in an anti- 
Austrian propaganda, provided that the Austrian Govern- 
ment would communicate their names. The Servian 
Government would allow Austrian officials to collaborate 
with Servian officials in the execution of these objects, in 
so far as such collaboration agreed with international law. 
Finally they would enforce and extend measures for pre- 
venting the illicit traffic of arms or explosives across the 
frontier. 

Thus Servia had practically accepted the whole of the 
Austrian Note except one or two points, and even these 
they had accepted with reservations. 

It was obvious, however, that no matter how considerate 
the answer of Servia was, the Austro- Hungarian Govern- 
ment was determined on a coup against its neighbour, for 
at 6.30 that evening the Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade, 
Baron Giesl, gave out that the Servian reply was unsatisfac- 
tory, and said that he would withdraw at once from 
Belgrade with his whole diplomatic corps. ^ 

GERMANY 

On the morning of the 25th the British Charge d'Affaires 
in Berlin had an interview 2 with the Foreign Secretary, 
who began by promising to pass on to Austria the British 
proposal for the time limit to Servia. The Foreign Secretary 
said he knew that Servia could not accept all the demands, 
but admitted that Austria meant to give Servia a lesson 
and proceed to military measures. At the same time he 
privately confessed that he knew nothing about the con- 
tents of the Note till it was presented, and he thought the 
' Orange Book 21. * White Paper 18. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 25 

Note was a bad diplomatic document. He added, that if 
the relations between Austria and Russia became threaten- 
ing he would be ready to fall in with the suggestion that the 
four disinterested Powers should work together for peace at 
Vienna and St. Petersburg. 

This attitude is confirmed in a telegram from the German 
Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London/ in 
which he says he agrees with Sir Edward Grey in drawing 
a distinction between an Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian 
conflict. The dispute, he thought, might be localized by 
virtue of all the Powers refraining from intervention. He 
hoped Russia would keep quiet, but said that if an Austro- 
Russian controversy arose, Germany would, quite apart from 
her duty to her ally, mediate between Austria and Russia 
with the other Powers. 

It appears, therefore, that as early as the 25th Germany 
accepted the principle of Four Power mediation in Vienna 
and St. Petersburg for any Austro-Russian dispute which 
might arise. She would not, however, allow this to apply 
to the Austro-Servian dispute, and a conflict of interest 
between Germany and Russia arose when the latter insisted 
that the Austro-Servian dispute was one which concerned 
Russia. It is not easy to see what was the point of 
Germany's refusal to allow from the first mediation over 
the Austro-Servian dispute. If she would admit of mediation 
over any Austro-Russian dispute that might arise, she must 
have known that it would only arise out of the difficulties 
created by the Austrian Note to Servia. She was there- 
fore playing with words. 

RUSSIA 

The attitude of the Russian Government is explained 
to-day in a telegram from Sir George Buchanan to Sir 
Edward Grey.^ In it M. Sazonof says that he wished to 
see the Austro-Servian question placed upon an inter- 
national footing. He pointed out that Servia's obligations 
in 1908 were to the Powers and not to Austria. // Servia 
appealed to the Powers, Russia would stand aside and leave 
' Denkschrift, Exhibit 13. " White Paper 17. 



26 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the question to the Four Powers — England, France, Germany, 
and Italy. Russia would take no action until it was forced 
upon her, but he felt that Austria was striking at Russia 
through Servia, and that she aimed at upsetting the balance 
of power in the Balkans. Then he repeated his bid to 
secure for Russia the solid support of England as he had 
done on the previous day (see Russia, July 24th, and White 
Paper 6). 

This attitude of M. Sazonof is also reported in a passage 
in the Russian Orange Book,i describing how on the same 
day the Russian Foreign Minister telegraphed to the Russian 
Ambassador in London, expressing the hope that England 
would take a definite stand by Russia and France, if all the 
European Powers were involved in the dispute, in order to 
preserve the equilibrium of Europe. This equilibrium, he 
added, would be destroyed if Austria triumphed over Servia. 

Russia was therefore willing to agree to the principle 
of a European concert to settle the trouble in South-east 
Europe. If, however, this should fail and Servia should 
be crushed, then, according to Russia, the whole of the 
European balance of power would be altered, and Russia 
should gather round herself the forces of France, and if 
possible England, to overpower the Triple Alliance. Such, 
apparently, was the clear and straightforward attitude of 
Russia at this moment. Moreover, she was prepared to 
back her words by deeds, for at a second meeting of the 
Council of Ministers which took place on the afternoon of 
the 25th at Krasnoe Selo, the Tsar signed the order for the 
mobilization of fourteen Russian army corps on the Austrian 
frontier. (See Mobilization Chapter, Russia, July 25th.) 

FRANCE 

On the 25th the French Government gave the Servian 
Minister in Paris the same advice ^ about the need for 
conciliation with Austria. 

The Russian Charge d'Affaires in Paris then describes 3 
how the German Ambassador visited the chief of the 

' Orange Book 17. ' White Paper 15. 3 Orange Book 19. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 27 

Political Department of the Foreign Office and informed 
him that his statement of the previous day (White Paper 9) 
was not threatening ; that the statements in the French 
Press emphasizing the menacing tone of his statement to 
M. Bienvenu-Martin on the previous day were not correct. 
He said, moreover, what the German Foreign Secretary 
said on the previous day to the British Ambassador at 
Berlin (see White Paper 18), namely, that Austria pre- 
sented her Note without Germany's knowledge ; that 
Germany sympathized with Austria's standpoint, but once 
the " shot was fired " Germany could only follow her obli- 
gations to her ally. 

According to Times and Daily Chronicle correspondents at 
Paris, an informal Cabinet Council was held on the night 
of the 25th, followed by " much activity at the Ministry of 
War," while M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, 
arrived in Paris on the same night. 



ENGLAND 

On the 25th the Russian Ambassador communicated to 
Sir Edward Grey the Russian Note,i saying that Russia had 
asked for an extension of the time limit and asking England 
to take similar steps in Vienna. 

The Austrian Ambassador also saw Sir Edward Grey,^ 
and explained to him that the Austrian Note was not an 
ultimatum but a "demarche with a time limit," and that 
rejection would be followed by military preparations, not 
operations. 

Sir Edward Grey then telegraphed to Sir Maurice de 
Bunsen in Vienna,3 instructing him to support in general 
terms Russia's demands for an extension of the time limit ; 
he added that he hoped that, even if the Austrian Govern- 
ment considered it too late to prolong the time limit, they 
would at any rate give time to prevent any irretrievable 
steps being taken. 

The same sense in a more definite form was conveyed in 

' White Paper 13. " Ibid. 14, and Orange Book 16. 

3 White Paper 26. 



28 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

a telegram from the Russian Ambassador in England to 
M. Sazonof/ in which Sir Edward Grey was described as 
having suggested to Sir Maurice de Bunsen that, if it was 
too late to discuss the prolongation of the time limit, the 
question of the arrest of Austria's military operations might 
at any rate be raised. 

Sir Edward Grey then received the German Ambassador, 
Prince Lichnowsky,^ to whom he pointed out what a short 
time there was between the presentation of Austria's Note 
and the break-off of her diplomatic relations with Servia. 
The best method, he thought, was for England, France, 
Germany, and Italy to join together in asking Austria and 
Russia not to cross the frontier until it was possible to arrange 
matters. The German Ambassador then informed Sir 
Edward Grey that his Government had not known how 
stiff the Austrian Note would be, but that once the Note 
had been launched Austria could not draw back. He said, 
however, that Austria might with dignity accept the Four 
Power mediation between Austria and Russia. He person- 
ally favoured it. This confirms the statement of the 
German Foreign Secretary on the same day. (See Germany, 
July 25th, and White Paper 18,) 

This part of the conversation is reported also in a 
telegram in the Russian Orange Book, in which the German 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg is reported to have said that 
Germany did not know the contents of the Austrian Note, 
but supports her action. 

In this interview between Sir Edward Grey and Prince 
Lichnowsky to-day Sir Edward Grey also expressed the 
opinion that so long as the question lay between Austria 
and Servia, England would not intervene, but as soon as 
it became one in which Russia and Austria were interested 
the peace of Europe was affected, and all the Powers must 
join in the settlement. 

This is also reported from a Russian source. According 

to the Orange Book, Sir Edward Grey was of opinion that 

British interests are only indirectly affected by the Austro- 

Servian dispute ; that if Austria mobilized, Russia would 

' Orange Book 16. ^ White Paper 25 and Orange Book 20. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 29 

mobilize, and that from that moment all the Powers would 
be interested ; in that event England would preserve for 
herself full freedom of activity. 

At the same time as this was going on, Sir Edward Grey 
had telegraphed ^ to Sir George Buchanan telling him that 
public opinion in England would not sanction war with 
Servia, but that a development of other issues might bring 
England in. 

Sir Edward Grey's attitude apparently on the 25th was 
this : He would not interfere in the dispute as an Austro- 
Servian one, but as soon as the dispute became an Austro- 
Russian one, as it was sooner or later bound to do, he 
would interfere. But having practically agreed, therefore, 
that Russia might take this question out of the hands of 
Austria and make it a European question, he was not then 
prepared to say whether England would stand by Russia 
and back her up under these circumstances to the full. He 
would only say that " England must preserve for herself 
full freedom of activity," and "that England might be 
drawn in." 

Two other points must be recorded in the Diary for 
the 25th. Sir Edward Grey had an interview ^ during 
the day with the Italian Ambassador, who said that he 
approved of what Sir Edward Grey had said to Prince 
Lichnowsky. He also told the Ambassadors in France, 
Germany, and Russia 3 that he had told the German 
Ambassador that he hoped the German Government 
would influence the Austrian Government to take a 
favourable view of the Servian reply. 

July 26 

AUSTRIA 

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna returned from 
St. Petersburg on the 26th, and at once had an interview 4 
with the British and French Ambassadors there, in which 
he expressed the opinion that Austria was determined 

' White Paper 24. " Ibid. 29. 

3 Ibid, 27. < Ibid. 40. 



30 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

on war, and that he did not propose to press any further 
for an extension of the time Hmit. 

Sir Maurice de Bunsen also had an interview ^ with the 
German Ambassador in Vienna during the day, when the 
latter expressed the opinion that Russia would keep quiet, 
and that she had no desire to interfere in Balkan affairs. 
This expression of opinion shows a considerable miscalcu- 
lation as to the real intentions of Russia in the mind of 
the German Ambassador. On the other hand, the view 
of the Russian Ambassador in Vienna about the desire 
of Austria to precipitate war between herself and Servia was 
borne out by subsequent events. 

GERMANY 

During the day the Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Herr Jagow, and the British Charge d' Affaires had 
a conversation together,^ in which the former expressed 
the opinion that Russia would remain quiet so long as 
Austria did not annex territory. 

He did not apparently see any danger in the event of 
Austria taking steps to assail the independent sovereignty 
of Servia and reducing her to a vassal State. This, indeed, 
Austria might easily do, while at the same time leaving 
her territorial integrity intact. 

But the Under Secretary would only say 3 that he had 
passed on to Vienna Sir Edward Grey's hope that Austria 
would take a favourable view of the Servian reply. 

The German Chancellor meanwhile telegraphed to the 
German Ambassadors in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, 
expressing the view that Austria sought no territorial aggran- 
disement at the expense of Servia. 

To the London Embassy he wired 4 that Germany was 
working to localize the conflict and preserve peace, and 
he asked England to use her influence for moderation in 
St. Petersburg. 

To the Paris Embassy he said 5 that on Russia rested the 

' White Paper 32. ' Ibid. 33. 3 ibid. 34. 

< Denkschrift, Exhibit 10. s Ibid., Exhibit lOA. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 31 

responsibility of avoiding war, and he hoped that France 
would influence St. Petersburg for moderation. 

To the St. Petersburg Embassy he expressed "^ the hope that 
Russia would take no steps to endanger the peace of Europe. 

The Kaiser returned suddenly from his cruise in the 
Baltic on the night of this day. He reached Potsdam 
early on the morning of the following (July 27th). 



RUSSIA 

At St. Petersburg on the 26th the Foreign Minister, 
M. Sazonof, had a long conversation 2 with the Austrian 
Ambassador, Count Szapary, in which the former pointed 
out that whilst some of the Austrian demands were reason- 
able, others were impossible for Servia to accept as a whole. 
He suggested that England and Italy should co-operate 
with Austria to allay the present situation. This new 
proposal was in effect that France and Germany should 
fall out of the mediation scheme, and that the good offices 
of two Powers only, England and Italy, should be used. 

Why Italy should have been specially selected is not 
quite clear, but some light is thrown on this move on the 
part of Russia in a passage in the Orange Book.3 Accord- 
ing to this source M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian 
Ambassador in Rome asking him to say that Russia would 
not be indifferent in an Austro-Servian dispute, and that 
Italy could play an important role by remaining neutral. 
This seems to mean that Russia was attempting to detach 
Italy from the Triple Alliance, and then use her as a 
mediator along with England. 

The above interview between M. Sazonof and Count 
Szapary is also reported in a telegram 4 to Sir Edward Grey 
from Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who had heard of it from the 
Russian Ambassador in Vienna. It is described there as very 
satisfactory. M. Sazonof, it says, had agreed that much of 
the Note was reasonable, and that he had practically come 
to terms with Count Szapary about its form. 

' Denkschrift, Exhibit lOB. " White Paper 44. 

3 Orange Book 23. " White Paper 56. 



32 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

This is also confirmed in a telegram ^ from the German 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Pourtales, to the 
German Chancellor. He refers here to the reassuring 
impression which this interview made both on M. Sazonof 
and the Austrian Ambassador. The Russian Foreign 
Minister is described as having been obviously calmed by 
Count Szapary's assurance that Austria had no plan of 
aggrandisement. 

This interview is also described in the Orange Book 
in a telegram 2 from M. Sazonof to the Russian Minister in 
Austria. The Russian Foreign Minister said that he pointed 
out the impossibility for Servia to accept some of the 
Austrian demands. On the other hand he thought that on 
other points a basis of agreement could be found, provided 
that Servian subjects' complicity in the murder were estab- 
lished. He concluded by proposing that conversations and 
exchanges of views between himself and the Austrian 
Ambassador should continue. 

Meanwhile, in Russia military preparations were about to 
be taken. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Russia, July 26th.) 
A degree of special protection also was issued to-day, and 
mobilization warnings were sent to all the frontier districts. 



FRANCE 

Through the Orange Book 3 we learn that in Paris on the 
26th the German Ambassador, acting under the instructions 
he had received from Berlin earlier in the day, again ex- 
plained the attitude of Germany. (See also Germany, July 
26th, Denkschrift, Exhibit lOA.) 

He said that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement, 
and did not threaten Servia ; that on Russia rested the 
responsibility for war, and he hoped that France would 
influence St. Petersburg for moderation. Germany, he 
added, could not influence Austria in a purely Austro- 
Servian dispute. 

' Denkschrift, Exhibit 5. ' Orange Book 25. 3 Ibid. 28. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 33 

ENGLAND 

On the 26th Sir Edward Grey made a fresh proposal == 
for the settlement of the crisis which had arisen. He 
asked the Ambassadors in France, Germany, and Italy, 
if their Governments would agree to allow them to meet 
in London in a conference and together with him discuss 
an issue which would prevent complications. This was a 
modification of his proposal on the 25th. (See Germany, 
July 25th and White Paper 18.) Instead of working directly 
through the Ambassadors in Vienna and St. Petersburg, 
as was first suggested, it was proposed to constitute a 
circle of Ambassadors in London who might propound 
some scheme or formula which might then be submitted 
to the different Governments concerned. The object was 
the same in both cases, but the method of procedure 
different. 

To this proposal the Italian reply ^ was already made on 
the 26th, accepting the principle of an ambassadorial con- 
ference in London. 

July 27 

AUSTRIA 

The morning of the 27th in Vienna commences with an 
expression of opinion 3 by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who said, 
in a talk with some of his diplomatic colleagues, that Austria 
appeared to him to be determined on war. 

This was followed by an interview between the Russian 
Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. According to the English White Paper 4 the 
Russian Ambassador said that if Austria attacked Servia 
the quarrel could not be localized. The Under Secretary, 
however, retorted that Servia had herself attacked Austria. 
The Russian Ambassador then said that Russia would hold 
Servia back, and referred to the conversation which was 
held on the previous day between M. Sazonof and Count 
Szapary in St. Petersburg. He urged that the latter should 
be given full powers to continue these conversations. 
' White Paper 36. » Ibid. 35. 3 Ibid. 41. * Ibid. 56. 

4 



34 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

This conversation between the Russian Ambassador in 
Vienna and the Austrian Under Secretary is reported also 
from a Russian source. ^ The Russian Ambassador, in 
reporting the conversation to his chief in St. Petersburg, 
states that the Austrian demands had caused an unfavourable 
impression in Russia, and might give rise to grave complica- 
tions. For this Germany, he thought, was responsible, 
having instigated Austria to send the Note and stiffen her 
back. This is the first occasion on which Germany is 
accused of deliberately intriguing to upset the status quo 
in the Balkans, No evidence, however, of this is forth- 
coming, at any rate at this stage. 

On the same day as the above the Austrian Government 
issued an othcial communique in which they declared that 
the Servian reply was neither satisfactory nor honest ; that 
Servia refused to allow Austrian officials to assist in the 
investigations for the suppression of the forces hostile 
to Austria within her kingdom ; it refers also to Servian 
mobilization, and declares that Servia never intended to 
conciliate Austria. 

GERMANY 

On the morning of the 27th the British Ambassador, Sir 
Edward Goschen, and the Under Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, Herr Jagow,^ had a conversation, in which Sir Edward 
Grey's Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in London 
was discussed. (See England, July 26th, White Paper 36.) 
Herr Jagow said that such a conference practically amounted 
to a court of arbitration and could not be called together 
except at the request of Austria and Russia. He said he 
had heard from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof wished for 
an exchange of views between himself and Count Berch- 
told, and thought that this w^as a better proposal than Sir 
Edward Grey's. 

This attitude of Herr Jagow's is confirmed from Russian 
sources,3 where in the Orange Book the Russian Ambas- 
sador in Berlin informed M. Sazonof in a telegram that 

^ Orange Book 41. = White Paper 43. 

3 Orange Book 38. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 35 

the German Government approves of the proposal that 
Austrian and Russian representatives in St. Petersburg 
should negotiate to find a settlement of Austria's demands. 

In another telegram ^ to M. Sazonof the Russian Am- 
bassador in Berlin described how the French Ambassador 
pressed Herr Jagow to accept Sir Edward Grey's Four 
Power Ambassadorial Conference, with the provision that 
Austria should abstain meanwhile from all acts which 
prejudiced the status quo. Herr Jagow, however, again 
refused, although the French Ambassador pointed out that 
the proposal had the advantage of combining the two 
groups of Powers into which Europe was divided, thereby 
forming the nucleus of a concert. But on this point 
Germany was quite obdurate. She still refused to recognize 
Russia's right to interest herself in the affairs of Servia. 

The same attitude is reflected in a communication 2 from 
the German Chancellor to the German Ambassador in 
London, in which he said that Germany could not 
bring her ally before a European tribunal, and that her 
action must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian 
conflict. 

In a later wire,3 however, the Chancellor said that he had 
started active intervention in Vienna in the sense desired 
by Sir Edward Grey, and had communicated to Count 
Berchtold the desire of M. Sazonof to exchange views with 
the Austrian representative in St. Petersburg. 

Germany's attitude was therefore clear. She would not 
accept the Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in London 
because she thought it would be derogatory to Austria's 
dignity, but she thought that direct conversations between 
Vienna and St. Petersburg were most likely to lead to 
fruitful results. In this sense she acted through her repre- 
sentatives in Vienna. That she had sincerely pacific 
intentions is also confirmed by the Press correspondents in 
Berlin for this same day. The Times, Manchester Guardian, 
and Daily Chronicle correspondents all agree that Germany 
was working for peace and putting pressure on Austria.4 

' Orange Book 39. ' Denkschrift, Exhibit 12. 

3 Ibid., Exhibit 15. * Press Correspondence (vii), (viii), (ix). 



36 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

The Times even goes so far as to say that " Germany is 
certainly and no doubt sincerely working for peace," and 
that she will "give as good advice in Vienna as France is 
giving in St. Petersburg." 

An interesting sidelight is thrown upon the proceedings 
in Berlin relating to the Four Power Ambassadorial Con- 
ference in a telegram ^ from the Belgian Minister in Berlin 
to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 27th. In 
describing the Four Power proposal of Sir Edward Grey it 
remarks that Germany has not yet answered and that the 
" Emperor is to decide." 

RUSSIA 

In an interview ^ to-day between M. Sazonof and Sir 
George Buchanan, the former again suggested that England 
should declare solidarity with Russia and France. Sir 
George Buchanan, however, held to his previous position, 
and said that he did not think the cause of peace would 
be promoted by England taking this action. In this 
attitude he had been confirmed by Sir Edward Grey on the 
previous day. (See Russia, July 24th and White Paper 24.) 
The British Ambassador also added that he hoped Russia 
would not mobilize or let her troops cross the frontier 
just yet. 

In a second telegram 3 Sir George Buchanan informed 
Sir Edward Grey of a suggestion by M. Sazonof that the 
modification proposed to be introduced into the Austrian 
Note should be the subject of negotiation between Vienna 
and St. Petersburg. 

In yet a third telegram 4 to-day Sir George Buchanan 
described the German Ambassador as holding that these 
direct exchanges of views between the two capitals would 
probably be agreeable to Austria- Hungary. The British 
Ambassador went on to say that M. Sazonof had promised 
to use all influence to make Servia go as far as possible 
in the satisfaction of Austria's demands, and that he was 
ready to stand aside and allow the four Powers to mediate 
in conference if they preferred it. 

' Belgian Grey Book 6. " White Paper 44, 

3 Ibid. 45. ' Ibid. 55. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 37 

On the same day M. Sazonof sent to the Russian 
Ambassador in London a formal acceptance ^ of Sir Edward 
Grey's Four Power Ambassadorial Conference, which he 
was prepared to fall back on in case his direct conver- 
sations with the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg did 
not come to anything. He had begun these conversations 
already, but had not yet received the reply of the Austrian 
Government about his proposal to revise the Austrian Note. 

Like Germany, therefore, Russia preferred direct con- 
versation between Vienna and St. Petersburg, but, unlike 
her, she was ready to agree to a Four Power Ambassadorial 
Conference in London, if the former method failed. 

Meanwhile the Tsar telegraphed a reply ^ to the Crown 
Prince of Servia, saying that he was mindful of Servia's 
misfortune and was trying to help her ; he hoped Servia 
would do nothing to impair her integrity, or cause a fresh 
war, but said that if this failed Russia would not be in- 
different to the fate of Servia. 



FRANCE 

In a telegram 3 to-day to Sir Edward Grey, Sir Francis 
Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, said that France 
had formally accepted Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a 
Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in London. 

On the same day M. Bienvenu-Martin communicated 
the contents of a Note 4 to Sir Francis Bertie, expressing the 
willingness of the French Government to support this con- 
ference, and stating that the French representatives in St. 
Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade had been instructed to 
induce the Governments of these countries to abstain from 
active military operations, pending the result of the con- 
ference. 

The Russian Charge d' Affaires also informed 5 his Govern- 
ment that his German colleague in Paris absolutely refused 
to consider the possibility of a conference, but added 
that Austria had no desire for more territory. Germany 

' White Paper 53, Orange Book 32. 

' Orange Book 40. 3 White Paper 42. 

'' Ibid. 51, and enclosure. s Orange Book 35. 



38 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

and France, he said, should use influence on Russia 
not to interfere in the Austro-Servian dispute. The German 
Ambassador in Paris, it will be observed, said nothing 
about the possibility of mediation by the four Powers in St. 
Petersburg and Vienna, although, as we see above (Germany, 
July 27th) this had been agreed to by his Government in 
Berlin, who thereby had sanctioned one method of media- 
tion between Austria and Russia. 

This attitude of the German Ambassador in Paris was 
to-day the subject of a further telegram ^ from the Russian 
Ambassador to M. Sazonof. In it he described the German 
Ambassador as deliberately aiming to sever the partners of 
the Dual Alliance by making France put pressure on 
Russia. This, he said, would compromise Russia in the 
eyes of France, take the responsibility for the crisis off 
Germany, and put it on Russia. According to this view, 
therefore, any attempt to use France to influence Russia for 
peace was tantamount to aiming at the Dual Alliance, a 
somewhat cynical admission on the part of the Russian 
representative in Paris. 

ENGLAND 

Early in the morning the British Admiralty issued orders 
that the fleet at Portland should not be dispersed.^ England 
thereby acted with Russia, who began her preparations 
to-day. The German fleet, however, was not concentrated 
till the 28th. (See Chapter on Mobilizations.) 

During the morning Sir Edward Grey saw Prince 
Lichnowsky,3 who told him that the German Government 
accepted the principle of Four Power mediation between 
Austria and Russia. This is not quite in keeping with 
the statement made by Herr Jagow in Berlin on the 
same day (see Germany, July 27th), when the latter could 
only suggest direct conversations between St. Petersburg 
and Vienna as a means of settling the dispute. Prince 
Lichnowsky also added that he had been instructed to 
ask Sir Edward Grey to use influence in St. Petersburg 

' Orange Book 35, = See English Press for July 27th. 

3 White Paper 46, Orange Book 42. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 39 

to keep the war localized. Sir Edward Grey answered that 
Servia had gone to the utmost limit of concession, and that 
was due to Russia's influence. Influence, he said, was 
needed more at Vienna, and that should be exercised by 
Germany. 

On the same morning Sir Edward Grey also had an 
interview ^ with the Russian Ambassador, who told him 
there was an impression in Austrian and German circles 
that England would stand aside in all circumstances. Sir 
Edward Grey pointed out that this idea should be dispelled 
by the orders to the British fleet not to disperse, but at 
the same time he added this must not be taken as meaning 
anything more than diplomatic action. He said that he 
had heard from Austrian and German sources that Russia 
would take no action, if Austria agreed not to take Servian 
territory. In this case England would not be more Servian 
than Russia. 

In the afternoon Sir Edward Grey saw Count Mensdorflf,^ 
who gave him the official Austrian reasons for the use of 
force against Servia. Sir Edward Grey told him that 
Servia's reply had gone to the utmost limits of concession. 
The Austrian Ambassador, however, replied that Servia 
had not yielded on the one essential point, namely, the 
co-operation of Austrian officials and police in the execu- 
tion of her demands. Sir Edward Grey then said that 
it looked as if Austria thought she could go to war with 
Servia without involving Russia, and pointed out how 
serious this was to Europe, adding as a warning that the 
British fleet was not to be dispersed. 

Meanwhile the Italian Ambassador saw Sir Arthur 
Nicolson at the Foreign Office,3 and expressed the 
approval of his Government of the proposal for a Four 
Power Conference. 

That afternoon Sir Edward Grey, speaking in the House 
of Commons, related how he had proposed Four Power 
mediation in St. Petersburg and Vienna after the issue of 
the Austrian Note.4 

' White Paper 47, » Ibid. 48. 3 jbid, 49. 

* See Parliamentary Speeches (e). 



40 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

July 28 

AUSTRIA 

The 28th of July began dramatically by the Austrian 
declaration of war on Servia. This action, which lit the 
European powder magazine, was announced in the Austrian 
Official Gazette for that day, and was followed by a mani- 
festo of the Austrian Emperor to his people. 

During the morning Sir Maurice de Bunsen had an 
interview ^ with Count Berchtold, in which the latter said 
that Austria could not delay her warlike operations and 
would refuse now to negotiate on the basis of the Servian 
reply. 

In the special dispatch 2 of Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
relating to this interview Count Berchtold is said to have 
remarked that he had never had any faith in the Balkan 
settlement of 1913. This remark shows clearly what vi^as in 
the mind of Austrian statesmen at that time. 

Later in the day the Russian Ambassador in Vienna told 
Sir Maurice de Bunsen 3 that Austria had declined Russia's 
suggestion for discussing the Servian question at St. Peters- 
burg, and that all avenues for negotiation were, for the time 
at least, closed. 

From German sources we also have the same story, and 
in the Denkschrift4 it is stated that on this day Count 
Berchtold, thanking Sir Edward Grey for his proposal to 
extend the time limit, regretted that he had to decline it, as 
it had come too late. 

In a telegrams from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff 
an interview is described between the Russian Ambassador 
and Count Berchtold, in which the former proposed the 
initiation of conversations between Vienna and St. Peters- 
burg. These were, however, declined. 

Austria, therefore, after temporizing for a day, had 
hardened her heart and had refused to listen either to 
reason from St. Petersburg or advice, such as it was, from 
Berlin. 

' White Paper 6i and 62. = Cd. 7596. 3 White Paper 74. 

4 Denkschrift, Exhibit 16. s White Paper 93, Enclosure No. i. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 41 

To-day we have reports that Austria was mobihzing 
eight army corps. It is not certain whether mobiHzation 
actually began on the 28th, but it is certain that by that 
day it was in full swing. (See Chapter on Mobilization, 
Austria.) 

GERMANY 

On the morning of the 28th the English, French, and 
Italian Ambassadors were discussing ^ Herr Jagow's reply 
of the previous day to Sir Edward Grey's Four Power 
proposal. It was the general opinion of the Ambassadors 
that if he was sincere he would only object to the form 
of the proposal, and that he might be induced to suggest 
the lines along which mediation should work. 

Some time in the morning the Austrian Ambassador told 2 
the British Ambassador that Russia neither wanted war 
nor was in a position to make war, indicating thereby that 
in the opinion of this official Austria's action was not 
likely to lead to serious consequences. 

Later in the day the British Ambassador and the German 
Chancellor had a conversation 3 together, in which the 
latter emphasized his desire to work with Sir Edward Grey 
for peace. He repeated that he could not accept the Four 
Power mediation scheme if it were like an " Areopagus " 
before which he would have to bring Austria. He said 
he was doing his best both in Vienna and St. Petersburg, 
and had great hopes of a good result. 

He had, however, news of a Russian mobilization, which 
he said was serious and would hamper his operations. He 
was evidently referring here to the partial Russian mobiliza- 
tion which was begun in Russia about this time. (See 
Chapter on Mobilization, Russia.) 

In a telegram 4 to Count Pourtales in St. Petersburg the 
German Chancellor repeated again that he was putting 
pressure on Vienna. 

Meanwhile the Kaiser, who was beginning to take an 
active part in the crisis, telegraphed 5 to the Tsar, saying 

' White Paper 60. = Ibid. 71. 3 ibid. 71. 

* Denkschrift, Exhibit 14. Ibid., Exhibit 20. 



42 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

that he was trying to induce Austria to come to an 
understanding with Russia. 

At this point the information of the Press correspondents 
in Paris and Berlin is interesting, for they bear out to some 
extent the action which Germany was said to have taken 
in Vienna on this day. 

Thus the Times correspondent in BerHn of this day 
wires ^ that "it is reasonable to hope that Germany is doing 
more than she can afford to admit." 

The Times correspondent in Paris says^ that "he has 
reason to believe that Germany has given more proof of 
desire for peace than has been known to the French." 

The Manchester Guardian correspondent in Berlin also 
says that Sir Edward Grey's proposal " is determined only 
by fear that it is unworkable." 

The Matin correspondent in Berlin also says " Germany 
does not want war ; she has refused Sir Edward Grey's 
proposal because she could not take her ally before a 
European tribunal, but she is anxious for mediation of other 
Powers." 

However stupid Germany may have been not to have 
accepted the conference, there is no reason to doubt the 
evidence of official documents and of the Times correspon- 
dent in Berlin that she was working for mediation, though 
in a different form from that proposed by Sir Edward 
Grey. 

FRANCE 

Early in the day the German Ambassador saw M. 
Bienvenu-Martin,3 and said that Austria would respect 
Servian integrity, but he would not give a guarantee about 
her sovereignty. 

In the afternoon Sir Francis Bertie saw M. Bienvenu- 

Martin.4 The latter, referring to the conversation between 

Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky (White Paper 46), 

said that it would have a good effect for peace. He also 

agreed that Sir Edward Grey could not declare complete 

solidarity with Russia. 

' Press Correspondence (xii). ' Ibid. (xiii). 

3 White Paper 59. * Ibid. 58 and 59. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 43 

ENGLAND 

The only record of diplomatic activity in London on the 
28th are two telegrams ^ from Sir Edward Grey to Sir 
Edward Goschen, saying that he approved of direct nego- 
tiations between St. Petersburg and Vienna, and thought 
that the best method of procedure. He proposed, however, 
that Germany should suggest lines along which mediation 
of the four Powers between Austria and Russia should 
proceed, to run parallel with the direct conversations 
between the capitals. 

July 29 

BELGIUM 
According to a letter 2 from the Belgian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers abroad, the Belgian 
army on this day was placed upon an advanced peace 
footing. 

AUSTRIA 

On the 29th hostilities had begun on the Danube, and 
Austria stood thus committed to a policy of force. 

The British, French, and Italian Ambassadors, who met 
in conversation 3 during the day, agreed that no steps could 
now be taken to stop the war with Servia. 

The Italian Ambassador, however, thought that Russia 
might be induced to stay quiet if Austria would agree not 
to attack Servian independence and integrity. 

Meanwhile news arrived 4 of Russia's partial mobiliza- 
tion, conveyed by the Russian Ambassador to the British 
Ambassador. 

The German Ambassador, who also interviewed the 
Russian Ambassador,s affected surprise that Russia should 
take such an interest in Servia. He added, however, that 
if the proper proposals were put forward Germany might 
consent to act with the other Powers. 

According to M. Sazonof^ it appears that the Russian 

' White Paper 67 and 68. ' Belgian Grey Book 8. 

3 White Paper 79. ■* Ibid. 94 ; also Chapter on Mobilization, Russia. 

s White Paper 94. ^ Orange Book 50. 



44 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Ambassador had been told by the Austrian Government 
that there could be no more exchange of views between 
Austria and Russia. 

GERMANY 

On the morning of the 29th the Crown Prince returned 
to Berlin from Zorpat, where he had been staying. About 
this time activity in military circles in Berlin began to be 
manifested. In this connection the remark of the Times 
correspondent in Berlin of this date is significant. " The 
development of military opinion," he says, " which is now 
making itself felt, may be difficult to control." ^ 

Disturbing news had come from Russia about mobili- 
zation in that country, and was affecting the equanimity 
of diplomatic circles in Berlin. This was remarked upon 
by Sir Edward Goschen when he visited Herr Jagow in the 
morning.2 Referring to the Austrian attitude the Under 
Secretary said that care was needed in pressing Austria 
too openly, or else she might only hasten to present a 
fait accompli before anything could be done to stop her. 

This remark of Herr Jagow is confirmed in a passage 
in the Russian Orange Book,3 in which Herr Jagow tells 
the Russian Ambassador in Berlin that " it is extremely 
difficult to put pressure on Vienna openly," and that " if 
too strong pressure were put upon Austria she might 
hasten to set before Germany a fait accompli." It is 
reasonable to suppose that this was one of the difficulties 
which confronted Germany in making her opinion felt 
in Vienna. 

Sir Edward Goschen also saw the Chancellor during the 
morning,4 and the latter said he had told the Austrian 
Government that if she had no territorial designs on Servia 
and sought only guarantees, she should " speak openly " in 
this sense. 

During the afternoon a War Council was held at Potsdam. 

On returning from this Council the Chancellor asked 
the British Ambassador to come and see him.s He began 

' Press Correspondence (xv), * While Paper 76. 

s Orange Book 51. * White Paper 75. s ibid, 85. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 45 

by saying that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany might, 
under her treaty of aUiance, become involved. This, 
according to the Austro-German Treaty, brought on 
Germany a serious HabiHty which was referred to above. 
(See Historical Introduction.) 

Seeing the danger ahead, therefore, the Chancellor in this 
interview with Sir Edward Goschen sounded him to see if 
England would remain neutral in the event of such a war. 
He said he understood that Great Britain would not allow 
France to be crushed, but Germany, he said, did not aim at 
this. If Great Britain remained neutral Germany would 
give an assurance that she aimed at no territorial gain at 
the expense of France in Europe. He would not, however, 
on being questioned, give a similar undertaking about the 
French Colonies. He added, however, that Germany would 
respect Dutch neutrality, but he could not give a definite 
assurance about Belgium, as that must depend upon the 
action of France. 

According to a telegram ^ on the following day, the 30th, 
from Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, the 
Chancellor also stated at this interview that he had had 
no time yet to reply to Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that 
Germany should formulate a new Four Power mediation 
scheme. He added that he was "pressing the button " as 
hard as he could in Vienna, and indeed was afraid he 
might, as a result, have caused Austria to precipitate 
matters (cf. above). 

At 6.30 p.m. the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar ^ saying 
that he could not share the Tsar's view that the action of 
Austria was shameful. Austria could not trust Servia's 
pledges and must have guarantees, but had no territorial 
ambitions. He added that he was working for an under- 
standing between Vienna and St. Petersburg. 

The situation at Berlin to-day, therefore, appeared to be as 
follows : Germany was much affected by Russia's partial 
mobilization, and the military party in Berlin was 
thereby rendered more powerful. The attempt to sound 
England as to her neutrality was no doubt the consequence 

' White Paper 107. ' Denkschrift, Exhibit 22, and Russia, July 29th. 



46 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

of this situation, which had been accentuated by Germany's 
commitments to Austria under the terms of her treaty with 
that country. While all this time Germany was putting 
pressure of a sort on Austria to come to terms with Russia, 
she does not seem to have made any definite suggestion as 
to the practical method by which mediation of the four 
Powers should proceed. 

RUSSIA 

The first event of importance in St. Petersburg on the 
29th was the issue of orders for partial mobilization. A 
meeting of the Council of Ministers under the presidency of 
the Tsar also took place. The attitude of Austria and her 
refusal to listen to Russia's suggestion for negotiation over 
her demands on Servia was the reason given for this step.^ 

According, however, to a statement ^ of the Chief of the 
Russian General Stafif to the German Military Attache in 
St. Petersburg, no reservists had been called on up to 3 p.m. 
The Military Attache doubted this, however, and said that 
he had evidence that mobilization was going on even in 
Vilna and Warsaw, on the German frontier. 

Apparently on the morning of the 29th M. Sazonof saw 
Sir George Buchanan,3 and said that on the suggestion of 
Count Pourtales he had again proposed exchange of views 
with Austria, but the proposal had been refused. He said 
that he was ready to return to Sir Edward Grey's Four 
Power Conference, or, if thought desirable, that the Ambas- 
sadors of three disinterested Powers together with the 
Austrian Ambassador should exchange views with him. 
He added that he would agree to anything which was 
agreed upon by the four Powers, // it was acceptable to 
Servia. This last condition, depending upon the willing- 
ness of Servia, was a subtle piece of diplomacy, for it was 
clear that Servia would do nothing without the wish of 
Russia, and therefore, for all practical purposes, Servia was 
Russia. 

Meanwhile M. Sazonof had telegraphed to the Russian 

' Chapter on Mobilization, Russia. 

» Denkschrift, Exhibit 10. 3 White Paper 78. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 47 

Ambassador in London describing an interview i with 
Count Pourtales on this day, in which the latter said that 
Germany was continuing to exercise influence at Vienna 
and would continue to do so even after the declaration of 
war on Servia. He said he favoured direct negotiations 
between Austria and Russia. M. Sazonof replied that he 
preferred parallel discussions to be carried on, on the one 
hand by a conference of the four Powers — Germany, 
France, England, and Italy — and on the other hand by 
a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia, on the same lines as occurred in the crisis of 
191 2. According to a telegram 2 on the following day 
(the 30th) from Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, 
Count Pourtales is described as having told M. Sazonof at 
this same interview that Germany was willing to guarantee 
that the integrity of Servia should be observed by Austria. 
This, so far as we know, is the only occasion on which this 
offer was made. 

From German sources 3 it is also stated that at this inter- 
view Count Pourtales told M. Sazonof how hard it was to 
influence Austria, now that Russia had begun to mobilize. 

From Russian sources,4 however, it appears that the 
German Ambassador went a good deal further, for accord- 
ing to this account he asked M. Sazonof if Russia would 
cease military preparations. The latter answered that 
Russia could not do this, since Austria w^ould not agree 
to a pacific settlement. Indeed, M. Sazonof added that 
Russia intended to hasten military preparations and re- 
garded war as inevitable. 

During the afternoon the Tsar wired to the Kaiser 5 
declaring that a shameful war had been opened by Austria 
on Servia, and urged the Kaiser to restrain his ally. This 
telegram was replied to by the Kaiser. (See Germany, 
July 29th.) 

Russia's action on the 29th, therefore, shows that she was 
determined to make Austria deal with her in her dispute 

' White Paper 93 (2), ^ Ibid. 97. 3 Denkschrift, Exhibit 10. 

* Orange Book 58. s Denkschrift, Exhibit 21. 



48 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

with Servia. In attaining this object she was evidently 
relying to some extent on the assistance of France and 
England. The former was certain to support her, but the 
latter was still doubtful. The report of Renter's corre- 
spondent in St, Petersburg on this day shows how 
England's support was valued.^ "Confident of England's 
support," he says, "about which doubts have mostly dis- 
appeared, the Russian public is prepared to accept war." 
It is possible that Russia decided upon her military step 
on the 29th, after being assured privately of this support. 
On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey, although he may 
morally have supported Russia in her military measures 
against Austria, had not made his position clear to 
Germany, who was doubtless under the impression at this 
time that, even if England would not remain neutral under 
all circumstances, she would not at any rate back Russia 
unconditionally in her interference over Servia. 

FRANCE 

There are two incidents to be recorded in France on 
the 29th. 

The German Ambassador, on the order of the German 
Chancellor, warned France about military preparations 
which he declared she was making. 

The Russian Ambassador in France also reported to 
M. Sazonof an interview 2 between the French Premier and 
the German Ambassador, in which the latter said that the 
words "conference or arbitration" in any mediation pro- 
posal frightened Austria. 

ENGLAND 

The Austrian Ambassador in London to-day reflected 
the unyielding attitude of his Government in an interview 
with Sir Edward Grey.3 The Ambassador presented a 
Memorandum from his Government detailing the Austrian 
case against Servia. Sir Edward Grey said that he was 
concerned about the peace of Europe, and remarked that 

' See Press Correspondence (xxiii). 

=" Orange Book 55. ^ White Paper 81 and 91. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 49 

Austria might attack the independence of Servia while 
at the same time respecting her territorial integrity. 

Later Sir Edward Grey saw M. Cambon ^ and told him 
how grave the situation was, and informed him what he 
proposed to say to the German Ambassador that afternoon. 
He warned M. Cambon that England would have to act 
in her own interests ; that the British public saw the 
case differently from the Morocco case ; that even if 
Germany and France were involved in a war the British 
Government had not yet made up its mind. 

In the afternoon Sir Edward Grey saw the German 
Ambassador.2 After speaking of the general situation he 
said privately to him that he must not be misled into 
thinking that England would stand aside under all 
circumstances. He said that he did not wish to threaten, 
but that if British interests became involved they would 
have to intervene rapidly. He also added 3 that Russia 
could not be expected to stand aside whilst Austria com- 
pletely humiliated Servia. 

The Italian Ambassador also called on Sir Edward Grey 
during the day 4 and ofBcially told him that his Government 
suggested that Germany should propose some new method 
of mediation. 

Sir Edward Grey's attitude to-day therefore appears 
obscure. He did not object to Russia interfering in Servia 
and thereby making the Austro-Servian dispute a European 
one. At the same time he would not say openly whether 
he would support Russia in the ensuing quarrel, although 
the Renter's message from St. Petersburg on this day sug- 
gests that Russia had received an intimation privately of 
what England would really do. Meanwhile Sir Edward 
Grey told the French Ambassador officially that England 
would not bind herself to support France, and had not 
made up her mind, while he told the German Ambassador 
that if France were involved England might be drawn in 
and therefore might have to be reckoned with. England's 

' White Paper 87. ' Ibid. 88 and 89. 

3 Ibid. 90. "• Ibid. 92. 



50 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

attitude, viewed through German eyes, is fairly clearly 
explained by the correspondent of the Westminster Gazette 
in Berlin. " England's position," he wired on the 29th, 
"would be made clearer by a statement whether, in case 
localization is foiled by a Russian attack on Austria, 
England would refrain from supporting Russia and France. 
Technically, at least, localization or spread depends on 
Russia alone, and the British Government, it is argued here, 
can influence Russia's decision by making British policy 
plain." 

Sir Edward Grey did not do this. He did not say, at 
any rate openly, that he would back Russia under all cir- 
cumstances ; nor did he say that he would remain neutral 
under all circumstances. Nor did he define clearly the 
conditions under which England would be drawn in, or 
at what point the question became a matter of British 
"interest." 

ITALY 

Two telegrams ^ from Sir Rennell Rodd in Rome reflect 
the attitude of the Italian Government. They suggest 
that Germany should be asked to propose a method for 
exchange of views and thus keep the door open to a 
settlement. 

July 30 

AUSTRIA 

By this time Austria began to show signs of listening to 
reason, frightened as she no doubt was by the Russian partial 
mobilization. 

At an earlier stage in the day Sir Maurice de Bunsen met 
the Russian Ambassador ^ and expressed the hope that 
Austria would understand the meaning of Russia's mobili- 
zation, namely, that Russia must be consulted over the fate 
of Servia. Meanwhile news arrived that Germany was 
making more serious efforts to press Austria to come to 
terms than she had done hitherto. Thus the French 
Ambassador heard from Berlin 2 that the German Ambassador 
» White Paper 80 and 86. ' Ibid. 95. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 51 

in Vienna had been instructed to "speak seriously to the 
Austrian Government about acting in a manner calculated 
to provoke a European war." Sir Maurice de Bunsen, 
however, remarked that M. Tschirscky was so identified with 
anti-Slav propaganda that he doubted whether he would 
plead the cause of moderation seriously. 

Indeed, it cannot be denied that the personality of the 
German Ambassador in Vienna and his reluctance to obey 
his Government was one of the main difficulties of efifecting 
an Austro-Russian understanding. 

The pressure which Germany began to put on Austria 
to-day is further confirmed by the communication given 
by the German Foreign Office to the correspondent of the 
Westminster Gazette in Berlin to-day.^ That remarkable 
document, which was printed in the Westminster Gazette 
for August 2nd, showed that Germany went to the farthest 
limit that she could to put pressure upon Austria without 
breaking her alliance. "The refusal of Austria," it said, 
"to exchange views with Russia was a great mistake, and 
Germany would refuse to be drawn into a world conflagra- 
tion because Austria would not listen to Germany's advice." 

The authenticity of this communication was challenged 
by Sir Valentine Chirol in a letter to the Westminster 
Gazette on Friday, September 18, 19 14, in which he stated, 
without producing evidence, that this document was pur- 
posely falsified and had never been sent to Vienna at all. 

It is rather remarkable, however, that in a passage in the 
English White Paper No. 95 (quoted above) the British 
Ambassador in Vienna relates having heard from the 
French Ambassador — a quite independent source — that 
the German Ambassador in Vienna has been instructed 
" to speak seriously to the Austrian Government against 
aoting in a manner calculated to provoke a European 
war." This statement, coupled with the communique of 
the German Government published in the Westminster 
Gazette, may certainly be regarded as two independent 
sources of evidence both pointing in the same direction. 

The Russian Ambassador meanwhile had an interview 
' See Documents (a). 



52 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

with Count Berchtold during the morning of the 3oth,i and 
the result was communicated to Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
and the French Ambassador during the afternoon. At 
this interview Count Berchtold's attitude was described as 
quite friendly, a fact which showed that he had considerably 
changed his attitude from that which he had taken up on 
the previous day. He said he saw no objection to com- 
mencing conversations at St. Petersburg between Austria 
and Germany. These conversations, it will be remembered, 
had been discontinued since the outbreak of war with 
Servia. Count Berchtold, however, would not say if these 
conversations would be upon the basis of the Servian reply. 

Again, from German sources ^ it is described how on the 
30th the German Government forwarded to Vienna the 
English proposal which was to serve as a basis of negotia- 
tion, namely that Austria should dictate her conditions in 
Servia after she had occupied Belgrade. 

In a telegram from Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward 
Grey 3 on the same day there is further evidence of German 
pressure on Vienna. In this the German Chancellor is 
described as having sent to-day a message " begging 
Austria" to reply to the English proposal of this day (30th). 
(See England, July 30th, and White Paper 103.) Count 
Berchtold, according to this account, replied that he 
would see the Austrian Emperor that morning and consult 
with him. 

All this cumulative evidence, therefore, shows that, possibly 
as the result of Russia's partial mobilization and possibly 
from fear of England not maintaining an attitude of strict 
neutrality, as had been intimated by Sir Edward Grey's 
statement to Prince Lichnofsky (see England, July 29th, 
and White Paper 88 and 89), the diplomats at Berlin 
had apparently realized the dangers of the situation and 
were making desperate efforts to make their ally come 
to terms with Russia. 

Their efforts, moreover, had some prospects of success, 
for Austria undoubtedly at this time began to show signs 

' White Paper 96, * Denkschrift, Exhibit 11. 

3 White Paper 112. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 53 

of becoming reasonable. Sir Maurice de Bunsen's special 
dispatch,! moreover, shows in one passage how, in spite 
of Russia's partial mobilization, Austria was willing on the 
30th to start direct conversations with St. Petersburg. 

The hopes of the diplomats, however, were blighted by 
the unexpected military developments which so speedily 
followed in Russia. 

GERMANY 

An account of Germany's pressure on Austria is also 
given from Berlin to-day.2 Herr Jagow, in an interview with 
Sir Edward Goschen, said that after Prince Lichnowsky's 
last wire containing an account of his conversation with Sir 
Edward Grey on the 29th (see White Paper 89) he had 
asked Austria if she was willing to " accept mediation on 
the basis of the occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade, 
or some other point, and issue her conditions from there." 
He had at that time (morning) received no reply, but he 
added that he feared the partial mobilization of Russia had 
complicated matters. He said he regretted Sir Edward 
Grey's warning about the possibility that England would 
participate in a war, but he appreciated the frankness. To 
the French Ambassador Herr Jagow also used similar 
language,3 sajdng that Germany had asked Austria direct 
what condition would satisfy them, but added that he had 
not yet got a reply. 

The only contradictory evidence of this comes from the 
Russian Orange Book,4 where in a telegram from the Russian 
Ambassador in Berlin the latter was described as having 
said that Russia's proposal (see Russia, July 30th, and White 
Paper 97) for mediation in the Austro-Servian dispute under 
certain conditions would be inacceptable to Austria. 

Meanwhile the Kaiser wired again to the Tsar 5 that 
Russian mobilization impeded his efforts at Vienna, and 
Prince Heinrich wired King George asking him to use his 
influence on Russia and to secure the neutrality of Russia 
and France. 

' Cd. 7596. => White Paper 98. 3 ibid. 107. 

* Orange Book 63. s Denkschrift, Exhibit 23. 



54 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

The Press correspondents also to-day reflect the attitude 
of Germany in the following manner. The Times corre- 
spondent in Berlin ^ says that " with the exception of the 
military journals, which are beginning to clamour for 
German measures, and of the Clerical Press, which is purely 
Austrian in tone, there is a strong demand for real activity 
on behalf of peace." 

Renter's agent in London 2 also learns on the 30th that 
Germany is working for peace ; " she cannot altogether 
control her ally, but she is giving good advice in Vienna." 

There are strong grounds for believing that Germany was 
exerting herself for moderation and peace in Vienna on 
July 30th. Unfortunately, the diplomats who had the situa- 
tion in hand on that day appeared to have lost control of it 
on the 31st, when, owing to causes which we find in the 
next section, the military party got the upper hand. 

RUSSIA 

Early in the morning (2 a.m.) of the 30th the German 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg saw M. Sazonof.3 The 
situation then was very serious. Russia's partial mobiliza- 
tion on the 29th had upset Germany's nerves, and showed 
her that if war was to be averted she must bestir herself at 
once in Vienna. Count Pourtales did not know what his 
Government in Berlin were going to do by way of pressing 
Austria. He seems to have assumed that war was already 
inevitable, and to have completely broken down in the 
presence of M. Sazonof. He implored the Foreign 
Minister to give him some suggestion to telegraph to 
his Government. Thereupon M. Sazonof dictated to him 
the following formula : — 

" If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has 
assumed a character of European interest, declares herself 
ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate 
the principle of Servian sovereignty, Russia engages to stop 
all military preparations." 

This, according to the Russian Orange Book,4 was 

' Press Correspondence (xix). * Ibid. (xxi). 

3 White Paper 97. ^ Orange Book 60. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 55 

telegraphed to Berlin, and the attitude of the German 
Government awaited with anxiety. Austria's answer to 
that suggestion did not come that day, and Germany, as 
we have seen (Germany, July 30th), was engaged for the 
greater part of the day in urging Austria to come to terms 
at once with Russia, Austria, as we see, was beginning to 
unbend (see Austria, July 30th), and had instructed her 
representative in St. Petersburg to discuss the matter direct 
with M. Sazonof. 

But how did Russia treat the situation ? Sir George 
Buchanan, at the end of his telegram to Sir Edward 
Grey,^ declared that preparations for a Russian mobili- 
zation were to be proceeded with at once, if the 
above proposal was rejected by Austria. He also said that 
Germany was " arming " and hinted that Russia would have 
to convert partial into general mobilization. What Sir 
George Buchanan referred to when he said " that Germany 
was arming" is not clear. It is certain that there was no 
general calling up of reservists in Germany at that time. It 
is shown elsewhere that nothing more than ordinary mili- 
tary precautions were going on on this day in Germany, as 
there were in all other countries at this time. (See General 
Mobilization, Germany.) 

But Russia did not wait for an answer to the proposal 
handed to the German Ambassador early on the morning 
of the 30th, as quoted above. M. Sazonof must have 
known also that Austria had agreed to commence conversa- 
tions again in St. Petersburg. (See Austria, July 30th, and 
White Paper 96.) But in spite of both these facts a general 
mobilization was ordered in St. Petersburg late on this 
night (the 30th). 

This fact is recorded by the Times correspondent in St. 
Petersburg, who wires on the 31st that "the Government 
decided on the general mobilization late last night." (See 
Chapter on Mobilization, Russia.) There is no evidence 
given in any official paper or in any of the telegrams of 
Press correspondents, so far as we are aware, that Austria's 
reply to Russia's suggestion, made early that morning (see 

' White Paper 97. 



56 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

above and White Paper 97), had been given, nor is there 
any evidence that Austria had stiffened her back or had 
gone back on her promise that she would discuss with 
St. Petersburg again. Indeed, all the evidence is to the 
contrary. 

There are two other points to be noted on the 30th in 
St. Petersburg. 

At I p.m. the Tsar wired to the Kaiser ^ saying that 
Russia's mobilization could not be stopped now because 
it had been decided upon five days ago, and that these 
measures undertaken then were now coming into operation. 
He thereby admitted that Russia had been making a partial 
mobilization of her forces as far back as July 25th. 

An interview also took place during the day between the 
Military Attache at the German Embassy and Prince 
Trubetskoy,2 in which the former said that Russia would 
be responsible if there was a general war. 



FRANCE 

In Paris to-day Sir Francis Bertie and M. Poincare had 
an interview,3 in which the latter said that Germany had 
warned Russia to stop her mobilization, otherwise Germany 
would herself mobilize. Later this was modified into a 
request to be told under what conditions she would stop 
mobilization. The answer given was contained in White 
Paper 97 (see Russia, July 30th), describing the interview 
between Count Pourtales and M. Sazonof. The French 
President, thinking that Austria and Germany would not 
agree to the suggestion produced at this interview, and 
feeling the danger of a general conflagration nearer at hand, 
asked England to say now unconditionally that she would 
come down on the side of Russia and France. But Sir 
Francis Bertie said that it would be difficult for England to 
do this. 

A Cabinet meeting took place during the afternoon and 
lasted two hours. 

" Denkschrift, Exhibit 23 (a). " Ibid., Exhibit 18. 

3 White Paper 99. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 57 

ENGLAND 

During the morning of this day Prince Lichnowsky had 
an interview with Sir Edward Grey.^ Presumably he had 
heard of the suggestion of Russia that she would demobilize 
under certain conditions. He then told Sir Edward Grey 
that Germany would try to make Austria promise not to 
go beyond Belgrade provided that meantime the Powers 
v/nuld examine how Servia could satisfy Austria's demands. 
Sir Edward Grey appeared to regard this as a relief to 
the situation, and telegraphed this statement of Prince 
Lichnowsky's to Sir George Buchanan, saying that he hoped 
that Russia would consent to disarm and suspend all 
further military operations provided that other Powers 
did the same. 

Instead of doing this, however, Russia declared a general 
mobilization. (See Russia, July 30th.) 

Sir Edward Grey also saw the Russian Ambassador, 
Benckendorff, about this time, and reported the result of 
his conversation in this same telegram to Sir George 
Buchanan. The Russian Ambassador had communicated 
to him the suggestion in White Paper 97. (See Russia, 
July 30th.) Sir Edward Grey slightly modified the formula 
in order to make it more explanatory, apparently with the 
Russian Ambassador's consent. In its modified form it 
was returned to St. Petersburg, and ran as follows : — 

" If the Austrian advance is stopped at Belgrade the 
Powers will examine how Servia can satisfy Austria without 
impairing her sovereignty rights and independence." 

The difference between this and the first formula is that 
the Powers are specially mentioned as arbitrators to decide 
upon those points concerning the sovereignty and indepen- 
dence of Servia. 

It appears, therefore, that as far as the representatives of 
Germany and Russia in London were concerned on the 
30th, a basis had already been found which might have led 
to an understanding. 

Another important interview also took place in London 

' White Paper 103. 



58 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

on the 30th between Sir Edward Grey and M. Cambon.i 
The latter reminded him of his letter of November 19 12, 
in which Sir Edward Grey agreed that if either England 
or France were the subject of an unprovoked attack, they 
would at once consult how they might take measures in 
common. M. Cambon asked how England would act if 
Germany attacked France now. He added that the aggres- 
sion might take the form of a demand to cease military 
preparations or a demand that France should remain neutral 
in the event of a Russo-German war. 

France, he said, would do neither. He thereby admitted 
that France would support Russia in this crisis and that 
Russia's quarrel was unconditionally her quarrel. Sir 
Edward Grey did not give ^n answer to these questions 
of the French Ambassador. He merely said that the 
British Government had not made up its mind and that 
a Cabinet meeting was shortly to be held at which it would 
be discussed. 

On this day also Sir Edward Grey replied by wire to Sir 
Edward Goschen to the German Chancellor's bid ^ for 
England's neutrality.3 He indignantly rejected the sugges- 
tion that England should remain neutral under the condi- 
tions laid down by the Chancellor. He said that England 
could not under any circumstances allow French Colonies 
to be taken, for France without Colonies would be sub- 
servient to Germany. According to Sir Edward Grey, the 
refusal of the German Chancellor to unconditionally 
guarantee the integrity of the whole French Empire under 
all circumstances, even on the supposition that France 
might be the aggressor, was to be regarded as a disgraceful 
attempt to bribe the British Empire to stand aside. Yet he 
had just told M. Cambon (see above, and White Paper 105) 
that he could not give an undertaking to support France 
and Russia, and that he had not made up his mind what 
to do. Sir Edward Grey went on to say that he could not 
bargain away obligations to Belgium. England, he said, must 

' White Paper 105. 

"^ See Germany, July 29th, and White Paper 85. 

3 White Paper loi and 102. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 59 

preserve full freedom of action as circumstances required. 
He then pressed Germany to combine with England to 
preserve the peace of Europe, and forecasted a future 
European arrangement to which Germany would be a 
party if the present crisis passed. 

Sir Edward Grey on this occasion at any rate had con- 
ceived an idea. He hoped to enlarge the present grouping 
of the Powers, so that Germany should associate with 
Powers other than the Teutonic ones. How he proposed 
to do so he did not say, but the group system had become 
so stereotyped in European politics that it obviously stood 
in the way of a settlement along these lines. Therefore, 
while Sir Edward Grey intimated to the French Ambas- 
sador that we were not in alliance to assist her under all 
circumstances (White Paper 105), he told the German 
Ambassador a few hours later (White Paper loi) that we 
should not remain neutral under all circumstances, and that 
we regarded ourselves as the protectors and guarantors of 
the French Colonies. 

What the "circumstance" was which would decide our 
neutrality or our intervention he did not, at least openly, 
disclose either to France or to Germany on July 30th. 

July 31 

AUSTRIA 

The outlook again to-day in Vienna was hopeful. Sir 
Maurice de Bunsen in his special dispatch ' refers to 
the fact that Austria and Russia were fast approaching 
an understanding in St. Petersburg. 

Some time during the day the Under Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs saw Sir Maurice de Bunsen '^ and told 
him that direct conversations were proceeding at St. Peters- 
burg between the Austrian Ambassador and M. Sazonof, 
and he hoped that a general war might be " staved off " 
by these efforts. Sir Maurice expressed a fear that 
Germany would mobilize, to which the Under Secretary 

' Cd. 7596. " White Paper 118. 



6o THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

replied that Germany must do something to "secure her 
position." He admitted that Austria was mobihzing on 
the Russian frontier as well as on the Servian frontier, 
but said that this was only in reply to Russia's general 
mobilization and was not aggressive. 

This conversation was reported later in the day to 
the Russian Ambassador by Sir Maurice de Bunsen.^ The 
former had seen Count Berchtold, who had begged him 
to remove the impression in St. Petersburg that the " door 
had been banged by Austria on all further conversations." 
Count Berchtold denied that Austria had broken off 
negotiations with Russia, and added that Austria wanted 
neither the " infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the 
acqnisition of Servian territory." 

This attitude of Count Berchtold is confirmed in the 
Russian Orange Book,^ where, in a telegram from the 
Russian Ambassador in Vienna to M. Sazonof, Count 
Berchtold is described as insisting that Austria had " no 
aggressive intention against Russia and no desire for 
conquest over Servia" ; she only desires to give Servia 
a lesson and to obtain " guarantees for the future." 

Although the Russian Orange Book says nothing about 
the infraction of Servian sovereign rights, the evidence 
accumulated in the White Paper and in Sir Maurice de 
Bunsen's dispatch 3 shows clearly that on the 31st Austria 
was ready to consider the excision from the terms of 
her demands of everything that endangered Servian inde- 
pendence. The Figaro for October 5th is also interesting.4 

GERMANY 

Berlin was in the meantime in a state of great alarm at 
the Russian general mobilization, and on this day the 
internal struggle, going on between the diplomats and the 
military party, reached its height. 

The German Chancellor saw Sir Edward Goschen in the 
mornings and told him that Russian mobilization made it 
difficult to put pressure on Vienna, but added that he was 

' White Paper 137. " Russian Orange Book 66. 3 Cd. 7596. 

4 See Addenda to Diary, p. 93. s White Paper 108. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 6i 

still very active there, indeed "perhaps almost more active 
than was altogether palatable to the Ballplatz." (See 
Austria, July 30th, White Paper 95, and Documents (a).) 

The Chancellor then had an audience with the Kaiser. 

After the audience he again received Sir Edward Goschen,i 
who informed him of Sir Edward Grey's reply to his pro- 
posal that England should remain neutral. (See England, 
July 30th, and White Paper loi.) The Chancellor was, 
however, so taken up with the news from the Russian 
frontier that he hardly noticed the reply, and asked that it 
should be left for his consideration. 

Later he informed the British Ambassador 2 that the 
German Government had received news of the complete 
mobilization of Russia, which ''put an end to hopes of a 
peaceful solution of the crisis." This news indeed proved 
to be fully correct. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Russia.) 
Sir Edward Grey then asked the Chancellor if he. could 
still put pressure on Austria. The Chancellor replied that 
last night (30th) he had " begged Austria to reply to the 
last proposal " from England. (See July 30th, Austria and 
Germany; White Paper 95,98, and 112, and Denkschrift, 
Exhibit 11). As a result he had heard that Count Berch- 
told was consulting with the Austrian Emperor to-day. 

With regard to the neutrality of Belgium, the Chancellor 
said apparently at this same interview 3 that he would have 
to know what the French intended to do before he could 
give an answer to England's request that they would respect 
the neutrality of Belgium. 

Sir Edward Goschen also had a talk with Jagow during 
the day,4 and urged him to accept Sir Edward Grey's 
proposal. (See England, July 31, and White Paper iii.) 
Jagow said it was impossible to consider any proposal until 
Russia's reply about her mobilization, but he added that 
the Emperor and the Chancellor had been " urging Austria 
to show willingness to continue discussions." (See above 
and White Paper 112.) But, he added, Russia's mobili- 
zation has spoilt everything. 

' White Paper 109. = Ibid. 112. 

3 Ibid. 122. * Ibid. 121. 



62 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

At 2 p.m. " Kriegzustand " was proclaimed in Berlin. 
This is a military state preceding mobilization, which, 
however, does not necessarily mean mobilization. It was 
evident that about this time military opinion in Berlin was 
beginning to overpower the Foreign Office. 

The Kaiser meanwhile had telegraphed to King George^ 
to say that a Russian general mobilization had forced him 
to take precautionary measures. The Kaiser also addressed 
a crowd of people from the Palace window that after- 
noon. 

The German Emperor also sent a telegram at 2 p.m.^ to 
the Tsar, declaring that all responsibility now rested on 
Russia. Feehng in Berlin was now rising to fever heat, and 
by evening the military element had practically got control 
of the situation. 

RUSSIA 

Meanwhile events in St. Petersburg were becoming very 
obscure and confusing. 

In a telegram from Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward 
Grey,3 the general mobilization of the Russian army was an- 
nounced, thereby proving the truth of the assertions which 
were current in Berlin on the same day. The reasons given 
by the Russian Government to Sir George Buchanan were, 
firstly, that Austria was moving troops against Russia, and, 
secondly, that Austria was " determined not to yield to the 
intervention of the Powers." With regard to the first 
accusation against Austria, it should be noted that nothing 
is said about an Austrian general mobilization. It is 
assumed that it was necessary to order a general mobiliza- 
tion only because Austria had replied to Russia's partial 
mobilization of the 29th by moving troops towards the 
Russian frontier. Russia, it should be noted, does not say 
that Austria had proceeded to a general mobilization, nor 
is there any direct evidence that she had done so. (See 
Chapter on Mobilization, Austria.) If Austria had done 
so, it is highly probable that Russia would have used this 

' Documents (d). ' Dcnkschrift, p. 124. 

3 White Paper 113. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 63 

as an excuse when stating the reasons for her general 
mobilization. 

With regard to the second point, there is no evidence that 
Austria had refused, or, for that matter, had even had time 
to reply to, Russia's suggestion of the previous day. (See 
White Paper 97.) This, it will be remembered (see White 
Paper 103, and England, July 30th), had been modified by 
Sir Edward Grey in London on the 30th. It was then 
returned to St. Petersburg, where on the 31st M. Sazonof 
put it into its final form and communicated it to the French 
and German Ambassadors. This formula ^ combined the 
first formula of M. Sazonof with that of Sir Edward Grey 
and ran as follows : — 

" If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops 
in Servia, and if, recognizing that the dispute between her 
and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, 
she will allow the Powers to look into the matter and 
determine whether Servia can satisfy the Austrian Govern- 
ment without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or 
her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain a 
waiting attitude." 

It should be noted that there is no suggestion here, as in 
the first formula, that Russia should demobilize, but only 
that she should maintain a "waiting attitude." Something 
had evidently happened in the meantime. Russia, in fact, 
without waiting for the result of the conversation, already 
producing excellent results (see Cd. 7596), without waiting 
for the modified formula to be fully considered by the 
Vienna Cabinet, had ordered a general mobilization of 
her whole army and navy. This, then, seems to account 
for the omission of any reference to the arrest of Russian 
military preparations, which is apparent in this final 
formula. It, moreover, fully accounts for the stampede of 
public opinion in Berlin. 

So far, indeed, from any summary rejection by Austria of 

the Russian proposal, it appears from M. Sazonof himself 

that while all this was going on, the Austrian Ambassador 

in St. Petersburg was holding conversations with him and 

' White Paper 120, Orange Book 67. 



64 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

had declared the "readiness of his Government to discuss 
the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia." In 
other words, he was ready to discuss with M. Sazonof what 
points in the Austrian Note could be so modified as to 
make it harmonize with Russia's view. The Russian 
Foreign Minister, however, although he expressed his satis- 
faction at this ofTer, " said that it was desirable that the 
discussions should take place in London with the participa- 
tion of the Great Powers." Thus it appears that at this 
moment when Russia had chosen to mobilize, Austria was 
willing to submit the whole of her demands on Servia to 
the consideration of Russia. The above conversation of 
the Austrian Ambassador with M. Sazonof is recorded in a 
telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen. 
The former heard of it through the Prussian Embassy in 
London on the following day, August ist, and the Russian 
Embassv had heard of it in a telegram from M. Sazonof 
dated July 31st. This important telegram, although quoted 
at length in the English White Paper,i is not to be found in 
the Russian Orange Book, the Russian Government having 
apparently suppressed it. 

The relations now between Russia and Germany were 
becoming more strained than they were between Austria and 
Russia. (See Sir Maurice de Bunsen's dispatch, Cd. 7596.) 
The latter, as we see above, were on a fair way to settling 
their dispute. The cause of the Russian general mobiliza- 
tion, therefore, remains a mystery, and cannot be explained 
unless it can be shown that news of an Austrian general 
mobilization had come to hand. Even then one would 
have expected that Russia would have waited for the results 
of her negotiations with Austria, which were now fast 
approaching a solution, and would have held her hand until 
the joint Anglo-Russian suggestion, which also had the 
consent of Germany, had had time to be considered by 
the Vienna Cabinet. But military exigencies had triumphed 
in St. Petersburg on the 30th just as they were triumphing 
in Berlin on the 31st. At 2 p.m. the Tsar telegraphed to 
the Kaiser that he could not stop his mobilization now, but 
he promised to take no provocative action. 
' White Paper 133. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 65 

But Germany, as we saw above, was panic-struck with 
the idea of Russia's mobihzation on the East Prussian 
frontier, and at midnight to-night the fatal step was taken 
of demanding the demobilization of the Russian army 
within twelve hours, in default of which Germany would 
herself mobilize.^ This was delivered by Count Pourtalesto 
M. Sazonof. This ultimatum was almost as rash as Russia's 
determination to mobilize, and the shortness of the time 
limit given by Germany to Russia was as bad as the refusal 
of Russia to wait for the results of the mediation between 
Vienna and St. Petersburg. 

FRANCE 

On the evening of this day the German Ambassador saw 
the French Premier 2 and told him that an ultimatum was 
to be addressed to Russia demanding demobilization. He 
was instructed also to ask what would be the attitude of the 
French Government under these circumstances. 

The British Ambassador was informed of this step at 
7 o'clock that evening, and at 10.30 he again met the Pre- 
mier, who said that he would consult about the question 
of Belgian neutrality with his colleagues, and meanwhile 
asked what the attitude of England would be to Germany's 
demand on Russia.3 

Later, Sir Francis Bertie reported to Sir Edward Grey 4 
the reply of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 
question of Belgian neutrality. He said that France would 
respect the neutrality of Belgium provided that another 
Power did not violate it. In the latter case, however, she 
would be compelled to act otherwise in defence. 

According to M. Hanotaux, in an article in Le Figaro 
for October 5, 1914, on this day (July 31st) the Austrian 
Ambassador in Paris stated the intentions of his Govern- 
ment to open up a second phase of the negotiations with 
Russia. Accordingly he took steps similar to those taken 
by Count Szapary in St. Petersburg.s 

' White Paper 141 ; Denkschrift, Exhibit 24 ; Orange Book 70. 

= White Paper 117 ; Denkschrift, Exhibit 25. 

3 White Paper 117 and 124. " Ibid. 125. 

5 See Addenda to Diary of Negotiations, p. 93, July 31st, France. 

6 



66 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

ENGLAND 

In a telegram to-day from Sir Edward Grey to Sir 
George Buchanan,^ the former describes an interview 
between himself and Prince Lichnowsky, who said that, 
at the instance of Germany, "a conversation had taken 
place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and the Russian Ambassador." He then asked Sir 
Edward Grey to ask Russia to cease her mobilization, but 
Sir Edward Grey replied that he could not do this if 
Austria would not agree to limit the " advance of her troops 
into Servia." 

This point about the Austrian advance into Servia was 
at this moment the subject of discussion between the 
Austrian Ambassador and M. Sazonof in St. Petersburg ; 
the formula had been agreed upon (see White Paper 120 
and Orange Book 67), and Austria had expressed her 
willingness to consider it. (See White Paper 133.) Sir 
Edward Grey, however, told Prince Lichnowsky that he 
could not see his way to urge Russia to suspend her 
military preparations. He did, however, tell Sir George 
Buchanan in this same telegram that "if Russia objected 
to Austria mobilizing eight army corps, it might be pointed 
out that this was not too great a number against 400,000 
Servians." Whether Sir George Buchanan pressed this 
point on Russia we do not hear, but it is the only 
evidence we have of any suggestion to Russia on the part 
of Sir Edward Grey that she might relax her military efforts 
without danger. 

Incidentally this last remark of Sir Edward Grey is also 
interesting, as showing that he at any rate was not aware 
of any Austrian general mobilization on July 31st. He 
speaks as if, so far as he knew, Austria had only mobilized 
eight army corps. This information is corroborated else- 
where. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Austria.) 

In this same interview with the German Ambassador, Sir 
Edward Grey made another proposal to him.^ He said 
that he would undertake to sound St. Petersburg whether 

' White Paper no. ' Ibid. in. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 67 

it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to 
offer Austria that they would undertake to see that she 
obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, 
provided that she did not impair Servian sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. He promised that if Germany would 
support this at Vienna, he would tell Russia and France 
that they would be unreasonable if they did not accept it, 
and would not be responsible for the consequences. This 
was the boldest move that Sir Edward Gray made du' ing the 
crisis. He threatened, in fact, to refuse to support the Dual 
Alliance, in spite of the naval understanding which he 
had with France, and which was shortly to be brought 
before the British Parliament. If he had taken this line 
before the military parties in Berlin and St. Petersburg had 
got the upper hand, it is conceivable that it might have 
been of some use in the preservation of the peace of Europe. 
It was obviously useless twelve hours after Russia had 
ordered the general mobilization of all her forces and 
Berlin was in a panic. 

Meanwhile the French Ambassador had seen Sir 
Arthur Nicolson at the Foreign Office,^ and had told 
him that the French Ambassador in Berlin had 
informed his Government that England's undecisive 
attitude was causing Germany to stiffen her back. He 
appealed, in fact, for a definite statement of England's 
position. 

Shortly after this a Cabinet meeting took place, at which 
the attitude of England was discussed. After the meeting 
Sir Edward Grey saw the French Ambassador, and told 
him that he still could not define England's position at 
present. He added that he could not pledge Parliament 
in advance, and that no British treaties or obligations were 
at the moment involved. At the same time he denied that 
he had left Germany in the dark as to what England's 
attitude would be. He had told the German Ambassador, 
he said, that if France and Germany became involved 
England would be drawn in, but at the same time he did 
not call this a definite pledge. 

' White Paper 119. 



68 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

He then referred casually to the question of Belgian 
neutrality, " which might be, he would not say decisive, but 
an important factor in determining England's attitude." 
He added that he was proposing to raise the question of 
Belgian neutrality at once, and to obtain guarantees from 
France and Germany about it. 

Thus it would appear that Sir Edward Grey, as far as he 
had made up his mind on the 31st, would still not 
commit England to unconditional support of France, 
but, nevertheless, he would not tell Germany under what 
conditions England would remain neutral. 

The question of Belgian neutrality, moreover, was, in 
spite of the imminence of war between Russia, France, and 
Germany, a matter of comparatively secondary importance 
in his mind. 

BELGIUM 

On the same day the French Minister at Brussels told 
the Belgian Foreign Minister ^ that there would be no 
incursion of French troops into Belgium, even if important 
forces should be massed on its frontier. The Government 
of the Republic, it added, will respect the neutrality of 
Belgium, and will only modify its attitude if another Power 
should not respect it. 

The Secretary-General of the Belgian Foreign Office 
then held an important conversation with the German 
Minister at Brussels.^ The former referred the German 
Minister to an assurance given in 191 1, when the question 
of Dutch fortifications on the Scheldt was under con- 
sideration, that in the event of a Franco-German war, 
Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. The 
German Chancellor had given similar assurances, and in 
19 1 3 the German Foreign Secretary had made like state- 
ments before the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. 
The German Minister said that " the sentiments expressed 
at that time had not changed." 

Mobilization of the Belgian army ordered. 3 

' Belgian Grey Book 9. " Ibid. 12. 3 ibid. 10. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 69 

August i 

AUSTRIA 

On August ist, according to the English White Paper,i 
the orders for the general mobilization of the Austrian 
army were issued. The confusion of dates that arises out 
of this announcement compared with that in Sir M. de 
Bunsen's dispatch (Cd. 7596) is discussed in the special 
Chapter on Mobilization (Austria). 

Sir Maurice de Bunsen and the Russian Ambassador 
met and discussed the situation during the day.^ The 
latter reported the German ultimatum to Russia the day 
before, and said that war was now practically certain. 
Russia's mobilization, he said, was in reply to Germany's 
military preparations, and the tension between Russia and 
Germany was much greater than between Russia and 
Austria. Russia, however, would even now, he said, be 
satisfied by assurances about the integrity and indepen- 
dence of Servia, The Russian Ambassador finally accused 
Germany of having worked for war from the first. 

It will be noticed that the Russian Ambassador did not 
excuse Russian mobilization on the grounds of an Austrian 
general mobilization, but on the grounds of German military 
preparations. This further confirms the supposition that 
Austria had not mobilized more than her eight army corps 
before August ist. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Austria.) 

GERMANY 

The detention of British shipping in Hamburg was the 
subject of conversation between Sir Edward Goschen and 
Herr Jagow to-day.3 The latter promised to see that the 
ships should be released. 

In a telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir George 
Buchanan 4 it transpires that Austria has already informed 
the German Government that she was ready to consider 
favourably Sir Edward Grey's proposals for mediation 

' White Paper 127. "= Ibid. 141. 

3 Ibid. 143. * Ibid. 135. 



70 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

between Austria and Servia. She made a reservation^ 
however, to the effect that Austrian military action against 
Servia should continue for the present, and that meanwhile 
the British Government should urge the Russian Govern- 
ment to stop the mobilization of her troops directed against 
Austria, in which case Austria would cease her defensive 
military preparations in Galicia. 

In the afternoon, orders for the general mobilization of 
the German army and navy were issued. ^ 

Sir Edward Grey meanwhile telegraphed to Berlin 2 
saying that the last formula (White Paper 120) accepted 
by Russia should afford a basis of negotiation offering still 
a chance of peace. He expressed the hope that no Great 
Power should commence warlike operations until that 
formula had been examined. 

Sir Edward Goschen then saw Herr Jagow,3 and urged 
him to restraint, saying that Germany was only drawn into 
this dispute as an ally of Austria. But Jagow said that it 
was impossible to take a calm view of the situation in 
view of Russia's mobilization ; for, as he pointed out, Ger- 
many's strategic position made it necessary for her to 
act at once, since while "she had the speed, Russia had 
the numbers." 

And so the German Government, with indescribable folly, 
refused to consider any more the proposals for mediation, 
in spite of the fact that Austria and Russia, the original 
authors of the quarrel, had by this time practically come 
to an understanding with each other. Regardless of this 
fact, and looking only to the Russian mobilization, which 
of course must be admitted to have been a grave danger 
to her, she took the fatal plunge and challenged Russia to 
war. Russia's wanton action, it is true, was a grave danger 
to Germany, since from a military standpoint Germany 
could not afford to allow Russia to have the start, and 
the military party in Berlin, making good use of this 
fact, overbore the diplomats and threw all other conditions 
aside. 

' White Paper 142. " Orange Book 71. 

3 White Paper 138. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 71 

Prince Lichnowsky had meanwhile telegraphed ^ to the 
German Chancellor saying that Sir Edward Grey had 
just that morning asked him by telephone whether, if 
France remained neutral in a Russo-German conflict, 
Germany would agree not to attack France. He said he 
thought he could assume the responsibility for accepting 
this, but wired to Berlin for confirmation, as is explained 
later. (See England, August ist.) 

The Kaiser thereupon wired to King George = that he 
understood England to guarantee the neutrality of France. 
In that case, he said, although he could not stop the 
mobilization of Germany, which was now in full swing, 
he would undertake not to attack France so long as 
France remained neutral. 

The Chancellor wired in the same sense 3 to Prince 
Lichnowsky. The above supposition that England would 
secure the neutrality of France was found to have rested 
upon a misunderstanding, as we see in King George's reply. 
(See England, August ist.) 

The Kaiser then wired to the Tsar 4 saying that he had 
shown yesterday how war could have been avoided, but 
still he asked the Tsar not to let his troops cross the 
frontier. 

RUSSIA 

The Austrian Ambassador and M. Sazonof were still 
holding conversations in St. Petersburg on the morning 
of the ist. This appears in a telegram on the morning 
of the ist from Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.s More- 
over, the negotiations for the terms of the Austrian Note 
were progressing satisfactorily. 

The Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, at the request 
of Count Berchtold, was also reported in the same telegram 
to have said that Austria desired neither " the infraction 
of Servian sovereignty nor the acquisition of Servian 
territory." Austria, he said, had not " banged the door " 
on all further conversations. 

' See Documents (Ii). " Ibid. (;). ^ ibid. (/). 

* Denkschrift, p. 126. s White Paper 137. 



72 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Indeed, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, in his special dispatch,^ 
not only explains that there was no break in the negotia- 
tions to-day, but says that by the ist of August he was 
informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last 
conceded the main point at issue, by announcing to 
M. Sazonof that Austria fvould consent to "submit to 
mediation those points in the Servian Note which were 
incompatible with the maintenance of Servian inde- 
pendence." 

On the other hand, in an interview with M. Sazonof, 
the French Ambassador, and Sir George Buchanan in St. 
Petersburg on the morning of the ist,^ the Russian Foreign 
Minister spoke of his conversation on the previous evening 
with the Austrian Ambassador, and said that the latter 
refused to discuss Austro-Servian relations. M. Sazonof 
spoke strongly against Austria and Germany, saying that 
the former had behaved immorally and the latter in a 
double-faced way ; that she would not put pressure upon 
Austria until too late, and that Russia could not endure 
the Austrian domination of Servia any more than England 
could endure German domination of Holland. 

These passages in Sir George Buchanan's telegram to 
Sir Edward Grey clearly conflict with the passages in Sir 
Maurice de Bunsen's special dispatch (Cd, 7596) and White 
Paper 137, in which it clearly states that the previous day 
Count Berchtold had instructed the Austrian Ambassador 
in St. Petersburg to " remove the wholly erroneous im- 
pression that the door had been banged by Austria-Hungary 
on all further conversations, and that neither the infraction 
of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian 
territory was contemplated by Austria-Hungary." 

It is difhcult, therefore, to reconcile the statements in 
White Paper 137 with those in White Paper 139 and 
Cd. 7596. 

Later in the day the Tsar wired the Kaiser,3 saying that 

he understood Germany must mobilize. He asked for a 

guarantee that this did not mean war, and said he would 

take no provocative action while negotiations continued. 

' Cd. 7596. = White Paper 139. ^ Denkschrift, p. 125. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 73 

In the afternoon of this day Russian troops were reported, 
but only from a German source/ to have crossed the 
frontier into Germany. 

At 7.10 p.m. Count Pourtales met M. Sazonof, and after 
a dramatic interview, handed to him on behalf of his 
Government a formal declaration of war on Russia.^ 



FRANCE 

On the morning of August ist the German Ambassador 
and the French Premier had a conversation,3 in which the 
latter said he could not understand the threatening com- 
munication of the previous day (July 31st), in view of the 
fact that, as he said, " Russia and Austria were still ready to 
converse." The German Ambassador did not demand his 
passports at this interview, but said that he had packed up. 

Sir Francis Bertie also had an interview during the morn- 
ing with the French President,4 who said that Germany 
was trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility for this 
impasse. He justified Russia's general mobilization by 
saying that it took place after Austria's general mobilization. 
(For this confusing statement, see White Paper 127 and 
113, and also Chapter on Mobilization (Austria).) The 
President also added that Germany, under cover of pre- 
cautionary measures, was really mobilizing, and that German 
troops were already in French territory. 

At 3.40 p.m. general mobilization of the French army 
took place.5 The French War Minister saw the British 
Military Attache and told him that under cover of martial 
law Germany had called up six classes of reservists, and 
added that three of these classes sufficed to bring the 
covering troops on the frontier up to the full strength. 
The French forces on the frontier, he said, had now 
opposed to them eight German army corps on a war 
footing. A zone of 10 kilometres was left by French and 
German troops on the frontier. (See Chapter on Mobiliza- 
tion, France.) 

' Denkschrift, p. 126. = Orange Book 76. 3 White Paper 126. 
" White Paper 134. s ibid. 136. 



74 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Meanwhile, the Austrian Ambassador saw the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs ^ and explained to him the 
Austrian attitude. There was, he said, " no intention in 
the minds of the Austro- Hungarian Government to impair 
the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain aggrandizement." 
There was, he also said, " no truth in the report which had 
been pubhshed in Paris to the effect that Austria- Hungary 
intended to occupy the Sanjak." This statement in Paris 
corresponds to a similar one made in St. Petersburg on the 
same day to M. Sazonof by the Austrian Ambassador. (See 
Russia, August ist, and White Paper 137.) 

Confirmation of Austria's conciliatory attitude to-day is 
also obtained from purely Russian sources.^ "Austria," 
said the Russian Ambassador in France to M. Sazonof in 
the Russian Orange Book, " not only has no intention of 
destroying Servian territorial integrity, but is ready to 
discuss her quarrel with Servia with the other Powers." 

The only statement that conflicts with this, as I pointed 
out above, is Sir George Buchanan's telegram to Sir 
Edward Grey. (See Russia, July 29th, and White 
Paper 139.) 

The Russian Ambassador in Paris also to-day saw the 
French President,3 who told him again of Austria's wiUing- 
ness to respect not only the territorial integrity, but also the 
sovereign rights of Servia, 

ENGLAND 

At II a.m. on the morning of August ist Sir Edward 
Grey telephoned to Prince Lichnowsky and asked him a 
question. 

The German Ambassador appears to have thought that 
Sir Edward Grey wished to ascertain whether Germany 
would refrain from attacking France if France remained 
neutral in a Russo-German war.-* The German Ambassador 
said he thought he could take the responsibility upon 
himself and accept it. He therefore telegraphed at once 

' White Paper 137. '' Orange Book 73. 

3 Ibid. 75. ■♦ Documents (/?). 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 75 

what he thought to be Sir Edward Grey's proposal to the 
German Chancellor.^ 

The Kaiser thereupon telegraphed to King George 
accepting this offer. (See Germany, August ist, and Docu- 
ments (/■).) 

To this King George telegraphed a reply ^ correcting the 
misunderstanding, and pointing out that Sir Edward Grey 
had only referred to the " avoidance of hostilities between 
the French and German armies" while Austria and Russia 
came to an understanding. This topic was again the subject 
of conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward 
Grey at an interview later in the day. (See White Paper 123 
and Documents (/) (///) (n).) King George was evidently re- 
ferring to this and not to the conversation over the telephone. 

Apparently nothing was said at either conversation about 
the possibility of securing French neutrality in a Russo- 
German conflict. In an answer, however, to a question 
by Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons on 
August 28th,3 Sir Edward Grey threw some light on this 
misunderstanding. According to him, it was the German 
Ambassador who made the suggestion. Sir Edward Grey 
understood it to be that Germany might remain neutral in a 
war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to 
attack France if England would remain neutral and secure 
the neutrality of France. Sir Edward Grey said he thought 
it was possible to arrange this. He then explained that 
what the Ambassador really meant was that France should 
remain neutral in a Russo-German war. This is certainly 
what the German Ambassador had in his mind when he 
sent his first telegram on August ist to the German Chan- 
cellor. (See Documents (A).) Sir Edward Grey, however, 
continued, in his answer to Lord Robert Cecil, by saying 
that he could not promise to secure such a condition from 
France, because it was "in all probability incompatible with 
the terms of the P'ranco-Russian Alliance." 

Both from Sir Edward Grey's answer in the House of 
Commons and from King George's reply to the Kaiser, it is 

' Documents (h) ; see also Germany, August ist. 
* Ibid {k). 3 Documents (0). 



7^ THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

clear that England would not prevent France from taking 
part in a Russo-German conflict if France wished to do so. 
England, in fact, refused to discriminate between a quarrel 
which arose out of a purely Franco-German misunderstand- 
ing, and a quarrel in which France became involved with 
Germany on account of her engagements to Russia. That, 
it was felt, would destroy the Dual Alliance, and Great 
Britain was too heavily committed to the Dual Alliance by 
her moral obligations in the naval understanding to back 
out now. 

After he had telegraphed his message (Documents (A)) 
to the German Chancellor, based as it was on a misunder- 
standing. Prince Lichnowsky then had a very important 
interview with Sir Edward Grey. Previous to this he had 
again telegraphed to the German Chancellor ^ that he was 
going to discuss with Sir Edward Grey proposals for 
England's neutrality in the event of Germany being at 
war with France as well as with Russia. A large part of 
this conversation is reported in the White Paper in a 
telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen.^ 
Sir Edward Grey began by saying that he regretted the 
reply of the German Government with regard to Belgian 
neutrality. This reply was contained in White Paper 122. 
(See Germany, July 31st.) " If Germany," said Sir Edward 
Grey, "should see her way to give the same assurance as 
that which had been given by France, it would materially 
contribute to relieve the anxiety and tension here. On the 
other hand, if there was a violation of the neutrality of 
Belgium by one Government while the others respected it, 
it would be difficult to restrain public feeling in this 
country." It will be observed that Sir Edward Grey did 
not say that the violation of Belgian neutrality would be 
considered at once by the British Government to be a casus 
belli, but he did suggest to the German Chancellor that if it 
was violated public feeling in England might give the 
Government cause to intervene. Prince Lichnowsky then 
asked ''wheiJicr if Germany gave a promise not to violate 
Belgian neutrality ive {that is, England) ivonld engage to remain 

' Documents (/). - White Paper 123. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 77 

netitraL" Sir Edward Grey replied that he could not say. 
"All I could say," he added, "was that our attitude would be 
determined largely by public feeling here, and that the 
neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public 
opinion. I do not think we could give a promise of 
neutrality on that condition alone." 

Unable, therefore, to secure England's neutrality on con- 
dition that Germany should respect the neutrality of 
Belgium, Prince Lichnowsky then "pressed" Sir Edward 
Grey as to whether he could "formulate conditions in 
which we (England) would remain neutral." He even 
suggested that " the integrity of France and her Colonies 
might be guaranteed." But Sir Edward's reply was explicit. 
" I felt obliged," he said, " to refuse definitely any promise 
to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say 
that we must keep our hands free." 

The substance of this conversation also appears in the tele- 
gram from Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor 
describing this interview.' It was published in the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitiing for September 5th. It repeats 
exactly what Sir Edward Grey said about Belgian neutrality 
being a matter which affected public opinion in England, 
and describes how he refused to give a pledge that England 
would be neutral if Germany respected the neutrality of 
Belgium. There is added, however, a part of the conversa- 
tion which did not appear in the White Paper 123. 
According to Prince Lichnowsky, he asked Sir Edward Grey 
if it were possible to secure that in a Russo-German war 
France and Germany should stand opposed to each other 
armed but not attacking each other. He said that Germany 
neither wished to ruin France nor to conquer her territory, 
and that it seemed to him possible to arrange this, since it 
would secure Great Britain's neutrality. 

Sir Edward Grey, however, only said he would endeavour 
to obtain information, and seemed to see difficulties in the 
way of holding back the military authorities. 

At 8.30 p.m. Prince Lichnowsky telegraphed 2 back to the 
German Chancellor saying that " as no positive English 

' Documents (m). '.Ibid. («). 



78 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

proposals have been submitted, further steps in connection 
with the instructions given were superfluous." He there- 
upon cancelled his previous telegrams. 

This interesting interview was the subject of a question 
to Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on August 
27th by Mr. Keir Hardie,^ who asked whether these 
proposals and suggestions of the German Ambassador 
were considered by the Cabinet, and why they were 
rejected. 

Sir Edward Grey replied by saying, firstly, that they were 
" personal suggestions " made by the German Chancellor on 
August ist, and were "without authority" to alter the 
conditions of neutrality proposed on July 29th to Sir 
Edward Goschen at Berlin by the German Chancellor. 
(See Germany, July 29th, and White Paper 85.) Sir 
Edward Grey drew a distinction between " personal sugges- 
tions " made by the German Ambassador and official 
"communications on behalf of his Government." The 
German Ambassador, he said, spoke on his "own personal 
initiative without authority." This, according to Sir Edward 
Grey, was enough to warrant his refusal to consider them as 
practicable. They were not to be taken seriously because 
they were personally suggested by the German Ambassador. 
The only basis upon which Sir Edward Grey would discuss 
the question of Belgian neutrality with Germany was on 
the basis laid down in No. 85 of the White Paper. He 
categorically refused the basis personally suggested in 
No. 123. No. 85, it will be remembered, described the 
German Chancellor's statement to Sir Edward Goschen on 
July 29th (see Germany, July 29th), that Germany would 
respect the integrity of France but not her Colonies, if 
England remained neutral. The question of Belgmm here 
was left doubtful, indeed was scarcely mentioned, showing 
that it was not strong in the mind of either statesman at 
that time. 

Sir Edward Grey then went on to explain, in answer to 
Mr. Keir Hardie's question, that the substance of Prince 
Lichnowsky's suggestion in No. 123 was considered at a 

' Documents (/>). 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 79 

Cabinet meeting on the following day (Sunday, August 2nd). 
It is clear, however, that these personal suggestions were 
not accepted at this meeting, even if they were discussed, 
and the statement was simply made by Sir Edward Grey in 
answer to Mr. Keir Hardie that "respect for the neutrality 
of Belgium must be one of the conditions of English 
neutrality." Sir Edward Grey then went on to say that 
the German Ambassador requested him on the morning of 
August 3rd "not to make the neutrality of Belgium one 
of his conditions when he spoke in the House." 

Now this was two days after the personal suggestions con- 
tained in No. 123, and it seems, therefore, that the German 
Ambassador, failing to induce Sir Edward Grey to formu- 
late conditions of neutrality over Belgium, attempted to 
dissuade him from insisting upon this condition at all. 
Since he could only get an indefinite statement from Sir 
Edward Grey, viz. that respect for Belgian neutrality must 
be "one of" England's conditions, the German Ambas- 
sador then tried another tack. (See England, August 3rd, 
and statement issued by the German Embassy, Docu- 
ments (u).) He tried, in fact, to get England to agree 
to remain neutral if Germany respected the north coast of 
France. 

But it was now too late. The German military authori- 
ties had already laid their plans, and England had meanwhile 
been committed to the naval understanding with France. 
(See Sir Edward Grey's speech in the House of Commons, 
August 3rd.) 

It is obvious that this naval understanding with France 
goes a long way to explain why Sir Edward Grey could 
not accept a German offer to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium without further guarantees. (White Paper 123.) 
The existence of the moral obligation arising out of this 
naval understanding with France also explains why 
England could not guarantee to Germany that she would 
keep France out of a Russo-German conflict (see above, 
telegram of King George to the Kaiser.) ^ In both cases 
England's hands were tied. She was compelled to follow 
' Documents (k). 



8o THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the policy of the Dual Alliance, and could not give any 
guarantees to Germany about her neutrality without the 
consent of France and Russia. 

During August ist also Count Mensdorff had an interview 
with Sir Edward Grey, in which he informed him that 
Austria would respect the integrity and sovereignty of 
Servia. This confirmed what took place in St. Petersburg 
and Vienna on this day, namely, the virtual settlement of 
the Austro-Servian quarrel which had been the real cause 
of all the trouble in Europe. 



BELGIUM 

In an interview between Sir F. Villiers and the Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels to-day,^: the latter 
said that Belgium would uphold her neutrality, and felt 
herself in a position to do the same. 



ITALY 

The German Ambassador at Rome on August ist asked 
the Italian Government ^ what the intentions of Italy were 
in the impending war between the Dual and Triple 
Alliances. The Italian Foreign Minister replied that the 
war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences that 
might result from it, had an aggressive object. Both were 
therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character 
of the Triple Alliance, and Italy would therefore remain 
neutral. The casus foederis under the terms of the Triple 
Alliance would not arise. 



August 2 

The sands of peace were now fast running out. The 
fatal errors of the previous days committed by the 
Chancelleries of Europe were now beginning to bear 
fruit. 

' White Paper 128. - Ibid. 152. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 8i 

AUSTRIA 

By irony of fate, the countries over whom all the 
trouble had originally started, Austria and Russia, had by 
this time settled their grievances, and nothing more is 
recorded from Vienna till the declaration of war against 
Russia on August 5th, which was caused, not by any 
grievance against Russia, but because of her alliance with 
Germany.' 

GERMANY 

In Berlin Herr jagow saw Sir Edward Goschen,^ and 
informed him that Russian troops had crossed the frontier, 
thus causing a state of war between Russia and Germany. 
The Secretary of State also stated that the British ships 
detained on the Saturday had now been released. 

In the afternoon the Kaiser made a speech from the 
Palace at Berlin, declaring that Russia had attacked them, 
and praying for success. 

RUSSIA 

At St. Petersburg to-day the Tsar issued an Imperial 
Ukas giving his reasons for war, and declaring that 
Germany had attacked Russia.3 

St. Petersburg was now in a frenzy of excitement to 
know if England would join in with Russia. The telegram 
of the Times correspondent on this day is interesting.4 
" Truth," he says, " compels me to say that Russians, high 
and low, are waiting with the intensest anxiety to learn 
Great Britain's decision. The articles in the Times have 
done much to inspire hope, but if, contrary to reasonable 
expectation, the British Parliament insists on neutrality, 
there will be a terrible revulsion of feeling here." 

If this is at all a correct reflection of what had taken 
place at St. Petersburg, it is clear that at an early stage of 
the crisis the Russian public had been given to understand 
that England's unconditional support in a Russo-German 
quarrel would sooner or later be forthcoming. 

' Cd. 7596. = White Paper 144 and 145. 

3 Manifestoes (6). ■• Press Correspondence (xxv). 

7 



82 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 



ENGLAND 

A Cabinet Council was held early in the morning. 

After the Council Sir Edward Grey saw M. Cambon, to 
whom he gave the following memorandum ^ : — 

" I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the 
German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North 
Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French 
coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the pro- 
tection in its power. 

"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of 
His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parlia- 
ment, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's 
Government to take any action until the above contingency 
of action by the German fleet takes place." 

Sir Edward Grey then said that the Government could not 
bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily, 
if war broke out between France and Germany, but they 
felt it was essential to the French Government, whose 
fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to 
know how to make their dispositions with their north 
coast undefended. 

M. Cambon then asked about the violation of Luxemburg, 
and Sir Edward Grey told him the doctrine laid down 
by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon on that point in 1867.2 
According to debates in both Houses of Parliament that 
year, it was laid down by those two statesmen that the 
guarantee of the neutrality of Luxemburg was " limited 
in liability," and carried with it more a " moral sanction 
than a contingent liability to go to war. No party was 
called upon to undertake the duty of enforcing it." 

M. Cambon then asked Sir Edward Grey 3 what he would 
say about the violation of Belgian neutrality. He replied 
that "that was a much more important matter." He was 
" considering what statement he should make in Parliament 
to-morrow [August 3rd] — in effect, whether we should 
declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli." 

' White Paper 148. " Annual Register, iS6y. 

3 White Paper 148. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 83 

It would seem from this that on Sunday, August 2nd, 
the Cabinet, though it had decided upon naval aid for 
France, had not made up its mind what it would do about 
Belgian neutrality. 

Then, in a telegram to the German Chancellor, Prince 
Lichnowsky explained the mistake he made the previous 
day. (See Germany, August ist, and Documents {h).) 
" Sir Edward Grey's proposals," he said, " to guarantee 
the neutrality of England and France, if Germany did not 
attack France, were made without consultation with France 
and no longer held good." 

BELGIUM 

Confirming his statement of the 31st, the German Minister 
in Brussels ^ told the Belgian Foreign Minister that " he 
had not been instructed as yet to make an official com- 
munication, but that Belgium knew his personal opinion 
upon the security Belgium was entitled to feel in regard 
to her eastern neighbour." 

At 7 p.m. the German Minister presented an ultimatum ^ 
stating that Germany had received reliable information 
that French forces intended to march across Belgium to 
attack Germany by way of Givet and Namur ; that Ger- 
many feared Belgium would not be able to resist it, and 
that Germany must forestall the enemy. She proposed to 
Belgium friendly neutrality while she marched her troops 
along the Meuse to the French frontier. At 12 p.m. a 
Cabinet Council was held to consider it. 



LUXEMBURG 

The German Minister at Luxemburg to-day handed to 
the Luxemburg Government a Note 3 saying that their 
military measures were not hostile and that compensation 
would be made. 

Early in the morning German troops entered Luxemburg 

' Belgian Grey Book 19. " Ibid. 20, and Documents (s). 

3 White Paper 129. 



84 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

territory. The Luxemburg Government protested against 
the violation of their neutraHty.^ 

The French Minister then tells the Luxemburg Govern- 
ment that France will respect her neutrality. 



August 3 

GERMANY 

To-day Germany issued an official declaration of war on 
France,^ giving as reasons certain hostile acts said to have 
been committed by France, including amongst others the 
dropping of bombs by French aviators on the railway near 
Nuremburg, and also marching troops across Belgium to 
attack Germany. 

FRANCE 

M. Viviani, the Premier, made a long speech 3 in the 
Chamber of Deputies to-day, stating France's case in the 
coming war. He declared that Germany had done nothing 
to restrain her ally, Austria, that she had worked for war 
from the beginning and had been guilty of various acts 
of aggression, such as flying aeroplanes into French terri- 
tory and violating the frontier with troops. 

RUSSIA 

To-day the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg ad- 
dressed a crowd of people from the British Embassy and 
assured them of England's sympathy.4 



ENGLAND 

In the morning Prince Lichnowsky saw Sir Edward Grey 
and begged him not to make Belgian neutrality the 
condition of England's neutrality.s 

Baron Kuhlmann, of the German Embassy in London, 

' White Paper 147. = Manifestoes (c). 

3 Parliamentary Speeches (a). -» Press Correspondence (xxvi). 

5 Documents (/>), also England, August ist. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 85 

then issued an official communique ^ that Germany would 
undertake not to attack the north coast of France, or use 
the Dutch or Belgian seaports as bases, if England would 
remain neutral for the time being. 

Seeing that Germany could not secure England's 
neutrality on the basis of a German guarantee to respect 
Belgian neutrality (see England, August ist), she thus tried 
on the 3rd to get her to stand out if she (Germany) 
would not attack the north coast of France. 

Sir Edward Grey answered this in his historic speech 
in the House of Commons that afternoon.^ He first traced 
the history of England's relations with France, showed 
how the Entente had grown from an agreement over 
Morocco and Egypt in 1904 to a diplomatic understanding 
in 1906, and from that to a naval understanding in 191 2, 
which, though not made public, carried with it a " moral 
obligation to support France " to-day. Referring to the 
German offer to respect the north coast of France, he 
rejected this, saying that " this was too narrow an engage- 
ment for us," Towards the end of the speech only did 
he mention the question of Belgian neutrality, which he 
still described as " an important point to consider." The 
chief point of this speech was the explanation of the 
naval understanding with France, which by allowing her to 
concentrate in the Mediterranean had left her north coast 
undefended. This revelation, hitherto unknown to Parlia- 
ment, explained many hitherto obscure points in British 
diplomacy, such as the reasons for supporting France 
unconditionally in a war with Germany and the impossi- 
bility for England to keep out of war in spite of a German 
guarantee to respect Belgian neutrality or not attack the 
French coast. The commitment to France was uncondi- 
tional, and a war in which France was unconditionally 
involved along with Russia meant a war in which England 
must automatically become involved too. 

From Belgian sources 3 comes an interesting sidelight on 

' Documents, (u). 

^ See Appendix to White Paper and also Historical Introduction, p. 13. 

3 Belgian Grey Book 26. 



^6 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

what passed between Sir Edward Grey and the Belgian 
Minister in London on August 3rd. The former told the 
latter on this day that if Belgian neutrality were violated 
there would be war with Germany. This was the day on 
which Sir Edward Grey spoke in the House of Commons. 
He referred in his speech almost entirely to France and the 
naval understanding, and said practically nothing about 
Belgian neutrality. If he had seen the Belgian Minister 
before he spoke in the House he must have withheld the 
knowledge of our armed support for Belgium from the 
House. On the other hand, he may have seen him after 
his speech, in which case the decision about Belgium was 
arrived at between the speech in the House and the meeting 
with the Belgian Minister. 

BELGIUM 

At 1.30 a.m. the German Minister in Brussels informed 
the Secretary-General of the Foreign OfBce at Brussels ^ 
that French airships had thrown bombs on German soil 
and patrols of French cavalry had crossed the frontier. 
This he put forward as an excuse for violating Belgian soil ! 

The Cabinet sat from i to 4 a.m. 

At 7 a.m. the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
handed to the German Minister the reply of his Government, 
saying that Belgium would offer a strenuous resistance 
to any Power which violated its neutrality and had no 
fear that France would fail to respect it. She " refused to 
believe that her independence can only be preserved at 
the cost of violating her neutrality." 

The French Military Attache at Brussels offered the 
Belgian Government, on behalf of his Government,^ 
the assistance of five French army corps to Belgium. The 
Government expressed its thanks for the offer, but said 
they would decide on their course of action later. 

' Belgian Grey Book 21. =" "White Paper 151. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 87 

August 4 

GERMANY 

To-day the German Chancellor made an historic speech 
in the Reichstag/ explaining the causes of the war from 
the German standpoint. He passed lightly over the Austro- 
Servian dispute and the " free hand " which Germany gave 
to her ally Austria, and which proved one of the main 
causes of the European war. He dwelt upon the justifi- 
able anger which was felt throughout Germany at (what 
he described as) the deceitful behaviour of Russia in 
mobilizing her army while negotiations were quietly 
proceeding between Vienna and St. Petersburg and a settle- 
ment was almost in sight. 

He admitted that Austria had moved two out of her 
eight mobilized army corps on to the Austrian-Russian 
frontier, but denied a general Austrian mobilization. Such 
being the case, Russia, he said, had no right to mobilize, 
and had to be treated as an enemy. France also, he added, 
would not give Germany an assurance of her neutrality, 
and so Germany was surrounded by foes. With charac- 
teristic Prussian brutality and lack of imagination, he then 
went on to justify the attack on Belgium. After he 
admitted the illegality, he explained its necessity on strategic 
grounds, and said that in circumstances like those in which 
Germany was placed she had to " hack her way out " 
as best she could. Herr Haase, the leader of the Social 
Democrats, also spoke supporting the Government in 
repelling Russian barbarism, but declaring that the war 
was not a people's war. 

In the afternoon Sir Edward Goschen saw Herr Jagow 
and formally requested him, according to his instructions 
from Sir Edward Grey, to respect Belgian neutrality and to 
withdraw his troops from Belgian soil.2 

Herr Jagow, however, declined. 

At 7 p.m. Sir Edward Goschen handed in the British ulti- 

' Parliamentary Speeches [b). 

" White Paper 159 and Sir Edward Goschen's dispatch, Cd. 7445. 



88 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

matum to Germany.^ The German Chancellor then sent 
for Sir Edward Goschen, and in great excitement protested 
against England acting in this manner against Germany. 
Since the British Government had only on the previous day 
decided to make the violation of Belgium a casus belli, and 
since the plans of the German military authorities to go 
through Belgium had been known to the European 
Chancelleries for years past, his excitement may perhaps 
be pardoned. Instead of proceeding calmly, however, he 
then made the disgraceful reference to the Belgian Treaty as 
a "scrap of paper," and appealed to England to disregard 
it. England, however, who had up to the previous day 
been in doubt as to whether she would fulfil her obligations 
under the Belgian Treaty, had at last determined to do so, 
and Sir Edward Goschen gave a polite but firm refusal. 
The deadlock being reached, there was nothing for Sir 
Edward to do but to ask for his passports, which he did 
at 9.30 p.m. 

Meanwhile the declaration of war had been issued by the 
London Foreign Office. 

FRANCE 

In Paris the President sent a message to-day to the 
Chamber 2 stating the causes of the war, and accusing 
Germany of aggression on France. 

The French Government then notified the Powers of 
a state of war between France and Germany. 



ENGLAND 

The King of the Belgians made an appeal to-day to King 
George, asking him for diplomatic help.3 

Prince Lichnowsky then made a final statement to Sir 
Edward Grey,4 that Germany would respect Belgian terri- 
torial integrity and would annex no part of her territory. 
The sincerity of Germany could, he said, be seen, because 
she had engaged not to touch Holland, and Belgian terri- 

? Cd. 7445, " Manifestoes (a). 

3 White Paper 153. ■» Ibid. 157. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS 89 

tory without Dutch would be useless to Germany. It was 
necessary, however, to march troops across Belgium, since 
reliable information had come to hand that France intended 
to march her troops across Belgian territory. France, 
however, had promised to support Belgian neutrality, as 
is seen elsewhere.^ 

Sir Edward Grey also informed the Ministers of Norway, 
Holland, and Belgium that England expects that the three 
countries will resist German pressure and guard their 
neutrality. 2 He also offered them alliance and support 
of the Triple Entente if they would do this. 

At midnight, in default of a satisfactory reply having been 
given to the British ultimatum by Germany about Belgian 
neutrality, a formal declaration of war against Germany 
was issued. 

BELGIUM 

At 6 o'clock on the morning of August 4th the German 
Minister in Brussels handed a second ultimatums to the 
Belgian Government threatening, in default of a reply, to 
force the passage of German troops through Belgium. 

Meanwhile the British Minister conveyed to the Belgian 
Government 4 the expectation of his Government that 
Belgium would uphold her neutrality and integrity, and 
offered armed assistance for this purpose. 

Later in the day German troops entered Belgian territory 
and summoned Liege to surrender, but were repulsed.s 

The King of the Belgians then made a speech ^ before 
the Chamber, in which he said that Belgium must resist 
the German invasion with all her power. 

August 5 

AUSTRIA 

On this day Austria formally declared war on Russia on 
account of the hostilities existing between her and Germany. 

' White Paper 125. ^ Belgian Grey Book 36. 

3 White Paper 154 * Ibid. 155. 

5 Ibid. 158. ^ Parliamentary Speeches (/). 



SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EVENTS 

July 23 rd. 

Austria hands her Note to Servia. 
July 24TH. 

Russia proposes extension of time limit to Servia and decides on a 
partial mobilization. She also tries to obtain the unconditional 
support of England. 

England proposes that the four Powers not directly interested in the 
dispute should work together for moderation in Vienna and St. 
Petersburg. 
July 25TH. 

Germany passes on to Austria the proposal for the extension of the 
time limit and agrees to Four Power mediation between Vienna 
and St. Petersburg in case of an Austro- Russian but not an 
Austro-Servian dispute. 

Russia accepts Four Power mediation if direct conversations with 
Vienna should fail. Tsar signs orders for partial mobilization of 
fourteen army corps. 

England. — Sir E. Grey says that England is not interested in Austro- 
Servian dispute, but if it is enlarged she would become interested. 
July 26th. 

Germany. — Herr Jagow states he has passed on Germany's hope that 
Austria will take a favourable view of the Servian reply. 

Russia. — M. Sazonof has a conference with the Austrian Ambassador 
which he describes as satisfactory. 

England. — Sir Edward Grey proposes Four Power Ambassadorial 
Conference in London. 
July 27TH. 

Germany. — Herr Jagow refuses Four Power Ambassadorial Confer- 
ence, and says he prefers direct negotiations between Austria 
and Russia, aided by Four Power mediation. Press corre- 
spondents in Berlin testify to German desire for peace and 
moderation. 

France and Italy accept Four Power Ambassadorial Conference. 

Russia. — M. Sazonof accepts Four Power Ambassadorial Conference 
if direct negotiations with Austria fail. 
July 28th. 

A ustria. — Refuses Four Power Ambassadorial Conference ; breaks 
off discussion with Russia ; says that the Servian reply as a 
basis of negotiation has come too late, and declares war on 
Servia. She also mobilizes eight army corps. 
90 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS— SUMMARY 91 

Russia. — Partial mobilization begins. 

England. — Sir Edward Grey asks Germany to suggest along what 
lines Four Power mediation between Austria and Russia should 
proceed. 
July 29TH. 
Austria. — Still refuses direct communications between Vienna and 

St. Petersburg. 
Germany. — Chancellor says he has asked Austria to say openly that 
she has no territorial designs on Servia, and is only seeking 
guarantees. He makes an attempt to secure the neutrality of 
England in case of a European war. Military party in Berlin 
begins to get alarmed at Russian mobilization ; German Ambas- 
sador in St. Petersburg says that Germany will guarantee Servia's 
integrity. 
Russia. — M. Sazonof expresses willingness to return to England's 
Four Power Ambassadorial Conference, if it were acceptable 
to Servia. Partial mobilization order issued. 
England.— Sir Edward Grey tells M. Cambon that England has not 
made up her mind to support France, but he warns the German 
Ambassador that if France is involved England will be drawn in. 
July 30TH. 

Austria. — Count Berchtold expresses willingness to begin conversa- 
tions again with Russia, but not on the basis of the Servian reply. 
Germany. — Herr Jagow says that he has proposed to Austria that she 
should occupy Belgrade, or some other point, and issue her con- 
ditions from there. Germany even threatens to break the Alliance 
if Austria will not listen to reason and discuss with Russia ; she 
asks Russia for an explanation of her mobilization. 
Russia.— M. Sazonof, at bidding of German Ambassador, makes a 
proposal that if Austria will respect the sovereignty of Servia, 
Russia will stop military preparations ; this is forwarded to 
Vienna vtd Berlin, M. Sazonof also takes up conversations with 
the Austrian Ambassador. A general mobilization of the whole 
army and navy is ordered late in the evening. 
France. — M. Cambon reminds England of her naval understanding. 
England. — Sir Edward Grey refuses to give France a definite 
assurance of support. He refuses the German Chancellor's 
proposal that England should remain neutral if French territory 
in Europe were guaranteed. 
July 31ST. 
Austria continues discussions with Russia, and Count Berchtold says 

that Austria did not want infraction of Servian sovereign rights. 
Russia issues general mobilization orders. Tsar informs Kaiser that 
he will take no provocative action so long as negotiations con- 
tinue. M. Sazonof modifies his offer to Austria of the previous 
day to read that " if Austria will stop her advance in Servia and 
accept mediation of the Powers, Russia will maintain an 
expectant attitude." 



92 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Germany refuses to continue negotiating or put pressure on Vienna 
so long as Russia mobilizes ; asks for reasons for Russia's 
mobilization, and on receiving no satisfactory answer, sends an 
ultimatum late at night to Russia and France. Will not give a 
definite answer about respecting the neutrality of Belgium. 

England. — Sir E. Grey makes another proposal and undertakes to 
sound Russia if Four Powers might guarantee to Austria full satis- 
faction of demands on Scrvia. 

France agrees to respect the neutrality of Belgium. 
August ist. 

Austria orders a general mobilization, but continues to discuss with 
Russia. She reaches a settlement to-day and gives way on the 
only outstanding point. 

Germany orders general mobilization in the morning, and declares 
war on Russia late at night. 

France orders general mobilization. 

England refuses to secure France's neutrality in a Russo-German 
war ; refuses to remain neutral on condition that Germany 
respects Belgian neutrality, and refuses to make any suggestion 
to Germany about British neutrality. 

Belgium declares she will uphold her neutrality. 

Italy decides to remain neutral. 
August 2nd. 

Russia in state of war with Germany. 

England. — British Cabinet agrees that subject to sanction of Parlia- 
ment British naval aid shall be given to France in the event of a 
German attack. 

Germany sends ultimatum to Belgium proposing friendly neutrality 
and passage for her troops. 

Luxemburg territory violated by German troops. 
August 3RD. 

Germany declares war on France ; offers England not to attack the 
north coast of France, or use Dutch and Belgian ports as bases. 

England refuses the German offer to stand out under these 
conditions, and holds herself bound to France under all 
circumstances. 

Belgium refuses to entertain Germany's offer. 
August 4TH. 

Germany sends second ultimatum to Belgium threatening force ; 
offers England not to annex any Belgian territory. 

England sends an ultimatum to Germany demanding respect for 
Belgian neutrality, and in default of reply declares war at 
midnight. 
August 5TH. 

Austria declares war on Russia. 



DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS— ADDENDA 93 



Addenda to Diary of Negotiations 

August 9TH. 
Belgium. — On this day Germany made another offer to Belgium. 
She approached the United States, asking for her good offices 
to open up negotiations again. The United States refused, and 
then Germany approached Holland, who agreed. Baron Fallon 
thereupon saw the Belgian Foreign Minister in Brussels, and 
said that he had been commissioned to say on behalf of Germany 
that she did not want to make Belgium an enemy, and that she 
was only compelled by necessity to make a counter-stroke to the 
French military plan, and to take Liege ; she prayed Belgium 
to avoid further horrors of war, and said that she would respect 
Belgian territory and independence after the war. 

August i2TH, 
Belgium. — The Belgian Government then answered the German 
Government's proposal of the 9th, that Belgian would remain 
true to her international obligation, and that she could only 
repeat her answer to the German ultimatum of August 2nd. 

July 31ST. 
France. — The Austrian attitude on the 31st, as reflected through its 
representative in Paris, is described in an interesting article in 
Le Figaro for October 5, 1914. He refers first to the willing- 
ness of his Government, expressed by the Austrian Ambassador 
in St. Petersburg on the 31st to M. Sazonof, that Austria should 
" submit to mediation those points in the Austrian Note which 
were incompatible with Servian independence." M. Hanotaux 
comments on this by pointing out that the Austrian official 
Frcmdenblatt had said that there was no truth in this statement 
about the Austrian attitude. 

He then proceeds to relate how on July 31st he met the 
Austrian Ambassador in Paris, who told him that "if Russia 
advises Servia to ask Austria what are her conditions, Austria 
will answer frankly and will suspend her mobilization, provided 
that Russia does the same." "Austria," he said, "had no 
intention of acquiring Servian territory or of threatening her 
sovereignty." 

He then made an interesting statement, namely, that " this 
would not last, and that Germany, herself compelled to take 
precautions, would drag Austria along with her, if she did not 
act at once, in order to make St. Petersburg recognize the 
Austrian propositions, and also make Servia take the steps which 
would therefore open up a second phase of the negotiations." 
Commenting upon this M. Hanotaux said it was clear that 
Austria feared being dragged along by Germany, and for that 
reason the Austrian Ambassador in Paris made the same 
d-marche on this day (31st) as Count Szapary made in St. 
Petersburg on the same day. 



MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND 
MOBILIZATIONS 

IN sifting the evidence concerning the mihtary measures 
taken by the different countries during the various 
stages of the crisis, it is first necessary to recognize the 
distinctions between "military preparations" and "mobili- 
zation." The former may be taken by any Government as 
soon as it has reason to think that the diplomatic situation 
is strained, and may consist of the movements of troops on 
a peace footing to places on the frontier, the strengthening 
of garrisons and forts, commandeering of railways and 
telegraphs — in fact, anything short of calling up reservists. 
As soon as the army is brought from a peace to a war 
footing by the calling up of reservists, mobilization takes 
place. Mobilization is generally preceded by martial law, 
which enables the Government to facilitate the transition 
from a peace to a war footing. Mobilization may be 
partial or general. In the former case it affects certain 
concentration areas only, in the latter case it affects 
them all. 

It is now proposed to take each of the four countries — 
Russia, France, Germany, and Austria — and trace, as far as 
is known, the history of the military and naval preparations 
and mobilizations of each in the ten days preceding the 
outbreak of war. 

The information which throws light upon the military 
measures is derived to some extent from the British and 
German White Books, but chiefly from the Press corre- 
spondents in Berlin, Paris, and St. Petersburg. While 
isolated statements of facts from Press sources must be 
received with caution, agreement on the part of a number 
of correspondents on specific points can generally be 

94 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS 95 

accepted as evidence. But in regard to information about 
military measures, in any given country, it is best to loolc 
for such evidence from correspondents in the country itself 
rather than to trust correspondents in other capitals, who 
probably set forth evidence based only on rumour and 
often distorted, especially if that country's relations with the 
first country happen to be strained. Thus, in looking for 
evidence about the progress of Russian military preparations 
and mobilization on the German and Austrian frontiers 
during the earlier stages of the European crisis, I have 
relied on news from St. Petersburg rather than on that 
from Berlin and Vienna. 

RUSSIA 

July 24 and 25 

The earliest reference to Russian military activity comes 
from the Morning Post correspondent in St. Petersburg, who 
wired on July 28th to London as follows : "As a matter 
of fact Russia took steps for mobilization the moment the 
Council of Ministers decided last Friday (July 24th) that 
the sovereign status of Servia must be protected at all 
costs." It appears that on the day following the presenta- 
tion of the Austrian Note to Servia, a Council of Ministers 
was held, and it seems to have been decided at this 
meeting to take military measures. They were not, how- 
ever, put into operation till a further meeting had been held 
on the following day. This took place at Krasnoe Selo 
under the presidency of the Tsar on Saturday, July 25th. 
In referring to this meeting the Times correspondent at St. 
Petersburg telegraphed on July 27th that at the close of 
the meeting the Tsar, speaking of the Austrian Note to 
Servia, is said to have exclaimed, " We have stood this 
sort of thing for seven and a half years. This is enough ! " 
"Thereupon," the correspondent continues, " His Majesty 
authorized the issue of orders for a partial mobilization 
confined to the fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. 
At the same time an intimation was given to Germany that 
orders for the mobilization of the remainder of the Russian 



96 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

army would follow immediately upon mobilization in 
Germany." 

Renter's correspondent in St. Petersburg, telegraphing 
on the 25th, gave similar information about the outcome 
of the Council meeting on Saturday the 25th, although 
he reported that orders had been issued for the mobiliza- 
tion of five (not fourteen) army corps. ** Mobilization," 
he added, " is to be proceeded with at once." 

According to the Daily Chronicle correspondent at St. 
Petersburg, the Cabinet was divided into a war and peace 
party, the Ministers of War and Interior being for the 
former, and the Ministers of Finance and Agriculture 
for the latter. 

From German sources we hear, through a telegram of the 
German Ambassador ^ at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor 
on July 25th, that Russian manoeuvres at Krasnoe Selo had 
been broken ofT, and the troops had returned to their 
garrisons. Military pupils were raised that day to the rank 
of officers, and the telegram concludes that the impression 
prevails that complete preparations were being made for 
mobilization against Austria. 

From French sources we hear that the Temps corre- 
spondent in St. Petersburg stated on the 26th that on 
the 25th, "after the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 
it was decided that mobilization orders should be issued 
immediately for the army corps at Odessa and Kief. 
The energetic intervention," he added, " of the War 
Minister, General Sukhumlinof, created a great impres- 
sion." 

Evidence about the commencement of partial mobiliza- 
tion in Russia is still further confirmed by the telegrams of 
the Tsar to the Kaiser on July 30th,2 when the former 
replies to the latter's request to demobilize his forces by 
saying that the *' military measures now coming into 
operation were decided upon five days ago." This would 
mean that they began on the 25th, and so confirms the 
previous evidence. 

' Denkschrift, Exhibit 5. * Ibid., Exhibit 23A. 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS 97 

July 26 

On the following day, Sunday the 26th, there were 
indications only of precautionary measures which im- 
mediately precede mobilization, but no direct evidence that 
the mobilization orders were posted. 

Renter's correspondent in St. Petersburg, on 25th, tele- 
graphed that " a decree had been promulgated forbidding 
the publication of detailed information concerning the 
army and navy," and described St. Petersburg and Moscow 
as being placed under extraordinary protection," which is 
a modified form of martial law. 

The Standard correspondent in St. Petersburg wired also 
on the same day that there was reason to believe that im- 
portant steps in the way of mobilization had been taken. 

The Moniitig Post correspondent in St, Petersburg also 
stated that military steps were being taken on the 26th. 
He recorded the fact that mobilization warnings had 
already been sent to the frontier military districts, and that 
the Chief of the General Staff had returned from a tour of 
inspection. 

Another source of information for the 26th came from 
two telegrams in the German White Book. In one tele- 
gram I the German Military Attache informed the German 
General Staff that he considered it certain that mobilization 
had been ordered in Kief and Odessa, that it is doubtful in 
Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere. 

In another telegram ^ the German Chancellor informed 
the German Ambassador in London that the call for several 
classes of reservists is immediately expected in Russia, and 
that this is equivalent to mobilization. 

These two telegrams, taken in conjunction with the 
reports of the Press correspondents in St. Petersburg, seem 
to indicate that all preparations for mobilization were being 
made on this Sunday. Partial mobilization orders may 
have been issued to certain southern districts during that 
day, but the only direct information from this source is 
German, and this must be discounted. 

' Denkschrift, Exhibit 7. =" Ibid., Exhibit 10. 



98 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

July 27 

On this day the Daily News correspondent in St. Petersburg 
threw some light on Russian military preparations by his 
remark that the " crisis will become acute later in the 
week, when the mobilization of the Kief, Warsaw, and 
Vilna military contingents will be in full swing." This 
remark suggests that the mobilization was already in its 
initial stages, and would be in full progress in a few days. 
It also suggests that the calling up of reservists would not 
be confined to the military districts on the Austrian frontier 
only, but would include that of Vilna and Warsaw, which 
lie directly on the German frontier. The correspondent 
added, that mobilization means that the Russian field force 
is thereby raised to double its summer strength. 

From the German sources ^ we have confirmation that 
Russian military preparations were not only confined to 
the Austrian frontier. The German Consul at Kovno, 
according to the German White Paper, conveyed to the 
Imperial Chancellor that martial law (Kriegzustand) had 
been declared in Kovno, a Russian town close to the 
German frontier. This does not necessarily mean mobi- 
lization, but it generally precedes it. This announcement 
is significant when read in conjunction with the Daily News 
St. Petersburg remarks about the possibility of mobilization 
in the Warsaw and Vilna areas. The Denkschrift ^ also 
recorded the departure of the Warsaw and the strengthen- 
ing of the Alexandrovno garrisons. 

On the other hand, a telegram from the German Am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg to the German Chancellor 
described an interview on the 27th between the German 
Military Attache and the Russian War Minister, in which 
the latter gave his word of honour that no mobilization 
order had as yet been issued. He admitted that general 
preparations were being made, but denied that reserves 
were being called up. He added that if Austria crossed 
the Servian frontier the military districts directed against 
Austria, viz. Kief, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, were to be 

' Denkschrift, p. 120. ' Ibid. 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS 99 

mobilized, but under no circumstances those on the German 
frontier, viz. Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. 



July 28 

On this day some further information from Press corre- 
spondents is forthcoming. 

The Daily Telegraph correspondent in St. Petersburg 
recorded that the Baltic fleet received orders to-day to 
" prepare to mobilize," and added that midshipmen had 
been promoted. The correspondent of the same journal 
in Paris makes a passing reference to the fact that Russia 
is *' undoubtedly mobilizing." The Daily Chronicle corre- 
spondent at St. Petersburg said : "Already a rapid mobiliza- 
tion is proceeding in the west and south-west, virtually 
from the German frontier to the Black Sea." The vague 
statement may or may not refer to military areas of Warsaw 
and Vilna on the German : it certainly refers to those on 
the Austrian frontier. 

Reuter's correspondent in St. Petersburg, telegraphing 
on the 29th, confirmed the above remarks and definitely 
stated that a partial mobilization was ordered on Tuesday 
night. " It is confined to the military districts of Kief, 
Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, and affects the Austrian and 
not the German frontier. Kazan," he added, " is the 
central district from which reserves are drawn for the 
western borders." 

As a matter of fact the Kazan district provides recruits 
for both the Austrian and the German frontiers, being 
situated equi-distant from both. It is unlikely that reserves 
for the military areas on the Austrian frontier only were 
affected. The order calling up reservists in the Kazan area 
would certainly refer to the reservists drawn to the German 
as well as to the Austrian frontier. 

In connection with the announcement of partial mobiliza- 
tion in these four areas, it is interesting to note that 
according to the British White Paper ' M. Sazonof informs 
the Russian Ambassador at Berlin that the mobilization 
' White Paper 70. 



100 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

announcement was going to be made on the 29th. In the 
Russian Orange Book, however,^ the official communique 
of the Foreign Minister declares that Russia began her 
mobilization of four military districts five days after the 
handing in of the Austrian Note, which means that it began 
some time on the 28th. In view of all the evidence from 
the Press of partial mobilization stated above, and of the 
evidence in the Russian Orange Book, it appears that the 
mobilization orders were issued to the different districts 
affected on the 28th, but, according to the White Paper, not 
officially announced till the following day, the 29th. 

July 29 

Further definite information about the progress of partial 
mobilization is forthcoming on this day. 

The Daily Chronicle correspondent at St. Petersburg 
announced that " mobilization is even now being actively 
pushed forward." He added that an official announcement 
was issued foreshadowing a general mobilization of all the 
military forces in the Empire, as a reply to Austria's action. 

The Times correspondent in Paris on the 29th gave details 
of twelve Russian army corps which were being mobilized, 
and estimated that the peace strength was thereby raised 
from 400,000 to 700,000. 

Renter to-day also recorded that " a partial mobilization 
has already been ordered," and went on to suggest that it 
might become wider in its scope, for, he said, " there is 
every indication that the whole of the vast military 
machinery will be soon set in motion." He concluded 
by a remark which indicated how Russian public opinion 
had been led to expect England's support for a Russian 
forward policy. " Confident of England's support," he said, 
" about which doubts have mostly disappeared, the Russian 
public is prepared to accept war." There can be little 
doubt from statements such as these, that the hints, 
whether open or secret, from England had much to do 
with the warlike tone of St. Petersburg during these days, 

* Orange Book 77. 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS loi 

and with the readiness on the part of the Russian authori- 
ties to proceed to a display of mihtary strength.^ 

From France comes an interesting statement on this 
same day, July 29th, t6 the effect that active military 
preparations were not confined to the Austrian frontier 
only. The St. Petersburg correspondent of the Temps 
telegraphed that " mobilization is proceeding in Kief, 
Odessa, Vilna, IVarsaiv, and St. Petersburg." The last three 
military areas are against the German frontier. They are 
not mentioned in the references to the mobilization areas in 
the Press on the 28th, nor do they appear in the official 
announcement of partial mobilization (see White Paper 70), 
where the Kief, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan areas only are 
mentioned. In these three districts against the German 
frontier, according to this account, reservists were being 
called up, but no public announcement was made of the 
fact, in order apparently not to compromise relations with 
Germany. This news, if it came from Germany, would 
have to be heavily discounted, but as it comes from France 
it demands attention. The Temps correspondent mentions 
also in this same telegram, as an indication that mobiliza- 
tion was proceeding in these districts, the fact that " troop 
trains are passing Warsaw every quarter of an hour." If 
they were " passing Warsaw " they could only have been 
going to the German frontier. 

The uneasiness meanwhile felt by Germany is indicated 
clearly in the German Denkschrift,2 when on page 122 it 
describes the interview between the German Military 
Attache in St. Petersburg and the Chief of the Russian 
General Staff. The latter gave the former his word of 
honour that no mobilization had taken place at all up to 
3 o'clock that afternoon. This statement can not have 
been strictly true, because the orders for partial mobiliza- 
tion were issued on the night of the 28th, and the reservists 
were already on their way. The German Military Attache 
added at the interview that he had received news of the 
calling up of reserves in different parts of the country, 

' Also see Press Correspondence (xxiii) and (xxiv). 
" Denkschrift, p. 122. 



102 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

including Warsaw and Vilna, thus tending to confirm the 
Temps and other correspondents' telegrams of this day. In 
regard to naval preparations on the 29th, it may be noted 
that various lights on the Baltic and Black Sea coasts were 
extinguished, and certain harbours were put under special 
regulations. 

July 30 

The Russian papers on this day, according to the 
Morning Post correspondent at St. Petersburg, contained the 
mobilization orders of four out of the twelve military dis- 
tricts of the Empire. He added that these four areas were 
the most densely populated of all Russia, and produce in 
mobilization about half the fighting strength of the Empire. 

Again we find statements, as on previous days, that this 
partial mobilization was in reality much larger in its scope 
than the official world would publicly admit. The Daily 
Chronicle correspondent in St. Petersburg, Mr. Harold 
Williams, telegraphs on the 30th that "the order for partial 
mobilization is intended as a reply to the Austrian declara- 
tion of war. As a matter of fact," he continued, "it is 
absolute and general. Reservists in the northern districts 
are also being called up." Now reservists from the 
northern provinces do not all serve on the Austrian frontier. 
If they were all being called up to the colours, it follows 
that many of them must have been ordered to the districts 
on the German frontier as well. There is thus reason to 
suppose that the mobilization by this time had extended 
beyond the limits of the officially announced four southern 
and south-western districts. 

Indeed, the Government appears to have decided about 
this time to openly declare a general mobilization of all the 
fleet and army, and thus admit in print what apparently 
had already been going on in fact before it was actually 
announced. 

" There are rumours that a general mobilization will be 
ordered to-night," said the Daily Chronicle correspondent in 
Warsaw on the 30th. This is confirmed by the telegram of 
the Times correspondent in St. Petersburg on the 31st, in 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS 103 

which he states that "the Government decided upon a 
general mobilization late last night" (July 30th). 



July 31 

The telegrams to all the military districts which had 
not already been affected by the partial mobilization were 
apparently sent out late on the night of the 30th, and the 
orders were posted early on the morning of the 31st. (See 
White Paper 113 and German Denkschrift.) The remoter 
parts of the Empire received the order to mobilize in the 
early hours of the morning of the 31st. This is proved by 
Mr. Stephen Graham's letter in the Times of September nth, 
in which he describes how he was in a Cossack village on 
the Mongolian frontier in Siberia at the outbreak of war, 
and how the first telegram to mobilize came through at 
4 o'clock on the morning of the 31st. From this time 
forward the fullest military measures came into operation 
throughout the whole Empire. 

Stated concisely, the decision of Russia to mobilize 
partially was taken on the 24th, directly after the Austrian 
Note to Servia. This was confirmed on the 25th, and 
during the week-end all military preparations except the 
calling up of reservists were made, and partial mobilization 
orders signed but not issued. In spite of rumours there 
is no direct evidence that reservists were on the move on 
Monday the 27th. On the 28th several correspondents 
agree that mobilization was in progress, but that it was 
partial, and one definite statement comes from Reuter that 
a partial mobilization order was issued on the night of the 
28th. On the 29th it was officially announced, and all 
through this day proceeded steadily. Rumours grew that 
the districts on the German frontier were being affected, 
but we have only one definite statement to this effect from 
the Temps on the 29th, and two other less definite ones. On 
the 30th, late, a general mobilization order was issued, thus 
bringing officially the whole military machinery of the 
Empire into action. It may, therefore, be said that Russia 
began to put her army from a peace to a war footing early 



104 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

in the week that preceded the outbreak of the general 
European war, gradually extending the operations till by 
the 31st the whole machinery was in progress. 



FRANCE 

Turning to France, we will trace the course of the military 
preparations which preceded the general mobilization there. 
Here again it is desirable to eliminate, or at any rate to 
largely discount, news from Berlin, where a mere rumour 
about the movement of a patrol is liable to be exaggerated 
into a statement comprising the mobilization of an army 
corps. News from France itself, however, may be taken 
as fairly reliable. 

On July 25th we hear from the Temps, in its issue of the 
26th, that the "garrisons of Toul, Nancy, Neufchatel, and 
Troy on the Franco-German frontier were mobilized and 
the soldiers sent to the forts." There is no reason to 
suppose that any mobilization order was issued, or that 
this measure was anything more than a concentration 
at certain points of frontier troops which had hitherto 
been scattered. The same journal reports similar measures 
being taken at Metz on the German side of the frontier. 
These were ordinary measures of precaution which would 
be taken by any country when the diplomatic situation 
becomes delicate. 

On the following day, the 26th, the Tunes correspondent 
in Paris reports that after the informal Cabinet Council held 
that day there was much activity at the War Ministry : 
precautionary measures were decided on, officers on leave 
were recalled, and the postal officials were at their posts 
all day. 

The Daily Chronicle correspondent at Paris also records 
on the same day that the French are taking necessary 
measures ; that the War Minister has given urgent in- 
structions that every one concerned with the army is to 
be at his post, and officers on leave have been recalled. 

On the 27th we learn in the German Denkschrift,i from 

' Denkschrift, Exhibit 9. 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS 105 

the German Ambassador at Berne in a telegram to the 
Chancellor, that the manoeuvres of the 14th French Army 
Corps were broken off. 

Throughout the 28th there is no more news, except that 
of general preparations for placing the army on a war 
footing at some future and undetermined date. 

According to the Daily Chronicle correspondent in Paris, 
no mobilization orders had been issued, though there had 
been movements of troops on the frontier. Corroboration 
is also given that manoeuvres were also broken off. 

The Daily Neivs correspondent in Paris also learns on 
the best authority that a partial mobilization order calling 
up classes of troops liberated in the previous November 
had been prepared, and was waiting the signature of the 
President, who arrived in Paris on that day (28th). 

On the 29th the Times correspondent sends a telegram 
throwing some light on the military situation. "All pre- 
parations," he said, " are being made on the east and north- 
east frontiers." Six army corps, he added, were being 
brought up to full peace strength of 200,000 men, and 
this means that, since these corps draw their recruits 
locally, they will be brought up to 280,000 on the first 
day of mobilization. 

This means that the fullest peace strength was being 
maintained, in order at the quickest possible moment to 
transfer the army to a war footing. 

The White Paper also shows in a telegram ^ from Sir 
Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, that the French 
Ambassador in Berlin had information from his Govern- 
ment that the military precautions were the same as in 
Germany, and were chiefly concerned with the recall of 
officers on leave. 

On the 30th the Daily Chronicle correspondent in Paris 
records the issue of a Government communique or Note 
describing as false the rumours that a single recruit had 
been summoned to the colours, or that concentration had 
begun at any point. The first part of this statement is 
indisputable, but the second hardly corresponds with the 
' White Paper 76. 



io6 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

universal news quoted above that the frontier fortresses had 
been strengthened. 

On the 31st the Ti}ncs correspondent in Paris reports that 
at a Cabinet Council that day it was decided to bring 
French covering 'troops up from a peace to a war footing, 
by the incorporation of 40,000 old recruits from the locality. 
This means that a partial mobilization had begun. No 
doubt the partial mobilization order, which the Daily News 
correspondent reported on the 28th was awaiting the 
President's signature, was issued about this time, and 
applied chiefly to the Franco-German frontier districts, 
thus enabling the frontier garrisons to be placed on a 
war footing. The Times correspondent also records that 
railway bridges were being guarded, and that the troops 
mobilized were kept a distance of ten kilometres from the 
frontier. 

France definitely started the mobilization of her whole 
army and navy at 3.40 on August ist,^ after the issue of 
the German ultimatum. This appears in Sir Francis 
Bertie's telegram to Sir Edward Grey in White Paper 136. 
This, it may be noted, is just exactly the same time as the 
issue of the order of German general mobilization.^ It 
may therefore be said that while both countries were 
taking precautionary measures, strengthening garrisons and 
frontier troops all through the week, the final movement of 
the army from a peace to a war footing did not take place 
till the afternoon of August ist, and was simultaneous in 
both countries. Each of course accused the other of acts 
of aggression. The French say the Germans violated the 
ten kilometres limit on the Franco-German frontier (see 
White Paper 134), while the German say that French 
aeroplanes dropped bombs on Nuremberg on August 3rd, 
and were preparing to invade Belgium. (See M. Viviani's 
speech in French Chamber.3) But these accusations must 
be discounted on both sides as coming from sources not 
likely to be impartial, especially at a time of so much 
tension. 

' White Paper 136. ' Ibid. 142. 

3 Parliamentary Speeches (a). 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS 107 

GERMANY 

News about German military preparations during the 
early stages of the negotiations, except for that which comes 
from Paris through the Temps, is scanty. On the assumption 
that news of the movement of troops coming from a 
potentially hostile country is liable to be tainted or 
exaggerated (a principle which should apply all round), 
news from this quarter should be received with caution, 
unless strongly supported by independent evidence. 

On the 25th there came some news from Paris to the 
effect that military activity had commenced in the German 
frontier fortresses. The Times reports that " leave was 
stopped in the garrisons at Saarburg and Strassburg," and 
that the " garrisons at Metz were mobilized and sent to the 
forts." These movements correspond to the report of 
similar measures which appeared in the same journal about 
French military preparations in their frontier fortresses. 
(See Mobilization, France, July 25th.) It appears, in fact, 
that these measures took place simultaneously on both sides 
of the frontier. 

On the 26th again comes news from Paris about prepara- 
tions for mobilization. Railways received orders to dis- 
tribute their rolling stock ; manoeuvres were broken off 
and men on leave were recalled. 

On the 27th the Daily News correspondent in Berlin 
contradicts the news that any officers at all had been 
recalled, although, he said, extension of leave had been 
refused. On the same day the Temps reported from Paris 
that local mobilization had begun. By this, presumably, it 
was meant that local reservists in the frontier garrisons had 
been called up in the same way as took place on the French 
side of the frontier on the 29th (see Times, 29th). No con- 
firmation of this, however, comes from German sources, or 
from the foreign correspondents resident in Berlin. Since 
it comes from a Paris source alone it can hardly be accepted 
as complete evidence. 

On the 28th the Temps reports that the German covering 
troops on the frontier were brought up to their full effective 



io8 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

by the calling up of individual reservists. Horses and 
motor-cars, moreover, were said to have been comman- 
deered. Here, again, there is no corroboration from an 
independent source. 

The only evidence of this news is from Reuter in Berlin, 
who reported the official announcement that the German 
fleet was returning to home waters on this day, and con- 
centrating at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. 

The Daily News correspondent in Berlin reported news of 
dislocation of traffic on the eastern frontier, but said that 
otherwise there was no "outward appearance of unusual 
activity." 

There was no news on the 29th, but on the 30th the 
Temps itself denied through its correspondents in Berlin 
that there had been any mobilization of the German army. 
" Precautionary measures only," it adds, " such as the 
guarding of railway bridges, have been taken." 

This is confirmed by the Berlin correspondent of the 
Morning Post, who telegraphed on this day that the measures 
adopted up to now were solely for defensive purposes, and 
that the troops on the eastern and western frontiers were 
ordered to hold themselves in readiness to protect railways 
in case of need. 

The Times Paris correspondent also reported that the 
German Government had informed the French Government 
that there had been no mobilization in Germany. 

There was a report from Russia ' about this time, however, 
which conflicts with the above statements. In the Russian 
Orange Book, a telegram from the Russian Embassy in 
Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg 
declared that a general mobilization of the German army 
and navy had been issued on this day. The statement, 
however, was withdrawn in the next telegram. No. 62, and 
the Russian Ambassador in Berlin explained that there had 
been a false rumour published by a Berlin newspaper which 
had been officially denied, and the newspaper was con- 
fiscated. 

On the 31st the Daily Chronicle correspondent in Paris 

* Orange Book 61. 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS 109 

reported activities of the German military authorities on 
the frontier, arid described the seizure of a locomotive, the 
cutting of telephonic communications, the barring of all 
the public ways, and the seizure of motor-cars. From 
three sources also come vague statements about German 
mobilization. 

The Times correspondent in Paris stated that Germany 
had been carrying on a secret mobilization, and that tens 
of thousands of reservists had been brought up by indi- 
vidual appeal. Several army corps had been brought up 
to the frontier and put into position. This call on reservists 
cannot have been universal, for no evidence is given of any 
mobilization orders. The statement apparently refers to 
the incorporation of local reservists in the frontier garrisons 
which went on on both sides of the frontier from the 29th 
onwards. 

From Russian sources also we hear vague statements 
about German mobilization. ^ In the Orange Book there 
is a telegram from the Russian Ambassador in Berlin to 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggesting that 
Germany was making secret mobilization under cover of 
martial law. " Kriegzustand " was not, however, proclaimed 
in Germany until the 31st. 

In regard to these German preparations, the French 
Minister for Foreign Afifairs sent to M. Cambon a state- 
ment 2 that the German army, on Friday the 31st, had twice 
crossed the frontier and penetrated into French territory. 
He also says that reservists have been called up by tens 
of thousands. This document is dated the 31st, but in the 
English White Paper it appears as an enclosure under 
No. 105. It is represented as having been handed by the 
French Ambassador in London to Sir Edward Grey on the 
30th. Thus Sir Edward Grey telegraphs to Sir Francis 
Bertie in No. iof5, on July 30th, and says, amongst other 
things, ** He [M. Cambon] gave me a paper, of which a copy 
is also enclosed, showing that the German military prepara- 
tions were more advanced on the frontier than anything 
France had done." But as this paper, which was a copy 
' Orange Book 68. » White Paper 105 (iii.) 



no THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

of the telegram from the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to M. Cambon, is dated on the 31st, it is hard to 
say how it could have been handed to Sir Edward Grey by 
M. Cambon on the 30th. 

It may, however, be noted that in the recently published 
penny edition of the White Paper, the date of this enclosure 
No. 3 has been omitted, thus making it appear that the 
document handed to Sir Edward Grey by M. Cambon was 
written on the 29th or 30th. The first edition of the White 
Paper prints the date on this document as "Vendredi, 
Juli 31." This is an important point which ought to be 
cleared up, since it makes a difference of at least forty-eight 
hours in the record of the German mobilization. It is 
difficult to prove from these documents as they stand at 
present that before the 31st the military measures on the 
German side of the frontier were any more advanced than 
those on the French side of the frontier. Indeed, the 
declaration of martial law is announced in Sir Edward 
Goschen's telegram to Sir Edward Grey only on the 31st. 
(White Paper 112.) 

This is confirmed by the Times Berlin correspondent, 
who describes the declaration as being issued at 2 o'clock 
in the afternoon. It is hardly likely, therefore, that mobili- 
zation over a large area had been carried on in Germany 
for some days previous to the 31st under cover of martial 
law, if that martial law had not been declared till 2 p.m. 
on that afternoon. 

On August ist the mobilization order was issued for the 
whole of the German army and navy. 

This is confirmed by Sir Edward Goschen's telegram 
to Sir Edward Grey on this day,i and it also added that 
the first day of mobilization was to be August 2nd. The 
time of the issue of the order coincides exactly with the 
time at which the general mobilization orders were issued 
for the French army. (See White Paper 136.) 

Curious independent information concerning German 
mobilization is obtained from the Westminster Gazette's 
Berlin correspondent, who wrote in that journal for 
' White Paper 142. 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS in 

August loth an account of an English traveller's experi- 
ence (Mr. Littledale), when travelling in East Prussia 
at the outbreak of war. At a place called Konitz, he 
describes how " the red mobilization order did not appear 
till Saturday, August ist." "This point," adds the corre- 
spondent, ** is important, as proving that near the Russian 
frontier Germany mobilized only at the same time as 
round Berlin." 

In conclusion, therefore, the evidence shows that exactly 
similar measures of military precaution were taken on the 
frontier by Germany throughout this week as were taken 
by France. These measures took the form of the mobiliza- 
tion of the frontier garrisons and the strengthening of 
the covering troops along the frontier. But the raising 
of the army from a peace to a war footing did not begin 
till August ist, at exactly the same time as that of the 
French army, and about thirty-six hours after that of the 
Russian army. 

AUSTRIA 

News about Austrian mobilization and military pre- 
parations is scanty, but there are several important points 
about which a certain amount of information has come 
to hand. It appears that Austria, like Russia, first ordered 
a partial mobilization of her army, which it applied to 
certain military districts, and then enlarged the area at 
a later date till the mobilization became general. 

The first information comes in the Russian Orange 
Book,i from the Russian Consul in Prague, who reports 
that mobilization was ordered on the 26th. While there 
is no direct confirmation of this, still we find that the 
Temps reports on July 28th, through the Havas Agency, and 
the Times Berlin correspondent also notes on the same day, 
that eight Austrian army corps were being mobilized on 
this day. These army corps were centred at Prague, 
Leitvenitz, De Gratz, Budapest, Temesvar, Agram, Serajevo, 
and Ragusa. According to three sources, therefore, it 
appears that at some time between the 26th and 28th 

* Orange Book 24. 



112 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

mobilization of the Austrian army began. But it is 
also clear that it was only a partial mobilization, for in 
the ofHcial communique ^ issued by the Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg it is stated that Russia 
ordered her partial mobilization on the 28th as a reply 
to the mobilization of half the Austrian army. It is clear, 
therefore, according to this statement that Austrian mobili- 
zation was only partial on the 28th. 

From Russian sources,^ however, we learn that on the 
28th a general mobilization of the whole of the Austrian 
army was signed. It does not say that the orders were 
issued or that mobilization began on that day, and therefore 
it appears that since Austria was at that time only fighting 
Servia, her mobilization remained partial for some days. 

This is further confirmed by Sir Edward Grey's telegram 
to Sir George Buchanan on July 3ist,3 when he says, "If 
the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilizing 
eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not 
too great a number against 400,000 Servians." These words 
clearly show that Sir Edward Grey was under the 
impression that the mobilization of the Austrian army 
had not become general. 

On the following day, August ist. Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
reports from Vienna,4 "General mobilization of army and 
fleet." This, it may be noted, was on the same day as the 
German and French general mobilization, and about thirty- 
six hours after that of Russia. But here we find conflicting 
evidence, for Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who telegraphed the 
news of the general mobilization in Austria on the ist 
(White Paper 127), states in his special dispatch on the 
rupture of diplomatic negotiations s that " Russia replied 
to the partial Austrian mobilization by a partial Russian 
mobilization against Austria. Austria met this by complet- 
ing her own mobilization, and Russia again responded, with 
the results which have passed into history." Now, accord- 
ing to evidence, Russia's general mobilization took place 
late on the night of July 30th (see Chapter on Mobilization, 

' Orange Book 77. - Ibid. 47, 

' White Paper no. ■* Ibid. 127. s cd. 7596. 



PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS 113 

Russia), while Austrian mobilization, according to Sir 
Maurice de Bunsen himself in the White Paper, did not 
take place till August ist (see White Paper 127). According 
to this evidence, therefore, Austria could not have replied 
to Russia's partial mobilization by a general mobilization 
on her part, because Russia converted her partial mobiliza- 
tion into a general one at least thirty-six hours before 
Austria did so. The evidence, therefore, of the official 
documents is conflicting. 

The evidence from Russian sources ' also conflicts in one 
passage with the evidence in the White Paper. In a tele- 
gram on August 2nd from the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to the Imperial Representatives abroad, the former 
states that " Russian mobilization was called forth by the 
great responsibility which would have rested on her if she 
had not taken all precautionary steps during the time that 
Austria had proceeded to a general mobihzation," This 
suggests that Austria's general mobilization took place 
before Russia's, but no dates are given, and therefore it 
cannot be accepted as evidence. On the other hand, in 
the telegram of Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 
on July 3ist,2 the British Ambassador explains Russia's 
reasons for mobilization on the grounds that Austria would 
not hold to the intervention of the Powers, and secondly 
because she had moved troops against Russia. This move- 
ment of troops on the Russian frontier may well refer to 
the mobilization of the eight army corps which was 
already known to be in progress in Austria, and it is 
known that some portion of these forces was sent to the 
Russian frontier. Indeed, it is admitted in the speech of 
the German Chancellor in the Reichstag on August 4th,3 
who said that at the time of Russia's general mobilization 
Austria had two army corps only on the Russian frontier 
and the rest were all concentrated against Servia. But the 
omission of Sir George Buchanan in this telegram on 
July 31st (No. 113) to mention any reference to an Austrian 
general mobilization as a reason for a Russian, suggests 

' Orange Book 178. = White Paper 113. 

3 See Parliamentary Speeches (b). 

9 



114 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

strongly that no evidence had come even to St. Petersburg 
that Austria had taken this step or had extended her 
measures beyond that of the eight army corps. Moreover, 
the Press correspondence confirms this view. Thus, the 
Times correspondent in St. Petersburg describes on the 31st 
the reason given by Russia for her general mobilization. 
"This step," he said, "has been forced upon them (the 
Russian Government) by the German military preparation 
and by considerations of strategy. It became apparent that 
the Germans were purposely delaying an official notice of 
their mobilization in order to place Russia in a position 
of inferiority." No mention is made of an Austrian general 
mobilization as the cause for Fiussia's step. The only 
reference is to Germany, and we see what evidence there 
is relating to German mobilization under the section dealing 
with that subject. 

It may also be remembered that according to Sir Maurice 
de Bunsen himself (Cd. 7596), the tension between Austria 
and Russia by this time, the 31st, was becoming less. He 
describes in his special dispatch how Count Berchtold 
had allowed conversations between Russia and Austria to 
begin again on the 30th, and an agreement was almost 
arrived at on August ist. It is hardly likely, therefore, 
that with diminishing tension against Russia, Austria would 
have mobilized the whole of her army. 

Without more definite information to the contrary, there- 
fore, it is safe to assume that the English White Paper is 
correct in telegram No. 127, when it describes the general 
mobilization of the Austrian army as beginning on August 
ist. In that case, however, the statements in the Orange 
Book and in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's special dispatch 
require further explanation. 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 

Official Translation by German Government 

Foreign Office, Berlin, 
August, 1914. 

ON June 28th the Austro- Hungarian successor to the 
throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, 
the Duchess of Hohenburg, were assassinated by a member 
of a band of Servian conspirators. The investigation of 
the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has 
yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the hfe of the 
Archduke and successor to the throne was prepared and 
abetted in Belgrade with the co-operation of Servian 
officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State 
arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the 
entire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the 
Servian politics directed against the conservation and in- 
tegrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but also con- 
cerning the criminal means which the Pan-Serb propaganda 
in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achieve- 
ment of these aims. 

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing 
and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with Servia. 
This direction of Servia's policy has not been altered in the 
least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of 
Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies 
toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good 
and neighbourly relations. 

In this manner, for the third time in the course of the 
last six years, Servia has led Europe to the brink of a 
world-war. 

115 



ii6 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

It could only do this because it believed itself supported 
in its intentions by Russia. 

Russia, soon after the events brought about by the 
Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavoured to found a union 
of the Balkan States under Russian patronage, and directed 
against the existence of Turkey. This union, which suc- 
ceeded in 191 1 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of 
her European possessions, collapsed over the question of 
the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not 
disma^^ed over this failure. According to the idea of the 
Russian statesmen a new Balkan union under Russian 
patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer 
against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkans, but against 
the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It was 
the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of 
Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan 
War, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina, which 
were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall 
in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached 
to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia 
promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that 
it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of 
self-preservation of the Monarchy to view idly any longer 
this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal 
Government apprised Germany of this conception and 
asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able 
to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure 
him that any action considered necessary to end the 
movement in Servia directed against the conservation of 
the Monarchy would meet with our approval. 

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude 
of Austria- Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon 
the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, 
in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, 
however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary which 
were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not 
compatible with her dignity, nor deny her our assistance in 
these trying days. We could do this all the less as our 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 117 

own interests were menaced through the continued Serb 
agitation. If the Serbs continued, with the aid of Russia 
and France, to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, 
the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all 
the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the conse- 
quence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic 
race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria 
under the pressure of Russian Pan-Slavism would be no 
longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we 
could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view 
of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and 
westerly neighbours. We, therefore, perinUted Austria a 
completely free hand in her action towards Servia, but have 
not participated in her preparations. 

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian 
Government a Note, in which the direct connection between 
the murder at Serajevo and the Pan-Serb movement, as not 
only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian 
Government, was explained, and in which a complete 
cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the 
guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary 
demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment 
of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in 
the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the 
final dissolution of the Pan-Serb societies agitating against 
Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government 
gave a period of forty-eight hours for the unconditional 
acceptance of its demands. 

The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army 
one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian Note. 

As after the stipulated date the Servian Government 
rendered a reply which, though complying in some points 
with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all 
essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new 
negotiations to escape from the just demands of the 
Monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations 
with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or 
accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to her 
loss, she had sufficiently experienced. 



ii8 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of 
war with Servia, which it prochiimed otEcially on the 
28th of July by declaring war. 

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the 
position that there were here concerned the affairs of 
Austria alone, which it would have to settle with Servia. 
We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of 
the war, and toward convincing the other Powers that 
Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self- 
defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphati- 
cally took the position that no civilized country possessed 
the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with 
barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians 
against their just punishment.^ In this sense we instructed 
our representatives with the foreign Powers. 

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government com- 
municated to the Russian Government that the step 
undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive 
measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria- 
Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a 
continued friendly behaviour of Servia towards the 
Monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever 
to shift the balance of power in the Balkans.^ 

In answer to our declaration that the German Govern- 
ment desired and aimed at a localization of the conflict, 
both the French and the English Governments promised an 
action in the same direction. But these endeavours did 
not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in 
the Austro-Servian disagreement. 

The Russian Government submitted an official com- 
munique on July 24th, according to which Russia could not 
possibly remain indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. 
The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, to the German Ambassador, 
Count Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26th.3 The 
German Government declared again, through its Ambas- 
sador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no 
desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers.4 

' See Exhibits i and 2. ' Sec Exhibit 3. 3 See Exliibit 4. 

* See Exhibit 5. 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 119 

After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia 
that it did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision 
concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with 
St. Petersburg. 

The same day the first news of Russian mobilization 
reached Berlin in the evening.' 

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. 
Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the 
danger of this Russian mobilization.^ The Imperial 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make 
the following declaration to the Russian Government : — 

" Preparatory military measures by Russia will force 
us to counter-measures which must consist in mobiliz- 
ing the army. 

" But mobilization means war. 

" As we know the obligations of France towards 
Russia, this mobilization would be directed against 
both Russia and France. We cannot assume that 
Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Sfnce 
Austria- Hungary will not touch the existence of the 
Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can 
afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all 
the more support the desire of Russia to protect the 
integrity of Servia as Austria- Hungary does not intend 
to question the latter. It will be easy in the further 
development of the affair to find a basis for an under- 
standing." 

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Sukhum- 
linof, gave the German Military Attache his word of honour 
that no order to mobilize had been issued ; merely prepara- 
tions were being made, but not a horse mustered nor 
reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian 
frontier the military districts directed towards Austria, 
i.e. Kief, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, 
under no circumstances those situated on the German fron- 
tier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry 
into the object of the mobilization against Austria-Hungary, 

' See Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9. " See Exhibits 10, lOA, iob. 



I20 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his 
shoulders and referring to the diplomats.^ The Military 
Attache then pointed to these mobilization measures against 
Austria- Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany. 

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobili- 
zation came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news 
about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as, for 
instance, the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, 
the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening 
of the Alexandrovno garrison. 

On July 27th the first information was received concern- 
ing preparatory measures taken by France : the 14th Corps 
discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison. 

In the meantime we had endeavoured to localize the 
conflict by most emphatic steps. 

On July 26th Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to 
submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia 
to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, 
and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard 
to this proposal that we could not, however much we 
approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we 
could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a 
European tribunal.^ 

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but 
it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected. 

Faithful to our principle that mediation should not 
extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be 
considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but 
merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an 
understanding between these two Powers. 3 

We further declared ourselves ready, after failure 01 
the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of 
Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna, in which he suggested 
Austria-Hungary 4 should decide that either the Servian 
reply was sufficient or that it be used as a basis for 
further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Govern- 

' See Exhibit 11. ^ See Exhibit 12. 

3 See Exhibits 13, 14. '' See Exhibit 15. 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 121 

ment remarked, with full appreciation of our action, that 
it had come too late, hostilities having already been 
opened. I 

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the 
utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible 
advance compatible with the dignity of the Monarchy. 

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the 
military preparations of Russia and France. 

On July 29th the Russian Government made the ofBcial 
notification in Berlin that four army districts had been 
mobilized. At the same time further news was received 
concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of 
France, both on water and on land.^ 

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Peters- 
burg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, 
in regard to which he reported by telegraph as follows : — 

"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should 
urge my Government to participate in a quadruple 
conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary 
to give up those demands which touch upon the 
sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to 
report the conversation and took the position that, after 
Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobiliza- 
tion, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely 
difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was 
demanding from us with regard to Austria-Hungary the 
same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for 
with regard to Servia, i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. 
Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the 
Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspira- 
tion — a great concession on the part of a State engaged 
in war — should therefore be permitted to attend to 
its affairs with Servia alone. There would be time at 
the peace conference to return to the matter of for- 
bearance towards the sovereignty of Servia. 

" I added very solemnly that at this moment the 
entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of 

' See Exhibit i6. = See Exhibit 17. 



122 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

a general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to 
present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. 

" It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the 
idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia." 

On July 29th the German Military Attache at St. Peters- 
burg wired the following report on a conversation with the 
Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army : — 

" The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call 
on him, and he has told me that he has just come from 
His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary 
of War to reiterate once more that everything had 
remained as the Secretary had informed me two days 
ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me 
his word of honour in the most solemn manner that 
nowhere had there been a mobilization, viz. calling in 
of a single man or horse, up to the present time, i.e. 
3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume 
a guarantee for the future, but he could emphasize 
that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His 
Majesty desired no mobilization. 

" As, however, I had received here many pieces of 
news concerning the calling in of the reserves in 
different parts of the country, also in Warsaw and in 
Vilna, I told the General that his statements placed 
me before a riddle. On his officer's word of honour 
he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly 
here and there a false alarm might have been given. 

" I must consider this conversation as an attempt to 
mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto 
taken in view of the abundant and positive information 
about the calling in of the reserves." 

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its 
threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly 
pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no 
conversation in St. Petersburg. The Austro -Hungarian 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on 
July 2gth, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation 
with Sazonof. Count Szapary was empowered to explain 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 123 

to the Russian Minister the Note to Servia, though it had 
been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any 
suggestion on the part of Russia, as well as to discuss with 
Sazonof all questions touching directly upon the Austro- 
Russian relations. 

Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces- 
santly, and supported every proposal in Vienna from which 
we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of 
the conflict.! We even as late as the 30//? of July forwarded 
the English proposal to Vienna^ as basis for negotiations, that 
Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, 
i.e. after her march into Servia. VVe thought that Russia 
would accept this basis. 

During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there 
appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian 
measures of mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the 
East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of 
war all over important parts of the Russian west frontier 
allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was 
in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such 
measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg 
on word of honour. 

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the 
Anglo-German mediation, whose tendencies and basis must 
have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been 
received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization. 

During the same days there took place between His 
Majesty the Kaiser and Tsar Nicholas an exchange of tele- 
grams, in which His Majesty called the attention of the 
Tsar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilization 
during the continuance of his own mediating activities.^ 

On July 31st the Tsar directed the following telegram to 
His Majesty the Kaiser : — 

" I thank You cordially for Your mediation, which 
permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. 
It is technically impossible to discontinue our military 

' See Exhibit 19. 

' See Exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 23A. 



124 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

preparations, which have been made necessary by the 
Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. 
As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia 
continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. 
I give You my solemn ivord thereon. I confide with all 
my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the 
success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare 
of our countries and the peace of Europe. 

" Your cordially devoted 

Nicholas." 

This telegram of the Tsar crossed with the following, 
sent by H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m. : — 

" Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your 
request for my aid I have engaged in mediation 
between Your Government and the Government of 
Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, 
Your troops were being mobilized against my ally 
Austria- Hungary, whereby, as I have already com- 
municated to You, my mediation has become almost 
illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now 
I receive reliable news that serious preparations for 
war are going on on my eastern frontier. The re- 
sponsibility for the security of my country forces me to 
measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit 
of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the 
peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsi- 
bility for the misfortune which now threatens the 
entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert 
it. No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia, 
which might well have awaited the success of my 
mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, 
bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his death-bed, 
has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faith- 
fully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, 
especially during its last war. The peace of Europe 
can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to 
discontinue those military preparations which menace 
Germany and Austria-Hungary." 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 125 

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobiH- 
zation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against 
us and already ordered during the afternoon of July 31st, 
was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the 
Tsar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon. 

After the Russian general mobilization became known in 
Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was 
instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the 
Russian Government that Germany declared the state of 
war as counter-measure against the general mobilization ^ 
of the Russian army and navy, which must be followed by 
mobilization if Russia did not cease its military measures 
against Germany and Austria- Hungary within twelve hours, 
and notify Germany thereof. 

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was 
instructed to demand from the French Government a 
declaration within eighteen hours, whether it would remain 
neutral in a Russo-German war,^ 

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobili- 
zation, menacing the security of our country, the laborious 
action at mediation of the European Cabinets. The Russian 
mobilization, in regard to the seriousness of which the 
Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain 
a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows 
clearly that Russia wanted war. 

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his 
note to M. Sazonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight. 

The reply of the Russian Government has never 
reached us. 

Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Tsar 
telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser as follows : — 

" I have received Your telegram. I comprehend 
that You are forced to mobilize, but / should like to 
have from You the same guarantee which I have given 
You, viz. that these measures do not mean war, and that 
we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two 
countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our 
* See Exhibit 24. » See Exhibit 25. 



126 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our 
long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. 
I expect with full confidence Your august reply." 

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied : — 

" I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown 
yesterday to Your Government the way through which 
alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked 
for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my 
Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your 
Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize 
my army. An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply 
of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless 
misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my 
great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. 
I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, 
order your troops to commit, under no circumstances, 
the slightest violation of our frontiers." 

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the 
receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered 
the mobilization of the entire German army and navy on 
August ist, at 5 p.m. 

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed 
that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving 
a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should 
declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after 
the refusal of our demands.^ However, before a confirma- 
tion of the execution of this order had been received, that 
is to say, already in the afternoon of August ist, i.e. the 
same afternoon on which the telegram of the Tsar, cited 
above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and 
marched into German territory. 

Thus Russia began the war against us. 

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our 
question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m. 

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and 
unsatisfactory reply on August ist at i p.m., which gave 

See Exhibit 26. 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 127 

no clear idea of the position of France, ^ as he Hmited 
himself to the explanation that France would do that which 
her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the 
mobilization of the entire French army and navy was 
ordered. 

On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities. 



THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES 

The Note of Austria-Hungary to Servia 

Presented July 2T,rd in Belgrade 

" On March 31, 190Q, the Royal Servian Minister to 
the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order 
of his Government : — 

" Servia declares that she is not affected in her 
rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that 
she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which 
the Powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art. 
25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the counsels 
of the Powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude 
of protest and resistance which she has assumed since 
last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds 
herself further to change the direction of her present 
policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, 
to live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly 
relations. 

" The history of the last years, and especially the painful 
events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a 
subversive movement in Servia whose aim it is to separate 
certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
This movement, which developed under the eyes of the 
Servian Government, has found expression subsequently 
beyond the territory of the kingdom in acts of terrorism, a 
series of assassinations and murders. 

" Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained 
' See Exhibit 27. 



128 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

in the declaration of March 31, 1909, the Royal Servian 
Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. 
She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies 
and associations directed against the Monarchy, the un- 
bridled language of the Press, glorification of the origi- 
nators of assassinations, the participation of officers and 
officials in subversive intrigues : she suffered the unwhole- 
some propaganda in public education, and lastly permitted 
all manifestations which would mislead the Servian people 
into hatred of the Monarchy and into contempt for its 
institutions. 

" This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government 
made itself guilty has lasted up to the moment in which 
the events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world 
the ghastly consequences of such sufferance. 

" It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions 
of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that 
the murder at Serajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that 
the murderers received the arms and bombs with which 
they were equipped from Servian officers and officials 
who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, 
the transportation of the criminals and their arms to 
Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian 
frontier officials. 

"The cited results of the investigation do not permit the 
Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer the 
attitude of waiting which it has assumed for years towards 
those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade, and 
which from there radiate into the territory of the Monarchy. 
These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial 
and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues 
which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the 
Monarchy. 

" In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and 
Royal Government is forced to demand official assurance 
from the Servian Government that it condemns the propa- 
ganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety 
of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from 
the Monarchy which belonfr to it, and that she binds herself 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 129 

to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing 
propaganda. 

"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, 
the Royal Servian Government will publish on the first 
page of its official organ of July 26, 1914, the following 
declaration : — 

" The Royal Servian Government condemns the 
propaganda directed against Austria- Hungary, i.e. the 
entirety of those machinations whose aim it is to 
separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy terri- 
tories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the 
ghastly consequences of these criminal actions. 

''The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian 
officers and officials have participated in the propa- 
ganda, cited above, and have thus threatened the 
friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal 
Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its 
declaration of March 31, 1909. 

" The Royal Government, which disapproves and 
rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing 
the destinations of the inhabitants of any part of 
Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most 
emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials, 
and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it 
will henceforward proceed with the utmost severity 
against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent 
and suppress which it will make every effort. 

"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the 
cognizance of the Royal army through an order of H.M. 
the King, and it is to be published in the official organ of 
the army. 

" The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, 
as follows : — 

" I. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred 

of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian 

Monarchy, and whose general tendency is 

directed against the latter's territorial integrity ; 

10 



130 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

" 2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the 
society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their 
entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in 
the same manner against the other societies and 
associations in Servia which occupy themselves 
with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. 
The Royal Government will take the necessary 
measures, so that the dissolved societies may 
not continue their activities under another name 
or in another form ; 
" 3. Without delay to eliminate from the public in- 
struction in Servia, so far as the corps of 
instructors, as well as the means of instruction 
are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, 
to foster the propaganda against Austria- 
Hungary; 
"4. To remove from military service and the adminis- 
tration in general all officers and officials who 
are guilty of propaganda against Austria- 
Hungary, and whose names, with a communi- 
cation of the material which the Imperial and 
Royal Government possesses against them, the 
Imperial and Royal Government reserves the 
right to communicate to the Royal Government ; 
"5. To consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial 
and Royal Government co-operate in the sup- 
pression of a movement directed against the 
territorial integrity of the monarchy ; 
"6. To commence a judicial investigation against the 
participants of the conspiracy of June 28th who 
are on Servian territory. Officials delegated by 
the Imperial and Royal Government will par- 
ticipate in the examinations ; 
"7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major 
Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, 
Servian State officials, v.'ho have been com- 
promised through the result of the investigation ; 
" 8. To prevent through effective measures the par- 
ticipation of the Servian authorities in the 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 131 

smuggling of arms and explosives across the 
frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz 
and Loznica who assisted the originators of the 
crime of Serajevo in crossing the frontier ; 
"9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government 
explanations in regard to the unjustifiable 
remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia 
and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of 
their official position, to express themselves in 
interviews in a hostile manner against Austria- 
Hungary after the outrage of June 28th. 
'*' 10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a 
reply from the Royal Government at the latest 
until Saturday, 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir 
concerning the results of the investigations at 
Serajevo, so far as they concern points 7 and 8, is 
enclosed with this Note." 

Enclosure. 

The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and 
accomplices in the Court of Serajevo, on account of the 
assassination on June 28th, has, so far, yielded the following 
results : — 

1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand 

during his stay in Serajevo was conceived in 
Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, Gab- 
rinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko 
Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic. 

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which 

were used by the criminals were obtained by 
Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and 
presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade. 

3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at 

the arsenal of the Servian Army in Kragujevac, 

4. To ensure the success of the assassination, Milan 

Ciganowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the 
use of the grenades and gave instructions in shoot- 
ing with Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez 



132 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

in a forest near the target-practice field of 
Topshider (outside Belgrade). 
5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic 
and Grabez, and the smuggling of their arms, 
a secret system of transportation was organized 
by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with 
their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade 
Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by the 
custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica 
with the aid of several other persons. 

The Servian Answer 
Presented at Vienna July 25, 1914 
(With Austria's commentaries [in italics]) 

The Royal Government has received the communication 
of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. 
and is convinced that its reply will dissipate any misunder- 
standing which threatens to destroy the friendly and 
neighbourly relations between the Austrian monarchy and 
the kingdom of Servia. 

The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere have 
there been raised such protests against the great neighbour- 
ing Monarchy like those which at one time were expressed 
in the Skuptchina, as well as in the declaration and actions 
of the responsible representatives of the State at that time, 
and which were terminated by the Servian declaration of 
March 31, 1909 ; furthermore, that since that time neither 
the different corporations of the kingdom nor the officials 
have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial 
condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The 
Royal Government states that the I. and R. Government 
has made no protest in this sense excepting in the case of a 
schoolbook, in regard to which the I. and R. Government 
has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia 
has given during the time of the Balkan crisis in numerous 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 133 

cases evidence of her pacific and moderate policy, and 
it is only owing to Servia and the sacrifices which she has 
brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this 
peace has been preserved. 

The Royal Servian Government limits itself to esiablisJiing 
that since the declaration of March 51, igog, there has been no 
attempt on the part of the Servian Government to alter the 
'bosition of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 

With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our 
Note, as we have not insisted that she and her officials have 
undertaken anything official in tliis direction. Our gravamen 
is that in spite of the obligation assumed in the cited Note, she 
has omitted to suppress the movement directed against the 
territorial integrity of the Monarchy. 

Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the 
entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and 
neighbourly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
and not only not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia. 

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for 
expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper 
articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions 
which are of very common appearance in other countries, 
and which ordinarily are not under the control of the State. 
This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown 
great courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions 
which have arisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, 
whereby it has succeeded in solving the greater number 
thereof, with mutual profit to both countries. 

The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the 
expressions of the Press and the activity of Servian associations 
possess a private character and thus escape governmental 
control stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern 
States and even the most liberal of Press and society laws, 
which nearly everywhere subject the Press and the societies to 
a certain control of the State. This is also provided for by the 
Servian institutions. The rebuke against the Servian Govern- 
ment consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise 
its Press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction 
to be hostile to the Monarchy. 



134 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised 
by the assertions that citizens of Servia had participated in 
the preparations of the outrage in Serajevo. The Govern- 
ment expected to be invited to co-operate in the investiga- 
tion of the crime, and it was ready, in order to prove its 
complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in 
regard to whom it should receive information. 

This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was 
accurately informed about tJie suspicion resting upon quite 
definite personalities and not only in the position, but also 
obliged by its own laws, to institute investigations spontane- 
ously. The Servian Government has done nothing in this 
direction. 

According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, 
the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court, 
without regard to position and rank, every Servian citizen 
of whose participation in the crime of Serajevo it should 
have received proof. It binds itself particularly on the 
first page of the official organ of the 26th of July to publish 
the following enunciation : — 

" The Royal Servian Government condemns every 
propaganda which should be directed against Austria- 
Hungary, i.e. the entirety of such activities as aim towards 
the separation of certain territories from the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the 
lamentable consequences of these criminal machina- 
tions." 

The Austrian demand reads : — 

" Tlie Royal Servian Government condemns the propa- 
ganda against Austria-Hungary. . . ." 

The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which 
has been tnade by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to 
imply that a propaganda directed against Austria- Hungary 
does not exist, and that it is not aware of such. This formula 
is insincere, and the Servian Government reserves itself the 
subterfuge for later occasions that it had not disavowed by 
this declaration the existing propaganda, nor recognized the 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 135 

same as hostile to the Monarchy, whence it could deduce 
further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a 
propaganda similar to the present one. 

The Royal Government regrets that according to a 
communication of the I. and R. Government certain Servian 
officers and functionaries have participated in the propa- 
ganda just referred to, and that these have therefore 
endangered the amicable relations for the observation of 
which the Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself 
through the declaration of March 31, 1909. 

The Government . . . identical with the demanded text. 

The formula as demanded by Austria reads: — 

" The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers 
and functionaries . . . have participated . . ." 

Also with this formida and the furihcr addition, "accord- 
ing to the declaration of the I, and R. Government," the 
Servian Government pursues tlie object, already indicated 
above, to preserve a free hand for the future. 

The Royal Government binds itself further : — 

I. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptchina to 
embody in the Press laws a clause, to wit, that the incite- 
ment to hatred of, and contempt for, the Monarchy is to be 
most severely punished, as well as every publication whose 
general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity 
of Austria-Hungary. 

It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the 
constitution to embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the 
constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such 
publications, as is at present impossible according to the 
clear definition of Art. 22 of the constitution. 

Austria had demanded : — 

I. "To suppress every publication which incites to hatred 
and contempt for the Monarchy, and whose tendency is directed 
against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy." 

We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take 
care that such attacks of the Press would cease in the future. 

Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are meant 
as means towards this end, viz. : — 



136 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

(a) A law according to which the expressions of the Press 
hostile to the Monarchy can be individually punished, 
a matter which is immaterial to ns, all the more so as 
the individual prosecution of Press intrigues is very rarely 
possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such lazvs, the 
few cases of this nature would not be punished. The pro- 
position, therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, 
and it offers not the least guarantee for the desired success. 

(b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which 
would permit confiscation, a proposal which does not 
satisfy us, as the existence of such a law in Servia is of 
no use to us. For we want the obligation of the Govern- 
ment to enforce it, and that has not been promised us. 

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and 
evasive, as ive are not told ivitliin what time these laws will 
be passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws 
by the Skuptchina everything would remain as it is, excepting 
the event of a possible resignation of the Government. 

2. The Government possesses no proofs and the Note of 
the I. and R. Government does not submit them that the 
society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have 
committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this 
manner through any one of their members. Notwithstand- 
ing this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of 
the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna 
Odbrana, as well as every society w^hich should act against 
Austria- Hungary. 

The propaganda of tlie Narodna Odbrana and affiliated 
societies hostile to the Monarchy fills the entire public life of 
Servia; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve if the 
Servian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it. 
Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we 
have asked besides : — 

" To confiscate the means of propaganda of tJiese 
societies, to prevent the reformation of the dissolved 
societies under another name and in another form." 

In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 137 

silent, so that through this semi-concession there is offered 
us no guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the 
associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna 
Odbrana. 

3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without 
delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia 
anything which might further the propaganda directed 
against Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R. Government 
furnishes actual proofs. 

Also in this case the Servian Government first demands 
proofs for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public 
instruction of Servia while it must know that the textbooks 
introduced in the Servian schools contain objectionable 
matter in this direction and that a large portion of the 
teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and 
affiliated societies. 

Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled a 
part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in 
its text the addition desired by us : " as far as the body of 
instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction " 
— a sentence which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile 
to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian schools. 

4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those 
officers and officials from the military and civil services 
in regard to whom it has been proved by judicial investi- 
gation that they have been guilty of actions against the 
territorial integrity of the Monarchy ; it expects that the 
I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose 
of starting the investigation the names of these officers and 
officials, and the facts with which they have been charged. 

By promising the dismissal from the military and civil 
services of those officers and officials who are found guilty 
by judicial procedure, the Servian Government limits its 
assent to those cases in whicli these persons have been charged 
with a crime according to the statutory code. As, however, 
we demand the removal of such officers and officials as indulge 
in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally 
not punishable in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled 
in this point. 



138 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear 
about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and 
R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part 
of the Royal Servian Government to permit the co-operation 
of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian territory, 
but it declares that it is willing to accept every co-operation 
which does not run counter to international law and criminal 
law, as well as to the friendly and neighbourly relations. 

The international law, as well as the criminal law, has 
nothing to do with this question ; it is purely a matter of 
the nature of State police which is to be solved by way of 
a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is 
therefore incomprehensible and on account of its vague 
general form it would lead to nnbridgeable difficulties. 

6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a 
matter of course to begin an investigation against all those 
persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th 
and who are in its territory. As far as the co-operation in 
this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and 
R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as 
this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal pro- 
cedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation 
might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials. 

The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable : — ■ 

1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants 
in the outrage. 

2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in tJie 
examinations {''Recherche" in contrast ivith " cnquete 
judiciaire"). 

3. // did not occur to ns to let I. and R. Government 
officials participate in the Servian court procedure ; they were 
to co-operate only in the police researches which had to furnish 
and fix the material for the investigation. 

If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this 
is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference 
between " enquete judiciaire " and simple police researches. 
As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation 
which would yield, if correctly carried out, higJily undesirable 
residts for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 139 

plausible manner the co-operation of our officials {precedents 
for such police intervention exist in great number) it tries to 
justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible. 

7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening 
of the day on which the Note was received the arrest of 
Major Voishir Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciga- 
nowic is concerned, who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th with 
the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to 
locate him, wherefore a warrant has been issued against him. 

The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, 
as soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the 
investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion and the 
proofs of guilt obtained in the investigation at Serajevo. 

This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, 
Cigauoivic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three 
days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known 
that Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first 
place, it is tlierefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian 
service on June 2Sth. In the second place, we add that the 
prefect of police at Belgrade, who had himself caused the 
departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his whereabout, 
declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan 
Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade. 

8. The Servian Government will amplify and render 
more severe the existing measures for the suppression of 
smuggling of arms and explosives. 

It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once 
against, and punish severely, those ofhcials of the frontier 
service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty 
and who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to 
cross the frontier. 

9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations 
about the expressions which its officials in Servia and 
abroad have made in intervievv'S after the outrage and which, 
according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, 
were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. 
Government points out in detail where those expressions 
were made and succeeds in proving that those expressions 



I40 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, 
the Royal Government itself will take care that the 
necessary evidences and proofs are collected therefor. 

The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the 
interviews in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Govern- 
ment that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the 
said interviews^ and if it reserves for itself the right of a 
formal investigation, it shoivs that it is not its intention 
seriously to fulfil the demand. 

10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. 
Government, so far as this has not been already done by 
the present Note, of the execution of the measures in 
question as soon as one of those measures has been ordered 
and put into execution. 

The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the 
common interest not to rush the solution of this affair, and 
it is therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not 
consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to 
accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision 
of this question to the International Court at The Hague or 
by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have 
participated in the working out of the declaration given by 
the Servian Government on March 31, 1909. 

The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time. 

Exhibit i 

The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, 
London, and St. Petersburg, on July 23, 19 14. 

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
concerning the circumstances under which the assassina- 
tion of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort 
took place, disclose clearly the aims which the Pan-Serb 
propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilizes 
for their realization. Through the published facts the 
last doubt must disappear that the centre of action of the 
efforts for the separation of the south Slavic provinces from 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 141 

the Servian kingdom must be sought in Belgrade, where it 
displays its activity with the connivance of members of the 
Government and of the army. 

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series 
of years. In a specially marked manner the Pan-Serb 
chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis. Only 
to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic interces- 
sion of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations 
to which at that time Austria- Hungary was exposed on 
the part of Servia did not lead to a conflict. The assurance 
of future well-behaviour which the Servian Government 
gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, 
at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the 
Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope 
and intensity ; at its door is to be laid the latest crime 
the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become 
evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity 
nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings across 
the border through which the safety and the integrity of the 
Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of 
affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable. 
Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well 
as by the Government in Servia does not preclude the fear 
that the Servian Government will decline to meet these 
demands and that it will allow itself to be carried away into 
a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. Nothing 
would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
unless it renounced definitely its position as a Great Power, 
but to press its demands with the Servian Government and, 
if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, 
in regard to which the choice of means must be left 
with it. 

I have the honour to request you to express yourself 
in the sense indicated above to (the present representative 
of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sazonof) and there- 
with give special emphasis to the view that in this question 



142 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely 
between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to 
which it must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to 
ensure. We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict 
because every intercession of another Power on account of 
the various treaty-alliances would precipitate incalculable 
consequences. 

1 shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report 
about the course of your interview. 



Exhibit 2 

The Chancellor to the Ambassadors of Germany. 
Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

You will make the following report to the Government 
to which you are accredited : — 

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government 
has published in its Note to the Servian Government, the 
last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the 
Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim 
was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance 
of members of the Servian Government and army. It is a 
product of the Pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of 
years have become a source of permanent disturbance for 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of 
Europe. 

The Pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked 
during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self- 
restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be 
ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary 
was exposed at that time did not lead to a conflict. The 
assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Servian 
Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the 
very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, 
the Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to 
increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible 
neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-preserva- 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 143 

tion if the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted to view 
idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through 
which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are 
permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the 
action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government can be viewed only as justifiable. 

The reply of the Servian Government to the demands 
which the Austro-Hungarian Government put on the 
23rd inst. through its representative in Belgrade, shows 
that the dominating factors in Servia are not inclined to 
cease their former policies and agitation. There will remain 
nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian Government than to 
press its demands, if need be, through military action, 
unless it renounces for good its position as a Great Power. 

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter 
of necessity, and a duty for Russia, to actively become a 
party to Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and 
Servia. For the European conflagration which would 
result from a similar step by Russia, the Kowoje IVreiiija 
believes itself justified in making Germany responsible in 
so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield. 

The Russian Press thus turns conditions upside down. 
It is not Austria- Hungary which has called forth the conflict 
with Servia, but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous 
favour toward Pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, threatens the same in her 
existence, and creates conditions which eventually found 
expression in the wanton outrage at Serajevo. If Russia 
believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this 
matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However it 
must realize that it makes the Serb activities its own to 
undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsi- 
bility if out of the Austro-Servian affair, which all other 
Great Powers desire to localize, there arises a European war. 
This responsibility of Russia's is evident, and it weif^hs the 
more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to 
Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire 
Servian territory, or to touch the existence of the Servian 



144 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

kingdom, but only desires peace against the Servian 
intrigues threatening its existence. 

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question 
is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the Pan- 
Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruc- 
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the scattering or 
weakening of the Triple Alliance, with a complete isolation 
of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest 
therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The 
duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal 
war, points to the support by ourselves of those endeavours 
which aim at the localization of the conflict, faithful to the 
course of those policies which we have carried out success- 
fully for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation 
of the peace of Europe. 

Should, however, against our hope, through the inter- 
ference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to 
support, faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbour- 
monarchy with all the power at our command. We shall 
take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear 
consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which 
war will bring upon the peoples of Europe. 

Exhibit 3 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the 
Chancellor on July 24, 19 14. 

Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charge 
d'Affaires, in order to explain to him thoroughly and 
cordially Austria-Hungary's point of view towards Servia. 
After recapitulation of the historical development of the 
past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchy entertained 
no thought of conquest towards Servia. Austria- Hungary 
would not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that 
this step was meant as a definite means of checking the 
Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstances, Austria- 
Hungary must have a guarantee for continued amicable 
relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to 
bring about a change in the balance of power in the 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 145 

Balkans. The Charge d'Affaires, who had received no in- 
structions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the 
Secretary ad referendum, with the promise to submit it 
immediately to Sazonof. 

Exhibit 4 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to 
the Chancellor on July 24, 1914. 

I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a pro- 
longed interview with Sazonof. The Secretary (Sazonof) 
indulged in unmeasured accusations toward Austria- 
Hungary, and he was very much agitated. He declared 
most positively that Russia could not permit under any 
circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled 
alone between the parties concerned. 

Exhibit 5 

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. 
Telegram of July 26, 1914. 

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended 
interview with Sazonof this afternoon. Both parties had 
a satisfactory impression as they told me afterwards. The 
assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no 
idea of conquest, but wished to obtain peace at last at her 
frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary. 

Exhibit 6 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador of St. Petersburg 
to the Chancellor on July 25, 19 14. 

Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German 
honorary aide-de-camp to the Tsar). 

The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were 
suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their 
garrisons at once. The manoeuvres have been cancelled. 
The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of 
officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains 

II 



146 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have 
the impression that complete preparations for mobihzation 
against Austria are being made. 

Exhibit 7 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
to the Chancellor on July 26, 1914. 

The MiHtary Attache requests the following message to 
be sent to the General Staff : 

I deem it certain that mobilization has been ordered for 
Kief and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow 
and improbable elsewhere. 

Exhibit 8 

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the 
Chancellor on July 27, 19 14. 

Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war. 

Exhibit 9 

Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor 
on July 27, 1914. 

Have learned reliably that French XlVth corps has dis- 
continued manceuvres. 

Exhibit 10 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
London. Urgent. July 26, 19 14. 

Austria- Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially 
and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in 
Servia ; that it will not touch the existence of the kingdom, 
but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions. Accord- 
ing to news received here, the call for several classes of the 
reserves is expected immediately, which is equivalent to 
mobilization. If this news proves correct, we shall be 
forced to counter-measures very much against our own 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT i47 

wishes. Our desire to localize the conflict and to preserve 
the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act 
in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis. 

Exhibit ioa 

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial 
Ambassador at Paris on July 26, 1914. 

After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary 
has no intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch 
the existence of the kingdom, the decision whether there 
is to be a European war rests solely with Russia, which 
has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon 
France, with which we are at one in the desire for the 
preservation at the peace of Europe, that it will exercise 
its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace. 

Exhibit iob 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg on July 26, 19 14. 
After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial dis- 
interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance 
of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention 
rests solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will 
undertake no steps which will threaten seriously the peace 
of Europe. 

Exhibit ii 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to 
the Chancellor on July 27, 1914. 

Military Attache reports a conversation with the Secretary 
of War :— 

Sazonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the 
situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word 
of honour that no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. 
Though general preparations are being made, no reserves 
were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed 
the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed 



148 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

toward Austria, viz. Kief, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are 
to be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on the 
German frontier, Warsaw, Vihia, St. Petersburg. Peace 
with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry 
into the object of mobiHzation against Austria he shrugged 
his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the 
Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but 
considered mobilization even against Austria as very 
menacing. 

Exhibit 12 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
London on Jidy 27, 1914. 

We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward 
Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London. It is 
impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Servia 
before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited 
to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict. 

Exhibit 13 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
London on Jidy 25, 1914. 

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an 
Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly 
correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any 
more than England, and as heretofore we take the position 
that this question must be localized by virtue of all Powers 
refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that 
Russia will refrain from any action in view of her respon- 
sibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are pre- 
pared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite 
apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between 
Russia and Austria jointly with the other Powers. 

Exhibit 14 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg on Jidy 28, 1914. 

We continue in our endeavour to induce Vienna to 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 149 

elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the 
Austrian action in Servia in a manner both convincing and 
satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has 
meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter. 



Exhibit 15 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in 
London on Jidy 27, 1914. 

We have at once started the mediation proposal in 
Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We 
have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire 
of M. Sazonof for a direct parley with Vienna. 



Exhibit 16 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the 
Chancellor on July 28, 1914. 

Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your 
Excellency his thanks for the communication of the 
English mediation proposal. He states, however, that 
after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the sub- 
sequent declaration of war, the step appears belated. 

Exhibit 17 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador 
at Paris on Jidy 29, 1914. 

News received here regarding French preparations of 
war multiplies from hour to hour. I request that you call 
the attention of the French Government to this and accen- 
tuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures 
on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening 
state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would 
not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the 
tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for 
the preservation of peace. 



ISO THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Exhibit i8 

Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to 
H.M. the Kaiser on July 30, 19 14. 

Prince Trubetskoy said to me yesterday, after causing Your 
Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Tsar Nicholas : 
" Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come." 
He has just told me the telegram has made a deep im- 
pression upon the Tsar, but as the mobilization against 
Austria had already been ordered, and Sazonof had con- 
vinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, 
His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. 
I then told him that the guilt for the measureless con- 
sequences lay at the door of premature mobilization against 
Austria- Hungary, which after all was involved merely in 
a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear 
and the responsibility rested upon Russia, which ignored 
Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of 
territorial gain in Servia. Austria - Hungary mobilized 
against Servia and not against Russia, and there was no 
ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. 
I further added that in Germany one could not understand 
any more Russia's phrase that " she could not desert her 
brethren in Servia," after the horrible crime of Serajevo. I 
told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army 
were to be mobilized. 



Exhibit 19 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador 
at Rome on July 31, 1914. 

We have continued to negotiate between Russia and 
Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams 
between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Tsar, 
as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey, Through 
the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been greatly 
handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite 
of pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 151 

measures against us that the situation is becoming con- 
tinually more menacing. 

Exhibit 20 
I. His Majesty to the Tsar. 

July 2W1, 10.45 P-'^^' 

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression 
which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against 
Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going 
on for years in Servia has led to the revolting crime of 
which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. 
The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King 
and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless 
You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, 
and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist 
that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder 
shall suffer their deserved punishment. 

On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty 
encountered by You and Your Government to stem the 
tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship 
which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, 
I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary 
to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with 
Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in 
my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise. 

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin, 

(Signed) Wilhelm. 

Exhibit 21 

H. The Tsar to His Majesty. 

Peterhof Palace, July 2gth, i p.m. 

I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this 
serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An igno- 
minious war has been declared against a weak country, and 
in Russia the indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. 
I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure 



152 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take 
measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity, 
as a European war would be, I urge You in the name 
of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain 
Your ally from going too far. 

(Signed) NICHOLAS. 

Exhibit 22 
III. His Majesty to the Tsar. 

July 2()th, 6,30 p.m. 

I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire 
for the conservation of peace. However, I cannot — as 
I told You in my first telegram — consider the action of 
Austria-Hungary as an " ignominious war." Austria- 
Hungary knows from experience that the promises of 
Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely 
unreliable. 

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary 
is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guarantee 
that the promises of Servia are effectively translated into 
deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation 
of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no 
territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore 
of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain 
a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing 
Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe 
that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between 
Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which 
— as I have already telegraphed You — my Government 
endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally 
military measures by Russia, which might be construed as 
a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity 
which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine 
my position as mediator, which — upon Your appeal to my 
friendship and aid — I willingly accepted. 

(Signed) WiLHELM. 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT 153 

Exhibit 23 

IV, His Majesty to the Tsar. 

July 2,oih, 1 a.m. 

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention 
of Your Government to the dangers and serious conse- 
quences of a mobilization ; I have told You the same in 
my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilized only 
against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, 
as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that 
of Your Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, 
the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted 
me in such friendly manner, and which I have accepted 
upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made im- 
possible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon 
Your shoulders ; You have to bear the responsibility for 
war or peace. 

(Signed) Wilhelm. 

Exhibit 23A 

V. The Tsar to His Majesty. 

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1.20 p.m. 

I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I 
am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the 
Kaiser) with instructions. The Jiiititary measures now taking 
form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason 
of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with 
all my heart that these measures will not influence in any 
manner Your position as mediator, which I appraise very 
highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so 
that an understanding can be arrived at with us. 

(Signed) Nicholas. 

Exhibit 24 

Telegram of the CJiancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg on Jidy 31, 1914. Urgent. 

In spite of negotiations still pending and although we 
have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, 



154 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, hence also 
against us. On account of these Russian measures we have 
been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim 
the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply 
mobilization. Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if 
Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and 
against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours and notifies us 
definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at once 
to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication. 

Exhibit 25 

Telegram of tlie Chancellor to tJie Imperial Ambassador in 
Paris on July 31, 19 14. Urgent. 

Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and 
fleet, therefore also against us in spite of our still pending 
mediation. We have therefore declared the threatening 
state of war, which is bound to be followed by mobilization 
unless Russia stops within twelve hours all measures of war 
against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies 
war. Please ask French Government whether it intends 
to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must 
be made in eighteen hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. 
Utmost speed necessary. 

Exhibit 26 

Telegram of the Chancellor to tJie Imperial Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg on August i, 12.52 p.m. Urgent. 

If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply 
to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this 
afternoon five o'clock (mid-European time) the following 
statement : — 

" Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts 
de la crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant 
a un desir que lui en avait ete exprime par Sa Majeste 
I'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste I'Empereur dAllemagne 
d'accord avec I'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un 
role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. 



THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT i55 

Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le r^sultat, 
proceda a la mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de 
terre et de mer. 

"A la suite de cette mesure mena^ante motivee par aucun 
preparatif militaire de la part de I'Allemagne, I'Empire Alle- 
mand se trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. 
Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque de parer a ce 
peril il aurait compromis la securite et I'existence meme 
de I'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Alle- 
mand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste I'Empereur de toutes les Russies insistant sur la 
cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse 
de faire droit a cette demande et ayant manifesto par ce 
refus, que son action etait dirigee contre I'Allemagne, j'ai 
I'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir 
a Votre Excellence ce qui suit : — 

" Sa Majeste I'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom 
de I'Empire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre 
avec la Russie." 

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this 
instruction by Russian time. 

Please ask for your passports and turn over protection 
and affairs to the American Embassy. 

Exhibit 27 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the 
CJiancellor on August i, 1.50 p.m. 

Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France 
would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German 
war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do 
that which her interests dictated. 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOKi 

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

Collections of Diplomatic Documents 

NegoUatioiis froui loth to 24//^ July {2T,rd July to August 
6th), igi^, preceding the war 

St. Petersburg, Imperial Press 

No. I 

Charge d' Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Belgrade, July 10/23. 

AUSTRIAN Ambassador at six o'clock has given to 
Finance Minister, who is acting for Pashitch, ulti- 
matum from his Government giving forty-eight hours for 
acceptance of its demands. Giesl supplemented this by 
saying that in the event of this not being accepted in full 
within forty-eight hours he would leave Belgrade with 
his whole Mission. Pashitch and other Ministers have 
gone on an electioneering tour, and are recalled and 
expected in Belgrade at 10 a.m. to-morrow. The Finance 
Minister communicated to me the above Note and asked 
for Russian protection. He said that no Servian Govern- 
ment could agree to the Austrian demands. 

(Signed) Strandman. 

No. 2 

Charge d' Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Belgrade, July 10/23. 

The following Note has been presented to-day by the 

Austrian Ambassador to the Servian Government : — 

' Translation made by author from original Russian text. 

156 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 157 

(Here follows Austrian Note to Servia. See White 
Paper 4.) 

No. 3 

Memorandum communicated by the Austrian Ambassador 
in St. Petersburg to Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 
11/24, at 10 a.})i. 

The Imperial and Royal Government has found it 
necessary to instruct its Ambassador to convey on the 
ioth/23rd of this month the following Note to the Servian 
Government : — 

(Here follows text of Note, Document No. 2.) 

No. 4 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Charge d' Affaires in Austria. 

(telegram.) 

St. Petersburg, July 11/24. 

I shall be glad if you communicate to the Austrian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs the following : — 

The conduct of Austria towards the Powers in presenting 
its ultimatum to Belgrade with a time limit of forty-eight 
hours deprives the Powers of the possibility of taking in the 
short time remaining any useful steps towards settling the 
complications arising therefrom. Therefore in order to 
avert the immeasurable and undesirable consequences 
which the action of Austria may cause, we consider it 
indispensable that the latter should first of all prolong the 
time allowed for the Servian reply. Having expressed her 
readiness to acquaint the Powers with the circumstances 
on which she founds her accusation, Austria ought to afford 
them the possibility of forming a judgment on the matter. 
In the event of the Powers being convinced of the justice 
of the Austrian demands they could give Servia suitable 
advice. The refusal of Austria to present us with a clear 
statement of her case is contrary to international etiquette, 
and would deprive the announcement made by her to-day 



158 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

of any meaning. This Note has been communicated to 
London, Berlin, Rome, Paris, and Belgrade. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

NO. 5 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Imperial Representatives in 
England, Germany, Italy, and France. 

St. Petersburg, July 11/24. 
In reference to the telegram communicated to Kudashef 
we hope the Government to which you are accredited will 
agree with our standpoint and will instruct its Ambassador 
in Vienna in this sense. This has been communicated 
to Belgrade. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 6 

Telegram of the Crozvn Prince of Servia to the Emperor 

of Russia. 
/ Belgrade, July 11/24. 

Yesterday evening the Austrian Government handed Note 
to Servian Government relating to Serajevo murders. 
Servia in accordance with international obligation expressed 
on first day after the terrible murder her condemnation of 
the crime and her readiness to open investigation in her 
territory if evidence brought forward by Austria showed 
complicity of her subjects. But demands included in 
Austrian Note are not consistent with maintenance of 
Servian integrity, and aim at her humiliation. Among 
other things a declaration is demanded from us in the 
Official Gazette, and an Imperial Proclamation to the Army 
in which we denounce the hostile spirit against Austria 
and express regret for our criminal laxness in relation to 
such intrigues ; further, that we agree to the co-operation of 
Austrian officials in Servia, both in the carrying out of the 
investigations and in the undertaking of measures demanded 
in the Note. They give us forty-eight hours for complying 
with all this ; if not, Austria withdraws her Ambassador 
from Belgrade. We are ready to accept those demands 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 159 

of Austria which can be reconciled with our independence 

and integrity, and also those which Your Majesty advises us 

to accept, and we are willing to punish severely all those 

who are shown to be implicated in the crime. Among the 

demands are some that will necessitate a change in our 

legal system, and for this time is indispensable. The time 

allowed is too short. The Austrian Army is posted along 

our frontier and can attack us at the end of the time limit. 

We cannot defend ourselves. Therefore we pray Your 

Imperial Majesty to give us help as quickly as possible. 

Your Imperial Majesty has given me abundant evidence of 

Your precious goodwill, and we hope that the call will find 

response in Your noble heart which loves the Slav race. I 

express the feeling of the Servian people, which in this 

troubled time prays Your Majesty to take interest in the 

fate of Servia. 

(Signed) Alexander. „ 

No. 7 

Charge d' Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Berlin, ji^uly 11/24. 

All the morning papers, even some which acknowledge 
the harshness towards Servia of the Austrian conditions, 
are sympathetic towards the arbitrary tone of the Austrian 
Note. Especially frank is the semi-official Lokal-Anzeiger, 
which says that the appeal of Servia to St. Petersburg, 
Paris, Athens, and Bucharest is superfluous, and concludes 
that the German people will now breathe freely, knowing 
at last that there will be established a stable state of affairs 
in the Balkan Peninsula. 

(Signed) Bronefsky. 

No. 8 

Charge d' Affaires in Paris to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, ^uly 11/24. 

The Official Copy of the Note handed in at Belgrade 
has now been communicated by Austrian Ambassador to 



i6o THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

French Government. The German Ambassador visited the 
French Minister and read to him a communication in 
which the Austrian case was reproduced, and further states 
that in the event of a Servian refusal Austria would have 
to resort to pressure and in case of necessity to military 
measures. In conclusion Germany considers the question 
to be one immediately between Austria and Servia, and it 
is in the interest of the Powers that the matter should be 
confined to the interested parties. The Director of the 
Political Department, who took part in the conversation, 
asked the Ambassador whether or not the Austrian Note 
must be regarded as an ultimatum. In other words, would 
military measures follow inevitably if Servia did not submit 
to the Austrian demands. The Ambassador declined to 
give a definite answer, not having received instructions. 

(Signed) Sevastopulo. 

No. 9 

Charge d' Affaires in Belgrade to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Belgrade, July 11/24. 
Pashitch has returned to Belgrade. He proposes to give 
Austria within the given time limit, that is by to-morrow, 
Saturday, evening at 6 o'clock, an answer indicating the 
acceptable and unacceptable points. To-day an appeal to 
the Powers for the protection of Servian independence will 
be sent. After that, says Pashitch, if war is unavoidable, 
we shall fight. 

(Signed) Strandman. 

No. 10 

Government Communication. 

St. Petersburg, July 12/25. 
The Government is anxiously awaiting the consequences 
of Austria's aggressive Note to Servia. The Government is 
following closely the developments of the Servo-Austrian 
dispute, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent. 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK i6i 

No. II 
Charge d' Affaires in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 12/25. 

Count Berchtold is in Ischl. Owing to the impossibility 
of reaching him personally in time, I have telegraphed to 
him our proposal for the prolongation of the time limit 
allowed in the ultimatum, and have communicated it 
verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised to trans- 
mit it immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but 
added that he could say with certainty that it would be 
rejected. 

(Signed) KuDASHEF. 

No. 12 

Charge d' Affaires in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 12/25. 

In continuation of my telegram of to-day, I have received 
through Macchio a negative answer from the Austrian 
Government to our proposal for the prolongation of the 
time limit. 

(Signed) KUDASHEF. 

No. 13 
Charge d'Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 
(Received after a delay on July 14/27.) 

Belgrade, July 12/25. 

I communicate the answer given by the Servian President 
of the Council of Ministers to the Austrian Ambassador in 
Belgrade to-day at the expiration of the time limit of the 
ultimatum. 

(Here follows te.xt of Servian reply. See White 
Paper 39.) 

IZ 



i62 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 14 
Charge d' Affaires in Berlin to Minister oj Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Berlin, July 12/25. 

Your telegram of iith/24th received and contents com- 
municated to Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He says 
British Government has asked him to recommend in 
Vienna a prolongation of the time limit. He has tele- 
graphed about it to Vienna, but he fears that the absence of 
Berchtold at Ischl and the lack of time will prevent any 
result, and he doubts if it would be politic for Austria to 
agree to yield at the last moment in view of the possible 
strengthening of Servia's self-confidence. I replied that 
a Great Power like Austria could yield without loss of 
prestige, and cited various arguments to strengthen this 
view, but he did not give any more definite assurance. 
Even on hints that action from Vienna might be followed 
by terrible consequences the Secretary for Foreign Affairs 

refused any assurances. 

(Signed) Bronefsky. 

No. 15 
Charge d' Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, July 12/25. 

Your telegram of July 11/24 concerning the prolonga- 
tion of the time limit in the Austrian ultimatum ; I made 
the above communication. The French representative 
in Vienna has been given corresponding instructions. 

(Signed) Sevastopulo. 

No. 16 
Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

London, July 12/25. 

Have received telegram of i ith/24th. Grey has telegraphed 
to English Ambassador in Vienna to support our proposal 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 163 

relating to the prolongation of the time limit in the 
ultimatum. Meanwhile he told me that the Austrian 
Ambassador had been with him and had explained that the 
Austrian Note should be regarded, not as an ultimatum, but 
as a demarche which would result, in the absence of a 
reply or on an unsatisfactory reply, in the breaking off 
of diplomatic relations and the immediate recall of the 
Austrian Ambassador from Belgrade, but not in the im- 
mediate beginning of military operations. Grey added that 
in view of this explanation he, in his instructions to the 
Ambassador, had suggested to the latter that if it were too 
late to discuss the prolongation of the limit, the question of 
arrest of military operations might be raised. 

(Signed) Benckendorff. 

No. 17 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in England. 

(telegram.) 

St. Petersburg, J-'uly 12/25. 
In the event of the situation becoming more critical, 
possibly involving the Great Powers, we assume that 
England will not delay to take a definite stand by the side 
of Russia and France in order to preserve the equilibrium 
of Europe, which she has always stood for in the past, and 
which will be undoubtedly destroyed in the event of an 
Austrian triumph. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 18 

Memorandum communicated by the German Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

July 12/25. 
We are informed from authoritative sources that the 
report in certain journals that the action of Austria in 
Belgrade was taken at the instigation of Germany is 
altogether false. The German Government up to the 
time of its delivery was not aware of the text of the 



i64 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Austrian Note, and had no influence over its contents. 
The statements made that Germany had adopted a definite 
attitude are entirely without foundation. Germany as an 
ally of course supports Austria in a claim against Servia 
which she considers legitimate. Above all she wishes, as 
she has shown from the very beginning of the Austro- 
Servian quarrel, that the conflict should be localized. 

No. 19 

Charge d' Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, July 12/25, 

In reference to my telegram of i ith/24th. There appeared 
in this morning's papers, although not in very clear terms, 
the announcement of the German Ambassador, yesterday, 
together with Press comments, in which its threatening 
character was underlined. The German Ambassador, dis- 
turbed at these revelations, visited the Chief of the Political 
Department this morning and assured him that his words 
had in no way a threatening character. He explained that 
Austria presented the Note to Servia without previous con- 
versation with Berlin, but that Germany sympathizes with 
the Austrian standpoint, and that of course, as he said, 
" once the shot has been fired " Germany can only be guided 
by her obligations to her ally. 

(Signed) Sevastopulo. 

No. 20 

Ambassador in England to Minister oj Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 12/25. 
Grey tells me that he is told by the German Ambassador 
that Germany was not informed of the text of the Austrian 
Note, but that she fully supports Austria's action. The Am- 
bassador asked if England would agree to exert its influence 
at St. Petersburg in the interests of peace. Grey answered 
that it was altogether impossible. He added that so long 
as the complication was confined to Austria and Servia, 
British interests were only indirectly affected. He said, 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 165 

however, that he was forced to realize that Austria's 
mobihzation would mean Russia's mobilization, and that 
from that moment a state of affairs would arise in which 
all the Powers would be interested. England, in that 
event, would preserve for itself full freedom of activity. 

(Signed) Benckendorff. 

No. 21 

Charge d' Affaires in Servia to the Minister of Foreign 

Affairs. 

^ (telegram.) 

y Belgrade, ^uly 12/25. 

'^ Austrian Ambassador, despite the unexceptional character 
of Servian reply to the ultimatum, at 6.30 this evening 
informed the Servian Government by Note that, not having 
received a satisfactory answer within the given time, he 
would withdraw from Belgrade with his whole suite. The 
Skuptchina will meet on July 14/27 at Nisch, to which 
town the Servian Government and diplomatic corps proceeds 
this evening. 

(Signed) Strandman. 

No. 22 

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

London, J^uly 12/25. 

Grey told German Ambassador that in his opinion 
Austrian mobilization would mean Russian mobilization, 
and that then there would arise the danger of a general war. 
He said he saw only one means for a peaceful solution, that 
in view of the danger of an Austro-Russian mobilization 
Germany, France, Italy and England should refrain from 
immediate mobilization and should make an offer of 
mediation. Grey told me that this plan needed above all 
the agreement of Germany and a promise from her not to 
mobilize. With this object he was making inquiries in 
Berlin, 

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF. 



i66 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 23 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in Italy. 

(telegram.) 

St. Petersburg, J^uly 13/26. 
Italy could play an all-important role in the preservation 
of peace if she could use her influence in Austria and adopt 
an unfavourable attitude towards the conflict, since it could 
remain localized. It would be desirable for you to express 
your conviction that it is impossible for Russia not to give 
help to Servia. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 24 

Consul in Prague to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Prague, J^uly 13/26. 

Mobilization ordered. 

(Signed) Kazansky. 

No. 25 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in Austria. 

(telegraphic.) 

St. Petersburg, ^uly 13/26. 
I had a long talk to-day with the Austrian Ambassador 
in a friendly tone. We went over with him the ten 
demands on Servia, and I showed him that, besides their 
inacceptable form, some of the demands were altogether 
impossible to execute, even if the Servian Government con- 
sented to do so. For instance, points i and 2 could not 
be carried out without altering the Servian laws concerning 
the Press and societies, and that it would hardly be possible 
to obtain the consent of the Skuptchina ; that the execution 
of points 4 and 5 would inevitably produce dangerous con- 
sequences, and might even lead to terrorist acts directed 
against the Royal House and Pashitch, which would hardly 
be in accordance with Austria's aim. In regard to other 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 167 

points, it seemed to me that with certain modifications in 
detail it would not be difficult to find a basis of agreement 
if the accusations included in them were confirmed by 
sufficient evidence. 

In the interests of peace, which, in the words of Szapary, 
was equally dear to Austria as to the other Powers, it is 
indispensable to put an end to the present strained relations 
as quickly as possible. With this object it seems very 
desirable that the Austrian Ambassador should be author- 
ized to enter into a private exchange of views and to 
work out with me certain points in the Austrian Note of 
July 10/23. ^^ ^his way it might be possible to find a 
formula which, while acceptable to Servia, would give 
satisfaction to the Austrian demands. Speak in this sense 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in a quiet and friendly 
manner. This has been communicated to the Ambassadors 
of Germany, France, England, and Italy. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 26 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to tlie Ambassador in Germany. 

(telegram.) 

St. Petersburg, J^uly 13/26, 
When communicating the contents of my telegram to 
Vienna to the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, please 
express my hope that he will find it possible on his part to 
influence Vienna to meet our proposals. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 27 

Charge d' Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

(telegram.) 

Paris, ^uly 13/26. 

The Director of the Political Department has com- 
municated to me that, when he handed to the Austrian 
Ambassador the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the 
Ambassador did not hide his surprise that Giesl was not 
satisfied with it. The submissiveness of the Servian reply 



i68 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

should, in the opinion of the Director of the Political 
Department, produce in Europe a favourable impression. 

(Signed) Sevastopulo. 

No. 28 
Charge d' Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(TELEGRAM.) 

Paris, July 13/26. 
To-day the German Ambassador visited the Director of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made the following 
statement : " Austria expressed to Russia that she has no 
territorial designs and does not threaten the integrity of 
Servia. Her only object is to secure her own tranquillity. 
On Russia accordingly rests the responsibility for the 
avoidance of war. Germany feels herself at one with 
France in the urgent desire to preserve peace, and hopes 
France will use her influence in St. Petersburg in favour of 
moderation." The Minister observed that Germany might 
on her part undertake similar steps in Vienna, especially 
after the yielding attitude of Servia. The Ambassador 
answered that this was not possible in view of the decision 
not to interfere in the Austro-Servian quarrel. Then the 
Minister asked could not the four Powers, England, Ger- 
many, Italy, and France, take steps in St. Petersburg and 
Vienna, since the whole question at bottom resolves itself 
into the quarrel between Austria and Russia. The Am- 
bassador said that he had no instructions. In conclusion 
the Minister refused to agree to the German proposition. 

(Signed) Sevastopulo. 

No. 29 

Charge d' Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, July 13/26. 

Director of Political Department expressed his personal 
opinion that the consistent German policy in Paris had the 
object of frightening Fiance and of making her influence 
felt in St. Petersburg. 

(Signed) Sevastopulo. 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 169 

No. 30 

Charge d' Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Berlin, July 13/26. 

On the receipt of the news in Berlin of the Servian ^ 
mobihzation a great crowd, consisting, according to the 
newspapers, partly of Austrian elements, created a noisy 
demonstration in favour of Austria. Late in the evening 
the demonstrators several times collected before the 
Russian Embassy making hostile exclamations against 
Russia. Meanwhile the police were almost entirely absent 
and took no measures of any kind. 

(Signed) Bronefsky. 

No. 31 
Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

London, July 14/27. 

Received your telegram of July 13/26. Please telegraph 
me whether your direct conversations with the Vienna 
Cabinet are consistent with the project of Grey for the 
mediation of the four Powers. Learning from a telegram 
from the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you 
are ready to accept this concerted action. Grey decided 
to make an official proposal, which was done yesterday in 
Berlin, Paris, and Rome. 

(Signed) Benckendorff. 

No. 32 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassadors in France and 

England. 

(telegram,) 

St. Petersburg, July 14/27. 

At request of his Government British Ambassador has 

asked whether Russia agrees to England taking the 

' The French edition of the Orange Book says " la mobiHsation de 
Tarmee autrichienne." The original Russian version, however, says 
" Mobilizatsi Serbskich voysk," which means " mobilization of Servian 
soldiers." The reference in the original text is evidently to Servian 
and not to Austrian mobilization. — Ed. 



I70 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

initiative in calling a conference in London of the repre- 
sentatives of France, Germany, and Italy in order that they 
shall consider a qiiatre the possibility of solving this 
problem. I answered the Ambassador that although my 
direct conversations with the Austrian Ambassador had 
begun, I had not yet received an answer to my proposal 
for a joint revision of the (Austrian) Note. The Russian 
Government is ready to accept the English proposal or any 
other as a means of finding a peaceable solution to the 
problem, if our direct conversations with the Vienna 
Cabinet do not lead to anything. This is communicated to 
the Embassies in Germany, Austria, and Italy. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 33 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassadors in France, 
England, Germany, Anstria, and Italy. 

(telegram.) 

St. Petersburg, July 14/27. 

I am acquainted with the answer handed in by the 
Servian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our 
expectations in its moderation and its willingness to give 
the fullest satisfaction to Austria. Provided the Vienna 
Cabinet is not seeking a pretext for war with Servia, we 
are at a loss to understand on what the further demands of 
Austria can be based. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 34 
Charge d' Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, July 14/27. 

German Ambassador to-day again discussed situation in 
detail with Director of Political Department. The Ambas- 
sador was very insistent on the exclusion of all possibility 
of mediation or a conference. 

(Signed) Sevastopulo. 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 171 

No. 35 
Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, fuly 14/27. 

I have conversed with the Director of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in the presence of Berthelot, who has just 
returned to Paris. They confirmed to me details concern- 
ing the action of the German Ambassador over which 
Sevastopulo has communicated to you in his telegram. This 
morning Baron von Schoen confirmed in writing the de- 
claration made by him yesterday : — 

1. Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek 
extension of territory and does not aim at destroying the 
integrity of Servia. Her object is security for her own 
peace. 

2. On Russia rests the responsibility of averting war. 

3. Germany and France on the basis of their complete 
agreement to preserve peace ought to influence Russia in 
this sense. 

Thereupon Baron von Schoen especially emphasized the 
expression concerning the solidarity between Germany and 
France. In the opinion of the Minister of Justice the 
above-mentioned step of Germany had as its undoubted 
aim the severing of Russia from France. It was an attempt 
to induce the French Government to put pressure on St. 
Petersburg, and thus to compromise our ally in our eyes, 
and in the event of a war to throw the responsibility not on 
Germany, who, it would appear, is using all her efforts to 
keep peace, but on Russia and France. 

(Signed) Isvolsky. 

No. 36 
Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, Jw/y 14/27. 

From your telegrams of July 13/26 it is clear that you 
were not yet aware of the answer of the Servian Govern- 



172 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

ment. The telegram to me from Belgrade with this news 
was twenty hours on the road. The telegram dispatched to 
Vienna under the triple tariff the day before yesterday at 
II o'clock by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs with 
the order to support our step was only delivered at 6 o'clock. 
There is no doubt that it was purposely delayed in the 
Austrian telegraph office. 

(Signed) IsvoLSKY. 

No. 37 

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, July 14/27. 
At the order of his Government the Austrian Ambassador 
here has communicated to the Director of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that the answer of Servia was considered in 
Vienna to be unsatisfactory, and that to-morrow (Tuesday) 
Austria will undertake " energetic action " with the object 
of compelling Servia to give the necessary guarantees. On 
the question of the Minister as to what form this activity 
would take, the Ambassador answered that he was not 
exactly informed about it, but that it might be a talk of the 
crossing of the Servian frontier, of an ultimatum, and even 
of the declaration of war. 

(Signed) Isvolsky. 

No. 38 

Charge d' Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Berlin, July 14/27. 

I asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to support your 
proposal in Vienna that Szapary should be authorized 
through frequent conversations with you to secure an 
agreement of both parties as to the terms of the Austrian 
demands. Jagow answered that he approved of this, and 
that he inclined to the opinion expressed by Pourtales, that 
once Szapary has started on this exchange of views he should 
be able to continue on these lines. To this effect he had 
telegraphed to the German Ambassador in Berlin {sic ; 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 173 

? Vienna, or St. Petersburg). On my request that he should 
himself strongly urge Vienna to adopt a peaceful attitude he 
replied that he could not advise Austria to give way. 

(Signed) Bronefsky. 

No. 39 
Charge d' Affaires in Geruiany to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 14/27. 
To-day, before my visit to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
the French Ambassador was with him attempting to induce 
him to accept the English proposal that England, Germany, 
France, and Italy should take action to preserve peace both 
in St. Petersburg and Vienna at the same time. Cambon 
proposed that these Powers should offer advice in Vienna 
in the following form : " To abstain from all acts which 
would prejudice the status quo at the moment." This 
ambiguous formula would avoid mentioning the indis- 
pensable necessity of restraining Austria from an invasion 
of Servia. Jagow gave to the proposal a sharp refusal, not- 
withstanding the insistence of the Ambassador, who brought 
out the good side of the proposal, that is to say, the com- 
bination of the two groups of Powers, thereby avoiding the 
opposition between the two groups of which Jagow himself 
had so often complained. 

(Signed) BRONEFSKY. 

No. 40 
The Tsar to the Servian Crown Prince. 

St. Petersburg, July 14/27. 
Your Royal Highness, in appealing to me in a most 
serious moment, did not mistake the feelings which I 
cherish towards you, and my cordial sympathy for the 
Servian people. The present state of affairs has roused 
my warmest attention, and my Government is making all 
efforts to get rid of the present difficulties. I do not doubt 
that your Highness and the Royal Government are filled 
with the desire to lighten this task, neglecting nothing in 



174 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

order to reach a decision which, while it preserves the 
dignity of Servia, avoids the horror of a new war. 

So long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed 
all our efforts must be directed to this goal. Should we, 
however, against our most earnest wish, have no success, 
your Highness can be assured that Russia under no 
circumstances will remain indifferent to the fate of Servia. 

(Signed) Nicholas. 

No. 41 

The Russian Ambassador in Austria to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 14/27. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is absent. 

I had to-day a prolonged conversation with Macchio, 
in which I explained to him in friendly terms what an 
unfortunate impression the Austrian demands on Servia 
had produced in Russia, and how they were utterly inac- 
ceptable for an independent, though small. State. I added 
that this step, which may carry with it most undesirable 
complications, caused in Russia deep perplexity and uni- 
versal censure. One must suppose that Austria has counted 
on the support of the German Government in Vienna 
playing in the course of this crisis the role of an instigator 
and preventing the probability of localizing the conflict 
with Servia, and destroying the possibility for the latter 
of bearing with impunity this heavy blow. The declaration 
of the Imperial Russian Government that Russia cannot 
remain indifferent to this step produces great anxiety here. 

(Signed) SCHEBEKO. 

No. 42 

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

London, Jidy 14/27. 

Grey has just replied to request of the German Ambas- 
sador, who asked him about the possibility of influencing 
St. Petersburg, by pointing out that influence should be 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 175 

exerted in Vienna and that this would be done best of all 
by the Berlin Cabinet. Grey also pointed out to the 
Ambassador that the Servian answer to the Austrian Note 
exceeded in its moderation and conciliatory character all 
that could possibly have been expected. Grey added that 
he inferred that Russia had used her influence in Belgrade 
to secure a conciliatory answer, and that he thought that 
the Servian answer could serve as a basis of a peaceful and 
acceptable solution of the question. In view of this, Grey 
continued, if Austria, notwithstanding this answer, proceeds 
to military operations, that will show that she is taking 
measures to annihilate Servia. The situation that would 
arise from this produces conditions under which war might 
follow, in which all the Powers might be involved. Grey 
finally pointed out that the British Government was ready 
to co-operate most sincerely with the German Government 
as long as peace could be maintained. Should this not be 
possible England would maintain for herself full freedom 
of action. 

(Signed) Benckendorff. 

No. 43 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian 
Ambassador in London. 

St. Petersburg, July 15/28. 

From the private conversation between Count Pourtales 
and myself, it seems highly probable that the key to the 
situation lies in Berlin, and that Germany is upholding 
the irreconcilable attitude of Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, 
which could arrest the whole development of the crisis, 
does not apparently exert any pressure on its ally. The 
Embassy (Germany) here think the answer of Servia 
unsatisfactory. 

I look with alarm at this attitude of Germany, and I 
submit that England could, better than any other Power, 
undertake steps in Berlin for a mutual understanding. 

I have communicated with the Embassy in France. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 



176 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 44 

Consul-General in Fmme to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

FiuME, July 15/28. 

State of siege declared in Slavonia, Croatia, and Fiume, 
and simultaneous with this mobilization of all classes of 
reservists. 

(Signed) Salviaty. 

No. 45 
Ambassador in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Vienna, July 1SI2S. 

I have just had a friendly conversation with Berchtold on 
the lines of your proposal that the Austrian Ambassador 
should be authorized to enter into direct conversations with 
you for a combined attempt to solve certain difficulties in 
the Austrian Note. I pointed out the desirability for Austria 
herself of reaching some such solution of the question 
which might improve her relations with Russia and at 
the same time give a sufBcient guarantee for future relations 
between the Monarchy and Servia. I drew attention to the 
existing danger which was threatening the peace of Europe 
in the event of an armed conflict between Austria and 
Servia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that he 
fully understood the seriousness of the situation and the 
advantage of an open discussion with us about this matter, 
but that the Austro-Hungarian Government, having unwill- 
ingly decided to take a decisive step in its relations with 
Servia, could not at the present moment retract and proceed 
to a discussion of the text of its Note. The answer of 
Servia, added the Minister, showed the insincerity of her 
assurances for the future. This is communicated to the 
Ambassadors in Germany, France, England, and the 
Charge d'Affaires in Servia. 

(Signed) SCHEBEKO, 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 177 

No. 46 

Charge d' Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Berlin, J^uly 15/28. 

The Wolff Bureau here has not printed the text of the 
Servian reply, which was communicated to it, and since a 
full account does not appear in any of the local papers, 
it appears that they do not wish to give it a place in their 
columns, realizing the sobering impression which it would 
produce on the reading public in Germany. 

(Signed) Bronefsky. 

No. 47 

Ambassador in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, fuly 15/28. 
Order for general mobilization signed. 

(Signed) SCHEBEKO. 

No. 48 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in London. 

(telegram.) 

St. Petersburg, J^tily 15/28. 
Owing to the military operations between Austria and 
Servia it is indispensable that the influence of England 
should be exercised at once to secure mediation, and to put 
a stop to Austria's military activities against Servia. Other- 
wise mediation will serve only to prolong the settlement, 
and in the meantime to give Austria the opportunity of 
crushing Servia and of obtaining a commanding position 
in the Balkans. 

This is communicated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and 
Rome. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 
13 



178 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 49 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to Charge d' Affaires in Germany. 

(telegram.) 

St. Petersburg, July 16/29. 

At the request of the Imperial Chancellor himself the 
German Ambassador informed me that Germany has not 
ceased to exercise moderating influence in Vienna, and 
will continue to do so notwithstanding the declaration 
of war. 

I asked the Ambassador to convey to the Chancellor the 
expression of my gratitude for the friendly character of 
this communication. Speaking to him of certain of our 
military measures, I pointed out that they were in no way 
directed against Germany, and cannot be taken as indicat- 
ing any aggressive action against Austria. The measures 
taken by us are explained by the mobilization of the 
Austrian army. At the suggestion of the Ambassador 
to continue our conversation with the Vienna Cabinet, 
I answered that I was willing to do this if Austria would 
listen to German advice. At the same time I pointed out 
the readiness of Russia to accept the conference a qiiatre — 
the proposal for which had not, it appears, met with a 
sympathetic response in Germany. The best method of 
all for reaching a peaceful solution of the crisis seemed 
to us to be parallel negotiations of the Four Powers 
Conference at the same time as our direct conversations 
with the Vienna Cabinet, as was done at certain delicate 
moments during the last year's crisis. 

We think that after the concessions made by Servia it 
would not be difficult to discover a compromise about the 
remaining points of difference, if Austria shows goodwill, 
and if Germany directs her strength towards conciliation. 
I ask you to bring the contents of this telegram to the 
knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited. 

It is communicated to England, France, Austria, and 

Italy. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 179 

No. 50 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassadors in England 
and France. 

(telegram,) 

St. Petersburg, July 16/29. 
At the time of my conversation with the German 
Ambassador I had not yet received the telegram from our 
Ambassador in Austria, from which it appears that the 
Vienna Cabinet decHnes to agree to an exchange of views 
with us. In view of this we wholeheartedly leave to 
England the initiative in those steps which it may consider 
expedient. 
Communicated to Vienna, Rome, and Berlin. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 51 

Charge d' Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Berlin, July itjig. 

On my question as to whether he had received from 
Vienna the answer to your proposals for private conver- 
sations in St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State answered 
in the negative. In his own words it is extremely difficult 
to put pressure on Vienna, especially openly. To Cambon 
he even added that, in the event of too strong pressure, 
Austria would hasten to set before Germany 2ifait accompli. 
The Secretary of State said that he had received to-day 
a telegram from Pourtales from which he infers that you 
are more inclined than at first to agree to a compromise 
which should be acceptable to all parties. I said that you 
had been inclined from the beginning towards compromise, 
provided that, of course, it was acceptable, not only to 
Austria, but also to us. Further, he said to me that 
we had apparently begun mobilization on the Austrian 
frontier, and he feared that this might make it more difficuK 
for Austria to come to an agreement with us, the more 
so since Austria had mobilized only against Servia, and 
had made no preparations on our frontiers. I answered 



i8o THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

that, according to information which reached me, Austria 
had also mobilized on our frontier, and therefore we had 
to take corresponding measures. I added that our military 
measures were in no way directed against Germany. 

(Signed) Bronefsky. 

No. 52 
Charge d' Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

NiscH, J^uly 16/29. 

To-da}^ the Bulgarian Ambassador in the name of his 
Government informed Pashitch that Bulgaria would 
remain neutral. 

(Signed) Stkandman. 

No. 53 

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, y^uly 16/29. 

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the arrival of the 
President of the French Republic a short survey was made 
of the present political situation approximately in the 
following words : Austria, threatened with internal dis- 
order, had profited by the pretext of the murder of the 
Archduke to try to obtain guarantees which might take 
the form of a military occupation of Servian territory. 
Germany supports Austria. The maintenance of peace 
depends upon Russia alone, for, the question being that 
of punishment for the past policy of Servia and guarantees 
for the future, the affair is one which ought to be confined 
to Austria and Servia. From this Germany concludes 
that it is necessary to advise moderation in St. Petersburg. 
This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and London. 
In Paris Baron von Schoen is vainly trying to bring over 
France into solidarity with Germany, in order to influence 
Russia for the purpose of preserving peace. The same 
arguments were used in London. In both capitals it was 
observed that it was in Vienna that pressure should be 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK i8i 

brought to bear ; for the excessive demands of Austria, 
her refusal to consider the few objections expressed in 
the Servian reply, and her declaration of war threatened 
to cause a general conflagration. France and England 
could not bring moderating influence to bear on Russia, 
who had, up till now, shown the greatest moderation, 
especially in counselling Servia to accept what was possible 
in the Austrian Note. At present Germany apparently 
refuses the idea of bringing influence to bear only on Russia, 
and is in favour of common mediation both in St. Peters- 
burg and Vienna, but in the meantime both Germany and 
Austria are trying to delay any such arrangement. Germany 
protests against a conference and does not suggest any 
possible line of action. Austria is clearly keeping up 
conversations at St. Petersburg, while at the same time 
she plans active measures. If these active measures are 
permitted her demands will increase proportionately. It 
is most desirable that Russia should express her complete 
agreement with the project of mediation put forward by 
Sir Edward Grey. In the other event Austria, under the 
pretext of obtaining guarantees, could in fact change the 
territorial status quo in Eastern Europe. 

(Signed) Isvolsky. 

No. 54 
Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

London, ^uly 16/29. 

I have communicated the contents of your telegram of 
July 15/28 to Grey. He told the German Ambassador 
to-day that the direct negotiations between Russia and 
Austria have been unsuccessful, and that the newspaper 
correspondents communicate from St. Petersburg that 
Russia is mobilizing against Austria in consequence of 
the latter's mobilization. Grey added that the German 
Government in principle expresses itself in sympathy with 
mediation, but finds difficulty over the form. Grey insisted 
that the German Government should suggest the form 



i82 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

which in the opinion of Germany would allow the four 
Powers to realize their mediation for the avoidance of war. 
In view of the agreement of England, France, and Italy, 
mediation could be realized only if Germany would agree 
to stand on the side of peace. 

(Signed) Benckendorff. 

No. 55 

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, ^uly 16/29. 

Viviani has just confirmed to me the full resolution of 

the French Government to act at one with us. This 

resolution meets with support in the widest circles and 

parties, including the Radical Socialists, who have just 

brought him a resolution of absolute confidence expressing 

the patriotic sentiment of their groups. On his arrival in 

Paris, Viviani at once telegraphed to London that, in view 

of the interruption of direct conversations between St. 

Petersburg and Vienna, it was indispensable that the 

London Cabinet should as quickly as possible renew in 

one form or another its proposal for the mediation of the 

Powers. Before my visit Viviani yesterday received the 

German Ambassador, who renewed his assurance as to 

Germany's efforts for peace. On the observation of Viviani 

that if Germany wanted peace she should hasten to concur 

in the proposal of England for mediation, Baron von Schoen 

answered that the word " conference " or " arbitration " 

frightened Austria. Viviani said that it was not a matter 

of words, and that it would not be difficult to find another 

form of mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen it 

is indispensable for the success of conversations between 

the Powers to know what Austria has in view in her 

demands from Servia. To this Viviani replied that for the 

Berlin Cabinet it was easy to ask this of Austria, and in the 

meantime the Servian reply to the Note could serve as 

the basis of discussion. He added that France was entirely 

on the side of peace, but at the same time has decided to 

act in complete unanimity with its allies and friends, and 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 183 

that he (Baron von Schoen) could be assured that this 
decision met with the full sympathy of the country. 

(Signed) Isvolsky. 

No. 56 

Telegram of His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Servia 
to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

NiscH, July 16/29. 
I am deeply touched with the telegram with which 
Your Majesty was pleased to honour me yesterday, and I 
hasten to express to Your Majesty my most heartfelt thanks. 
I ask Your Majesty to believe that the cordial feelings 
which Your Majesty shows to this country are especially 
precious to us, and fill our spirit with hope that the future 
of Servia, which is the object of the gracious care of Your 
Majesty, is secure. These dark times cannot fail to 
strengthen the deep devotion which binds Servia to Holy 
Slav Russia, and the feelings of eternal thankfulness for the 
help and protection of Your Majesty will always be sacredly 
kept in the souls of all Servians. 

(Signed) Alexander. 

No. 57 

Charge d' Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

NiscH, July 16/29. 

I have communicated the text of the Imperial reply to 
Prince Alexander to Pashitch, who on reading it crossed 
himself and said, " Lord and High Honoured Russian 
Tsar ! " Thereupon he embraced me, hardly able to restrain 
his emotion. The successor to the throne is expected 
to-night at Nisch. 

(Signed) Strandman. 

No. 58 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in France. 
(telegram.) 

St. Petersburg, July 16/29. 
To-day the German Ambassador communicated to me 
the decision of his Government to mobilize if Russia does 



i84 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

not break off her military preparations. Such measures 
had only been undertaken by us in consequence of the 
mobilization which had already taken place in Austria and 
of the latter's obvious unwillingness to agree to any pro- 
posals for the pacific settlement of the dispute with Servia. 
As we cannot comply with the wish of Germany, it remains 
only to hasten our preparations and to reckon with the 
probable inevitability of war. Please bring this to the 
notice of the French Government, and at the same time 
express to it our heartfelt thanks for the assurances given to 
me through the French Ambassador that we can rely in full 
measure on the support of our ally France. In the present 
circumstances this expression is especially valuable to us. 

This is communicated to the Ambassadors in England, 
Austria, Italy, and Germany. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 59 

Charge d' Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

NiscH, July 17/30. 

The Regent issued yesterday manifesto signed by all the' 
Ministers on the occasion of the declaration by Austria of 
war on Servia. Its concluding words were as follows : 
" Protect with all your strength your hearths and homes in 
Servia." At the solemn opening of the Skuptchina the 
Regent read the Speech from the Throne, in which he 
began by observing that the place of the assembly showed 
the earnestness of the event. After that came a review of 
the events of the preceding days : the Austrian Note, the 
Servian reply, the efforts of the Royal Government to do 
all compatible with the dignity of the kingdom to avoid 
war, and finally the armed attack by a powerful neighbour 
on Servia, side by side with whom stands Montenegro. 
Passing over in review the attitude of the Powers towards 
the conflict, the Crown Prince emphasized the feeling in 
Russia, and the most gracious communication of the 
Emperor that on no account would Russia desert Servia. 
At every mention of the name of the Emperor and of 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 185 

Russia, loud and excited cries of " Long life ! " resounded 
through the hall. The show of sympathy from the side of 
France and England was also referred to, and provoked 
approving shouts of " Long life ! " from the deputies. The 
Speech from the Throne concluded with the announce- 
ment of the opening of the session, and with an expression 
of desire that all steps should be taken to lighten the task of 

the Government. 

(Signed) Strandman. 

No. 60 

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Embassies in 
Germany, Austria, France, England, and Italy. 

July 17/30. 

The German Ambassador, who has just been with me, 
has asked whether we cannot be satisfied with a pro- 
mise such as Austria could give, not to destroy the integrity 
of Servia, and on what conditions we would agree to arrest 
our mobilization. I dictated to him for immediate trans- 
mission to Berlin the following statement : — 

" If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Servian question 
has assumed the character of a European question, declares 
her willingness to exclude from her ultimatum the points 
which threaten the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia binds 
herself to cease military preparations." 

Please telegraph quickly the attitude of the German 

Government to this new exhibition of our willingness to do 

all possible for the peaceful solution of this question, since 

we cannot allow that conversations of this kind should 

only serve Germany and Austria to gain time for making 

military preparations. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 61 

Russian Embassy in Germany to Russian Minister for 

Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 17/30. 

I am informed now that orders are issued for the 

mobilization of the German fleet and army. 

(Signed) SVERVIEF. 



i86 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 62 
Ambassador in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(TELEGRAM.) 

Berlin, J^iily 17/30. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to 
me to inform me that the news published of the general 
mobilization of the German army and fleet was untrue, 
that the papers had been printed beforehand in order to 
be prepared against any event, and were circulated for a 
short time only ; they have now been confiscated. 

(Signed) SvERViEF. 

No. 63 

Russian Embassy in Germany to Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 17/30. 

Your telegram of i6th/29th inst. received, and I gave the 

text of your proposal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 

with whom I have just been. He told me that he had 

received identically the same telegram from the German 

Ambassador in St. Petersburg, but told me that he 

considered that our proposal would be unacceptable to 

Austria. 

(Signed) Svervief. 

No. 64 

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegraphic.) 

London, J^uly 17/30. 
I have communicated the contents of your telegrams of 
the 26th/29th and i7th/3oth to Grey, who acknowledges the 
extreme seriousness of the situation, but wishes to continue 
negotiations. I observed to Grey that since the time when, 
you proposed to him to accept all that he could suggest 
in favour of the maintenance of peace provided that Austria 
should not take advantage of the delay to crush Servia, your 
position has evidently changed. At that time our relations 
with Germany were not compromised. But after the 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 187 

declaration of the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg 
as to German mobilization the situation was changed, and 
his demand received from us only such an answer as 
befitted a Great Power. When the German Ambassador 
returned to you and asked you your conditions, you formu- 
lated them under altogether exceptional circumstances. I 
repeated to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration 
the altered conditions caused through the fault of Germany 
and thanks to the demarche of the German Ambassador. 
Grey answered me that he understood this, and was taking 
these factors into consideration. 

(Signed) Benckendorff. 

No. 65 

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

London, ^uly 17/30. 

The German Ambassador has asked Grey why England is 
taking military measures on land and sea. Grey assured 
him that these measures have no aggressive character, but 
that such a state of affairs exists that each Power ought to 
be ready. 

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF. 

No. 66 
Ambassador in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Vienna, J^tily 18/31. 

Notwithstanding the general mobilization I am continuing 
an exchange of views with Count Berchtold and his 
colleagues. They all insist on the absence on the part of 
Austria of any aggressive intentions against Russia or of any 
desire of territorial conquest against Servia. All insist, how- 
ever, on the necessity for Austria of carrying the matter, 
when once begun, to an end, and of giving Servia a serious 
lesson which will ensure guarantees for the future. 

(Signed) ScHEBEKO. 



i88 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 67 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Embassies 
in Germany, Austria, France, England, and Italy. 

St. Petersburg, ^uly 18/31. 

In reference to my telegram of the 30th : by order of his 
Government, the British Ambassador has transmitted to me 
the desire of the London Cabinet to make certain modifica- 
tions in the formula presented by me yesterday to the 
German Ambassador. I answered that I agreed to the 
English proposal and herewith transmit the accordingly 
modified formula. 

" If Austria will agree to stop military operations in Servian 
territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict 
has acquired the character of a European question, she will 
allow the Great Powers to examine the question of the 
satisfaction that Servia could give to Austria without 
suffering any loss of her sovereign rights and independence, 
Russia will undertake to maintain an expectant attitude." 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 68 

Russian Embassy in Germany to the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 18/31. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that 
our negotiations, rendered already difficult through the 
mobilization against Austria, have become still more so, in 
view of our serious military measures against Germany her- 
self ; that news about this appears to have been received 
here from all quarters, and must inevitably call for counter- 
measures on the part of Germany. I answered him that 
I had trustworthy evidence, corroborated by all my fellow- 
countrymen who had arrived in Berlin, that measures 
against us were in full force. Regardless of this the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs said that only officers on 
leave were being called back and troops were returning 
from manoeuvres. 

(Signed) Svervief. 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 189 

No. 69 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London. 

(telegram.) 

St. Petersburg, fidy 18/31. 
I have conveyed to the British Ambassador a request to 
express to Grey my most sincere thanks for the adoption 
by him in the negotiations with Germany and Austria of 
a firm and friendly tone, thanks to which the hope of 
a peaceful issue from the present situation is not yet lost. 
I asked him to convey to the British Minister my belief 
that the only chance of success lies in conversations in 
London, which may make it easier for Austria to accept 
the necessary compromise. This has been communicated 
to the Ambassador in France, 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 70 

Secret Telegram to the Imperial Representatives Abroad. 

St. Petersburg, ^uly igjAugust i. 
At midnight the German Ambassador informed me, by 
order of his Government, that unless in twelve hours, that 
is by midday on Saturday, we demobilized, not only against 
Germany but also against Austria, the German Government 
would be compelled to give the order for mobilization. On 
my question if that was equivalent to war, the Ambassador 
answered " No," but said that we should come very near 
to it. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 71 

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

London, July igl August i. 

Grey told me that he has telegraphed to Berlin saying 

that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian 

Government presents a basis for negotiation offering some 

chance for a peaceful solution of the conflict. He expressed 



190 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the hope that no Great Power would commence warHke 
operations until the formula has been examined. 

(Signed) Benckendorff. 

No. 72 

Russian Embassy in England to the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

London, J^uly igj August i. 
"The British Government has asked Germany and 
France whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium. 
France has answered in the affirmative. The German 
Government has stated that she cannot answer that question 
in a categorical form. 

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF. 

No. 73 

Russian Ambassador in France to the Russian Minister for 

Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, ^uly igj August i. 
The Austrian Ambassador was yesterday evening with 
M. Viviani, and informed him that Austria not only has no 
intention of destroying Servian territorial integrity, but is 
ready to discuss her quarrel with Servia with the other 
Powers. The French Government is anxious about the 
extraordinary military preparations of Germany on the 
French frontier, and is convinced that under the cover of 
martial law mobilization is being carried out. 

(Signed) ISVOLSKY. 

No. 74 

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

(telegram.) 

Paris, yz/iy iqj August i. 
On the receipt here of a telegram from the French 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the effect that the German 
Ambassador has communicated to you Germany's decision 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 191 

to mobilize to-day, the President of the RepubHc signed the 
order for mobilization. Notices calling up the reservists 
are being posted in the streets. The German Ambas- 
sador has just visited Viviani, but has made no new com- 
munication to him, giving as his reason the impossibility 
of deciphering the telegram which he has received. Viviani 
has informed him of the issue of mobilization orders in 
reply to the German mobilization, and expressed his 
astonishment that Germany should proceed to such 
measures at the moment when a friendly exchange of views 
between Russia, Austria, and the Powers was still going on. 
He added that mobilization did not yet mean war, and just 
as the Russian Ambassador remains in Vienna and the 
Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, so the German 
Ambassador could remain in Paris. 

(Signed) IsvoLSKY. 

No. 75 

Russian Embassy in France to Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, July iglAugust i. 

According" to the President, the Austrian Ambassador 
recently assured him and the Council of Ministers that 
Austria had expressed her readiness to respect not only the 
territorial integrity of Servia, but also her sovereign rights, 
and that we had deliberately remained silent about this 
declaration. I categorically denied this. 

(Signed) IsvoLSKY. 

No. 76 

Note from the German Ambassador in St, Petersburg to the 

Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, J^uly iglAugust i, j. 10 p.m. 
The Imperial Government has endeavoured since the 
beginning of the crisis to arrive at an understanding. 
In consequence of a desire expressed by the Emperor of 
Russia, the German Emperor in agreement with England, 
made endeavours to play the role of a mediator between 



192 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the Vienna and St. Petersburg Cabinets. Meanwhile Russia, 
not waiting for the result, ordered a general mobilization 
on land and sea. In consequence of these measures, not 
provoked by any measure on the part of Germany, there 
is a serious danger to the German Empire. If the Imperial 
German Government did not take steps to stop this danger, 
it would undermine the safety of Germany. The German 
Government therefore found itself compelled to ask the 
Russian Government to stop the above-mentioned military 
measures. Since Russia refused (did not find it necessary 
to answer) to satisfy this desire, and meant by this refusal 
that her step was directed against Germany, I have the 
honour to inform Your Excellency by order of my Govern- 
ment that His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, 
considers himself in a state of war with Russia. 

(Signed) PouRTALES. 

No. 77 

Communication of the Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning 
events of the last few days. 

July 2ojAugust 2. 
In consequence of distorted reports of the events of 
recent days having appeared in the foreign Press, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to give the 
following short account of diplomatic relations during that 
time. On July loth (23rd) of this year the Austrian Ambas- 
sador in Belgrade handed the Servian Government a Note 
charging the latter with the guilt for the propagation of the 
Pan-Serb movement which led to the assassination of the 
Austrian Heir Apparent. In view of this the Austrian 
Government solemnly demanded from the Servian Govern- 
ment not only a solemn condemnation of the above propa- 
ganda but also the undertaking of a number of measures 
carried out under the control of Austria for disclosing the 
plot, for punishing those Servian subjects who had par- 
ticipated in it, and for suppressing ail such attempts in the 
Royal territory in future. For an answer to the above 
the Servian Government was given forty-eight hours. 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 193 

The Imperial Government, being informed only seventeen 
hours after its presentation by the Austrian Ambassador 
in St. Petersburg of the text of the Note which was handed 
in at Belgrade concerning the terms of these demands, 
could not overlook the fact that some of them were essen- 
tially impossible to fulfil, whilst others were presented in 
a form inconsistent with the dignity of an indepen- 
dent State. Considering inadmissible the degradation of 
Servia included in these demands and the aspirations 
of Austria to assert her predominance in the Balkans, 
the Russian Government in the most friendly manner 
* showed Austria the desirability of submitting to fresh 
discussion certain points in the Austrian Note. But the 
Austrian Government would in no way agree to discussing 
the Note. Similarly moderating influences of the other 
Powers in Vienna met with no success. Notwithstanding 
Servia's condemnation of the criminal act and her aforesaid 
readiness to give satisfaction to Austria to an extent which 
exceeded the expectations not only of Russia but of all the 
other Powers, the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade con- 
sidered the Servian reply unsatisfactory and left Belgrade. 
At an earlier stage, in view of the excessiveness of the Austrian 
demands, Russia, though expressing the impossibility of her 
remaining indifferent, did not refuse to apply all her strength 
for obtaining a peaceful issue and one which would be 
acceptable to Austria and at the same time not touch her 
pride as a Great Power. Meanwhile Russia firmly asserted 
that she was seeking a peaceful solution of the question 
as long as that solution did not mean the diminution of 
Servian dignity as an independent State. Unfortunately all 
the efforts of the Imperial Government were made in vain. 
The Austrian Government, declining any conciliatory 
mediation of the Powers in its dispute with Servia, pro- 
ceeded to mobilize, officially declaring war on Servia, 
and on the following day began the bombardment of 
Belgrade. In the manifesto accompanying the outbreak of 
war, Servia is openly accused of preparing and carrying out 
the Serajevo crime. Such an accusation of the whole people 
in this crime has by its obvious untruth evoked for Servia 

14 



194 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the sympathy of all Europe. In consequence of this action 
of the Austrian Government, carried out in spite of Russia's 
announcement that she could not remain indifferent to the 
fate of Servia, the Imperial Government was compelled to 
declare mobiHzation of the Kief, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan 
military districts. This decision was caused by absolute 
necessity, in view of the fact that five days had elapsed 
between the day of the handing of the Austrian Note to 
Servia and the first steps taken by Russia, while at the same 
time no steps had been taken by the Vienna Cabinet to 
meet our peaceable overtures, but on the contrary the 
mobilization of half the Austrian army had been declared. 
With reference to the Russian measures undertaken, the 
German Government was told that they were caused by 
the Austrian military measures, and were in no way aimed 
at Germany. Meanwhile the Imperial Government showed 
the willingness of Russia, either by means of direct dis- 
cussions with the Vienna Cabinet or by means of a 
conference of the four Powers not directly interested, 
namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy, to continue 
negotiations for the peaceful solution of the quarrel. But 
this attempt also of Russia was not crowned with success. 
Austria declined to exchange views with us, and the Berlin 
Cabinet would not take part in the proposed Conference of 
the Powers. Nevertheless, Russia continued her efforts to 
preserve peace. On the question of the German Ambas- 
sador, who asked us to say on what condition we would 
agree to the arrest of our military preparations, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs declared that admission of Austria that 
the Austro-Servian dispute had acquired the character of 
a European question, and a declaration from her that she 
agrees not to insist on those demands which are not 
consistent with the sovereign rights of Servia, would be a 
necessary condition of the arrest of these preparations. 
The proposal of Russia was considered by Germany to be 
unacceptable to Austria. Meanwhile, in St. Petersburg 
news was received of a general mobilization on the part of 
Austria. At that time military operations were going on in 
Servian territory, and Belgrade was subjected to further 



RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK 195 

bombardment. In consequence of the failure of our peace 
proposals, it became necessary to take larger military pre- 
cautions. On the inquiries on this matter by the Berlin 
Cabinet, it was answered that we were compelled to begin 
military preparations in order to guard against all possibili- 
ties. While taking these precautions, Russia continued 
with all her strength to seek a solution, and declared her 
readiness to agree to all means of solving the quarrel which 
would keep our conditions intact. Notwithstanding these 
peaceful communications, the German Government on 
July i8th sent Russia a demand, which ran up to 12 o'clock 
on July 19th, to stop all military measures, threatening, in 
the contrary event, to proceed to general mobilization. On 
the following day, July 19th, the German Ambassador 
handed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the name of 
his Government, a Declaration of War. 

No. 78 

Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Representatives 

Abroad. 

(telegraphic.) 

St, Petersburg, July 20! August 2. 

Undoubtedly Germany is already trying to lay upon us 
the responsibility for a rupture. Our mobilization is called 
forth by the great responsibility which would have rested 
upon us had we not taken all precautionary steps during 
the time that Austria, while carrying on negotiations, was 
bombarding Belgrade and had proceeded to a general 
mobilization. 

The Emperor bound himself by word to the Kaiser that 
he would not undertake any aggressive action as long as 
conversations with Austria continued. After such guarantee 
and after all Russia's evidence of her love of peace, Germany 
had no right to doubt our assertion that a peaceful solution 
would be gladly accepted so long as it was consistent with 
the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other issue 
was altogether incompatible with our own dignity, and of 
course would have shaken the equilibrium of Europe, con- 



196 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

firming the hegemony of Germany. The European world- 
wide character of the conflict is infinitely more important 
than the matter which has created it. For the decision to 
declare war on us, at a time when conversations between the 
Powers were proceeding, Germany takes upon herself the 
heavy responsibility. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 

No. 79 

Note Cotnmtinicated by the Austrian Minister in St. Peters- 
burg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 2^1 August 6. 
By order of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador 
has the honour to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial 
Government of Russia the following : Taking into account 
the threatening attitude assumed by Russia on the Austro- 
Servian conflict, and in view of the fact that in consequence 
of this conflict Russia, according to the communication of 
the Berlin Cabinet, has taken open warlike measures against 
Germany, and the latter has therefore found herself in a 
state of war with Russia, Austria from this moment considers 
herself in a state of war with Russia. 

(Signed) SzAPARY. 



WHITE PAPER ISSUED BY THE AUS- 
TRIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNING 
THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION- 
EXTRACTS AND ANALYSIS 

PART I 

Memorandum about the Servian Propaganda 

"'T'^HE Servian propaganda to upset the Austro-Hun- 
X garian Government goes far back into history." 
"The Servian Government has countenanced and assisted 
it." 

"The Narodna Odbrana, although private, is run with 
the assistance and connivance of the Servian Government. 
Many subjects of the Monarchy have been taken under the 
wing of the society and have been used to carry out their 
designs. In 1909 as many as 140 such individuals thus 
came under their influence." 

"Thus, it cannot be forgotten that on June 15, 1910, in 
Serajevo, at the time of the attempted murder of the Land- 
schef by Zerajic, the Servian journals issued highly com- 
promising articles." 

It is interesting to learn how Zerajic came to cherish the 
ideas of his deeds. Before the attempt he burnt his papers. 
Under these circumstances the motive of his action could 
not come to light. But one was able through one of the 
badges found upon him to conclude that he held " Kro- 
potkinisch " ideas. In the examination which was carried 
out it was made clear that he had come in contact with 
Anarchist movements in Servia. 

On August 1 8th of that year the Servian journal Politika 

197 



198 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

said thatZerajic, though an anarchist, was "a heroic Servian, 
whose name is sacred among the people." 

The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana was at that 
time described by the society itself as follows : — 

" In fanatical and unceasing toil to show the truth to the 
Servian people under the Monarchy, who have had their 
freedom taken away ; to fight against Austria, the worst 
and greatest enemy ; to extirpate with gun and cannon and 
to free the subjected provinces where millions of our 
brothers are down-trodden." 

In 1909 the President of the Narodna Odbrana was 
Major Kovasevitch, a Servian officer. He said in a speech 
that they must prepare for battle against the dangerous 
and heartless enemy in the North who held seven millions 
of their brothers in slavery. Then it came to the knowledge 
of the judicial authorities in the Monarchy that the Servian 
" Sokolverein " had decided to unite in a secret union with 
certain analogous associations in the Monarchy whose 
character at that time was not quite clear. Investigation 
had hitherto led to no results. But at last one of the clues 
to the methods which had subversive tendencies of the 
Servian " Sokolverein " and their accomplices in the 
Monarchy has been found. Through their confidential 
friends and secret emissaries they carried poison into the 
minds of aimless youths. 

The agitation was also carried into Croatia, the object of 
the Narodna Odbrana being to prepare an " atmosphere." 
This found expression in a series of plots which, when 
traced far enough back, were found to originate on Servian 
soil. Thus "Jukic," who fired at the Royal Commissioner 
in Agram on June 8, 191 2, got his bomb and pistol from 
a Servian major in Belgrade. The bomb was made in the 
Servian military arsenal. 

On May 20, 1913, an attempt was made by "Jacob 
Shupe " on the Ban of Croatia in an Agram theatre, but 
the attempt was at the last moment frustrated by the 
policeman. The examination made it clear that he had 
an accomplice, "Rudolf Hecigonja." The latter escaped to 
Servia, and it then transpired that he had taught " Shupe " 



AUSTRIAN WHITE PAPER 199 

to do this deed, and had been excited to do so by the 
pubUcations in the Narodna Odbrana. In this manner 
"Hecigonja" had worked in Agram on his friends, some 
of whom he had won over to his ideas. In the forefront 
of his plans stood the idea to assassinate the heir-apparent, 
Franz Ferdinand. Some months later a prosecution was 
instituted against " Luker Aljinovic" for treasonable propa- 
ganda. In the course of the investigation certain matters were 
brought out. "Aljinovic" made it clear that during 1913 
in Belgrade a plot was made to assassinate the Archduke. 
For this object he had personally received a hundred dinars 
from the Narodna Odbrana, and a similar sum from a 
Student Society. Thus one sees how the criminal action 
of the Narodna Odbrana has latterly concentrated upon 
the person of the Archduke. 

But the Narodna Odbrana, instead of doing the deed 
themselves, obtained helpless young men, to whom they 
have taught these ideas, to commit them. 



PART II 

The Publications of the Narodna Odbrana 

" The principles and objects of the Narodna Odbrana 
were then set forth and defined as follows : — 

" I. The uplifting and strengthening of the Servian national 
feeling, 

" 2. The association of all those who are sympathetic 
with these ideas. 

" 3. The formation of volunteer corps to be prepared for 
armed action. 

" 4. The collection of money for these objects. 

" 5. The organization and training of troops for special 
and independent (' Selbstandiger') warfare. 

" 6. The protection of the Servian race." 

The document then proceeds to set forth the manifesto 
of the Narodna Odbrana, which appeared as a special 
supplement of the Servian official newspaper Serbsky 



200 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Novinje on June 28, 1914. The manifesto ran as 
follows : — 

" Brothers and sisters, only a part of Kossovo is avenged, 
only a part of St. Veittages is atoned for. As wide as are 
the provinces which contain our race, the Servian, Croatian 
and Slavonian people, from Kikendir to Monastir, from 
Trieste to Carevo Selo, so great is the importance to us 
of St. Veittages and Kossovo. So many souls of our 
brothers in these lands are weeping, so many chains are 
hanging on them, so much work have we yet to do, so 
much still to sacrifice. St. Veittages has a meaning for us 
every day the sorrow lasts, but to-day we have gone deep 
into the life of the Servian people, for behind us is a great 
and glorious national history, and before us an even greater 
and more glorious. To-day, when we are in the midst 
of proving our national destiny, St. Veittages' day must be 
for us the day of great joy and pride, not only for what 
is past but for what is to come. Servian men and women ! 
Millions of our brothers, Slovenes and Croats living 
beyond our frontiers, look to-day to us, the children of the 
Royal Kingdom, and their breasts are warmed with joy and 
hope when they realize their national ideals. God helps 
the courageous. Forward all ! The task which is not 
yet finished calls us. On St. Veittages' day, 1914, in 
Belgrade." 

PART III 

Analysis of the Evidence taken by the Servian 
Court Martial over "Princip" at Serajevo 

I. The Account of the Plot. 

The accused made the following statement : — 
In April 1914, while in Belgrade, " Princip " hatched 
the plot with other students to kill the Archduke. He 
met "Cabrinovitch," who favoured the plan. He (Princip) 
wanted to get the money, bombs, and pistols from the 
Narodna Odbrana, or from Major Precicevich, but finally 
arranged to get them from " Milan Ciganovich," an official 
in the railway service. About Easter " Princip " met 



AUSTRIAN WHITE PAPER 201 

"Grabez" and told him of the plan. Then a Servian 
officer, " Major Tankovich," taught them to shoot with it 
in the woods near Belgrade. On May 27th "Cigano- 
vitch " gave " Princip," " Cabrinovitch," and " Grabez " six 
bombs, four Browning pistols and ammunition, and a glass 
tube with cyanide, which he taught him how to use if he 
needed it. He also gave him money. 

2. The Bombs and Passports. 

The five bombs which were not exploded were examined 
by the police. They were Servian military hand grenades, 
the same as the twenty-one which were found in 1913 
on the Save, near Breko. According to their cover- 
ing thev came from the Servian Government Arsenal 
at Kragevatz. " Grabez " spoke of them as " Kragevatz 
bombs." 

"Ciganovitch " then told the three men that they should 
go via Sabric and Loznitsen to Tuzler and see there 
" M, Ivanovitz," who would hand them the weapons. 
They should then go back to Sabric and see the frontier 
official, " Popovitch," for whom he gave a receipt. Accord- 
ingly on May 28th the three accomplices came with their 
weapons to Belgrade. They then returned to Sabric, 
where " Princip " handed over the receipt which he had got 
from " Ciganovitch " to " Popovitch." The latter then 
took them to the Commander, who furnished them with 
passports in which it was stated that one of them was a 
" Finanzwachmann," and the two others his comrades. 
Then they got a passport to proceed over the frontier via 
Loznitza, and crossed the frontier on foot as " Finanz- 
wachmann " with the bombs and revolvers. 

PART IV 
Servian Press on the Serajevo Assassination 

"The Balkan for June 29th makes a bald statement about 
the murder without comment. 

"The Piemont for July ist said that the work of ' Princip ' 



202 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

has its explanation in the Bosnian system of Government, 
and says that the * despair of these young martyrs was 
natural and intelligible.' 

"The Odjic on July 3rd referred to the visit of the 
Archduke to Serajevo as* a brutal manifestation of power 
and subjection, which had its counterpart in feelings of 
hatred and revenge.' 

"The Pravda for July 4th said 'the down-trodden races 
of the Monarchy must have this method of protection 
since all other ways are impossible.' " 

The following is the report of a meeting of the Narodna 
Odbrana in Nisch after the murder of the Archduke; it is 
said to have been received by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in Vienna from a confidential person whose name 
is not disclosed. At this meeting the President, who 
was also director of the Mider Police Magistracy, Jaser 
Neuadovic, made the following speech : — 

" Servians were bound to find the means to undertake 
the attempt on the Archduke, since his aggressive and 
eccentric character was a terrible danger for Servia, and 
also for other Slav lands. If he had lived he would, in 
short, have challenged Servia to war, and would have 
seized her, in which case Servia, still weak and not yet 
ready with her defence organization, would have been lost. 
Now, since the Serajevo murder, Servia is rescued, and 
thereby one who is dangerous to Servia was got out of the 
way. Servia will now have some years of peace, and the 
new heir-apparent, if he lives, is likely to follow the steps of 
his predecessor. Bombs and revolvers must play their 
proper part. If there is a Servian God we cannot allow 
matters to stop here." ^ 

' The authenticity of this report is doubtful. The story sounds 
improbable, and the refusal of the Austrian Government to disclose the 
source of their information excites suspicion, especially in a Government 
that is capable of " Friedjung trial" and " Prochaska" methods. — Ed. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO 
THE WAR OF 1914 

No. I 

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister in Vienna to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brussels. 



I 



Vienna, July 24, 1914. 
HAVE the honour to present you the text of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Servia. 

(Here follows the Austrian Note. See White Paper 4.) 



No. 2 

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the Belgian Ministers in Paris^ London, Belgium, 
Vie7tna, and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, July 24, 1914. 
The Government of the King is asked if under the 
present circumstances it will make, to the Powers who 
have guaranteed its independence and neutrality, a com- 
munication confirming her resolution to fulfil her inter- 
national obligations which will be imposed on her in case 
of war breaking out on her frontiers. It has come to the 
conclusion that such a communication would be premature 
at the present hour, but that events might be forced and 
could not allow time at the desired moment for the 
necessary instructions to its representatives abroad. In 

this situation I have proposed to the King and to my 

203 



204 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

colleagues in the Cabinet, who have come round to my 
point of view, to give you precise indications of the 
dcmarclic that you should make in case the Franco-German 
war becomes imminent. You will find a letter signed, but 
not dated, which you should read and leave a copy with 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs if the circumstances require. 
I will indicate by telegram the moment of action. The 
telegram will be addressed to you at the hour of mobiliza- 
tion of the Belgian Army, if contrary to our sincere 
desire and to the hopes of a pacific solution we are 
compelled to take measures of extreme precaution. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

Annex to No. 2 

The international situation is grave. Belgium has ob- 
served with scrupulous exactitude the duties of a neutral 
State, imposed on her in 1839. This she intends to fulfil 
whatever the consequences. The friendly attitude of the 
Powers in this respect has been confirmed, that Belgium 
can have confidence in seeing that her territory remains 
free from attack if hostilities come near her frontiers. 

All the measures necessary to ensure the observation 
of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by 
the King's Government. The Belgian Army is mobilized, 
and takes its stand on the strategic position chosen to 
ensure the defence of the country and the respect of its 
neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and the Meuse are in 
a state of defence. 

It is necessary to insist that these measures have no 
other object except that of putting Belgium in a position 
to safeguard its international obligations. She is not, and 
cannot be, inspired by a desire to take part in an armed 
conflict with the Powers nor by any sentiments of defiance 
towards any of them. Conforming with the order which 
I have received, I have the honour to submit to you a 
copy of the declaration of our action. The communication 
has been made to all other Powers who have guaranteed 
the neutrality of Belgium. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 205 

No. 3 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
the Belgian Ministers in Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. 

Brussels, July 28, 1914. 
I have addressed to your colleagues accredited to the 
Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of 
Belgium a circular without date of which you will find a 
text enclosed. If the menace of a Franco-German war 
becomes imminent the circular will be communicated to 
the Governments of the Powers, that they may know our 
resolution to fulfil the international obligations which 
are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839. The com- 
munication will only be effectual on a telegraphic order 
on my part. If circumstances cause me to give this 
order, I ask you also by telegraph to give recognition of 
our demarche to the Government to which you are 
accredited, while communicating to it a copy of this joint 
circular by way of information and without demanding 
that you should give proof of this communication. My 
telegram will indicate to you eventually the date which 
ought to be added to this circular. This date you should 
take care to inscribe on the copy which you will hand 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is necessary that the 
present dispatch and its annex should be strictly con- 
fidential in character, till the receipt of new instructions 

on my part. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

(Here follows the Annex to No. 2.) 

No. 4 

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister at Belgrade to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

I have the honour to forward to you enclosed the text 
of the answer made by the Servian Government to the 
Austrian communication of July 23rd. 

(Signed) Michotte de Welle. 

(Here follows the text of the Servian reply.) 



2o6 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 5 

Communication on July 26, 19 14, dj/ the Austrian Legation 
in Brussels to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

M. Pashitch gave yesterday, before 6 o'clock, the answer 
of the Servian Government to the Austrian Note. This 
answer not being considered satisfactory, diplomatic rela- 
tions have been broken off and the Minister and his 
personnel have left Belgrade. Servian mobilization had 
also been decreed three hours before. 

No. 6 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Berlin to the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 27, 1914. 
According to a telegram from the British Charge 
d' Affaires in Belgrade, the Servian Government has given 
way on all points to the Austrian Note. It will admit of 
the collaboration of Austrian officials, if it is in accordance 
with international law. The Belgian Charge d'Affaires 
thmks that this must be satisfactory unless Austria wants 
war. Nevertheless the impression is more favourable to-day 
because hostilities against Servia have not yet begun. The 
British Government proposes the intervention of England, 
Germany, France, and Italy, at St. Petersburg and Vienna, 
to find a basis of conciliation. Germany only has not yet 
answered. The Emperor will decide. 

(Signed) Baron Beyrens. 

No. 7 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Viemta to the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs has notified a declaration 
of war by Austro-Hungary on Servia. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 207 

No. 8 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. 
Petersburg, Rome, Holland, and Luxemburg. 

Brussels, July 29, 1914. 
The Belgian Government has decided to put the Belgian 
Army on a reinforced peace footing. This measure must be 
in no way confounded with mobilization. Because of the 
smallness of her territory Belgium constitutes a one-frontier 
zone. Her army on an ordinary peace footing is only 
composed of one class of militia under arms. On a rein- 
forced peace footing her divisions of the army and of the 
cavalry, thanks to the recall of three classes, have their 
effective counterpart to those of the corps permanently 
maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring 
Powers. This will enable you to reply to the questions 
which may be put to you. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 9 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, and London. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 
The French Minister has come to show me a telegram 
of the Havas Agency decreeing a " state of siege " in 
Germany, and said to me as follows : " I take the oppor- 
tunity of telling you no incursion of troops will take place 
into Belgium. Even if important forces are massed on the 
frontiers of your country, France does not wish to bear the 
responsibility of taking the first act of hostility in regard to 
Belgium. Instructions to this effect will be given to the 
French authorities." I thanked M. Klobukofsky for his 
communication, and I thought it necessary to remark to 
him that we have always had the greatest confidence in the 
loyalty of our two neighbouring States in maintaining their 
engagements towards us. We also have every ground for 
believing that the attitude of the German Government would 
be identical with that of the French Republic. 

(Signed) DAVIGNON. 



2o8 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. lo 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Chiefs of the Legations abroad. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs is informed that mobili- 
zation is ordered. First day of mobilization, Saturday, 
August ist. 

(Signed) Davignon. 



No. II 

Letter from the Belgiaii Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in London, Berlin, and Paris. 

Brussels. July 31, 1914. 

The British Minister has asked to see me urgently, and has 
made the following communication to me which he wished 
to make several days ago. In consequence of the possi- 
bility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the 
French and German Governments respectively if each is 
prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided that 
no other Power violates it. 

" In view of the existing treaties," said the Minister, " I 
am instructed to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
Belgium that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will 
do all in its power to preserve and maintain its neutrality, 
and it is desired that all other Powers will do the same to 
maintain it." I have thanked Sir Francis ViUiers for this 
communication, which the Belgian Government specially 
appreciates, and I have added that Great Britain and other 
nations who are guaranteeing our independence can be 
assured that we will neglect no effort to maintain our 
neutrality, and we are convinced that the other Powers, 
in view of the excellent relations and confidence which we 
have always maintained with them, will observe and main- 
tain their neutrality. I have not failed to affirm that our 
military power, considerably developed in consequence of 
our recent re-organization, will energetically defend any 
violation of our land. In the course of the conversation 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 209 

which followed, Sir Francis Villiers appeared a Httle sur- 
prised at the rapidity with which we had ordered the 
mobilization of our army, I had remarked that the Dutch 
had taken an identical step, and that the date of our military 
regime and of the preparations which we had decided on 
this occasion imposed on us urgent and complete measures. 
Our neighbours and guarantors ought to see in this resolu- 
tion a desire to show our deep wish to maintain our 
neutrality. Sir Francis Villiers appeared satisfied with my 
answer, and assured me that his Government awaited this 
answer to complete the negotiations with France and 
Germany, the result of which will be communicated. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 12 

Letter from Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in London, Berlin, and Paris. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 
This morning, in the course of a conversation which my 
department had with M. von Below, we explained to the 
German Minister the extent of the military measures which 
we had taken, and told him that it was in consequence of 
our desire to fulfil our international obligations that they 
did not imply any form of defiance towards our neigh- 
bours. The Secretary-General also asked from the German 
Minister if he had any knowledge of the conversation 
which had taken place with his predecessor, M. de Flatow, 
and the answer which the Chancellor of the Empire had 
charged him to make. In the course of the agitation which 
was raised in 191 1 concerning the fortifications of Flushing 
by the Dutch Government, certain journals had affirmed that 
in the case of a Franco-German war our neutrality would 
be violated by Germany. The Department of Foreign 
Affairs had suggested that a declaration made by the 
German Parliament on the occasion of a debate on 
political affairs would have the nature of appeasing public 
opinion, and would calm the distrust, so regrettable 
from the standpoint of the relation between the two 

15 



2IO THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

countries. M. Bethmann-Hollweg stated that he had been 
very much impressed by the sentiments that had inspired 
our demarche. He declared that Germany had no intention 
of violating our neutrality, but he thought that, in making 
a public declaration, Germany would weaken her military 
position against France, who, reassured on the north side, 
would bring all her forces on the west. Baron von der 
Elst, at that time, said that he understood perfectly 
the objection made by M. Bethmann-Hollweg to the 
public declaration suggested, and he recalled that in 1913 
M. Jagow had made before the Budget Committee of the 
Reichstag reassuring declarations about the neutrality of 
Belgium. 

M. Below has answered, and in the course of conversa- 
tion said that these sentiments had not been changed. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

Annex to No. 12 

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister at Berlin to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, May 2, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you according to the North 
Genuan Gazette about the declarations made in the course 
of the sitting on April 29th of the Budget Committee of the 
Reichstag by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and 
the Minister of War concerning the neutrality of Belgium. 
A member of the Social Democratic party said that in 
Belgium one views with some apprehension the approach 
of a Franco-German war because it is thought that Germany 
will not respect Belgian neutrality. M. Jagow, however, 
said that the neutrality of Belgium was fixed by international 
convention, and Germany is bound to respect these con- 
ventions. This statement did not satisfy another member 
of the Social Democratic party. Herr Jagow observed that 
he had nothing to add to the plain statements which he had 
made relative to the relationship of Germany with Belgium. 
To some more questions put by the Social Democratic 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 211 

party, Herr Heering, Minister of War, answered : " Belgium 
does not play any part in the plan of German military 
organization, such as is justifiable by the situation in the 
East. Germany would not lose sight of the fact that 
Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties." 
To a member of the Progressive party, speaking once more 
about Belgium, Herr Jagow repeated again that his state- 
ment about Belgium was sufficiently clear. 

(Signed) Baron Beyrens. 

No. 13 

Telegram addressed by Count Lalaing, the Belgian Minister 
in London, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

London, August i, 1914. 
England has demanded from France and Germany respec- 
tively if they would respect the territory of Belgium, pro- 
viding that their enemy did not violate it. The German 
answer is awaited. The French have accepted, 

(Signed) Count de Lalaing. 

No. 14 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Berlin to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, August i, 1914. 
The British Ambassador has asked the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs if in the case of war Germany would respect the 
neutrality of Belgium, and the Minister has answered that 
he cannot answer that question. 

(Signed) Baron Beyrens. 

No. 15 

Letter from Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, and London. 

Brussels, August i, 1914. 
I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister 
has furnished us verbally with the following statement : — 
" I am authorized to declare that in the case of inter- 



212 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

national conflict the Government of the RepubHc will in all 
cases respect the neutrality of Belgium. If this neutrality 
shall not be respected by another Power the French 
Government might, for the purposes of its own defences, 
have to modify its attitude." 

I have to thank his Excellency, and have added that 
on my part we have without delay taken all necessary 
measures for the respect of our independence and our 
frontier. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. i6 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in London, Paris, Berlin, St. Peters- 
burg, and Vienna. 

Brussels, August i, 1914. 

Carry out instructions contained in the letter of July 24th. 
[See No. 2.] 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 17 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
the Belgian Ministers in Rome, The Hague, and 
Luxemburg. 

Brussels, August i, 1914. 

Follow up instructions given in my letter of 25th February. 
[See No. 3.] 

(Signed) DAVIGNON. 

No. 18 

Telegram from M. Eyschen, President of the Government of 
Luxemburg, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. 
I have the honour to bring to the notice of your Excel- 
lency the following facts : — 

On Sunday, August the 2nd, early in the morning. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 213 

German troops,, according to the information which has 
been received in the Grand Duchy, at that time entered 
Luxemburg territory at the points between WasserbiUig 
and Remich. They marched towards the south of the 
country and towards Luxemburg. A certain number of 
armoured trains with arms and ammunition have been 
dispatched by the railway from WasserbiUig to Luxem- 
burg and are expected to arrive at any moment. This 
constitutes an act contrary to the neutrality of the Grand 
Duchy, guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The 
Luxemburg Government has not failed to protest energetic- 
ally against this aggression to the representative of the 
German Government at Luxemburg. A similar protest 
has been sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. 

No. 19 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, 
and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August i, 1914. 

I have informed the German Minister through M. Bas- 
sompiere that a communique of M. Klobukofski, the French 
Minister, to the Brussels Press announces the formal 
declaration which the latter made to me on August ist. 
On meeting Herr Below, the latter thanked me for this 
attention, and added that up to the present he had not 
been charged with making any official communication, 
but that we knew his personal opinion of the security 
we had a right to expect from our neighbours in the East. 
I immediately answered that we knew the intentions indi- 
cated by him in former interviews allowed us of no doubt 
as to their perfectly correct attitude with regard to Belgium. 
I added that we should attach a great value to a formal 
declaration, which the nation would recognize with satis- 
faction. 

(Signed) Davignon. 



214 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 20 

Note sent on August 2nd by Herr Below, German Minister 
in Brussels, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
at 7.0 p.m. 

Brussels, August 2, 1914. 

From the Imperial Embassy in Germany. Very con- 
fidential : — 

The Imperial Government has received reliable informa- 
tion of a prospective march of the French forces by way 
of Maas, Strecke, Givet, and Namur. They have no doubt 
that the intention of France is to march against Germany 
by way of Belgian territory. The Imperial Government 
cannot avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of the best 
intentions, will not be in a position without assistance 
to defend itself against the French march, which alone 
can give complete security against the danger threatening 
Germany. It is a necessity of self-preservation for Ger- 
many to parry this hostile attack. The German Govern- 
ment would regret if Belgium should regard as an act of 
hostility the fact that Germany is obliged to violate Belgian 
territory on account of the measures of her enemy. In 
order to avoid any misunderstanding the Imperial Govern- 
ment explains its position as follows : — 

1. Germany has no intention of any animosity against 
Belgium. If Belgium is willing in the coming war to 
remain in benevolent neutrality towards Germany, the 
latter on her part will undertake at the conclusion of 
the war to guarantee the independence of its kingdom. 

2. Germany also undertakes for the above consideration 
to evacuate the territory of the kingdom at the conclusion 
of peace. 

3. If Belgium behaves in a friendly manner Germany 
is prepared to pay for all the needs of her troops and to 
make good any damage which may be caused by those 
troops. 

4. Should Belgium be hostile to Germany and particularly 
seek to hinder her advance by a defence of Maas fortifica- 
tion or by destruction of railways, streets, tunnels, or other 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 215 

artificial erections, Germany will with regret be forced 
to regard Belgium as an enemy. In this case Germany 
would not feel disposed to enter into any engagement, but 
would leave the settlement between the two States to force 
of arms. The Imperial Government hopes that this will 
not be necessary, and that the Belgian Government will 
take such steps as will prevent any such occurrence. In 
this case the friendly relations of the two States will be 
further and more lastingly consolidated. 

No. 21 

Note of Interview between Herr Below, German Minister in 

Brussels, and the Secretary-General to the Minister of 

Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

At 1.30 a.m. the German Minister demanded to see the 
Secretary-General. He said he had been informed by his 
Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs and 
that a patrol of French cavalry had violated international 
law and had crossed the frontier without a declaration of 
war. The Secretary-General asked Herr Below where this 
had taken place, and he answered in Germany. The 
Secretary-General remarked that in that case he could not 
understand the object of the interview. Herr Below said 
that these acts were contrary to the law of nations, being 
of such a nature as to lead one to suppose that other acts 
contrary to the laws of nations would be committed by 
France. 

No. 22 

IVote sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Herr 
Below, German Minister in Brussels. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914. 
According to the Note of August 3rd the German Govern- 
ment has been informed that according to reliable informa- 
tion French forces intend to march across the Meuse by 
way of Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of its 
desire, will not be able to repulse without help the French 
troops. The German Government considers itself under 



2i6 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the obligation to prevent this attack and the violation of 
Belgian territory. Under these conditions Germany pro- 
poses to the Belgian Government to take steps in order to 
guarantee the integrity of Belgium and its possessions fully. 
The Note adds that if Belgium makes difhculties in a march 
of Belgian troops Germany will feel herself obliged to look 
upon her as an enemy, and the solution in future between 
the two States will have to be settled by force of arms. 
This Note provoked among the Government of the King 
a profound and painful impression. The intentions which 
it attributes to France are contrary to the declaration by 
France which has been given to us in the name of the 
Republic. If, contrary to our hope, a violation of Belgian 
neutrality is committed by France, Belgium will fulfil all 
her international obligations and her army will oppose 
the invader to the uttermost. The treaties of 1839, con- 
firmed by the treaties of 1870, assured the independence 
and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the 
Powers, and particularly of His Majesty the King of 
Prussia. Belgium has always been true to her international 
obligations. She has fulfilled them in a spirit of loyal 
impartiality and has not neglected any effort to obtain or 
cause respect for her neutrality. The attempt on her inde- 
pendence, the menace of the German Government, forms 
a violation of the right of nations. The strategical in- 
terests do not justify a violation of this right. The Belgian 
Government, in accepting the propositions which were noti- 
fied to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and 
would betray its cause before Europe. Conscious of the 
role that Belgium has played for eighty years in the civiliza- 
tion of the world, she refuses to think that the independence 
of Belgium could not otherwise be maintained than at the 
price of the neutrality of our nation. If this step is decided 
upon, the Belgian Government is determined to repel it 
by all the means in its power in order to maintain 
her rights. 

(Signed) Davignon. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 217 

No. 23 

Telegram addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the Belgian Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, 
Paris, London, Vienna, and The Hague. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914. 
Germany has handed at 7 o'clock a Note proposing 
benevolent neutrality to Belgium, promising the main- 
tenance of the independence of the kingdom and its 
possession at the conclusion of peace ; threatening, on 
the other hand, to treat Belgium as an enemy in case 
of refusal. Twelve hours are allowed for an answer. We 
have replied that this was an attempt on our neutrality, and 
that the acceptance of the German proposal would be a 
sacrifice of the honour of the nation. Conscious of its 
rights, Belgium has decided to withstand to the utmost 
the aggression. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 24 

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs 

to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, Berlin, London, 

Vienna, and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

As you know, Germany has sent to Belgium an ultimatum 
expiring this morning, August 3rd, at 7 o'clock. No act 
of war has been committed at the actual hour, and therefore 
the Council of Ministers has decided that for the moment 
there is no need to make an appeal to the guaranteeing 
Powers. The French Minister has told me on this point, 
without being charged wdth instructions from his Govern- 
ment, " I believe that I can say that if the Belgian 
Government calls on the French Government, as a Power 
guaranteeing its neutrality, we will answer to its call imme- 
diately. If this appeal is not made, it is probable, at 
least well understood, that the care of her own defences 
will determine the exceptional measures which she will 
decide to take when Belgium has made an effort of re- 
sistance." I have thanked M. Klobukofsky for the support 
which the French Government will offer us eventually, 



2i8 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

and have told him that the Belgian Government has not 
made for the moment any call upon the guaranteeing 
Powers, and reserves itself to appreciate later on whatever 
may take place. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 25 

Telegram from the King of Belgium to the King of England. 

Remembering the numerous marks of friendship of Your 
Majesty and of Your predecessors in the friendly attitude of 
England in 1870, and of the proof of the sympathy which 
she will again afford us, I make a supreme appeal for the 
diplomatic intervention of the Government of His Majesty 
to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium. 

(Signed) Albert. 

No. 26 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Lofidon to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 3, 1914. 
I have shown your telegram to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (Sir Edward Grey), which he has communicated to 
the Cabinet. The Minister has told me that if our neutrality 
is violated there will be war with Germany. 

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING. 

No. 27 

Letter from Herr Below, German Minister in Brussels, to 
the Belgiaii Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914. 
I have been charged and have the honour to inform Your 
Excellency that, in consequence of the opposition of the 
Belgian Government to the well-intentioned proposals 
which the Imperial Government has submitted, it feels 
compelled with extreme regret to execute, if necessary by 
force of arms, the measures of security which are deemed 
to be indispensable to prevent French attack. I offer the 
expression of my highest esteem. 

(Signed) VON Belov^^. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 219 

No. 28 

Note sent by Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister in 
Belgium, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
I am charged to inform the Belgian Government that if 
Germany exercises pressure to force Belgium to abandon 
her role as a neutral country, the Government of Great 
Britain expects that Belgium will resist with all the means 
in its power. The British Government in this case is 
prepared to join with Russia and France, if Belgium desires, 
to offer to her without delay a common assistance, to resist 
measures of pressure employed by Germany, and at the 
same time to offer a guarantee to maintain the indepen- 
dence and integrity of Belgium in the future. 

(Signed) F. ViLLiERS. 

No. 29 

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister at The Hague to 
the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 4, 1914. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening 
that the Queen's Government will be compelled under these 
grave circumstances to set up a war beacon on the Scheldt. 
The Note which announced this decision was read to me. 
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the 
Note, which was sent to me yesterday. As you see, the 
Scheldt will be only closed at night. During the day 
navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who 
have been provided with the necessary naval passes. In 
this manner the interests of the defence of Dutch territory 
and that of the Belgian navigation of Antwerp will be 
safeguarded. You will note in consequence that the 
Dutch Government have demanded in the case of war 
beacons being set up that we withdraw the lightships set 
up at Vielingen and Vandelaar, in order to facilitate the 
neutrality of the Netherlands. I must remark that the 
terms employed in the Note, " the ascent of the Scheldt," 



220 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

are not sufficiently explicit. To descend the river will be 
permitted under the same conditions. The Minister will 
give me this assurance. As soon as the Dutch Government 
has decided on this measure I shall be informed. It is 
necessary to give six hours' notice of war beacons. I will 
telegraph you immediately. 

(Signed) Baron Fallon. 

Note annexed to No. 29 

The Government of the Queen may be obliged in the 
interests of the maintenance of Dutch neutrality to set up 
on the Scheldt a war beacon, that is, to move or alter some 
of the beacons and lights. At all times the war beacons 
have been arranged in such a manner that after its in- 
stitution it will be possible to ascend the Scheldt to reach 
Antwerp during the day, but only with Dutch pilots who 
have been provided with the necessary naval passes. In 
acting in this manner the Government of the Queen is 
convinced of being able to uphold the interests of the 
defence of Dutch territory and of the Belgian navigation 
of Antwerp. After war beacons on the Scheldt have been 
set up there will be no longer reason to enter the passage of 
the sea-way at Flushing during the night, and as the 
presence of the lightships at Vielingen and Vandelaar 
is not indispensable for navigation during the day, the 
Dutch Government will be much obliged if the Belgian 
Government wnll in the case of setting up war beacons 
withdraw the said ships in view of facilitating the mainte- 
nance of Dutch neutrality. 

No. 30 

Telegravi from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
the Belgian Ministers in London and Paris. 

Brussels, August 4, 19 14. 
The General Staff has been informed that Belgian 
territory has been violated at Gemminich. 

(Signed) Davignon. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 221 

No. 31 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
German Minister at Brussels^ Herr Below. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that to-day 
the Government of the King no longer recognizes your 
diplomatic character and ceases to have official relations. 
Your Excellency will find herewith your passports, which 
will render necessary your departure and that of your 
legation. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 32 

Letter from Herr Below, the German Minister at B^'ussels, 
to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your 
Excellency's letter of the 4th, and to inform you that I have 
put the care of the Imperial Legation at Brussels into the 
hands of my colleague of the United States. 

(Signed) VoN Below. 

No. 33 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the Belgian Minister in Madrid. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
Will you ask the Spanish Government if it will take 
charge of protection of Belgian interests in Germany, 
and in this case to give the necessary instructions to the 
Ambassador in Berlin ? 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 34 

Telegram rrom the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the Belgian Minister at Berlin. 

Brussels, August i\, 1914. 
The German Minister left the country this evening. Ask 
for your passports. We have asked the Government of 



222 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Madrid to authorize the Spanish Embassy to be kind enough 
to take charge of Belgium's interests in Germany. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 35 

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Berlin to the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, August a,, 1914. 
I have the honour to submit to you the translation of the 
speech of the Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag to-day 
concerning the odious violation of our territory as follows : 
"We find ourselves in a state of legitimate defence, and 
necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxem- 
burg, and have perhaps already penetrated to Belgium. 
That is a contravention of the law of nations. France has, 
it is true, declared at Brussels that she has resolved to 
respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her adver- 
sary respects it. But we know that France holds 
herself ready to invade Belgium. France can wait ; 
we cannot. A French attack on the lower Rhine 
district would be fatal. Thus we are forced to pass over 
the justifiable protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian 
Governments. The injustice which we have committed 
in this manner we will repair when our military object 
has been attained. To one who is menaced like we are, 
and who is struggling for existence, it is only possible 
to think of the means of getting out." It is necessary to 
remark that Herr Bethmann-Hollweg recognizes without 
any doubt that Germany has violated international law 
in entering Belgian territory and has committed an 
injustice to us. 

(Signed) Baron Beyrens. 

No. 36 

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Lojidon to the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 4, 1914. 
I have the honour to inform you that the Prime Minister 
has made to-day in the House of Commons a new declara- 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 223 

tion relating to the European crisis. After recalling the 
principal points exposed by Sir Edward Grey yesterday, the 
Prime Minister spoke : (i) Of the telegram of Sir Francis 
Villiers received this morning which makes known the 
tenor of the second ultimatum addressed by the German 
Government to the Belgian Government and which you 
have sent this afternoon. (2) About the telegram by which 
you have announced the violation of the frontier at 
Gemmenich, of which I gave a copy to Sir Arthur Nicolson. 
(3) About a telegram addressed this morning by the German 
Government to its Ambassador in London with the object 
of misleading public opinion about its attitude. Here is 
the translation from a paper this evening : " Please dispel 
the mistrust which the British Government may have on 
the subject of our intentions by repeating in the most posi- 
tive manner the formal assurance that in case of armed 
conflict with Belgium, Germany will under no pretext 
annex Belgian territory. The sincerity of this declaration 
is corroborated by the fact that Germany has solemnly 
given her word to Holland to respect her neutrality. It 
is evident that we cannot annex Belgian territory in an 
advantageous manner without making territorial acquisition 
at the expense of Holland. Please make it clear to Sir 
Edward Grey that it is impossible to expose the German 
army to an attack through Belgium. An attack from 
incontestable information was projected. Consequently 
Germany has not taken account of the neutrality of 
Belgium, in order to avoid what is for her a question of 
life and death, namely, a French attack through Belgium." 

Mr. Asquith has in consequence stated in the Chamber 
that in answer to this Note of the German Government 
the British Government has renewed the proposal of 
last week, namely, to give the same assurance about 
Belgian neutrality as France gave last week to England 
and Belgium. The English Cabinet is awaiting an answer 
from Berlin. 

(Signed) DE Lalaing. 



224 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 37 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in London to the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 4, 1914. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs has made known to the 
British Ministers of Norway, Holland, and Belgium that 
England expects that these three kingdoms will resist the 
pressure of Germany and guard their neutrality. In their 
resistance they will be supported by England, who is ready 
to co-operate with France and Russia, if it is the desire of 
the three Governments, to offer an alliance to the said 
Governments to repel the use of force by Germany, and 
to guarantee to maintain the integrity and independence of 
the three kingdoms. I have remarked that Belgium is 
neutral in perpetuity. The Minister of Foreign Affairs 
answered, " That is in case neutrality is violated." 

(Signed) COUNT DE Lalaing. 

No. 38 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in Paris^ Lo7idon, and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
I have the honour to inform you of the order of certain 
events which have marked, during these last days, the 
relations with Belgium with certain of the Powers guarantee- 
ing neutrality and independence. On July 31st the Minister 
in England made to me a verbal communication concerning 
the terms which, in the case of a European war, Sir Edward 
Grey had demanded of the French and German Govern- 
ments respectively, namely, whether each of them is resolved 
to respect the neutrality of Belgium, in the event of the 
neutrality not being violated by another Power. In view of 
the existing treaties, Sir Francis Villiers is charged with 
bringing this demarche to the notice of the Belgian Govern- 
ment, adding that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium 
is ready to maintain its neutrality, and that it expects 
other Powers to do the same. I have told the Belgian 
Minister that we appreciate highly the communication, 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 225 

which answers our object, and have added that Great 
Britain, hke the other Powers guaranteeing our indepen- 
dence, is fully assured of our desire to maintain our 
neutrality. This does not appear to be menaced by States 
with which we have cordial relations. The Government, 
I have remarked, has given a proof of its resolution in 
taking at the present moment such military measures as the 
situation demands. In his turn the French Minister, on 
August ist, in a conversation, was authorized to make 
known to the British Government that in case of inter- 
national conflict France will conform to her constant asser- 
tion and respect the neutrality of Belgium, and will only 
be brought to modify her attitude in case of violation by 
another Power. I have thanked his Excellency, and have 
added that we have already taken all the measures for 
securing respect for our frontiers. On August 2nd, in 
the morning, I had with Sir Francis Villiers another 
interview, in the course of which he handed me a part of 
what was telegraphically submitted on Saturday to his 
Government, namely, a report of our conversation of 
July 31st, taking care to reproduce the solemn declaration 
which he had made of the desire of Belgium to defend her 
own frontiers from whatever side she might be invaded. He 
added that " we know that France has given you assurances, 
but England has received no such response from Berlin." 
This last fact provokes no particular surprise, because the 
declaration of the German Government would appear un- 
necessary. On the other hand, the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs has affirmed, at the sitting of the 
Reichstag on April 29, 1914, that the neutrality of Belgium 
is conventionally established and that Germany has the 
intention of respecting this treaty. On the same day Herr 
Below, German Minister in Brussels, presented to me 
at 7 a.m. a Note (see No. 20). German Government offered 
the Belgian Government a delay of twelve hours to make 
known its decision. No hesitation will be manifested on 
the subject of an answer which the proposal of the German 
Government calls for. You will find a copy herewith 
(see No. 22). The ultimatum expired on August yd ^t 

16 



226 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

7 a.m. Since at lo a.m. no act of war had been com- 
mitted, the Council of Ministers has decided that they will 
not for the moment appeal to the guaranteeing Powers. 
Towards the end of the day the French Minister asked me 
about this point, and said: "In consequence of the rapidity 
of events I have not yet been charged with any declaration, 
but I think, however, representing the intention of my 
Government, I can say that if the Belgian Government 
appeals to the French Government as a Government 
guaranteeing its neutrality, it would answer its call at once. 
If this appeal is not formulated it is probable, at least well 
understood, that the care of her own defences would only 
determine certain exceptional measures which will be 
expected, when Belgium makes an act of resistance." I 
thanked M. Klobukofsky for the eventual French offer to us, 
and told him that the King's Government does not make an 
appeal for the moment to the guaranteeing Powers, and 
reserves itself to appreciate ultimately what has taken place. 
At this moment the Council of Ministers are deliberating on 
the subject of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our 
neutrality. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 39 

Telegram from Belgian Minister in London to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 4, 1914. 
England has summoned Germany this morning to respect 
the neutrality of Belgium. The ultimatum says that in 
view of the Note addressed to Belgium menacing the latter 
by force of arms if she opposes a passage of her troops, 
in view of the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, 
in view of the fact that Germany has refused to give 
England the same assurance which was given last week 
by France, England demands a satisfactory answer on the 
subject of respecting the neutrality of Belgium and on the 
treaty, which Germany has signed as well as ourselves. 
The ultimatum expires at midnight. In consequence of 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 227 

the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposition 
which I have transmitted to you is annulled for the moment. 

(Signed) Count de Lalaing. 

No. 40 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 
The Belgian Government regrets to announce to your 
Excellency that this morning forces of German troops have 
penetrated our territory in violation of engagements. The 
Belgian Government has firmly decided to resist by all 
means in its power. Belgium calls on England, France, 
and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of 
her territory. Concerted measures should be taken with 
the object of resisting the German pressure employed 
against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee its 
integrity and independence in future. Belgium is glad 
to declare that she has assumed the defence of her fortified 
places. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 41 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in London to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 5, 1914. 
Germany having rejected the British proposals, England 
has declared war between the two countries at 11 o'clock. 

(Signed) Count de Lalaing. 

No. 42 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers at Paris, London and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 5, 1914. 
After the violation of the Belgian territory at Gemmenich, 
Belgium has made an appeal through its representatives in 
England, France, and Russia to co-operate as guarantors of 



228 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

its territory. Belgium has assumed the defence of her 
fortified places. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 43 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 5, 1914. 
By my dispatch of August 4th (see No. 38), I have the 
honour to set forth to you the course of events which have 
marked international relations of Belgium from July 3i3tto 
August 4th. I added that the Council of Ministers examined 
the question to know if Belgium, whose territory was invaded 
since this morning, would make an appeal to her guarantors. 
The Council decided in favour of the affirmative when the 
Minister of England informed us of the proposal which 
he had made that the British Government was disposed to 
answer to our appeal of guarantee which was annulled for 
the moment (see No. 37). A telegram from London told 
me that the change of attitude was caused by the ultimatum 
of England, leaving to Germany ten hours for evacuating 
Belgian soil and respecting its neutrality (see No. 39). In 
the evening the King's Government, addressed through their 
representatives in Brussels to France, England, and Russia 
a Note, a copy of which you will find herewith (see No. 40). 
As you have remarked, Belgium made an appeal to England, 
France, and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the 
defence of its territory and to maintain in the future its 
integrity and independence. She is assured of the defence 
of her fortified places. Up to now we do not know of the 
reception which has been given to our appeal. 

(Signed) DAVIGNON. 

No. 44 
Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foi'eign Affairs to the 
Heads of all the Countries with which Belgium has 

Diplomatic Relations. 

Brussels, August 5, 1914. 
By treaty of April 18, 1839, Prussia, France, England, 
Austria, and Russia have been declared as guarantors of 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 229 

the treaty made on that day between the King of Belgium 
and the King of the Netherlands. This treaty holds " that 
Belgium shall form an independent and neutral State." 
Belgium has fulfilled her international obligations, she has 
done her duty in a loyal and impartial spirit, she has not 
neglected any effort to maintain the respect of her neutrality. 
It is also with painful emotion that the King's Government 
has learnt that armed forces of Germany, a Power guaran- 
teeing our neutrality, have penetrated into Belgian territory 
in violation of the engagements which they have made by 
treaty. It is our duty to protest with indignation against 
this attempt on the right of nations which no act on our 
part has provoked. The King's Government has firmly 
decided to repulse by all means in its power this attempt 
acjainst its neutralitv, and it recalls that in virtue of 
Article 10 of the Hague Convention of 1907, concerning 
the rights and duties of Powers and neutral countries in 
case of war, on land it cannot consider as an hostile act the 
repulsion by a neutral Power of attempts on its neutrality. 
You should ask urgently for an audience with the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs and give to their Excellencies the letter of 
which you have left a copy. If the audience cannot be given 
immediately you will make a communication in writing. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 45 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Berlin to the 

Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, August 5, 1914. 
I have received my passports. I will leave Berlin for 
Holland to-morrow. 

(Signed) Baron Beyrens. 

No. 46 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister at Madrid to the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

San Sebastian, August 5, 1914. 
The Spanish Government is charged with Belgian in- 
terests in Germany. It has given to-day telegraphic 
instructions to its Ambassador in Germany. 

(Signed) Baron Grenier. 



230 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 47 

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Paris to the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, August 5, 1914. 
I have the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of 
the notification of the state of war between France and 
Germany which has taken place to-day. 

(Signed) Baron Guillaume. 

Annex to No. 47 

The Imperial German Government, after allowing its 
armed forces to violate the frontier and to commit on 
French territory numerous acts of death and violence, after 
having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxemburg, in spite of the stipulations in the London 
Convention of May 1867 and of the Hague Convention 
of 1907 of rights and duties of Powers and neutral coun- 
tries in the case of war on land (convention signed by it 
and others), and after having addressed an ultimatum to 
the Belgian Government requiring the passage of German 
troops on Belgian territory in violation of the treaty of 
April 19, 1839, also signed by them, has declared war 
on France on August 4, 19 14, the Government of the 
Republic finds itself under these conditions obliged on its 
part to have recourse to arms. It has, in consequence, the 
honour of making known to the King's Government a state 
of war between France and Germany from August 3rd. 
The Government of the Republic protests before all civi- 
lized nations, and especially before the Governments sign- 
ing the Convention and the Treaties, against the violation 
by Germany of its international engagements. It reserves 
to itself the rights of reprisal in face of an enemy so little 
careful of its parole. The French Government, which 
observes the principles of the rights of nations, will con- 
form during the hostilities and under the reserve of 
reprisals to the dispositions of international convention, 
signed by France, concerning the right of war on land and 
sea. The present notification, made in conformity with 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 231 

Article II of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, 
relating to the opening of hostilities, is sent to the British 
Minister in Paris on August 5, 19 14. 

No. 48 

Communication made on August ^tk by Sir Francis Villiers 
to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

I am charged with informing the Belgian Government 
that the British Government considers that common 
action with a view to resisting Germany is justified by 
treaty of 1835. 

(Signed) F. Villiers. 

No. 49 

Telegram addressed by the Belgian Minister in London to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 5, 1914. 
England accepts to co-operate as guarantor in defence of 
our territory. The British fleet will assure a free passage 
of the Scheldt to revictual Antwerp. 

(Signed) Count de Lalaing. 

No. 50 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister at The Hague to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 5, 1914. 
War beacons are going to be set up. 

(Signed) Baron Fallon. 

No. 51 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
the Belgian Minister at Madrid. 

Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

Express to the Spanish Government the thanks of the 



King's Government. 



(Signed) Davignon. 



232 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

No. 52 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Minister in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 5, 1914. 
I have the honour to inform you that the Ministers of 
France and Russia have made this morning a demarche 
before me concerning the desire of their Governments to 
answer to our call and to co-operate with England in the 
defence of our territory. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 53 

Letter from the Dutch Minister in Brussels to the Belgian 
Minister 0/ Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 6, 1914. 

I have the honour to enclose herewith for you a special 
copy of the Staats Courant, declaring the neutrality of 
Holland in a war between Belgium and Germany and 
between England and Germany. 

(Signed) Jonkheer de Veeder. 

Annex to No. 53 

Laws and Regulations. 

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and 
the Colonies are now authorized by Her Majesty to notify 
all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government 
observes in the war which has been declared between the 
Powers friendly with the Netherlands a strict neutrality, and 
in view of the observation of this neutrality the following 
orders have been issued : — 

Article 1. — In the limits of the State territory comprising the King- 
dom in Europe outside the Colonies and Possessions in other parts of 
the world, no kind of hostilities is permitted in their territory as may 
serve as a base of hostile operations. 

Article 2. — The occupation of any part of the territory of the State by 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 233 

a belligerent for obtaining a passage through territory by way of the 
land for convoys and ammunition belonging to the belligerent shall not 
be permitted in the territory of the Netherlands. 

Article 3. — The troops of the armies belonging to the belligerent 
arriving on the territory of the State by way of the land are to be 
immediately disarmed and to be interned for the rest of the war. 
Battleships which belong to the belligerents and have infringed 
the Articles 2, 4, or 7 may not leave the territory till the end of 
the war. 

Article 4. — The warships which belong to an enemy shall not have 
access to the State waters. 

Article 5. — The regulation of Article 4 is not applicable to — 

(i) The warships of the belligerent which, in consequence of 
damage or of the state of the sea, have entered any of the ports or 
harbours of the State. The ships must leave the above ports or 
harbours as soon as the circumstances have been removed for 
which they sought refuge. 

(2) The ships of the belligerents which have entered a port 
situated in the territory of the Colonies exclusive of those that 
wish to take in provisions or fuel ; those ships which have entered 
for these circumstances under the condition that they do not 
remain in the port or harbour for more than twenty-four hours ; 
ships of war belonging to the belligerent which are used for 
religious, scientific, or humanitarian missions exclusively. 

Article 6. — Ships of war belonging to belligerents must not repair 
their damage in the port or harbour of the State unless such repair 
is indispensable for navigation, and must not in any way assist their 
fighting powers. 

Article 7. — Ships of a belligerent which at the commencement of the 
war are within the territory of the State must leave at twenty-four hours' 
notice from the publication of these Articles. 

Article 8. — If the ships of war or gunboats belonging to the various 
belligerents find themselves in a position contrary to Article 5 in the 
same part of the world or the territory of the State, delay of not more 
than twenty-four hours is allowed for the departure of such ships 
belonging to the belligerents. Under such circumstances the order 
for departure is fixed by the time of arrival. A warship or gunboat 
belonging to the belligerents can only quit the territory twenty-four 
hours after the departure of a trading vessel carrying the flag of the 
other belligerent. 

Article 9. — Ships of war or gunboats, according to Articles 5 and 6, 
are not allowed to be re-victualled in those ports of the State where they 
are permitted in time of peace. They may only charge themselves 
with such fuel as is necessary to enable them, along with that which 
they have on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country. 
The same ship can only re-victual afresh or take in fuel at the expiration 



234 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

of a period of three months at least after the previous re-victualling 

in the State territory. 

Article lo. — A prize can only be brought into the territory which is 

incapable of navigation on account of the state of the sea or for lack of 

fuel or food. She must leave the territory when the cause for entry 

ceases to exist. If she cannot do it the order shall be given for her to 

depart at once. In case of a refusal it shall be customary to liberate 

the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the crew of the 

belligerent which has made the prize. 

Article ii. — It is forbidden in the territory of the State to form a 

fighting corps or to make use of the recruiting stations to the advantage 

of the belligerent. 

Article 12. — It is forbidden in the territory of the State to take service 

on warships or similar boats. 

Article 13. — It is forbidden in the territory of the State to arrange for 

the arming and equipment of the navies destined for the military 

purposes for the profit of the belhgerent. 

Article 14. — It is forbidden in the territory of the State to furnish 

ammunition to the ships of war of the belligerent, or to go to their 

assistance in any manner whatever which shall appear to assist the 

crew or their equipment. 

Article 15. — It is forbidden in the territory of the State, without first 

obtaining the permission of the competent authorities, to repair any ship 

of war or gunboat of the belligerent, or to furnish them with provisions 
or fuel. 
Article 16. — It is forbidden within the territories of the State to do 

any repairs or alterations to a prize unless it is considered necessary 
to make it seaworthy, or to buy up such a prize as confiscated 
merchandise, or to exchange it at a depot. 

Article 17. — The territory of the State shall include the sea for a 
stretch of 3 nautical miles up to latitude 60° and shall cease below, 
and this distance of 3 nautical miles is measured by buoys at the 
departure of a right line drawn to traverse the bay as near as possible 
to the entrance to a point at the mouth of the bay which does not 
extend 10 miles from the 60th latitude. 

Article 18.— Further attention is drawn to Articles loo and 205 of the 
Penal Code, Indisch Staatsblad 1906, No. 62, Article 7, and Article 
No. 3 of the laws of the Netherlands subjects. No. 55 of the Indisch 
Staatsblad, and Nos. 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Surinanne, and 
Nos. 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Curaco. The attention of 
commanders of ships armoured and unarmoured is drawn to the 
danger and inconvenience of them if they expose themselves in not 
respecting the blockade of the belhgerent, in transporting contraband 
of war or military messages for the belligerents, or for executing for 
them any other deed of transport. Those who violate the above Acts 
expose themselves to all the consequences of these Acts and cannot 
obtain any protection from the Government of the Netherlands. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 235 

No. 54 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

Brussels, August 6, 1914. 
Please communicate to your Government the following 
note: "The Dutch Government has notified the estab- 
lishment of war beacons on the Scheldt, and assures 
maintenance of navigation. It is convenient that the 
navigation shall begin thirty minutes before sunrise and 
shall cease thirty minutes after sunset, and that a change 
of pilots shall be made at Bath. If desired that it should 
be necessary to answer to the demarche of the Dutch 
Government, the Belgian Government thinks that there is 
reason on this part of the coast to maintain the lightships 
at Vielingen and Vandelaar, and also the buoys in the 
Vielingen Channel." 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 55 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister at The Hague to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 6, 1914. 
The navigation of the Scheldt shall be made by signals 
when it is clear. The buoys of the Vielingen shall be 
re-established. The taking of pilots at Hanswert is very 
easy and better organized. Do you insist on Bath ? 

(Signed) Baron Fallon. 

No. 56 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

Brussels, August 7, 1914. 
Please express to the Government of the Netherlands 
the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the 
measures which have been taken to secure the navigation 
of the Scheldt. The Belgian Government is in accord with 
the Dutch Government on the subject of the duration of 



236 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the navigation. I had proposed Bath, but accept Hans- 

wert, because this point seems useful for the change of 

pilots. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 57 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
the Belgian Ministers in Paris and London. 

Brussels, August 7, 1914. 
The Belgian Government hopes that the war will not 
extend to Central Africa. The Government of the Belgian 
Congo has received instructions to observe an attitude of 
strict defensive. The Belgian Government therefore asks 
if the French Government (English Government) will 
notify its intention to proclaim the neutrality of the French 
Congo (British Colonies in the Congo Basin) in conformity 
with the eleventh article of the Berlin Treaty. Information 
from Boma comes to hand that hostilities are probable 
between the French and Germans in Ubangi. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 58 

Letter from the Belgia?t Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
the Belgian Ministers in Paris and London. 

Brussels, August 7, 1914. 

In addition to my telegram of this morning I have the 
honour to request you to convey to the knowledge of the 
French Government (British Government), the following 
information : " The Governor-General of the Congo has 
been instructed to take all measures of defence for the 
frontiers of the Belgian Congo ; the Belgian Government 
invites the high functionaries to abstain from any offensive 
action against the Colonies. In view of the civilizing 
mission of the colonizing nations, the Belgian Government 
desires in the cause of humanity not to extend the field of 
hostilities to Central Africa. It does not intend to take the 
initiative in inflicting a similar trial on civilization in these 
regions, and the military forces shall not enter into any 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 237 

action unless they have to repel a direct attack against our 

African possessions. I shall attach value to the assurance 

that the Government of the Republic (Great Britain) share 

this point of view, and that it is their intention, should 

actual conflict arise, to adhere to Article 2 of the Act of 

Berlin by placing under active neutrality those of its 

Colonies which comprise the conventional basin of the 

Congo. I have sent an identical note to your colleague in 

London (Paris). 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 59 

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Paris to the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Afairs. 

Paris, August 8, 1914. 
I have had the honour to-day to speak with the President 
of the Republic on the subject of your telegram. I received 
it in the evening and I immediately communicated it to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. He asked for time to reply. 
M. Poincare promised me to speak to-day on this matter to 
the Minister of the Colonies. At present not being at actual 
war, it seems premature to proclaim the neutrality of the 
Congo. But he reserved his reply. He thinks that war has 
already broken out at Ubangi. He profited by the cir- 
cumstances to record that the protection which she (France) 
accorded to us would extend to our colonies, and he said 
we had nothing to fear. 

(Signed) Baron Guillaume. 

No. 60 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister at The Hague to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 9, 1914. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs has asked me to send you 
the following information, since the American Minister at 
Brussels has refused to do so. " The fortress of Liege has 
been taken after a courageous defence. The German 
Government regrets profoundly that owing to the Belgian 
attitude towards Germany it has had to resort to these 



238 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

sanguinary measures. Germany does not wish to make an 
enemy of Belgium, and it is only by sheer necessity that in 
connection with the mihtary operations in France she has 
seriously determined to enter Belgium and occupy Liege in 
order to have a base for later military operations. After the 
Belgian army has maintained the honour of its arms by 
offering a most valiant resistance against this superior force, 
the German Government entreats the King and the Belgian 
Government to avoid the horror of further warfare in 
Belgium. The Government would come to an agreement 
with Belgium over these matters, as is consistent with its 
conflict with France. [In original text "agreement," but 
see Nos. 64 and 70.] Germany assures most solemnly 
that she has no intention to appropriate Belgian territory. 
Germany is always prepared to evacuate Belgium as soon 
as a state of war will permit her to do so. The Ambassador 
of the United States has asked his colleague to mediate. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs has accepted, but without 
enthusiasm. 

(Signed) Baron Fallon. 

No. 61 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Paris to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Ajfairs. 

Paris, August 9, 1914. 
The French Government is disposed to maintain the 
neutrality of its possessions in the Congo Basin, and asks 
Spain to propose it to Berlin. 

(Signed) Baron GUILLAUME. 

No. 62 

Letter from the Belgian Minister at The Hague to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 10, 1914. 
Answering to the telephonic call yesterday at 9 o'clock, 
I went to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign 
Minister told me that my German colleague had handed 
him a document which the representative of the United 
States at Brussels had refused to transmit. The American 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 239 

diplomat on being approached by the German Legation 
has excused himself on the ground that he has not received 
special orders from Washington to intervene with the 
Belgian Government in the interests of Germany. The 
American Minister has in consequence telegraphed to his 
colleague at The Hague to inform the German represen- 
tative of the refusal of Mr. Whitlock. The first demarche 
was made by the German Government before the United 
States Ambassador in Berlin. His Excellency has read out 
to me the German text of the document. I cannot hide my 
astonishment at the attempt at mediation and its feeble 
chance of success, but nevertheless, since it was agreeable 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, I 
promised to telephone to you immediately. This I did 
yesterday. You will find enclosed the German document 
in its original text together with the translation. 

(Signed) Baron Fallon. 

Annex (see No. 60) 

" The fortress of Liege ... as soon as the state of war 
will permit her to do so." 

No. 63 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign A fairs to the 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

Brussels, August 10, 1914. 
The Belgian Government has received the proposals that 
the German Government has made through the mediation 
of the Dutch Government. It will shortly hand you its 
answer. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 64 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign A fairs to 
the Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

Brussels, August 10, 1914. 
There is a doubt about the meaning of the word 
" Auseinandersetzung," which you translate as " arrange- 



240 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

ments." Please inform us if in view of the German 

Government it is a matter of the arrangements we have 

taken with France, or of the difference between France 

and Germany. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 65 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian 
Minister at The Hague, on the request of the Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, has handed the following 
proposal to us. (See No. 60 and No. 62.) 

The following is the answer which the Belgian Govern- 
ment proposes to make : " The proposal which the German 
Government has made to us repeats its proposal to us of 
August the 2nd. Faithful to its international obligations, 
Belgium can only repeat the answer to that ultimatum, 
all the more so since its neutrality has been violated, a 
terrible war carried into its land, and since the guaranteeing 
Powers have responded loyally to its appeal." 

The Belgian Government thinks that the guaranteeing 
Powers should know about these documents. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 66 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Ajffairs to the 
Belgian Ministers in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 10, 1914. 
I have the honour to inform you of the circumstances con- 
cerning the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxem- 
burg. The General commanding the German troops 
caused on August 8th the German Minister in this town 
to insist on the departure of the Belgian Minister in 
the Grand Duchy. M. von Buch addressed to M. Eyschen 

a letter as follows : — 

Luxemburg, August 8, 1914. 

In consequence of the hostile attitude of Belgium the 

military authorities insist on the departure of the Belgian 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 241 

Minister from here. His Excellency the Commander asks 
Count Van der Steen de Jahay to arrange for his departure 
within twenty-four hours and to enter into an arrangement 
at Coblenz with General de Ploetz on the matter of his 
further journey. Departure is only possible via Treves 
and Coblenz. 

(Signed) VON BUCH. 

M. Eyschen handed this letter the same day to Count 
Van der Steen de Jahay. 

Luxemburg, August 8, 1914. 
I have with great regret to inform you that the German 
military authorities demand your departure. You will 
tind the conditions attached. M. de Buch tells me that 
the military authorities consider it best for you to travel 
by railway, for the journey by motor-car may expose you 
to frequent arrest. The German Minister has come to take 
your answer. I cannot adequately tell you how much I 
regret this necessity. I shall never forget the amicable 
relationships between us. 

(Signed) Eyschen. 

The Belgian Government thinks that the Government 
of the Grand Duchy had no choice to adopt but to ask 
the Belgian Minister in the Grand Duchy to leave for 
Belgium. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 67 

Brussels, August 10, 1914. 
The Legation has received to-day from Washington a 
dispatch stating that the Government of the United States 
consented to the claim of international courtesy to accept 
the protection of German subjects in Belgium. In view 
of the instructions which accompany this dispatch we will 
concern ourselves with the protection of German subjects. 
The pleasant reports which we have up till now received 
on this subject give us an assurance that we shall with 

17 



r 



242 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

mutual sentiments follow out these objects. I offer you 
my highest consideration. 

(Signed) Whitlock. 

No. 68 

Letter to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the 
British Minister in Belgium. 

Brussels, August ii, 1914. 
I have telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey the German 
communication and its answer. I have had the order to 
express to Your Excellency the approval of the British 
Government. The latter can only express agreement with 
the terms of the answer that the Belgian Government pro- 
posed to make to the proposal to sow discord between 
the countries after violating the treaty. 

(Signed) Francis Villiers. 

No. 69 

Letter to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the 
French Minister in Belgium. 

Brussels, August 11, 1914. 
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the 
French Government has given its entire adhesion to the 
answer of the Belgian Government to the German Govern- 
ment's new ultimatum. This answer could only be expected 
from a country which has so heroically defended its land. 
France will still continue to fulfil her duties as guarantor 
of Belgian neutrality. 

(Signed) Klobukofsky. 

No. 70 

Telegram to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 
the Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

The Hague, August 12, 1914. 
The German text contains a mistake. Before " Ausein- 
andersetzung " one must read " ihre," and then translate 
" Son conflit avec France." 

(Signed) Baron Fallon. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 243 

No. 71 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
the Belgiajt Minister at The Hague. 

Brussels, August 12, 1914. 
Please forward this telegram to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. (See answer to German Government in No. 65.) 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 72 

Telegram to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 
the Russian Foreign Minister. 

St. Petersburg, August 13, 1914. 
Please thank the Belgian Government for its communi- 
cation, and express the pleasure of the Imperial Government 
at its firm and dignified attitude, which greatly pleases the 
Russian Government. 

(Signed) Sazonof. 
No. 73 

Letter to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

The Hague, August 13, 1914. 
I had the honour to receive your telegram yesterday and 
to send the answer of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
second German proposal. His Excellency has promised 
to hand the communication to the German Minister at 
once. 

(Signed) Baron Fallon. 

No. 74 

Letter to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the 
Belgian Minister in Paris. 

Paris, August 16, 1914. 
In the course of a conversation with M. de Marjerie this 
morning I referred to the conversation on Colonial affairs 
and to the proposal which you had made by your telegram 
and dispatch of August 7th. He said that the French 
Government had approached the Spanish Government, 
who would not give an answer to its question without 
the advice of England. It appears that she still is unable 



244 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

to give an answer. M. de Marjerie thinks that under the 
present circumstances it is necessary to beat the German 
Government, wherever possible. He thinks that this is also 
the opinion of England, who will have certain claims to 
make. France desires to take back a part of the Congo 
which was ceded at the time of the Agadir crisis. A success, 
he said, would not be hard to attain. 

(Signed) Baron Guillaume. 

No. 75 

Letter from the Belgian Minister in London to the Belgian 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 17, 1914. 
In answer to the dispatch of August 7th I have the 
honour to inform you that the British Government cannot 
support the Belgian proposal to respect the neutrality of 
the possessions of the belligerent Powers in the Congo 
Basin. German troops in East Africa have already taken 
the offensive against the British Protectorate in Central 
Africa, and British troops have already attacked the German 
station of Dar-es-Salam, where they have destroyed the 
telegraph station. Under these circumstances, in spite of 
the fact that the British Government is persuaded of the 
political and strategical value of the Belgian Government's 
proposal, it cannot accept it. The British Government 
thinks that the force which it is sending to Africa will 
overcome all opposition. It will take all precautions to 
look after the native population. France has given the 
same reply as England in view of the German activity near 
Boma and Ekododo. 

(Signed) COUNT de Lalaing. 

No. 76 

Telegram from the Vice-Governor of Ku tango to the Belgian 

Minister of the Colonies. 

Elizabethville, August 26, 1914. 
The German force attacked on August 22nd, on Lake 
Tanganyika, the port of Tukugu. There are two dead and 
two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected. 

(Signed) ToMBEUR. 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 245 

No. 77 

Telegrmn front the Belgian Minister in Austro-Hungary to 
the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs^ transmitted by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. 

The Hague, August 28, 1914. 

By the order of my Government I have the honour to 
notify to Your Excellency as follows : — 

Seeing that Belgium after refusing to accept the proposals 
which have been addressed by Germany has prepared for 
co-operation with France and Great Britain, who have 
declared war on Austria-Hungary, and in view of the fact 
that subjects of Austria-Hungary in Belgium, under the eye 
of the King, have been subjected to treatment contrary to 
the principles of humanity, and usual only for the subjects 
of an enemy, Austria- Hungary feels it necessary to break off 
diplomatic relations with Belgium and considers herself in 
a state of war. I leave the country with the staff of the 
Legation and confide my affairs to the care of the United 
States Minister. The Imperial and Royal Government has 
handed me my passports. 

(Signed) Klary. 

No. 78 

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign A^airs to 
the Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

Antwerp, August 29, 1914. 

Please accept receipt of Austria- Hungary's declaration of 
war on Belgium and add the following : — 

Belgium has always entertained relations of amity with 
its neighbours. She has scrupulously fulfilled her obliga- 
tions as a neutral. If she could not accept the German pro- 
posals it was because they violated the engagements she 
had assumed in the face of all Europe, engagements which 
have been the conditions of the Belgian kingdom. It felt 
that no people could give up its duties and obligations in 
face of force. The Government waited not only after the 
ultimatum but also after the violation of Belgium by 
German troops before appealing to France and England, 



246 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

who with Germany and Austria-Hungary guaranteed the 

neutrality of Belgium. In repelling the invasion she has 

not done any act contrary to the Hague Convention, 

Article lo, for neutral countries. Germany has recognized 

herself that her invasion of Belgium is a violation of the 

laws of nations and cannot be justified by strategical 

necessity. Belgium makes a formal protest against the 

allegation that Austro-Hungarian subjects are treated with 

indignity within her territory. The Belgian Government 

has given orders to safeguard the persons and property of 

Austro-Hungarian subjects. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

No. 79 

Letter front the Belgian Minister of Foreign A fairs to the 
Legations abroad. 

Antwerp, August 29, 1914. 
Under the date of August 17th I have addressed to 
the Belgian Minister in London a letter which I think 
ought to dispel certain allegations of the German Govern- 
ment mentioned in the Blue Book published by the British 
Government. I have the honour to set before you a copy 
of the letter and its annexes. Please bring them to the 
knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

Annex No. i 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign A fairs to the 
Belgian Minister in London. 

Brussels, August 17, 1914. 
The Blue Book recently published by the British 
Government reproduces in No. 65 the text of a telegram 
from Berlin on July 31st, by Goschen to Grey, with the 
following passage : " It appears from what he says that 
certain hostile acts have already been committed by 
Belgium. As an instance of this he alleged that a con- 
signment of German corn had been placed under an 
embargo." The fact to which the German Secretary of 
State refers is undoubtedly the application of the Royal 



BELGIAN GREY BOOK 247 

decrees prohibiting the export of corn. As you state, the 
act has no character Hke that which Germany attributes 
to it. The Royal decrees of July 30th, published in 
the Moniteiir Beige, prohibited by provisional order the 
export by land or sea of certain products, notably cereals. 
Under the date of July 31st the German Minister at 
Brussels notified that the Customs at Antwerp had retained 
cargoes of corn destined for Germany. Herr Below de- 
manded a free exit of boats carrying these cargoes. The 
same day as the German Minister's complaint was received, 
my department informed the Minister of Finance, and two 
days after, August 2nd, the latter announced that he had 
given instructions to the Belgian Customs to give full satis- 
faction to Germany. I can only place before you a copy of 
the correspondence that has passed been Herr Below and 
the Belgian Government. You will see that nothing in our 
attitude could bear witness to hostile intention against 
Germany. Our action has only been that of simple right 
for all nations situated like we are, in exceptional cir- 
cumstances. It would be well to explain to England. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

Annex No. 2. 

Letter frofn the Belgian Minister of Foreign A^airs to 
Herr Below, the German Minister in Brussels. 

August 3, 1914. 
Following the letter you have addressed to me I have the 
honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has 
brought to the knowledge of the Customs that the prohibi- 
tion by Royal decree on July 30th last month only applies 
to goods which are for export and are intended for regular 
merchandise in process of transportation. When the goods 
are declared to be destined for transport they are allowed 
free entry on declaration. If such goods arrive without 
restriction, and are destined to remain in the country, the 
Customs will permit entry when they have paid duty. I 
can add that the transport of corn to which you refer in 
your letter was authorized on August 3rd. 

(Signed) Davignon. 



248 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Annex No. 3. 

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign A^airs to 
Herr Below, the German Minister in Brussels. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914. 
In answer to your letter of July 31st, I have the 
honour to inform you that the Royal decree of July 
30th only refers to export and not to goods in transit. I 
have taken care to make known your communication to the 
Minister of Finance and to ask him to give the depart- 
ment's instructions in order to prevent the application of 
the decree wrongly. 

(Signed) Davignon. 

Annex No. 4. 

Letter from Herr Below , German Minister in Brussels, to 
the German Minister of Foreign Aff-airs. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 
They have informed me that the Customs has refused to 
allow the departure of ships loaded with grain for Germany. 
Since this only concerns transit and not export, I ask that 
you will allow the German boats to depart. At the same 
time I should be glad if you would inform me if the Port of 
Antwerp is closed for this sort of merchandise. I should be 
glad if you will let me know as soon as possible. 

(Signed) VON BELOW. 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, 
TREATIES, SPEECHES, 
AND MANIFESTOES 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 

COMMUNICATIONS AND TELEGRAMS NOT IN THE 
WHITE PAPER, DENKSCHRIFT, ORANGE BOOK, 
OR GREY BOOK 

(a) 

July 30 

Bethmann-Hollweg to German Ambassador in Vienna, 

{From " Westminster Gazette" for August ist.) 

Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

THE report of Count Pourtales does not harmonize 
with the account which Your Excellency has given 
of the attitude of the Austro- Hungarian Government. 

Apparently there is a misunderstanding, which I beg you 
to clear up. 

We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with 
Servia, with which she is in a state of war. 

The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Peters- 
burg would be a grave mistake. 

We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty. 

As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a 
world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting 
our advice. 

Your Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold 
with all emphasis and great seriousness. 

(Signed) Bethmann-Hollweg. 

(b) 

July 30 
Telegram from Prince Heinrich to King George. 

{From " Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeiiung" for August 20th.) 

William is very troubled and is doing his utmost to 
carry out the Tsar's request of working to preserve peace. 



252 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

He is in continuous telegraphic correspondence with Tsar 
Nicholas, who has confirmed to-day the news that he 
has taken military measures which are equivalent to 
mobilization, and that these measures were initiated five 
days ago. We have in addition received the information 
that France is also taking military measures while we have 
as yet taken none. We may, however, be compelled to 
take them at any moment if our neighbours continue their 
preparations. This would mean a European war. If you 
are really and earnestly anxious to prevent this cruel 
calamity, may I suggest that you should, by your influence, try 
to secure the neutrality of France and Russia f That would, 
I believe, be of the greatest possible use. 

I think this is a certain and perhaps the only chance of 
preserving peace. I should like to add that Germany and 
England ought to support each other more now than ever 
in order to avoid the terrible catastrophe which otherwise 
appears inevitable. Believe me that William is filled with 
the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of 
peace. The military preparations of his neighbours, how- 
ever, may compel him at last to follow their example in 
order to assure the safety of his country, which otherwise 
will remain defenceless. I have informed William of my 
telegram to you, and hope you will take my communication 
in the same friendly spirit which has prompted it. 

(Signed) Henry. 
(c) 

July 30 

Telegram from King George to Prince Heinrich. 

{From " Nord-deiitsche Allgemeine Zeilung" for August 20th.) 

Thank you for your telegram. I am happy to learn of the 

efforts that are being made by William to agree with Nicholas 

for the maintenance of peace. I ardently desire to spare 

Europe the irreparable calamity of such a war. My 

Government is doing all that is possible to induce Russia 

and France to stop their military preparations, if Austria 

would content herself with occupying Belgrade and the 

adjacent portions of Servian territory as a pledge for the 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 253 

conclusion of an agreement satisfying her claims, while 
at the same time other countries stop their preparations for 
war. I count upon the great influence of the Emperor to 
obtain from Austria the acceptance of this proposal. He 
will thereby prove that Germany and England are working 
together for the prevention of an international calamity. 
Please assure William that I am doing all and will continue 
to do all that lies in my power in order to preserve the 
peace of Europe. 

(Signed) George. 

(d) 

July 31 

Telegram from the Kaiser to King George. 

{From " Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.) 

Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your 
proposals agree with my ideas and with the information 
which I have received to-night from Vienna and which I 
send on to London. I have just learned through the 
Imperial Chancellor that he has received the information 
that the Tsar has ordered this evening the mobilization of 
all his army and navy. He has not even waited for the 
result of the intervention on which I have been engaged 
and has left me entirely without information. I am going 
to Berlin in order to take measures for the safeguarding of 
my eastern frontiers, where numerous Russian troops have 
already assembled. 

(Signed) William. 

(e) 

August i 

Telegram from King George to the Kaiser. 

{From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.) 

Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent 
an urgent telegram to Nicholas, in which I have expressed 
my willingness to do everything that lies in my power 
in order to help on the resumption of negotiations between 
the States concerned. 

(Signed) GEORGE. 



254 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

(f) 

Telegram from King George to the Tsar. 
{From "Daily News" for August ^th.) 

August is/, 3.30 a.m. 

My Government has received the following statement 
from the German Government : — 

"On July 29th the Russian Emperor requested the 
German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia 
and Austria. The Emperor immediately declared his 
readiness to do so. He informed the Russian Emperor of 
this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. 
Without waiting for the result of this action, Russia 
mobilized against Austria. By telegraph, the German 
Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby 
his attempt at mediation would be rendered illusory. The 
Emperor further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the 
military operations against Austria. This, however, did not 
happen. In spite of this the German Government con- 
tinued its mediation in Vienna. In this matter the German 
Government have gone to the furthest limit of what can be 
suggested to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. 

"The proposals made by the German Government in 
Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by 
Great Britain, and the German Government recommended 
them in Vienna for their serious consideration. They were 
taken into consideration in Vienna this morning. During 
the deliberations of the (? Austrian) Cabinet, and before 
they were concluded, the German Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg reported the mobilization of the entire Russian 
army and fleet. Owing to this action on the part of 
Russia, the Austrian answer to the German proposals for 
mediation, which were still under consideration, was not 
given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed 
against Germany ; that is to say, the Power whose mediation 
had been invoked by the Russian Emperor. 

" We were bound to reply with serious counter-measures 
to this action, which we were obliged to consider as hostile, 
unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our 
countrv. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 255 

Russian mobilization on our frontier. We have therefore 

informed Russia that, unless she were prepared to suspend 

within twelve hours the warlike measures against Germany 

and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilize, and this 

would mean war. We have asked France if she would 

remain neutral during a German-Russian war." 

I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has 

produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss 

any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at 

present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a 

personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension 

which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open 

grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I 

can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I 

will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the 

interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. 

I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that 

is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world. 

(Signed) GEORGE. 

(g) 

Telegram from the Tsar to King George. 

{From "Daily News" for August ^th.) 

August I St. 

I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not 
German Ambassador this afternoon presented a Note to my 
Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of 
the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts 
to finding some pacific solution of the question raised 
by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush 
Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this 
would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, 
which is of such vital interest to my Empire. 

Every proposal, including that of your Government, was 
rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when 
favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria 
had passed that Germany showed any disposition to 
mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise 
proposal. Austria's declaration of war on Servia forced me 
to order a partial mobilization, though, in view of threaten- 
ing situation, ray military advisers strongly advised a 



2S6 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

general mobilization, owing to quickness with which 
Germany can mobilize in comparison with Russia. 

I was eventually compelled to take this course in conse- 
quence of complete Austrian mobilization, of the bombard- 
ment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in 
Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in 
Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved by 
Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite 
unexpected by me, as I had given most categorical assur- 
ances to the Emperor William that my troops would not 
move so long as mediation negotiations continued. 

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that 
I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has 
been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to 
support France and Russia. God bless and protect you. 

(Signed) NICHOLAS. 

(h) 

Telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor. 
(From " Nord-deutsche Allgemdnc Zeitung" for August 20///.) 

August ist, ii.o a.m. 
Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and 
asked whether I thought I could say that in the event of 
France remaining neutral in a Russo-German war we should 
not attack the French. I told him I thought I could accept 
the responsibility for this. 

(Signed) LiCHNOWSKY. 

(i) 

Telegram from the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial 

Ambassador in London. 

{From " Nord-deutsche Allgcmeine Zeitung" for August 20th.) 

Germany is ready to take up the English proposal if 
England guarantees with its forces the absolute neutrality 
of France in the Russo-German conflict. Germany's 
mobilization has taken place to-day as the result of the 
Russian challenge, before the English proposals reached 
here. For this reason it is also no longer possible to alter 
our march towards the French frontier. But we guarantee 
that the French frontier shall not be crossed by our troops 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 257 

until Monday, August 3rd, at seven o'clock in the evening, 
in the case of England's consent being given up to that time. 
(Signed) Bethmann-Hollweg. 

(J) 

August i 
Telegram from the Kaiser to King George. 
{From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.) 
I have just received the communication from your 
Government in which it offers French neutrality under 
the guarantee of Great Britain. This ofTer was accom- 
panied by a question whether in these circumstances 
Germany would refrain from attacking France. For 
technical reasons the mobilization on two fronts — to east 
and west — which I ordered this afternoon must proceed. 
It is impossible to give a counter-order, as your telegram 
unfortunately came too late. But if France offers me her 
neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army 
and navy, I will of course cease to consider an attack on 
France, and use my troops in another direction. I hope 
that France will not be nervous. The troops on my 
frontier are being held back by telegram and telephone 
from passing the French frontier. 

(Signed) William. 

(k) 

August i 

Telegram fro7n King George to the Kaiser. 
{From " Nord-deutscJie Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.) 
In answer to your telegram which has just come in, I 
think there must be a misunderstanding with regard to a 
suggestion which was made in the course of a friendly con- 
versation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward 
Grey when they were discussing how actual hostilities 
between the German and French armies could be avoided 
as long as the possibility remains that an agreement will be 
reached between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Sir Edward 
Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky to-morrow morning in 
order to discover if the misunderstanding lies on his side. 

(Signed) GEORGE, 
18 



258 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

(1) 

August i 

Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor. 
[Published in the " Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for September c^th.) 

Time, 1.15 p.m. 
Sir Edward Grey's private secretary has just called to 
tell me that the Minister wished to make proposals to me 
for the neutrality of Great Britain, even in the event of our 
being at war with France as well as with Russia. I see Sir 
Edward Grey this afternoon, and will report immediately. 

(Signed) Lichnowsky. 

(m) 

August i 

Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor. 

{Published in the " Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung "for September ^th.) 

Time, 5.30 p.m. 

Sir Edward Grey has just read me the following state- 
ment, which was agreed to unanimously by the Cabinet : 
" The reply of the German Government in respect of the 
neutrality of Belgium is extremely to be regretted, because 
the neutrality of Belgium affects this country. If Germany 
could see her way to make a positive declaration similar 
to that which France has made, it would contribute very 
considerably towards removing the anxiety and tension here, 
whereas, on the other hand, it would be extremely difficult 
to restrain public opinion in this country if one of the 
belligerents should violate the neutrality of Belgium, while 
the other respected it." 

In reply to my inquiry whether, on condition that we 
observed the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a 
definite statement as to England's neutrality, the Minister 
said that he could not do so, but that the question would 
play an important role with public opinion in this country. 
If we violated the neutrality of Belgium in a war w^ith 
France there would certainly be a change in public feeling, 
which would render it difficult for the present Government 
to assume a friendly neutrality. For the present there was 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 259 

not the slightest intention of taking hostile proceedings 
against us, and it was desired to prevent such an attitude 
being adopted. It was, however, difficult to draw a line to 
which we might go without any action being taken on the 
part of this country. He always returned to the Belgian 
neutrality, and expressed the opinion that this question 
would in any case play a great role. He said that he had 
asked himself whether it were not possible that, in the event 
of a Russian war, we and France could stand opposed to 
each other, armed, but without attacking each other. I 
asked him if he were in a position to state that France 
would agree to such a pact. As we wished neither to ruin 
France nor to conquer any of her territory, it seemed to me 
possible that we would acquiesce in such an arrangement, 
seeing that it ensured us Great Britain's neutrality. The 
Minister said he would endeavour to obtain further infor- 
mation, and he did not fail to appreciate the difficulties in the 
way of holding back the military on both sides in inactivity. 

(Signed) Lichnowsky. 

(n) 

August i 

Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor. 

{Published in the " Nord-detitsche Allgemeine Zeiiung" for September ^th.) 

Time, 8.30 p.m. 
My report of this morning is cancelled by my report of 
this evening. As no positive English proposals have been 
submitted, further steps in connection with the instructions 
given me are superfluous. 

(Signed) Lichnowsky. 

(0) 

Questions in Parliament concerning Telegrams of 

August i 

Sir Edward Grey's Reply in the House of Commons on 

August 2%th to Lord Robert Cecil. 

{Hansard, Vol. 66, No. 123.) 

Lord Robert Cecil asked the Secretary of State for 

Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the 



26o THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

publication by the German Government of certain proposals 
which are alleged to have been made to secure French and 
English neutrality during the war ; and whether the publi- 
cation was complete and accurate. 

Sir E. Grey : I have seen an incomplete publication. 
The circumstances were as follows : It was reported to me 
one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that 
Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia 
and Austria, and also engage not to attack France, if we 
would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. 
I said at once that if the German Government thought such 
an arrangement possible I was sure we could secure it. It 
appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was 
that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany 
went to war with Russia. This was quite a different pro- 
posal, and, as I supposed it in all probability to be incom- 
patible with the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance, it 
was not in my power to promise to secure it. Subsequently, 
the Ambassador sent for my private secretary, and told him 
that, as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he 
had sent a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impres- 
sion produced by the first telegram he had sent on the 
subject. The first telegram has been published. This 
second telegram does not seem to have been published. 

(P) 

Questions in Parliament concerning Telegrams on 

August i 

Sir Edward Grey's Reply to Mr. Keir Hardie on August 2'jth. 
(Hansard, Vol. 66, No. 121). 

Mr. Keir Hardie (Merthyr Tydvil, Lab.) asked the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether the suggestions for a 
peace settlement made by the German Ambassador (White 
Paper, p. 66, item No. 123), together with his invitation to 
the Foreign Secretary to put forward proposals of his own 
which would be acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were 
submitted to and considered by the Cabinet ; and, if not, 
why proposals involving such far-reaching possibilities were 
thus rejected. 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 261 

Sir E. Grey (Northumberland, Berwick) : These were 
personal suggestions made by the Ambassador on August ist, 
and without authority to alter the conditions of neutrality 
proposed to us by the German Chancellor in No. 85 in the 
White Paper — Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914). 

The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the 
next morning — that is, Sunday, August 2nd — the conditions 
on which we could remain neutral, and came to the con- 
clusion that respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be 
one of these conditions. (" Hear, hear.") The German 
Chancellor had already been told on July 30th that we 
could not bargain that way. 

On Monday, August 3rd, I made a statement in the House 
accordingly. I had seen the German Ambassador again at 
his own request on Monday, and he urged me most strongly, 
though he said that he did not know the plans of the 
German military authorities, not to make the neutrality of 
Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. 
It was a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet 
in the morning, and I had no time to record the conversa- 
tion, and therefore it does not appear in the White Paper ; 
but it was impossible to withdraw that condition (loud 
cheers) without becoming a consenting party to the viola- 
tion of the treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on 
Belgium. 

After I spoke in the House we made to the German Govern- 
ment the communication described in No. 153 in the White 
Paper about the neutrality of Belgium. Sir Edward 
Goschen's report of the reply to that communication had 
not been received when the White Paper was printed and 
laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the 
White Paper. 

I have been asked why 1 did not refer to No. 123 in the 
White Paper when I spoke in the House on August 3rd. 
If I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of 
neutrality I must have referred to No. 85, the proposals 
made, not personally by the Ambassador, but officially by 
the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the 
Prime Minister subsequently, and this would have made 



262 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the case against the German Government much stronger 
than I did make it in my speech. (" Hear, hear.") I 
dehberately rehained from doing that then. 

Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the 
German Ambassador, as distinct from communications 
made on behalf of his Government. He worked for peace ; 
but real authority at Berlin did not rest with him and others 
like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace 
failed. (Loud cheers.) 

Mr. Keir Hardie : May I ask whether any attempt was 
made to open up negotiations with Germany on the basis 
of suggestions here set forth by the German Ambassador ? 

Sir E. Grey : The German Ambassador did not make 
any basis of suggestions. It was the German Chancellor 
who made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambas- 
sador, speaking on his own personal initiative and without 
authority, asked whether we would formulate conditions on 
which we would be neutral. We did go into that question, 
and those conditions were stated to the House and made 
known to the German Ambassador. 

Mr. Keir Hardie (who was received with cries of " Oh I" 
from all parts of the House) : May I ask whether the 
German authorities at Berlin repudiated the suggestions of 
their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort at all 
(renewed cries of " Oh 1 " and " Order ") was made to find 
out how far the German Government would have agreed to 
the suggestions put before them by their own Ambassador ? 

Mr. T. Healy (Cork, N.E., Ind. Nat.) : Before the right 
hon. gentleman answers that, may I ask him if the Socialists 
in the Reichstag are asking any questions like this ? (Loud 
and prolonged cheering.) 

Sir E. Grey : The German Ambassador (Opposition 
cries of "Don't answer") — I would like to have no mis- 
understanding (cheers) — the German Ambassador did not 
make to us suggestions different from those which his 
Government had made. The suggestions that his Govern- 
ment made were those set forth in No. 85 of the White 
Paper. The German Ambassador never suggested to us 
that Germany would be able to agree to the condition of 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 263 

the neutrality of Belgium ; on the contrary, he did suggest 
fo me that we should not put that condition forward 
because he was afraid that his Government would not be 
able to accept it. (Cheers.) 

(q) 

August i 

German Official Communique. 

{Published in the " Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeiiung" for August is/.) 

After His Majesty the Kaiser has declared the state of 
war {Kriegsziistaiid) for the Empire, the time has come to 
present in brief the events that have led to this decision. 
A more detailed documentary exposition is reserved for 
later. 

For years Austria- Hungary has had to fight against 
movements which, with criminal means, and both permitted 
and forwarded by the Servian Government, have aimed at 
the revolutionizing and the tearing away of the south- 
eastern parts of Austria-Hungary. The winning of this 
area is the undisguised aim of Servian policy. Servia 
believed in this that it could reckon on the support of 
Russia, with the idea that it is Russia's duty to lend its 
protection to the South Slav peoples. Support has been 
given to this idea through Russia's efforts to create an 
alliance of the Balkan States. The greater Servia propa- 
ganda has finally been shown up in a clear light through 
the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife. 

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy determined to make an 
end to this criminal agitation, which was directed against 
its existence as a Great Power. Through this it was 
bound to come out whether Russia was determined actually 
to carry through its role of protector to the South Slavs in 
their campaign of destruction against the existence of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In this case a vital interest 
of Germany came in question : the unweakened existence 
of our allied Monarchy, which we, between opponents on 
the east and west, needed for the preservation of our own 
position as a Great Power. 



264 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Germany has from the beginning placed itself on the 
standpoint that the quarrel with Servia was an affair which 
concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia alone. While pre- 
serving this standpoint, we have with the greatest activity 
taken part in all efforts directed to the preservation of 
European peace. Austria- Hungary gave its hand to this 
by repeatedly declaring to the Powers that it aimed at no 
conquest and would not violate the territorial integrity of 
Servia. These declarations were given with emphasis, 
especially in St. Petersburg. We have advised our allies 
to show the utmost conciliation consistent with the dignity 
of the Monarchy. We have especially lent a helpful hand 
to all English steps directed towards mediation between 
St. Petersburg and Vienna. 

Already on the 26th reliable reports had come in of 
Russian mobilization. They caused the German Govern- 
ment to declare on the same day, under renewed assurance, 
that Austria-Hungary would not violate the territorial 
integrity of Servia : preparatory military measures of Russia 
must force us to retaliatory measures. These must be the 
mobilization of the army. But mobilization means war. 
We could not presume that Russia desires to unfetter a 
European war. On the next day the Russian Minister of 
War assured our Military Attache that no mobilization 
orders had yet been issued, that no horse or reservist had 
been called up. Nothing more than preparatory measures 
had been taken. If Austria- Hungary crossed the Servian 
frontier, the military districts towards Austria-Hungary 
would be mobilized, but under no circumstances those 
towards the German front. Nevei'theless^ in the days im- 
mediately following, reliable information left no doubt that 
Russia's military preparations were also in full progress on the 
German frontier. Reports on this subject became more 
numerous. Nevertheless, soothing declarations were again 
made by the Chief of the Russian General Staff to our 
Military Attache, which characterized the information of 
the Minister of War as still holding good to the full. 

On July 29th came a telegram from the Tsar to the 
Kaiser, which expressed the earnest request that the Kaiser 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 265 

should help him at this so serious moment. He asked him, 
in order to ward off the calamity of a European war, to do 
all in his power in order to keep his ally from going too 
far. On the same day the Kaiser replied, in a lengthy 
telegram, that, on the appeal to his friendship and help, 
he had undertaken the task of mediator. In accordance 
with this, diplomatic action was at once undertaken in 
Vienna. While this was in progress came the official 
information that Russia had mobilized against Austria- 
Hungary. At once the Kaiser pointed out to the Tsar in 
a further telegram that, through the Russian mobilization 
against Austria-Hungary, the role of mediator which he 
had undertaken at the request of the Tsar was endangered 
if not made impossible. Nevertheless, the action com- 
menced in Vienna was continued, and the proposals made 
by England in a similar direction warmly supported by the 
German Government. 

Over the proposals of mediation a decision was to have 
been reached in Vienna to-day ; but, before this was taken, 
the German Government received the official information 
that the mobilization orders had been issued for the whole 
Russian army and fleet. On this the Kaiser directed a last 
telegram to the Tsar, in which he pointed out that his 
responsibility for the safety of the Empire forced him to 
take defensive measures. He had gone in his efforts for 
the preservation of the world's peace to the farthest limits 
of possibility. It was not he who bore the responsibility 
for the calamity which now threatened the world. He had 
always been true to his friendship to the Tsar and the 
Russian Empire. The peace of Europe could still be 
preserved if Russia would cease to threaten Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. 

Thus, while the German Government was mediating at the 
request of Russia^ Russia was mobilizing its whole forces, and 
with that was threatening the safety of the German Empire, 
in which up to the present hour no extraordinary military 
measures had been taken. 

In this way, not at the call of Germany, but much more, as 
Germany has shown by its action, against its will, the moment 



266 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

has come which has summoned the argued forces of Germany on 
the scene. 

(r) 

August 2 

Telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor. 

{From "Nord-deiitsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.) 

Sir Edward Grey's suggestions, which arose from the 
desire to create the possibiHty of a histing neutrahty on 
the part of England, were made without previous con- 
sultation with France, and without knowledge of mobili- 
zation, and have meanwhile been abandoned as being 
absolutely without any prospect of success. 

(Signed) Lichnowsky. 

(s) 

August 2 
German Ultimatum to Belgium. 

The German Government has received reliable informa- 
tion according to which the French forces intend to march 
on the Meuse by Givet and Namur ; this news leaves no 
doubt of the intention of France to march on Germany 
through Belgian territory. The Imperial German Govern- 
ment cannot prevent the fear that Belgium, despite its best 
intentions, will not be able to repel, without help, a French 
advance in so great force. 

In this case there is sufficient certainty of a menace 
directed against Germany : it is an imperious duty of self- 
preservation for Germany to prevent this hostile attack. 

The German Government would very much regret that 
Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against her 
the fact that the measures of Germany's enemies should 
oblige her to violate, on her side, the territory of Belgium. 
In order to dispel all misunderstandmg the German 
Government declares the following : — 

I. Germany has in view no act of hostility against 
Belgium, if Belgium consents in the war which is about 
to commence to take up an altitude of benevolent neutrality 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 267 

towards Germany. The German Government on its side 
engages at the moment of peace to guarantee the kingdom 
and its possessions in their full extent ; 

2. Germany engages under the above conditions to 
evacuate Belgian territory immediately at the conclusion 
of peace ; 

3. If Belgium observes a friendly attitude, Germany is 
ready, in accordance with the authorities of the Belgian 
Government, to purchase, centre argent comptant, all that is 
necessary for its troops and to indemnify it for damage 
caused in Belgium ; 

4. If Belgium conducts itself in a hostile fashion against 
the German troops and in particular opposes its advance by 
the opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse or by the 
destruction of roads, railways, bridges, or other works, 
Germany will be obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy. 

In this case Germany will undertake no engagement 
towards the kingdom, but will leave the final arrangement 
of the relations between the two States to the decision 
of arms. 

The German Government has the justifiable hope that 
this eventuality will not take place, and that the Belgian 
Government will know how to take appropriate measures 
for preventing this event. 

In this case the friendly relations which unite the two 
neighbouring nations will become closer and more durable. 

(t) 

August 3 
Belgian Reply to German Ultimatum. 

Through its Note of August 2, 19 14, the German 
Government has made known that, according to reliable 
information, the French forces have the intention of 
marching on the Meuse by Givet and Namur, and that 
Belgium, despite its goodwill, is not in a position to repel 
without help the advance of the French troops. 

The German Government considers that it is obliged to 
ward off this attack and to violate Belgian territory. Under 



268 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

these conditions Germany proposes to the Government of 
the King to take with regard to it a friendly attitude, and it 
engages at the moment of peace to guarantee the integrity 
of the kingdom and of all its possessions in all their extent. 

The Note adds that if Belgium puts difficulties in the 
way of the advance of the German troops Germany will be 
obliged to consider it as an enemy, and to leave the later 
arrangement of the relations of the two States to the 
decision of arms. 

This Note has caused to the Government of the King a 
profound and sad astonishment. The intentions which it 
attributes to France are in contradiction to the formal 
declarations that have been made to us, on the ist of 
August, in the name of the Government of the Republic. 

Besides, if, contrary to our attempt, a violation of the 
neutrality of Belgium was committed by France, Belgium 
would fulfil all its international duties, and its army would 
oppose the invader with the most vigorous resistance. 
The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, 
consecrate the independence and neutrality of Belgium 
under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the 
Government of H.M. the King of Prussia. 

Belgium has always been faithful to its international 
obligations ; it has accomplished its duties in a spirit of 
loyal impartiality ; it has neglected no effort to maintain its 
neutrality and to make it respected. The attempt on its 
independence with which the German Government menaces 
it constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. 

No strategic interest justifies the violation of law. The 
Belgian Government, were it to accept the propositions 
notified to it, would sacrifice the honour of the nation at 
the same time as it betrayed its trust towards Europe. 
Conscious of the role which Belgium has played for more 
than eighty years in the civilization of the world, it refuses 
to believe that the independence of Belgium could only be 
preserved at the price of the violation of its neutrality. If 
this hope was false, the Belgian Government is firmly 
decided to repel, by every means in its power, every 
attempt on its rights. 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 269 

(u) 

August 3 

Communique of German Embassy in London. 

Baron Kuhlmann, Councillor of the German Embassy 
in London, made the following statement : — 

" The maintenance of British neutrality would in no way 
injure France ; on the contrary, it might be argued that, 
by remaining neutral. Great Britain could give France 
exactly as much strategic assistance and a good deal more 
effective diplomatic help, as, according to all reliable 
information, there is no intention of sending British troops 
to the Continent; and as a few British divisions, considering 
the enormous numbers engaged, could hardly alter the 
balance of power, all England can do for France is to 
protect her North Sea coast from invasion, and to prevent 
the neutral ports of Belgium and Holland being used as 
bases of armed aggression against France, 

"Germany would be disposed to give an undertaking 
that she will not attack France by sea in the north, or 
make any warlike use of the sea coast of Belgium or 
Holland, if it appeared that Great Britain would make this 
undertaking on condition of her neutrality for the time 
being. Thus England, without going to war herself, could 
render to France the maximum of assistance she could give 
by going to war. That England, as a neutral Power, main- 
taining an armed neutrality, would diplomatically be a 
greater asset for France for the termination of hostilities 
at an early moment than if herself involved in war is 
self-evident." 



TREATIES 

TEXTS OF TREATIES RELATING TO THE 
EUROPEAN CRISIS 

(a) 

November 15, 1831 

Neutrality of Belgium. 

{Herislei, "Map of Europe by Treaty" Vol. II, p. 858, No. 153.) 

TREATY between Great Britain, Austria, France, 
Prussia, Russia, and Belgium, relative to the 
separation of Belgium from Holland. Signed at London, 
November 15, 1831. 

Article VII 

Belgium within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV shall 
form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound 
to observe such neutrality towards all other States. 

(b) 

April 19, 1839 

Neutrality of Belgium. 

{Hertslet, "Map of Europe by Treaty," Vol. II, p. 979, No. 183.) 

Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, 
and Russia, on the one part, and the Netherlands on 
the other. Signed at London, April 19, 1839. 

Article VII 

Belgium within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV shall 
form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be 
bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States. 

270 



TREATIES 271 

(c) 

May II, 1867 

Treaty of London : guaranteeing integrity of Luxemburg. 

{Hertslet, "Map of Europe by Treaty," Vol. Ill, p. 1801, No. 405.) 

Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia, relative 
to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and the Duchy 
of Limburg, Signed at London, May 11, 1867. 

Article II 

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by 
the Act annexed to the Treaties of April 19, 1839, under the guarantee 
of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, 
shall henceforth form a perpetually neutral State. 

It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other 
States. 

The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of 
neutrality stipulated by the present Act. 

That principle is and remains under the sanction of the collective 
guarantee of the Powers signing Parties to the present Treaties, with 
the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State. 

(d) 

August 9, 1870 

Neutrality of Belgium. 

{Hertslet, "Map of Europe by Treaty," Vol. Ill, p. 1886, No. 427.) 

Treaty between Great Britain and Prussia relative to the 
Independence and Neutrality of Belgium. Signed at 
London, August 9, 1870. 

Article I 

His Majesty the King of Prussia, having declared that notwithstand- 
ing the hostihties in which the North German Confederation is 
engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the 
Neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by 
France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said 
hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will 
be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence 
of the same in such a manner as may be mutually agreed upon, 
employing for that purpose her Naval and Military forces to ensure its 



272 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

observance, and to maintain in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, 
then and thereafter, the Independence and NeutraUty of Belgium. 

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this 
Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the War, now 
carried on between the North German Confederation and France, 
beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between 
Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839. 

Article II 

His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part in the event pro- 
vided for in the foregoing Article to co-operate with Her Majesty the 
Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing 
his Naval and Military forces aforesaid ; and, the case arising, to 
concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, sepa- 
rately or in common, to secure tlic Neutrality and Independence of 
Belgium. 

Arlicle III 

This treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during 
the continuance of the present war between the North German Con- 
federation and France, and for twelve months after the Ratification of 
any Treaty of Peace concluded between those parties : and on the 
expiration of that time the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium 
will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, 
continue to rest as heretofore on Article I of the Quintuple Treaty of 
April 19, 1839. 

(e) 

August 9, 1870 

Neutrality of Belgium. 

{Hertslet, "Map of Europe by Treaty," Vol. Ill, p. 1889, No. 428.) 

Treaty between Great Britain and France, relative to the 
Independence and Neutrality of Belgium. Signed at 
London, August 11, 1870. 

Article I 

His Majesty the Emperor of the French having declared that, 
notwithstanding the hostilities in which France is now engaged with 
the North German Confederation and its Allies, it is his fixed deter- 
mination to respect the Neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall 
be respected by the North German Confederation and its Allies, Her 
Majesty the Queen of the United, Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 
on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of the 
North German Confederation and its Allies should violate that neutrality 
she will be prepared to co-operate with His Imperial Majesty for the 



TREATIES 273 

defence of the same in such manner as may mutually be agreed upon, 
employing for that purpose her Naval and Military forces to ensure 
its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Imperial 
Majesty, then and thereafter, the Independence and Neutrality of 
Belgium. 

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the Uni ed 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this 
Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now 
carried on betvi?een France and the North German Confederation and 
its Allies, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between 
Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839, 

Article II 

His Majesty the Emperor of the French agrees on his part in the 
event provided for in the toregoing article to co-operate with Her 
Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, employing his Naval and Military forces for the aforesaid 
purpose ; and in the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the 
measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure 
the Neutrality and Independence of Belgium. 

Article III 

This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during 
the continuance of the present war between France and the North 
German Confederation and its Allies, and for twelve months after the 
Ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those parties ; 
and on the expiration of that time the Independence and Neutrality 
of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively 
concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article I of the Quintuple 
Treaty of April 19th. 

(f) 

October, 1879 

Austro- German Alliance. 

The Alliance between Austria- Hungary and Germany was 
concluded in October 1879, but was not published 
till February 3, 1888, when it was made public simul- 
taneously at Berlin and Vienna. Its text is as follows : — 

Clause I. — Should, contrary to the hope and against the sincere wish 
of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked 
by Russia, the High Contracting Parties are bound to stand by each 
other with the whole of the armed forces of the Empires and, in 
consequence thereof, only to conclude peace jointly and in agreement. 

Clause II. — Should one of the High Contracting Parties be attacked 
by another Power, the other High Contracting Party hereby binds itself, 

19 



274 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

not only not to stand by the aggressor of its High Ally, but to observe at 
least an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards its High Co-contractor. 

If, however, in such a case the attacking Power should be supported 
by Russia, either in the form of active co-operation or by military 
measures menacing to the party attacked, the obligation defined in 
Clause I of reciprocal help with the entire armed strength comes 
immediately into force in this case also, and the war will then also be 
waged jointly by the two High Contracting Parties until the joint 
conclusion of peace. 

Clause III — concerning the secrecy of the Treaty — lost its validity 
on publication. 

(g) 

April 8, 1904 

Anglo-French Convention. 
APPENDIX III 

Public Declaration between the United Kingdom and France 
respecting Egypt and Morocco, April 8, 1904. 

Article I 

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no 
intention of altering the political status of Egypt. 

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare 
that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country, 
by asking them that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation 
or in any other manner, and that they give their assent to the draft 
Khedivial Decree annexed to the present arrangement, containing the 
guarantee considered necessary for the protection of the interests 
of the Egyptian bondholders, on the condition that, after its promul- 
gation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the 
Powers signatory of the Convention of London, 1885. 

It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in 
Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French savant. 

The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty 
as in the past. 

Article II 

The Government of the French Republic declare that they have 
no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. 

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize 
that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose 
dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of 
Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance 
for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military 
reforms which it may require. 

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France 
for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights 



TREATIES 275 

which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, 
enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the 
ports of Morocco enjoyed by British vessels since iqoi. 

Article III 

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the 
rights which France, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys 
in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports 
accorded to French vessels. 

Arlicle IV 

The two Governments being equally attached to the principle of 
commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will 
not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the im- 
position of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges. 

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy 
the same treatment of transit through the French and British posses- 
sions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall 
settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of 
entry. 

The mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. 
Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in 
advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time. 

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to 
themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government 
reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions 
for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as 
will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great under- 
takings of public interest. 

Article V 

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will use their 
influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service 
may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those 
applying to the British officials in the same service. 

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make 
no objection to the appHcation of analogous conditions to British 
officials now in the Moorish service. 

Article VI 
In order to ensure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic 
Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of 
the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being 
put in force. The free passage of the canal being thus guaranteed, the 
execution of the last sentence of paragraph i as well as of paragraph 2 
of Article VHI of that Treaty will remain in abeyance. 

Article VII 
In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the 
two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications 
or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised 



276 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command 
the right bank of the River Sebou. 

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present 
in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. 

Article VIII 

The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship 
for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that 
country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial 
possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to 
these interests the French Government will come to an understanding 
with the Spanish Government. 

The agreement which may be come to on the subject between 
France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's 
Government. 

Article IX 

The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic 
support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present 
Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco. 

In witness whereof His Excellency the Ambassador of the French 
Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the 
seas. Emperor of India, and His Majesty's principal Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, duly authorized for that purpose, have signed the 
present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals. 

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904. 

APPENDIX IV 
Secret Articles attached to the PubHc Declaration of 
April 8, 1904, published for the first time, in part, 
by Le Temps, in November, 191 1. 

Article I 

In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, 
by the force of circumstances, to modify the policy in respect to Egypt 
or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards 
each other by Articles IV, VI, and VII of the Declaration of to-day's 
date would remain intact. 

Article II 

His Britannic Majesty's Government have no present intention of 
proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the capitulations, 
or in the judicial organization of Egypt. 

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt 
reforms tending to assimilate the Eg3'ptian legislative system to that 
in force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French 
Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the 
understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to 



TREATIES 277 

entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic 
may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms 
in Morocco. 

Article III 

The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory 
adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other "presides" should, whenever the 
Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of 
influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast, from 
Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of 
the Sebou, shall be entrusted to Spain. 

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent 
to the provisions of Articles IV an^ VII of the Declaration of to-day's 
date, and undertake to carry them out. 

She would also have to undertake not to aUenate the whole, or a 
part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of 
influence. 

Article IV 

If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding 
article, should think proper to decline, the arrangement between 
France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of to-day's 
date, would be none the less at once applicable. 

Article V 

Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree men- 
tioned in Article I of the Declaration of to-day's date not be obtained, 
the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repay- 
ment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged, and Unified debts after the 
15th July, 1910. 

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day oij^^Qv^\'^o<\. 

(h) 

August 31, 1907 

Anglo- Russian Conventioti 

Convention signed on August 31, 1907, between Great \/j[^«. 

Britain and Russia, containing arrangements on the /' / ^^-"^ 

subject of Persia, Afghanistan, and Tiiibet.'^"f" V^' /*,] / / 

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Br^ain and ^. '"'A.^fL^ 

Ireland and of the British Dominions bej^ond the Seas, Emperor of '^"/ •— n 
India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by X^^^-a^ ' 
the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions "^ ^/"^ ^ 
concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have £J<;,.*^^ 
determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of m^ ^-^ 
misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to theC ?^ ^ _ "^ 
questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their ■(" r, ■^^^ 

respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit : — 

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 




278 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor 
of India, the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the 
Emperor of All the Russias ; 

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of His Court 
Alexander Isvolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs ; 

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in 
good and due form, have agreed on the following : — 

Arrangement concerning Persia 

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually 
engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and 
sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country, 
and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment 
of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations ; 

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic 
reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in 
certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighbourhood of, the 
Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and 
Baluchistan on the other hand ; and being desirous of avoiding all 
cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above- 
mentioned Provinces of Persia ; 

Have agreed on the following terms : — 

I 

Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in 
favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, 
any Concessions of a political or commercial nature — such as Conces- 
sions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc. — 
beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, 
Yezd, Kahhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the 
intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, 
directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region 
which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood 
that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which 
Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to. 

II 
Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself, and not to 
support in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of 
third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature — 
such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, 
insurance, etc. — beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way 
of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to 
oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this 
region which arc supported b}' the British Government. It is under- 
stood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in 
which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to. 



TREATIES 279 

III 

Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrange- 
ment with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to 
British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines 
mentioned in Articles I and II. 

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant 
of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia. 

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in 
Articles I and II are maintained. 

IV 

It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with 
the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues 
guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded 
by the Government of the Shah with the " Banque d'Escompte et des 
Prets de Perse " up to the date of the signature of the present Arrange- 
ment, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past. 

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of 
Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries 
on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea, and those of the Posts and 
Telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans 
concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of 
Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement. 



In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the pay- 
ment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the " Banque 
d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of 
Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and 
in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over 
the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans 
concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region men- 
tioned in Article I of the present Arrangement, the British and Russian 
Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange 
of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the 
measures of control in question, and to avoid all interference which 
would not be in conformity with the principles governing the 
present Arrangement. 

Convention concerning Afghanistan 
The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect security on 
their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these 
regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following 
Convention : — 

Article I 

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no 
intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan. 



280 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their 
influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not 
themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures 
threatening Russia. 

The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognize 
Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they 
engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be con- 
ducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Govern- 
ment ; they further engage not to send any agents into Afghanistan. 

Article II 

The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the 
Treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March, 1905, that they recognize the 
Agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Ameer 
Abdur Rahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the 
internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages 
neither to annex nor to occupy in contravention of that Treaty any 
portion of Afghanistan, or to interfere in the internal administration 
of the country, provided that the Ameer fulfils the engagements 
already contracted by him towards His Britannic Majesty's Govern- 
ment under the above-mentioned Treaty. 

Article III 

The Russian and Afghan authorities, especially designated for the 
purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish 
direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of 
a non-political character. 

Article IV 

His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian Government 
affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial 
opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may 
have been, or shall be hereafter obtained for British and British-Indian 
trade and traders shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and 
traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for com- 
mercial agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures 
shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Ameer's 
sovereign rights. 

Article V 

The present arrangements will only come into force when His 
Britannic Majesty's Government shall have notified to the Russian 
Government the consent of the Ameer to the terms stipulated above. 

Arrangement concerning Thibet 

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, recognizing the 
suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great 
Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in 



TREATIES 281 

the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Thibet, 
have made the following arrangement : — 

Article I 
The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial 
integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal 
administration. 

Article II 

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China 
over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotia- 
tions with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese 
Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations 
between British commercial agents and the Thibetan authorities pro- 
vided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and 
Thibet of the 7th September, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention 
between Great Britain and China on the 27th April, 1906 ; nor does it 
modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in 
Article I of the said Convention of 1906. 

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain 
or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious 
matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of 
Buddhism in Thibet ; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia 
engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to 
infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement. 

Article III 
The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to 
send Representatives to Lhassa. 

Article IV 

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to 
obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any Concessions 
for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet. 

Article V 

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, 
whether in kind or cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain 
or Russia or to any of their subjects. 

Annex to the Arrangement between Great Britain and 
Russia concerning Thibet 
Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by His Excellency 
the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the 
ratification of the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect 
that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease 
after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 
25,000,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II 



282 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that 
in the meantime the Thibetan authorities have faithfully complied 
in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is 
clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chunibi Valley by 
the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the 
time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian 
Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this 
subject. 

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications 
exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible. 

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the 
present Convention and affixed thereto their seals. 

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the i8th (31st) August, 1907. 

(L.S.) A. NicoLSON. 



(L.S.) ISVOLSKY. 



(i) 



Questions in House of Commons re British Foreign 
Obligations. 

March 10, 1913 

Debate on the Address. 

Lord Hugh Cecil : " There is a very general belief that this country 
is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising 
out of an assurance given by the Ministry in the course of diplomatic 
negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of this country to 
operate in Europe. This is the general belief." 
The Prime Minister : " I ought to say that is not true." 
Lord Hugh Cecil : " I am very glad to have elicited that explana- 
tion." 

(J) 

March 24, 1913 

Sir William Byles asked the Prime Minister whether he will say if 
this country is under any, and if so what, obligation to France to send 
an armed force in certain contingencies to operate in Europe ; and, if 
so, what are the terms of our agreements, whether by assurance or by 
treaty with the French nation ? 

Mr. King also asked the Prime Minister (i) whether the foreign 
policy of this country is at the present time unhampered by any 
treaties, agreements, or obligations under which British military forces 
would in certain eventualities be called upon to land upon the Continent 
and join there in military operations ; and (2) whether in 1905, 1908, 
and 1911 this country spontaneously offered to France the assistance of 
the British Army to be landed on the Continent to support France in 
the event of European hostilities. 



TREATIES 283 

The Prime Minister : " As has been repeatedly stated, this country 
is not under any obligation, not public and known to Parliament, v^hich 
compels it to take part in a war. In other words, if war arises between 
European Powers, there are no unpublished agreements which will 
restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament 
to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. 
The use that would be made of the naval or military forces if the 
Government or Parliament decided to take part in a war is, for obvious 
reasons, not a matter about which public statements can be made 
beforehand." 

(k) 

June ii, 1914 

Mr. King asked whether any naval agreement had been recently 
entered into between Russia and Great Britain, and whether any 
negotiations with a view to a naval agreement have recently taken 
place, or are now pending, between Russia and Great Britain. 

Sir Edward Grey : "The Hon. Member for North Somerset asked a 
similar question last year with regard to mihtary forces. The Prime 
Minister then replied that if war arose betv^een European Powers, 
there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper 
the freedom of the Government or Parliament to decide whether or 
not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers 
both the questions on the paper. It remains as true to-day as it was a 
year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any Power 
that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in 
progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far as I can judge. 
But if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to 
withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's statement of last year, which 
I have quoted, it ought in my opinion to be, and I suppose would be, 
laid before Parliament." 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 

PUBLIC UTTERANCES AND STATEMENTS IN THE 
PARLIAMENTS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, 
BELGIUM, AND GERMANY, NOT ELSEWHERE 
REPRINTED 

(a) 

Speech of M. Viviani in the French Chamber. 
{" Le Temps" August 3rrf.) 

Gentlemen, — The German Ambassador has left Paris 
after informing us of the state of war. The Government 
gives to ParHament a true account of the events which in 
the last ten days have caused the European war, and has 
obliged France, peaceful and strong, to defend her frontiers 
against aggression. This aggression, which nothing ex- 
cuses, took place before any declaration of war, and is 
notified to us as the last act of a plan which I set forth 
before our people and before the opinion of the whole 
civilized world. 

After the abominable crime which cost the Archduke of 
Austria and his wife their lives, difficulties were raised 
between the Cabinets at Vienna and Belgrade. Most of the 
Powers were only officially informed up to Friday, July 24th, 
the date on which the Ambassador of Austria issued his 
circular which has been communicated to the Press. This 
circular had for its object the explanation and justification 
of the ultimatum addressed to the Servian Government by 
the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, The ultimatum, while 
affirming the complicity of a number of subjects and 
societies of Servia in the Serajevo crime, insinuated that the 
Servian authorities themselves had been no strangers to the 

plot. It demanded an answer by 6 o'clock in the evening. 

284 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 285 

The satisfaction demanded aimed an undoubted blow at 
Servian sovereignty. In spite of its uncompromising char- 
acter, Servia on the 25th of July declared that she would 
submit to nearly all the demands. To this submission, which 
meant a success for Austria and a guarantee of European 
peace, the Councils of France, Russia, and Great Britain 
from the very first were parties. Thus the Councils of the 
Chancelleries of the Triple Entente showed as much wisdom 
on their part as the demands of Austria showed intrigue. 
Albeit, the Austrian Government during the previous three 
weeks had given on many occasions the assurance that their 
demands would be extremely moderate. The Cabinets of 
Paris, St. Petersburg, and London, however, learnt that 
the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after an examination, 
declared that the Servian answer was unacceptable and had 
broken off relations. Thus astonishment was aggravated by 
the fact that since Friday the 25th the German Ambassador 
wrote to the French Foreign Minister a verbal note, stating 
that the Austro-Servian dispute ought to be made localized 
without the intervention of a third Power, in default of 
which the consequences would be incalculable. A similar 
demarche was made on the 26th at London and St. 
Petersburg. Is it necessary, gentlemen, to detail to you the 
menacing language used by the German Ambassador in 
Paris, contrasted with the conciliatory sentiments of which 
the Powers of the Triple Entente showed proof by the 
counsels of submission which they gave to Servia ? 
Nevertheless, without considering the abnormal character of 
the German demarche, we have, in company with our allies 
and friends, immediately engaged in conciliatory action, 
and have invited Germany to be associated with it. We 
have had from the first to realize with regret that our efforts 
found no corresponding echo in Berlin. Not only has 
Germany not been disposed to give conciliatory advice to 
Austria, but from that moment, and still more in the follow- 
ing days, she interposed between the Cabinet of Vienna and 
the proposals which emanated from the other Powers. On 
July 28th Austria declared war on Servia. This declara- 
tion, aggravating the state of affairs created by the rupture 



286 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

of diplomatic relations, made one believe that there was a 
desire to precipitate war and a systematic programme for 
the subjugation of Servia. It contained a challenge not 
only to the independence of a valiant people, but also to 
the equilibrium of the Balkans inscribed in the Treaty of 
Bucharest, and consecrated by the moral adhesion of all the 
Great Powers. So at the suggestion of the British Govern- 
ment, always attached in the firmest manner to the interests 
of European peace, negotiations followed, or more exactly, 
the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to pursue them. 
From this common desire came the proposal for mediation 
a quatre between England, France, Germany, and Italy, 
designed, while assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfac- 
tion, to save a conflict. On the 29th the Russian Govern- 
ment, after persistent defeat of these attempts, and in the 
presence of the declaration of war and the mobilization of 
Austria, and fearing the destruction of Servian military 
power, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilize the 
troops of four military areas, that is, of the units along the 
Austrian frontier. In so doing they took good care to 
inform the German Government that this measure was not 
offensive in nature to Austria and in no way directed 
against Germany. In a conversation with the Russian 
Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs made no difficulty about understanding this 
point. On the other hand, all that Great Britain, wdth the 
addition of France and Russia, did to establish contact 
between Austria and Servia under the moral patronage 
of Europe met with a negative response at Berlin, of which 
the diplomatic documents furnish ample proof. This was 
the unfortunate situation which rendered probable the 
existence at Berlin of certain arriere-pensees. Some hours 
after, these beliefs and suspicions were transformed into 
certain facts. 

In fact, the negative action of Germany gave place some 
thirty-six hours later to alarming action. On the 31st, 
Germany, in oroclaiming martial law, cut the communica- 
tions between herself and the rest of Europe, and gave full 
liberty of action against France in the absolute secrecy of 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 287 

military preparations which nothing that you have seen 
hitherto would justify. Already for several days, and under 
conditions difficult to explain, Germany had prepared the 
passage of her army from a peace to a war footing. Since 
July 25th, that is before the expiration of the time limit to 
Servia, she had strengthened the garrisons in Alsace-Lorraine, 
The same day she had put on a war footing the forts near 
the frontier. On the 26th she put the railways in prepara- 
tion for concentration. On the 27th she made requisitions 
and put the covering troops in position. On the 28th the 
calling-up of reservists commenced. Did not all these 
measures on the part of Germany leave no doubt as to her 
intentions ? Such was the situation when on July 31st, 
evening, the German Government, which since the 24th 
had not taken part in any acts with the assistance of the 
conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, addressed to the 
Russian Government an ultimatum. It pretended that 
the Russian Government had ordered a general mobilization 
of its army, and it demanded demobilization within twelve 
hours. This demand was all the more wounding in form, 
since a few hours before the Emperor Nicholas, in a spirit 
of confidence, had asked the German Emperor for mediation, 
so pronounced at a time when at the demand of England, 
and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Govern- 
ment accepted a formula for a peaceful settlement of the 
Austro-Servian dispute with simultaneous arrest of military 
preparations. On the same day this unfriendly demarche 
in regard to Russia was doubled by acts hostile to France ; 
e.g. a break-off of communication by road, railway, 
telegraph, and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives 
on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of explosives on 
the railway, which had been cut, and the concentration of 
troops on this frontier. From that moment it was no 
longer possible for us to beheve in the sincerity of the 
pacific declarations which the representatives of Germany 
continued to send us. We knew that at the announcement 
of a state of martial law Germany was mobilizing against 
us. We knew that six classes of reservists had been called 
up and that the transports of the army corps were stationed 



288 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

at a little distance from the frontier. As these events 
developed, the Government, attentive and watchful, took 
from day to day and from hour to hour measures for safe- 
guarding against what the situation imposed upon them, 
and the general mobilization of our army and navy was 
ordered. The same evening, at 7.30 o'clock, Germany, with- 
out regard for the acceptance by the St. Petersburg Govern- 
ment of the English proposal to which I referred above, 
declared war on Russia. On August 2nd, without regard to 
the extreme conciliation of France, and in contradiction to 
the pacific declaration of the German Ambassador in Paris, 
and in defiance of international law, German troops crossed 
the frontier at three points. At the same time, the violation 
of the treaty of 1867, which guaranteed with the signature of 
Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, and the invasion of the 
Grand Duchy caused a protest from the Luxemburg Govern- 
ment. At last the neutrality of Belgium was menaced. 
The German Minister handed on August 2nd, evening, to the 
Belgian Government an ultimatum, inviting her to facilitate 
in Belgium military operations against France, under pretext 
of preserving the neutrality of Belgium, which they said was 
menaced by us. The Belgian Government refused, declar- 
ing that it was resolved to defend its neutrality, which was 
expected from it by France and Russia. 

Since then, gentlemen, the aggression has been renewed, 
multiplied and accentuated. At more than fifteen points 
our frontier has been violated. Shots were fired at our 
soldiers and customs ofificers, and there were dead and 
wounded. Yesterday a German aviator threw three bombs 
at Luneville. The German Ambassador, to whom we com- 
municated these facts, as well as to all the other Powers, 
did not express his regrets. On the contrary, he came 
yesterday and demanded his passports, and notified us of a 
state of war, speaking all the while contrary to facts about 
acts of hostility committed by French aviators in German 
territory in the Eiffel region, and on the railway between 
Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. This is the letter which he 
sent us on the subject : — 

" The German Administration and the military authorities 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 289 

have set forth a number of hostile acts committed in German 
territory by French aviators. Most of the latter are mani- 
festly violations of the neutrality of Belgium. One tried 
to destroy the construction near Wesel, another was seen 
in the neighbourhood of Eiffel, the other threw bombs 
on the railway between Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. I 
am charge-d, and have the honour of making known to 
Your Excellency, that in the presence of this aggression 
the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with 
France. I have at the same time the honour of making 
known to Your Excellency that the French authorities 
should withdraw their mercantile marine from German 
ports within forty-eight hours. My diplomatic mission 
having come to an end, it remains for me to pray Your 
Excellency to hand me my passports and to take fit 
measures to assure the return to Germany of myself and 
my suite, the Bavarian Legation, and the General Consulate. 
Please agree to the expression of my highest consideration. 

"Baron von Schoen." 

Have I any need to insist on the absurdity of these pre- 
texts, gentlemen ? At no moment has any French aviator 
penetrated Belgium. No French aviator has done any- 
thing in Bavaria or any other part of Germany. Against 
this attack, which violates all the laws of equity and public 
right, we have taken all the necessary precautions. Its 
execution has been carried out with rigour, and the 
mobilization of the Russian army continues with remark- 
able energy and enthusiasm. Belgium has mobilized 
250,000 men, and proposes to defend with magnificent 
courage her neutrality and independence. The British 
fleet is mobilized, and the order is given to mobilize the 
army. In the House of Commons the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs has spoken of France with the applause 
of all parties in high terms, and his language is already pro- 
foundly reciprocated from all French hearts. In the name 
of the Government and the Republic, I thank the British 
Government for the cordiality of its words, and the French 
people reciprocate the sentiments. The Secretary of State 
has made a notable pronouncement as follows :— 

20 



290 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

" In the case of the descent of the German fleet to attack 
the coasts of France or the French navy, the British navy 
will intervene and give the French navy all the help in its 
power." 

From this moment England and Germany are at war. 
So now the British fleet covers our flank on the north and 
west against German aggression. Gentlemen, these are 
the facts. I beheve in the circumstances they justify the 
Government's action. I wish to give a true sense of the 
aggression of which France has been a victim. The victors 
of 1870 have had a desire to redouble the blow which they 
have dealt us. In 1875, the war destined to see France con- 
quered, and she was only saved by the intervention of two 
Powers, to whom we ought to unite all the more the ties 
of alliance and friendship, namely, by the intervention of 
Russia and Great Britain. Since then the French Republic, 
by the restoration of national forces and the conclusion of 
diplomatic agreements, has liberated itself from the same 
yoke which Bismarck weighted on Europe. She has estab- 
lished European equilibrium and guaranteed the liberty and 
independence of all. 

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am wrong, but it appears 
to me that this work of peaceful restoration of the enfran- 
chisement of liberty was definitely sealed in 1904 and 1907, 
with the approval of King Edward of England, and it is 
this which the German Empire wishes to destroy by this 
audacious act of force, Germany has nothing to reproach 
us with. We have made for peace sacrifices without prece- 
dent, and have borne silently for half a century an open 
wound in our side (Alsace-Lorraine). We have submitted 
since 1904 to systematic provocation, whether in March 
1905, 1908, or 191 1. Russia has given proof of great 
moderation in the events of 1908 and in the actual crisis. 
She has helped to preserve peace and the Triple Entente, 
when in the actual crisis of 191 2 Austria and Germany 
formulated in Servia and Greece certain demands. Useless 
sacrifices, sterile transactions, vain efforts, since to-day in acts 
of conciliation w^e and our allies are attacked by surprise. 
No one can say in good faith that we are the aggressors. 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 291 

Italy, with the clear conscience of a Latin genius, has 
notified to us that she intends to remain neutral. This 
decision is met in all France with an echo of sincere joy. 
I have interpreted this to the Italian Charge d' Affaires, in 
letting him know how I congratulate our Italian sister, who 
has the same origin and ideals as ourselves. 

We declare, gentlemen, that our independence, dignity, 
and security, which the Triple Entente has regained in the 
equilibrium for the service of peace, is now attacked. The 
liberties of Europe, of which France and her allies are 
the defenders, are attacked. These liberties we are going 
to defend, for they are the cause and all the rest are 
the products. France, unjustl}' provoked, has not wished 
for war ; she has always tried to prevent it. Since it is 
imposed upon her she will defend herself against Germany 
and any other Power which takes her part. A free people 
and strong, who hold century-old ideals, are united to guard 
their existence. The democracy bears military discipline as 
an effort, but has not flinched from responding to the 
weight of neighbouring armaments. A nation armed for 
its rights and the independence of Europe — this is the sight. 
We are without reproach ; we are without fear. 

France has often proved under conditions less favourable 
that she is a more formidable adversary when she strikes, 
as is the case to-day, for liberty and right. In submitting 
these acts to you, gentlemen, who are my judges, we have 
to bear the weight and the heavy responsibility, the comfort 
of a clear conscience, and the satisfaction of our accom- 
plished obligations. 

(b) 

August 4 
Speech of Chancellor von Bethinann-Hollweg in the Reichstag. 

{From "North German Gazette," August StJi.) 

A tremendous crisis has broken in upon Europe. Since 
we won for ourselves the German Empire and respect 
before the world we have lived in peace for forty-four 
years and have kept safe the peace of Europe. In peaceful 



292 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

labour we have become strong and mighty, and for that 
reason we are envied. In dogged patience we have watched 
how, under the excuse that Germany was anxious for war, 
enmity has been nourished in the East and West, and fetters 
have been forged against us. The wind that was sown 
there rises now in storm. We desired to hve on in peaceful 
labour, and from the Kaiser to the youngest soldier went 
the unspoken oath : only in defence of a righteous cause 
shall our sword be drawn from its sheath. (Energetic 
applause.) The day on which we have to draw it has 
come upon us against our will, against our strenuous efforts. 
Russia has set the torch to the house. (Stormy shouts of 
" Quite right ! ") We stand in the midst of a war which has 
been forced upon us by France and Russia. 

Gentlemen, a collection of documents, put together 
under the pressure of this rush of events, has been placed 
before you. Let me point to the facts that characterize our 
attitude. From the moment of the Austro-Servian crisis we 
declared that the dispute must be localized to Austria and 
Servia, and we worked for that end. Every Cabinet, 
especially that of England, represented the same standpoint. 
Russia alone declared that its word must be heard in the 
settlement of this conflict. With this the danger of Euro- 
pean complications raised its threatening head. As soon 
as the first certain information of military preparations in 
Russia came to our hands we declared in St. Petersburg, 
in a friendly but emphatic way, that warlike measures 
against Austria would find us on the side of our ally 
(stormy applause), and that military preparations against 
ourselves would make necessary similar measures on our 
side. (Renewed energetic applause.) But mobilization is 
very near to war. Russia assured us in a solemn manner 
of its wish for peace (stormy cries of " Hear, hear ") and 
that it was making no military preparations against us. 
(Excitement.) In the meantime England made an attempt to 
mediate between St. Petersburg and Vienna, in which it was 
warmly supported by us. (" Hear, hear " and " Bravo ! ") 
On the 28th the Kaiser begged the Tsar by telegram to 
remember that Austria-Hungary had the right and duty to 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 293 

defend itself against the Greater Servian agitation which 
was threatening to undermine its existence. (" Quite right !" 
on the right and among the National Liberals.) The 
Kaiser drew the attention of the Tsar to the solidarity of 
monarchical interests as threatened by the crime of Serajevo. 
He begged him to give him his personal support in clearing 
away the differences between St. Petersburg and Vienna. 
About the same time, and before the receipt of this 
telegram, the Tsar on his side begged the Kaiser for his 
help, and asked him to advise moderation in Vienna. The 
Kaiser undertook the role of mediator. But scarcely had 
the action ordered by him been started, when Russia 
mobilized all its forces directed against Austria- Hungary. 
(Loud cries of " Hear, hear," " Disgraceful ! " " Pfui ! ") 
Austria-Hungary had only mobilized its army corps directed 
immediately against Servia. Against the north were only 
two army corps, and these were far from the Russian 
frontier. (" Hear, hear " from the right.) The Kaiser at 
once pointed out to the Tsar that through this mobilization 
of the Russian forces against Austria, the role of mediator, 
which he had undertaken at the request of the Tsar, had 
been made more diiBcult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, 
we continued our mediation in Vienna, which went to the 
farthest point compatible with our position as ally. ( "Hear, 
hear " on right and in centre.) During this time Russia 
spontaneously renewed its assurances that it was making no 
military preparations against us. (" Hear, hear," " Pfui ! ") 
Then comes the 31st of July. In Vienna the decision was 
to be taken. We had already through our representations 
reached so much, that Vienna again took up the discussion 
with St. Petersburg through direct conversations, which 
for some time had been dropped. (" Hear, hear" on right 
and in centre.) But before the last decision had been 
taken in Vienna came the news that Russia had mobilized 
its whole military forces against us as well. (" Hear, hear" 
on right and in centre.) The Russian Government, which 
knew from our repeated representations what mobilization 
on our frontier meant, did not notify us of this mobilization, 
nor did it give us any explanation of it. (" Hear, hear.") 



294 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

First, on the afternoon of the 31st came a telegram from 
the Tsar to the Kaiser, in which he guaranteed that his 
army would take up no provocative attitude against us, 
("Hear, hear" and amusement.) But mobilization on our 
frontier was already in full progress since the night between 
the 30th and the 31st of July. While we, at the request of 
Russia, were mediating in Vienna, the Russian forces drew 
up along our long and almost completely open frontier. 
France did not yet mobilize, but made, as it confesses, 
military preparations. 

And we — we from set purpose had called up no single 
reservist, for the sake of European peace. (Energetic 
applause.) Were we still to wait on patiently until the 
Powers between whom we were wedged in chose the time 
to strike their blow ? (Many cries of " No, no ! ") There- 
fore, still on the 31st, we demanded from Russia demobiliza- 
tion as the only measure which could still preserve Euro- 
pean peace. ("Quite right !") The Imperial Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg further received the order to declare to the 
Russian Government that in case of a refusal of our demand 
we should consider a state of war to have come about. 

The Imperial Ambassador carried out this order. What 
the reply of Russia was to this demand for demobilization 
we still do not know even to this day. (Energetic cries 
of " Hear, hear.") No telegraphic communication over it 
has reached us ("Hear, hear"), although the telegraphic 
cable has still brought many less important messages. 
(Renewed energetic cries of " Hear, hear.") 

For this reason, when the time limit had been passed, the 
Kaiser, on August ist, at five o'clock in the afternoon, saw 
himself forced to order a general mobilization of our forces. 
(Energetic applause.) 

At the same time we had to assure ourselves as to 
France's attitude. To our definite question as to whether 
it would remain neutral in case of a Russo-German war, 
France replied that it would do what its interests demanded. 
(Laughter.) This was an evasive answer to our question, if 
not a refusal. (" Quite true.") 

Nevertheless, the Kaiser gave the order most scrupu- 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 295 

lously to respect the French frontier. This order was 
carefully carried out, with one single exception. France, 
which mobilized at the same time as ourselves, said that it 
would respect a zone of 10 kilometres from the frontier. 
(" Hear, hear " on the right.) And what happened in 
reality ? Aviators throwing bombs, cavalry patrols, French 
companies breaking into our Alsace-Lorraine territory ! 
(" Hear, hear.") With this France had broken peace, 
although it was not yet in a state of war with us (many 
cries of " Quite right ! "), and had made an actual attack 
upon us. 

As to the exception I mentioned I have the following 
report upon it from the Chief of the General Staff : — 

" Of the French complaints over the infringement of the 
frontier from our side only one can be admitted. Against 
express command a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, 
apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on the 
2nd of August. It was apparently shot down, as only one 
man has returned. But long before this single case of 
frontier infringement took place French aviators penetrated 
into Southern Germany and threw down bombs on our 
railways (energetic cries: ** Hear, hear"), while in the 
Pass of the Vosges [Schhtchtpass] French forces have 
attacked our frontier troops. Up to now our troops, 
according to order, have acted on the strict defensive." 

So far the report of the General Staff. 

Gentlemen, we are now in a position of necessity (ener- 
getic assent) ; and necessity knows no law [Not kenni kein 
Gehot\. (Energetic applause.) Our troops have occupied 
Luxemburg (energetic " Bravo ! "); perhaps they have already 
entered Belgian territory. (Energetic applause.) Gentle- 
men, this is in contradiction to the rules of international 
law. The French Government has declared in Brussels 
that it is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long 
as it is respected by the enemy. But we knew that France 
stood prepared for an inroad. ("Hear, hear" from right.) 
France could wait, but we not. A French inroad on our 
flank on the Lower Rhine could have been fatal to us. 
(Energetic assent.) So we were forced to set aside the 



296 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. 
(" Quite right ! ") The wrong — I speak openly — the wrong 
that we now do we will try to make good again as soon 
as our military ends have been reached. When one is 
threatened as we are, and all is at stake, he can only think 
of how he can hack his way out. (Long, stormy applause 
and clapping from all sides of the House.) 

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria- 
Hungary. As to England's attitude, the declarations which 
Sir Edward Grey made yesterday in the House of Commons 
make the standpoint clear which the English Government 
adopts. We have given the English Government the 
declaration that so long as England remains neutral our 
fleet will not attack the north coast of France, and that 
we will not touch the territorial integrity and independence 
of Belgium. This declaration I repeat now before the 
whole world. (" Hear, hear ! ") And I can add that so long 
as England remains neutral we should also be ready, 
if equivalent assurances were given, not to take hostile 
measures against French merchant vessels. (" Bravo ! ") 

Gentlemen, this is what has happened. I repeat the 
word of the Kaiser : " Germany goes into the fight with 
a clear conscience." We are lighting for the fruits of our 
peaceful labours, for the inheritance of a great past, and 
for our future. The fifty years are not yet gone by in 
which Moltke said that we should have to stand armed, 
ready to defend the inheritance and conquests of 1870. 
Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. 
But we meet it with clear confidence. (Stormy applause.) 
Our army stands in the field, our fleet is ready for battle — 
behind them is the whole German people. (Long, enthusi- 
astic applause and clapping of hands from all sides of 
the House and from the Government benches — all the 
Members stand up.) The whole German people to the last 
man ! (Repeated stormy applause.) 

You, gentlemen, know your duty in all its great- 
ness. The Bills before you need no further explanation. 
I ask you to pass them as soon as possible. (Stormy 
applause.) 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 297 

Speech of Herr Haase, the Leader of the Social Democrats. 

I have been commissioned to make the following state- 
ment on behalf of my party. We are standing before an 
hour of Fate, the result of Imperialist policy, in consequence 
of which an era of armament competition has been created 
and the differences between nations have been accentuated. 
Now it has burst at last over Europe like a flood. The 
responsibility for this falls on those who have conducted 
this policy. We refuse to accept it. Social Democracy has 
fought this fateful development with all its power, and until 
the last moment it has worked for the preservation of peace 
through impressive demonstrations in all countries, and 
especially for a close understanding with our French 
brothers. (Social Democrat applause.) This struggle has 
been in vain. We stand now before the iron fact of war. 
The horrors of hostile invasions threaten us. We have not 
now to decide for or against war, but upon a question 
concerning the necessary supplies for the defence of the 
country. We have now to think of the millions of our 
fellow-countrymen who without their fault have been 
plunged into this catastrophe. They will be the hardest 
hit from the ravages of war. Without difference of party 
our innermost good wishes accompany those of our brothers 
who have been called to the flag. We think also of the 
mothers who must give up their sons, of the wives and 
children who have been robbed of their supporters, and of 
those who, in addition to the anxiety for their dear ones, 
are threatened with the horrors of hunger. To these there 
will soon be added the thousands of wounded and crippled 
soldiers. To stand by them all, to lighten the lot and help 
their immeasurable need, is felt by us to be our compelling 
duty. (Applause.) For our people and for its freedom in 
the future much, if not all, is at stake. Should victory come 
to Russian despotism, which has stained itself in the blood 
of the best of its own people? (Stormy applause.) We 
must ward off this danger and secure the Kultur and 
independence of our own country. By doing so we prove 
what we have always said, " In the hour of danger we shall 



298 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

not leave our Fatherland in the lurch." (Great applause.) 
We feel that in this we are at one with the " International," 
which recognizes the right of every nation at all times to 
national independence and self-defence, just as, in accord- 
ance with it, it condemns any war of conquest. We 
demand that this war, as soon as the end of ensuring our 
safety is reached, and the enemy is inclined to peace, shall 
bring us to a peace which makes friendship with our neigh- 
bouring nations possible. We demand this, not only in the 
interests of international solidarity for which we have always 
fought, but also in the interests of the German people. We 
hope that the terrible school of war will make a new hatred 
of war, and that it will win men to the idea of international 
Socialism and peace among nations. Led by these principles, 
we agree to the credits which have been demanded. 
(Energetic applause.) 

(C) 

August 4 

Speech of King Albert to the Belgian Parliament. 

Never since 1830 has a more grave hour sounded for 
Belgium. The force of our right and the necessity for 
Europe of our autonomous existence make us still hope 
that the events we fear will not take place ; but if it is 
necessary to resist the invasion of our soil, duty will find 
us armed and decided upon the greatest sacrifices ! 

From now our youth has risen up to defend our father- 
land against the danger. A single duty is imposed on our 
wills : a determined resistance, courage, and unity. 

Our enthusiasm is shown by our irreproachable mobiliza- 
tion and by the multitude of volunteers. 

The moment for action is here. I have called you 
together to allow the Chambers to associate themselves in 
the enthusiasm of the country. You will know how to pass 
all these measures at once. You are all decided to preserve 
intact the sacred patrimony of our ancestors. No one will 
fail in his duty. 

The army is equal to its task. The Government and 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 299 

myself have full confidence. The Government understands 
its responsibilities and will maintain them till the end to 
safeguard the supreme good of the country. If the stranger 
violates our territory, he will find all Belgians gathered 
round their sovereign, who will never betray his constitu- 
tional oath. 

I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends 
itself imposes respect on all and does not perish. God 
will be with us. 

(d) 

August 8 

At the Winter Palace. 
{Translated from the Special Edition of the Orange Book.) 

Speech of the Emperor 

" I greet you in these significant and troubled times which 
Russia is experiencing. Germany, and after her Austria, 
has declared war on Russia. Such an uplifting of patriotic 
feeling, love for our homes, and devotion to the Throne, 
which has swept over our land like a hurricane, serves in 
my eyes, and I think in yours, as a guarantee that our 
Great Mother Russia will by the help of our Lord God 
bring the war to a successful conclusion. In this united 
outburst of affection and readiness for all sacrifices, even that 
of life itself, I feel the possibility of upholding our strength, 
and quietly and with confidence look forward to the 
future. 

" We are not only protecting our honour and our dignity 
within the limits of our land, but also that of our brother 
Slavs, who are of one blood and faith with us. At this 
time I observe with joy that the feeling of unity among the 
Slavs has been brought into strong prominence throughout 
all Russia. I believe that you, each and all, in your place 
can sustain this Heaven-sent trial and that we all, begin- 
ning with myself, will fulfil our duty to the end. Great is 
the God of our Russian land ! " 

Long cries of " Hurrah !" sounded in the Great Hall. 



300 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

After the speech of the Emperor the first man who had 
the good fortune to answer was the President of the Imperial 
Council, M. Golubef. 

Speech of M. Golubef 

" Your Imperial Majesty ! The Imperial Council expresses 
to You, our Great Sovereign, the innermost feelings of 
Your subjects in unbounded love and universal thanks 
for Your grant of legislative institutions which allow us 
to take part in the consideration of the measures made 
necessary by the situation which, despite the peaceful 
etiforts of Your Majesty, has been produced by the 
declaration of war against Russia by two neighbouring 
monarchies. 

" The unity of feeling between our Beloved Master and 
the people of his Empire redoubles her strength. We 
are prepared for all sacrifices to guard our honour and 
dignity and to keep the Russian Empire undivided. With 
heartfelt prayers to the King of kings and Lord of lords 
for the preservation of our country under the sacred pro- 
tection of the Almighty, we quietly and confidently look 
forward to the future. The valiant Russian army by its 
victories over the enemy will crown with glory the Mighty 
Leader of All the Russias. May there be long life to His 
Imperial Majesty, our Lord Emperor, Nicholas Alexandro- 
vitch, in the welfare and happiness of our Fatherland ! " 

Again there rose from the Hall shouts of "Hurrah!" 
and echoes of the National Hymn. After M. Golubef, the 
President of the Duma, M. Rodzianko, turned to His 
Majesty with the following words : — 

Speech of the President of the Duma 
" Your Imperial Majesty ! With a deep feeling of happi- 
ness and enthusiasm all Russia has heard the words of the 
Russian Tsar calling on His people to unite with Him in the 
heavy trial which has fallen on our land. Your Majesty ! 
Russia knows that Your wish and thought is directed to 
the preservation of this land in a state of peace and rest, 
and that Your loving heart is bent on the maintenance of 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 301 

peace, for the protection of your subjects who are so dear 
to You. 

" But a terrible hour has struck. Great and small, all have 
understood the meaning and depth of these historical events. 
The welfare and integrity of our Empire is threatened. 
Our national honour has been attacked, and our national 
honour is dearer to us than life. The time has come to 
show all the world how terrible the Russian people is to 
its enemies ; how it will surround by an indestructible wall 
its crown-bearing Ruler, believing ever in heavenly provi- 
dence. The time has come for stubborn strife in the name 
of preserving the Imperial dignity, strife for the integrity 
and inviolability of our Russian land, and not in one of us 
is there doubt or hesitation. Called to Imperial life by the 
will of Your Majesty, the representative Government now 
stands before you. The Imperial Duma, reflecting the 
unanimous feeling of all the provinces of Russia, and united 
in one prevailing idea, has commissioned me to say to You 
that Your people are ready to fight for the honour and glory 
of the Fatherland. Without differences of opinion, view, or 
conviction, the Imperial Duma, brought together from the 
length and breadth of the land, quietly and firmly speaks to 
its Tsar : Trust, O Emperor, the Russian people ; firmly 
confiding in the grace of God, it will not flinch from any 
sacrifice until the enemy is defeated and the dignity of the 
country assured." 

The speech of the President of the Duma, M. Rodzianko, 
was received with cries of " Hurrah ! " followed by the 
singing of " God save the Tsar ! " When the hymn was 
over the Emperor graciously turned to the assembled 
members of the legislative Chambers and addressed to them 
the following words : — 

Reply of His Majesty the Emperor 
'* From my heart I thank you, gentlemen, for the declara- 
tion of your sincere patriotism, of which I had no doubt. 
But I am glad at such a moment as this to see such a 
demonstration. 

" From all my heart I wish you success. God is with us !" 



302 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

July 26/AuGUST 8, 1914 

Historic Day in the Imperial Duma 

{Translated from the Special Edition of the Orange Book.) 

Speech of the President 

" Members of the Duma, gentlemen ! To our Lord the 
Emperor in His trust in His people it was pleasing in these 
dark days through which our country is passing to summon 
the Imperial Duma in the name of the solidarity of the 
Russian Tsar with His devoted people. The Imperial Duma 
has already answered His Majesty's call in to-day's reception. 
We all well know that Russia did not want war and that the 
Russian people have no aggressive tendencies. But fate has 
dragged us into war. The die is cast, and we are faced in all 
its momentousness with the question of the integrity and 
unity of the Empire. In these rapid events, unprecedented 
as yet in the history of the world, it is comforting to see the 
stately calm which permeates all without exception, and 
clearly and without further words emphasizes before the 
world the strength and greatness of the Russian spirit. 
(Stormy demonstration : Cries of ' Hurrah ! ' from all sides 
interrupted the speech of the President.) 

"Quietly and without violence we can say to all who 
attack us, * Hands off ! ' (Renewed cheers.) * Do not dare 
to touch our Holy Russia. Our people is peace-loving and 
gentle, but powerful and terrible when called upon to defend 
itself.' We can say, * Look ! you thought that internal 
strife disunited us, and yet all the races inhabiting the 
immense land of Russia are united in one brotherly family 
when misfortune threatens our common Fatherland.' The 
Russian warrior does not hang his head in gloom, whatever 
trials he may have to undergo. His powerful shoulders 
will support any load. The enemy will be repulsed and 
peace will shine again, uniting in happiness and good 
fortune an undivided land in all the splendour of its 
unbroken greatness. 

" Gentlemen of the Duma ! In this hour our thoughts and 
wishes are on our frontiers, where the battle is now raging. 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 303 

Our brave army, our glorious fleet ! (Loud applause.) 
Our thoughts are there, where our children and brothers 
are defending our great heritage with their inherent valour. 
May the Almighty God give them aid ! May he strengthen 
and protect them ! Our ardent desire for their success and 
glory will always be with our heroes. We who stay at 
home accept our duty. We will put our hands to the work 
of supporting the families of those who have gone forth. 
Let them in our army know we assist them in their need 
not in words only but in deeds, and that we will let them 
know no want." 

Here the wave of enthusiasm reached its height. All the 
Deputies stood up in their places and the Hall resounded 
with the singing of the hymn and long-echoing " Hurrahs ! " 
When the singing had ceased, M. Rodzianko read some 
telegrams of greeting received by the Duma from the 
Servian and Montenegrin Shuptchinas. The Imperial 
Duma answered these addresses by an ovation to the 
Ambassadors of the friendly Powers, who were in the 
diplomatic box. Especially loud applause arose when the 
President cried, " Long life to the courageous Belgian 
people ! " 

Speech of the President of the Council of 
Ministers 

When the demonstration was over, the President of the 
Council of Ministers, M. Goremykin, mounted on the 
rostrum. 

"Gentlemen of the Duma," he began, " on July 20/August i 
there came the Imperial Ukas summoning you to renew 
the labours which had been broken off a month before 
in the midst, as it appeared, of profound peace. During 
this month, events of great historical importance have taken 
place. One after the other, like claps of thunder, they have 
broken over the life of Russia and of Europe. These 
events had been long prepared by the invisible course of 
history, but for all that they came unexpectedly. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs will take my place in presenting 



304 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

to you an account of the events which preceded the 
European war. Russia did not wish for war. The 
Government has conscientiously sought a peaceful issue 
out of the complication, not leaving untried even the 
weakest hope of warding off the approach of a bloody 
conflict. 

" But there is a limit to Russia's love of peace. Knowing 
to the full the heavy responsibility that lay on us, the 
Imperial Government could not withdraw ignominiously 
before the challenge thrown down to us. That would have 
meant to deny to Russia the status of a Great Power. That 
would have been a fatal mistake. That would have 
humbled us, but it would not have altered the course of 
events for which we are not responsible. The war has 
begun, and now it remains for us only to repeat the words 
which must resound through all the world : ' We will 
pursue this war, whatever it may be, to the end.' (Stormy 
applause.) In all Russia's many centuries of history per- 
haps only one war, only that of 1812, equals in importance 
the present events. Believe me, the Government has not 
done this in blind self-confidence : it clearly takes account 
of the fact that this war will need the greatest efforts of 
strength, much self-sacrifice, and manly preparation for the 
heavy strokes of Fate. But the Government in no way 
doubts the final success, and it fully believes in the great 
historic mission of Russia. (Applause.) On the declaration 
of war against us, the Government was faced by the question 
of providing for the means of carrying on the campaign. 
The war finds us in a financial state which does not suggest 
danger to the Government. The Minister of Finance will 
communicate to you the measures taken in the first in- 
stance. The necessity of those measures was one reason 
for the calHng together of the legislative assembly. But 
this was not the most important cause. The summoning 
of the Imperial Council and the Imperial Duma was caused 
by a deeper thought, clearly revealed by the words of the 
Imperial Ukas : * In view of the heavy trials sent to our 
land, and desirous of being in full unity with the people, 
we consider it well to summon the Imperial Council and 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 305 

the Imperial Duma.' (Loud applause.) The legislative 
assemblies should know that henceforth they will be 
summoned at once if through exceptional circumstances 
it is considered necessary. (Applause.) On us falls the 
great and responsible task of expressing the thoughts and 
feelings of the people. The Government has fulfilled and 
will fulfil its duty to the end. Now, gentlemen of the 
Imperial Duma, it is your turn. In this solemn historical 
moment, I, in the name of the Government, summon you 
all, without difference of faction or party, to become imbued 
with the sentiments of the Imperial manifesto : * Let in- 
ternal strife be forgotten (applause), and let us be united 
under one banner, on which are written the words equally 
great for all, * The Emperor and Russia.' " 

Loud applause, rising to an ovation, drowned the last 
words of the President of the Council of Ministers. 

Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(M. Sasonof) 

"Gentlemen of the Duma," he said, "at fatal moments 
when responsible decisions must be taken, the Government 
feels itself strengthened by the knowledge of its full unity 
with the popular conscience. When the time comes for the 
impartial judgment of History to be given, I firmly believe 
that her decision will be no other than that by which we 
have been guided. Russia could not refuse the challenge 
of her enemies. She could not abandon the greatest tra- 
ditions of her history. She could not cease to be Great 
Russia. (Exclamations on the right, and loud cheers.) 
Our enemies attempt to place upon us the responsibility for 
the disaster into which they have plunged Europe, but their 
calumnies cannot mislead any one who has conscientiously 
followed the policy of Russia during recent years and 
during these last few days. Recognizing the great problems 
bound up with her internal development and prosperity, 
Russia has for a long time given numerous proofs of her 
sincere love of peace. It was only through this love of 
peace that a conflagration, on the point of breaking out in 

21 



306 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Europe in 191 2-13, when trouble arose in the Balkans, was 
avoided. Not from her, not from Russian policy came the 
threat to European peace. The dignity of mighty Russia 
did not need the ostentatious rattle of the sword, attacks on 
the self-love of others, or neglect of the rights of the weak. 
(Cheers, and cries of ' Bravo ! ') Calm and peace-loving 
Russia has not been left in peace by her enemies. 

'• Is it necessary to remind you of all the attempts of 
Austria- Hungary to undermine the historical position of 
Russia in the Balkans ? The time has come when I do 
not hesitate to say that, by her intrigues, she [Austria] has 
succeeded in sowing fratricidal strife between Bulgaria and 
her allies. (Prolonged sensation \n the Chamber.) But in 
spite of heavy trials, the unity of our brother Slavs cannot, 
thank God, be destroyed. Torn by internal strife, Austria- 
Hungary decided to take a step which would at the same 
time create an impression of strength and humble Russia. 
In this object she chose out Servia, with whom we are 
linked by ties of history, origin, and faith. The circum- 
stances under which the ultimatum was delivered to Servia 
are known to you. If Servia had given way she would 
have become the vassal of Austria. It was clear that if we 
drew back it would be the beginning, not only of the 
abnegation of Russia's historical role as the protector of 
the Balkan people, but the recognition that the will of 
Austria, and behind her that of Germany, is law in Europe. 
(Cries of ' Bravo ! ' from all sides.) We could not agree 
to that, neither we, nor France, nor England. No less 
than us, our brave allies have done all in their power to 
preserve the peace of Europe. Our enemies were deceived, 
taking these efforts for a sign of weakness. After the 
challenge thrown down by Austria, Russia did not renounce 
its attempt to bring the conflict to a peaceful solution. In 
this aim all our efforts and those of our allies were exerted 
up to the end. You will be convinced of this by the 
documents which are to be published, and which present 
the course of the negotiations. We stood firmly by one 
condition. Ready to accept any possible compromise 
which could be agreed to by Austria, without loss of 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 307 

dignity, we refused anything which could encroach on the 
integrity and independence of Servia. 

" From the beginning we did not hide our point of view 
from Germany. Undoubtedly at one time, if the BerUn 
Cabinet had wished, it could by firm words have held its 
ally back, as it did at the time of the Balkan crisis. 
(' Bravo ! ') 

" But Germany, who to the end did not cease to express 
her readiness to influence Vienna, refused one after the other 
the proposals which were made, and from her side gave 
only empty assurances. Time passed. The negotiations 
did not advance. Austria bombarded Belgrade. It was 
an organized Government massacre. It was a natural con- 
tinuation of the massacre of the defenceless Servian popula- 
tion of Serajevo after the famous murder of June 15/28. 
The clear object of all this was to gain time, in order to 
place before us and Europe as a fait accompli the humilia- 
tion and extinction of Servia. Under such circumstances 
we could not but take natural measures of precaution, all 
the more as Austria had already mobilized half her army. 
When the mobilization of the army and navy was declared 
in Russia, our Lord the Emperor was graciously pleased to 
inform the German Emperor that Russia would not proceed 
to forceful measures as long as there was hope for a peace- 
ful solution to the negotiations which were being carried 
out with the moderation I have mentioned. His voice was 
not listened to. 

"Germany declared war on us and then on our ally. 
Losing all self-control, she persisted in trampling on the 
rights of neutral States guaranteed by her own signature, 
together with that of other States. (During the references 
of M. Sazonof to the heroism of the Belgian people, 
struggling against the mighty German army, all the 
Deputies gave an enthusiastic ovation to the representatives 
of Belgium in the diplomatic box.) 

"The manner in which Germany has proceeded," con- 
tinued M. Sazonof, " has provoked the deepest indignation 
of the whole civilized world, and especially of noble France, 
which, together with us, has stood for the protection of 



3o8 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

right and justice. (Demonstrations from all sides and con- 
tinued cries of ' Long live France ! ' The Deputies stood 
up in their places, and, turning to the diplomatic box, 
gave a prolonged ovation to the French Ambassador, 
M, Paleologue.) 

" Is it necessary to say," continued the Minister, " that the 
same sentiments inspired the English people, who, like one 
man, have united in a common resolve to resist the effort 
of Germany to lay on Europe the heavy hand of her 
hegemony ? (Stormy applause from all benches, while the 
Deputies stood up and cheered the British Ambassador, 
Sir George Buchanan.) 

" But now events leading to this war are obscured by the 
significance which it has acquired for all of us and for 
our allies, Germany declared war on us on July 19th/ 
August ist, and five days after Austria did the same, stating 
as her motive our interference in her quarrel with Servia 
and the fact that we had opened hostilities against Germany. 
This would also appear to be the casus belli of the latter 
against us. Hostile troops invaded our territory. 

" We are fighting for the defence of our country, we 
are fighting for our dignity and status as a Great Power. 
(' Bravo ! ') We cannot allow Europe to be dominated 
by Germany and her allies. {' Bravo ! ') That, too, is 
what our own allies have felt. We have shown no empty 
pride. We know that perhaps we shall be submitted to 
heavy trials. Our enemies have calculated on this. Not 
knowing Russia and its history, they have counted on the 
possibility of national apathy. But God will not desert 
Russia in the darkest hour of her history, and will not 
forsake our children united round their Tsar in common 
feelings of love and self-sacrifice. (Loud demonstrations 
from all sides and cries of 'True!') In the humble hope 
of God's help, in their unshaken faith in Russia, the Govern- 
ment turn to you, the representatives of the people, con- 
fident that in you is reflected the spirit of our great country, 
which our enemies shall tind no laughing matter." 

The last words of the M mister were drowned by enthu- 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 309 

siastic demonstrations from all sides. The Deputies stood 
up in their places and gave the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
an ovation which lasted for several minutes. 

Declaration of the Labour Party 

The first speech was made by M. Koronsky, who made 
the following statement on behalf of the Labour party : — 

"A heavy trial has fallen on the country and a great 
sorrow on the land. Thousands and thousands of young 
lives are doomed to inhuman suffering ; misery and want 
come to lay waste the orphaned homes of the working 
masses of the population. We steadfastly believe that 
the great primaeval force of Russian democracy will join 
with other forces in giving decisive resistance to the enemy 
(applause), and in protecting the land of our birth and our 
civilization, created by the sweat and blood of generations. 
We believe that on the field of battle and amidst suffering 
the brotherhood of all the races of Russia will be strengthened 
and a common desire created to free the land from its terrible 
internal troubles. The responsibility of those European 
Governments who in the interests of the ruling classes have 
plunged their peoples into a fratricidal war is incalculable. 

" The Socialists of all these belligerent countries — France, 
England, Belgium, and Germany — have tried to protest 
against this war which has burst upon us. We, the Russian 
democracy, were not able, even at the last, to raise our 
voice freely against the impending war. But, deeply believ- 
ing in the brotherhood of the workers of all lands, we send 
our fraternal greetings to all who protested against these 
preparations for this fratricidal conflict of peoples. Russian 
citizens, remember that we have no enemies among the 
working classes of the fighting countries. Protect to the 
end your country from attacks by Governments hostile to 
us, Germany and Austria, but remember that there would 
not have been this terrible war had the great ideals of 
democracy — freedom, equality, and brotherhood — been 
directing those who control the destinies of Russia and 
all other countries. As it is, our rulers even in this 



3IO THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

terrible hour show no desire to forget internal strife, 
give no amnesty for those who are struggling for the 
freedom and welfare of the land, show no desire for 
reconciliation with the non-Russian peoples of the Empire, 
who have forgiven all and are fighting by our side and for 
our common Fatherland, and instead of lightening the 
position of the working classes, the Government is laying 
on them the greatest weight of the military expenses, 
increasing the burden of indirect taxation. Peasants 
and workmen, all who wish for the happiness of Russia, 
strengthen your souls in these great trials, summon up 
all your strength when you have protected your country, 
and free it. Brotherly greetings to you and to our brothers 
who are shedding their blood for their country." 

The stormy applause of the whole Duma drowned the 
speech of the orator, which was delivered with striking and 
inspiring enthusiasm. 

After this Baron Felkersan, in the name of the Germans 
of the Baltic Provinces, spoke as follows : — 

"Of old the faithful German colonists of the Baltic Pro- 
vinces have stood ready to protect their Fatherland, We 
are not only ready to vote for all the proposals of military 
credit, but, following the example of our ancestors, we are 
ready to sacrifice our lives and property for the unity and 
greatness of Russia." (" Bravo ! " and cheers.) 

Declaration of the Poles 

'* In this historic moment," declared the Deputy M. 
Yarensky in the name of the Poles, " when the Slav and 
Teuton world directed by our eternal enemies, the 
Prussians, are meeting in fateful conflict, the condition 
of the Polish people, deprived of its independence and 
the possibility of declaring its free will, becomes tragic. 
The tragedy is redoubled not only because our country is 
the theatre of war with all its horrors, but because, divided 
into three parts, the Polish people sees its sons one against 
the other in the enemies' ranks. But, disunited territorially, 
we in our feelings and sympathies are one with the Slavs. 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES S" 

(Cheers and ' Bravo ! ') This attitude is dictated to us, 
not only by the righteousness of the cause which Russia 
is defending, but by poHtical considerations. The world- 
wide significance of the times in which we are living must 
put the settlement of all internal questions in the back- 
ground. (Cheers and * Bravo ! ') May God grant that 
the Slavs, under the leadership of Russia, will show such 
a resistance as, five centuries ago, the Poles and Letts 
showed to their enemies. (Cheers and * Bravo ! ') Let 
the pouring out of our blood and the horrors of fratricide 
in this war create for us a union of the Polish races, now 
divided into three parts." (Stormy cheers and " Bravo ! ") 

Declaration of the Lithuanians and Letts 

After the President of the Polish party, the President of 
the Lithuanians, the Deputy M. Goldman, declared that 
among the Lithuanians and Esthonians there was not one 
man who did not recognize that all they had achieved had 
been obtained under the protection of the Russian Eagle. 

** Therefore," said the Deputy M. Goldman, " you can find 
among us such a spirit of enthusiasm as cannot be described. 
Into the sea of blood in which the tyrant of Europe sitting 
in Berlin wishes to bathe (applause), into this sea the Lithua- 
nians and Esthonians will pour their last drop of blood, 
in order that the man who threatens the peace of the world 
and whispers always evil counsels to his neighbours shall 
not only bathe in this sea, but shall drown in it. In these 
great days we will show that we are capable not only of 
patriotic outbursts, but of the maintenance of internal 
order, an indispensable security for success in arms on the 
field of battle. In the present sacred and righteous conflict 
we shall go with the Russian people to the end. Not only 
our sons, brothers, and fathers will fight in the ranks of the 
army, but in each of our homes, in every hut, the enemy 
will find his fiercest foe, whose head he may indeed cut 
off, but from whom even on the point of death he will hear 
only one cry — ' Long live Russia ! ' " (Loud applause from 
all benches.) 



312 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

The Deputy M. Ichas, the leader of the Letts, mounted 
the rostrum. 

" In this historic moment," he observed, " I must declare 
in the name of the Letts that the fate of our people is always 
bound up with that of the Slavs. The Lettish people, on 
whose land the fighting began, forced to fight in the fore- 
most ranks, go into this war as a holy war. They forget 
all injuries, hoping to see Russia free and happy after the 
war. They hope that the Letts, now divided, will be united 
under one Russian ensign." 

Declaration of the Jews 

The Deputy M. Friedman mounted the rostrum. 

"On me," he said, "has fallen the high honour of expressing 
the feelings which at the present historic moment inspire 
the Jewish people. In the great storm of enthusiasm which 
has uplifted all the races and peoples of Russia the Jews 
will go shoulder to shoulder with all the rest. Despite 
the exceptionally severe political conditions under which 
we have lived and are living, we Jews have always felt 
ourselves Russian citizens and have always been true sons 
of the Fatherland. No power will tear us from our country 
Russia, or from the soil to which we are bound by century- 
long ties. In the protection of our country from foreign 
invasion we take our part not only from a sense of duty, 
but with deep affection. In the present hour of trial, in 
answer to the appeal from the Throne, we Russian Jews 
will arise as one man under the Russian fiag and will use 
all our strength to defeat the enemy. (Applause from all 
benches.) The Jewish people will fulfil their obligations 
to the end." 

The speaker concluded amidst the stormy applause of all 
the Duma. Even the Extreme Right applauded. 

Declaration of the Cadets 

On behalf of the Party of the Freedom of the People 
M. Milyokof said : — 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 313 

"The Party of the Freedom of the People has more than 
once spoken in the Imperial Duma on those questions 
referred to by the first two speakers from the rostrum. 
The party's opinion on those questions is well known to 
all, and of course no circumstances can alter this opinion. 
When the time comes the party will refer to these matters 
again, and will point out the only possible road towards 
the internal reform of Russia. We hope that in passing 
through the heavy trials which are before us the country 
will come nearer to her cherished aims. But at this 
moment we are too deeply occupied by other questions. 
Other problems, terrible and great, stand before us and 
require a speedy decision. We need all our strength to 
protect ourselves from the external enemy, who has sought 
conflict with us on his way to world-power. Our cause 
is just. We go into this conflict to free our country from 
the attack of the foreigner, and the Slav people from the 
German domination of the world ; to free Europe from 
the insufferable pressure of the burden of armaments, 
which nullify peaceful endeavours and lead again and again 
to armed conflict. In this conflict we are all at one ; we 
do not make conditions or demands ; we simply put into 
the scale our firm resolve to overcome the tyrant. (Applause 
from all benches and ' Bravo ! ') That is why the Central 
Committee of our party, guided by these considerations, has 
turned to its supporters with a declaration in which the 
party whole-heartedly unites, and which we feel it our duty 
to declare from this high rostrum." 

Declaration of the German Colonists 

The Deputy M. Liutz, in the name of the German 
colonists, said : — 

" The hour has come when the Germans living in Russia, 
true subjects of His Majesty, will show themselves able to 
co-operate for the protection of the dignity and honour of 
this great Empire, and to refute the insulting suggestion 
that the German-Russian subjects could change their 
Fatherland, the honour and dignity of which they have 



314 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

never forgotten and will never forget. The near future 
will show that they know how to justify the trust which 
was shown them in former times." (Applause on the 
right and centre.) 

Declaration of the Nationalists 

The leader of the Nationahst party, the Deputy M. 
Dalashof, made the following declaration : — 

"The clock of history has struck a great hour. In these 
dark but famous times Russia is called upon to rectify some 
of her historical mistakes, mistakes of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, mistakes of 1815, 1848, and 1870. On all sides, in all 
its immeasurable extent, has arisen that wave, that spiritual 
impulse, that invincible psychic force which is the true 
security for the final victory of right and justice. Let us 
swear to forget everything but the one great aim, to stand 
firm at this hour until the eternal menace to righteousness, 
justice and peace, this armed aggression, this German 
militarism, is broken and finally extinguished. (Cheers.) 
In perfect unity with our ruler we will overcome all our 
difficulties, and will reach our great and sacred goal." 

Declaration of the Central Groups 
In the name of the Central Groups, M. Nussen-Puschin 
said : — 

" Gentlemen of the Duma and brothers elected from the 
land of Russia, there are moments in the life of a people 
when all thought and feeling, all waves of popular enthu- 
siasm, ought to be expressed in one general manifestation. 
Let that manifestation be, * God, the Tsar, the People, and 
victory over our enemies ! ' " (Applause.) 

Declaration of the Right 

The leader of the Extreme Right, M. Markoff, made the 
following speech : — 

"Gentlemen, you have just heard with fervour the 
patriotic voices of the races populating Russia. We have 
only not heard the representatives of the Russian people, 
and in this there is no cause for wonder, for when Russia is 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 315 

at war it is, of course, unnecessary for the Russian people 
to explain its attitude. I have not risen as the represen- 
tative of the Russian people. You are all representatives 
of the Russian people. (Cheers.) I have risen to tell you 
how in Kursk part of the Russian people said good-bye to 
its army. There were more than 20,000 people, amongst 
whom I think there was not one who had not sent a 
brother, a son, or a husband to the army. I was amongst 
them several hours. The people blessed the soldiers with 
ikons, and I did not hear one reproach concerning the 
cause of the war, although in the crowd there were many 
workmen and mechanics, many of what is called the prole- 
tariat. All thought only of one thing : ' O Lord, give us 
victory !' In all the length and breadth of Great Mother 
Russia the Russian people is thinking only of victory. We 
representatives of the Russian people in full unison shall 
obey the cry of our souls and fulfil our sacred duty if 
we turn to the highest representatives of our brave Russian 
army and our brave Russian fleet, to the Ministers of War 
and Marine, and ask them to transmit to our soldiers and 
sailors the expression of that feeling which we all share. 
Gentlemen, I shout hurrah for our great army and navy ! " 
(Stormy applause from all the Duma ended the speech from 
the leader of the Extreme Right.) 

Declaration of the Tartars, Chovashes, and 
Cheremeks 
M. Godnof declared that he came forward on this occasion 
not as a Russian, but as the representative of the non- 
Russian peoples of the Kazan Province, of which in the 
Duma there was no other representative but himself. 

" The Kazan Principality," he said, " composed of Moham- 
medans and Tartars, not having here its own representatives, 
cannot express its own feelings. Allow me, as a repre- 
sentative elected by them, by the Chovashes and Cheremeks 
of the Kazan Province, to declare that, having lived among 
them for ten years, I can voice their feelings and say that 
they as one man will resist, like the Russians, the aggression 
which is being made against Russia at the present time. 



3i6 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Accept through me from them the assurance that they 
whole-heartedly wish complete success to the Russian arms, 
and that they will sacrifice their lives for Russia like the 
Russians." 

The next speaker was the representative of the Octobrists, 
M. Protopspof. 

"At the present time," he said, "when all Russia is united 
round our sacred covenant to protect the land of their birth, 
words are useless. All the world is witness to our unity, 
which, with God's help, will lead to victory. My political 
friends have sent me to the rostrum at this historic 
moment, not to express their feelings, for they are certain 
and without doubt. They have sent me to express their 
firm conviction and unshaken faith that in the face of a 
terrible aggression we shall all stand together. We are 
all ready with our fortunes and lives, without measure or 
limit, to resist the attempts of the enemy to break down 
by violence a free people. We believe that the Lord will 
lift up His sword against the wrong, and that Russia in this 
historic conflict, just as in former trials, will unite round 
the Tsar, and will come out of this trial whole, undivided, 
morally strengthened and reformed." 

Resolution 
" Having heard the statements of the Government, and 
being convinced that all means of keeping the peace 
consistent with the dignity of Russia as a Great Power have 
been exhausted, the Imperial Duma expresses its unshaken 
confidence that during these dark hours of trial, and faced 
by the operations of war, all the Russian people, united in 
one common feeling of love for their country, and firmly 
believing in the righteousness of its cause, are ready to 
stand at the call of the Emperor to defend the land of 
their birth, its honour and its dignity. Recognizing 
this, the Duma expresses its firm faith in the invincible 
strength and the sacred future of Russia. While expressing 
its full readiness to co-operate in the protection of the 
country and in guaranteeing the support of their families 
at home, the Imperial Duma sends its brotherly greeting to 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 317 

the brave ones protecting the country, who are unselfishly 
carrying out their heroic duty." 

Declaration of the Social Democrats 

This declaration, which is omitted in the official Orange 
Book as published by the Russian Government, is translated 
from the verbatim report published in the Russian news- 
paper Rech, of July 27/August 9, 1914. 

In the name of the Social Democratic party M. Khaustoff 
made the following declaration : — 

" A terrible, unprecedented evil has fallen upon the people 
of the whole world. Millions of workmen are torn away 
from their peaceful labour and ruined ; they are being 
hurled into a bloody whirlpool, while millions of families 
are condemned to starvation. When the Governments of 
Europe were getting ready for war, the European proletariat, 
including the German, entered a common protest against 
this war which was being prepared by the ruling classes. 
Various circumstances prevented the Russian workmen 
from openly making the same protest. But at the time 
of the enormous demonstration against the war on the part 
of the European proletariat the hearts of the Russian 
workers beat in unison with those of their comrades. The 
present war, the result of a policy of greed, is a war the 
responsibility for which will be borne by the ruling classes 
of all the countries now fighting. The proletariat, the 
constant defender of freedom and the interests of the 
people, will always protect the welfare of the people against 
all attacks, from whatever quarter they may come. The 
workers of the fighting countries were unable to prevent 
the outbreak of the war and that orgy of barbarism which 
it carries with it. But we are deeply convinced that it is in 
the international unity of all the working masses of the 
whole world that the proletariat will find the means of 
bringing the war to the quickest possible termination. 
And let the terms of peace be dictated not by diplomats 
but by the people itself. At the same time we express the 
deep conviction that this war will, once and for all, open 



3i8 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

the eyes of the European masses to the true source of the 
persecution and oppression under which they are suffering, 
and that the present outbreak of barbarism will be at the 
same time the last outbreak." (Applause from the left, hisses 
on the right.) 

The Deputies gave cheers for the Emperor and sang 
the National Anthem. At 7.30 in the evening this 
historic sitting of the Duma closed. The Deputies gave 
M. Rodzianko an ovation, and left the Chamber. 

(e) 

STATEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT BY MEMBERS OF 
THE GOVERNMENT AND SPEECHES BY PARTY 
LEADERS ON THE EUROPEAN CRISIS' 

July 27. 

Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons. 

{Hansard, Vol. 66, No. 121,) 

Austria and Servia. 

Mr. BoNAR Law : I rise to ask the Foreign Secretary a question of 
which I have given him notice : whether he would communicate any 
information to the House as to the situation which exists between 
Austria and Servia ? 

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir E. Grey) : The 
House will, of course, be aware through the public Press of what the 
nature of the situation in Europe is at this moment. I think that it is 
due to the House that I should give in short narrative form the position 
which His Majesty's Government have so far taken up. 

Last Friday morning I received from the Austro-Hungarian Ambas- 
sador the text of the communication made by the Austro-Hungarian 
Government to the Powers, which has appeared in the Press, and 
which included textually the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian 
Government upon Servia. 

In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors, and expressed the view 
that, as long as the dispute was one between Austria- Hungary and 
Servia alone, I felt that we had no title to interfere, but that, if the 
relations between Austria- Hungary and Russia became threatening, 
the question would then be one of the peace of Europe : a matter that 
concerned us all. 

I did not then know what view the Russian Government had taken 
of the situation, and without knowing how things were likely to develop 
I could not make any immediate proposition ; but I said that, if rela- 

' Sir Edward Grey's and Mr. Asquith's speeches for August 3rd and 
4th are quoted in the English White Paper (see Contents). 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 319 

tions between Austria- Hungary and Russia did become threatening, 
the only chance of peace appeared to me to be that the four Powers — 
Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain — who were not directly 
interested in the Servian question should work together both in 
St. Petersburg and V'ienna simultaneously to get both Austria- Hungary 
and Russia to suspend mihtary operations while the four Powers 
endeavoured to arrange a settlement. 

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off diplomatic 
relations with Servia, I made by telegraph yesterday afternoon the 
following proposal, as a practical method of applying the views that I 
had already expressed : — 

I instructed His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Berhn, and Rome 
to ask the Governments to which they were accredited whether 
they would be willing to arrange that the French, German, and 
Italian Ambassadors in London should meet me in a Conference to be 
held in London immediately to endeavour to find a means of arranging 
the present difficulties. At the same time, I instructed His Majesty's 
Ambassadors to ask those Governments to authorize their representa- 
tives in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade to inform the Govern- 
ments there of the proposed Conference, and to ask them to suspend 
all active military operations pending the result of the Conference. 

To that I have not yet received complete replies, and it is, of course, 
a proposal in which the co-operation of all four Powers is essential. 
In a crisis so grave as this, the efforts of one Power alone to preserve 
the peace must be quite ineffective. 

The time allowed in this matter has been so short that I have had to 
take the risk of making a proposal without the usual preliminary steps 
of trying to ascertain v.?hether it would be well received. But, where 
matters are so grave and the time so short, the risk of proposing some- 
thing that is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot 
but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Servian reply as pub- 
lished this morning in the Press is accurate, as I believe it to be, that it 
should at least provide a basis on which a friendly and impartial group 
of Powers, including Powers who are equally in the confidence of 
Austria- Hungary and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement 
that would be generally acceptable. 

It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that 
the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria- Hungary 
and Servia and becomes one in which another Great Power is 
involved, it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever 
befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow : no one can say what 
would be the limit of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict ; 
the consequences of it, direct and indirect, would be incalculable. 

Mr. Harry Lawson : May I ask the right hon. gentleman whether 
it is true that this morning the German Emperor accepted the principle 
of mediation which he has proposed ? 

Sir E. Grey : I understand that the German Government are favour- 
able to the idea of mediation in principle as between Austria- 



320 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Hungary and Russia, but that as to the particular proposal of applying 
that principle by means of a Conference which I have described 
to the House, the reply of the German Government has not yet been 
received. 

July 29. 

{Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 109.) 
Austria-Hungary and Servia. 

Mr. JOYNSON-HiCKS : I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
a question of which I have given him private notice, namely : — 
Whether he has communicated with the Bank of England with the 
view to their convening a meeting of bankers to take steps to deal 
with the present financial position ; and, if not, whether he will 
consider the advisability of so doing without further delay ? 

Mr. Lloyd George : I have been in consultation with the Bank of 
England, and I am advised that there is nothing in the financial 
situation at the present moment which would make such a suggestion 
necessary or advisable. 

Mr. Bonar Law : May I ask the Prime Minister whether he has 
any information in regard to the European situation to give to the 
House ? 

The Prime Minister : As the House is aware, a formal Declara- 
tion of War was issued yesterday by Austria against Servia. The 
situation at this moment is one of extreme gravity. I can only say — 
usefully say--that His Majesty's Government are not relaxing their 
efforts to do everything in their power to circumscribe the area of 
possible conflict. 

Mr. Walter Guinness : May I ask the right hon. gentleman 
whether he has received any information as to the alleged revolu- 
tionary outbreak in Russian Poland ? 

The Prime Minister : No, sir. 

July 30 

Statement of Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons. 

{Hansard, Vol. 65, p. 1568.) 

Mr. Bonar Law : May I ask the Foreign Secretary if he has any 
information which he can communicate to the House ? 

Sir E. Grey : There is very little that I can say. I regret I cannot 
say that the situation is less grave than it was yesterday. The out- 
standing facts are the same. Austria has begun war against Servia, 
and Russia has ordered a partial mobilization, which has not hitherto 
led to any corresponding steps by other Powers, so far as our in- 
formation goes. We continue to pursue the one great object, to 
preserve European peace, and for this purpose are keeping in close 
touch with other Powers. In thus keeping in touch, we have, I am 
glad to say, had no difficulty so far, though it has not been possible 
tor the Powers to unite in joint diplomatic action as was proposed 
on Monday. 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 321 

July 31 

Statement by Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons. 

{Hansard, Vol. 65, p. 1781.) 

The Prime Minister : We have just heard (not from St. Petersburg, 
but from Germany) that Russia has proclaimed a general mobilization 
of her army and fleet, and that in consequence of this, martial law 
was to be proclaimed for Germany. We understand this to mean 
that mobilization will follow in Germany if the Russian mobilization is 
general and is proceeded with. In the circumstances, I should prefer 
not to answer any questions till Monday next. 

August 3 
Speeches of the party leaders after Sir Edward Grey. 
{Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 112.) 
Mr. BoNAR Law : The right hon. gentleman has made an appeal for 
support, and it is necessary I should say a word or two. They shall be 
very few. I wish to say, in the first place, that I do not believe there 
is a single member of this House who doubts that, not only the right 
hon. gentleman himself, but the Government which he represents, have 
done everything in their power up to the last moment to preserve 
peace, and I think we may be sure that, if any other course is taken, it 
is because it is forced upon them, and that they have absolutely no 
alternative. One thing only, further, I would like to say. The right 
hon. gentleman spoke of the bright spot in the picture which only 
a day or two ago was a black spot on the political horizon. Every- 
thing he has said I am sure is true. I should like to say, further, 
that if the contingencies which he has not put into words, 
but which are in all our minds as possible, arise, then we have 
already had indications that there is another bright spot, and that 
every one of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas will be behind 
us in whatever action it is necessary to take. This only I shall add : 
the Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on 
behalf of the party of which I am Leader in this House, that in what- 
ever steps they think it necessary to take for the honour and security 
of this country, they can rely on the unhesitating support of the 
Opposition. 

Mr. John Redmond : I hope the House will not consider it improper 
on my part, in the grave circumstances in which we are assembled, if 
I intervene for a very few moments. I was moved a great deal by that 
sentence in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 
which he said that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed 
feeling in Ireland. In past times when this Empire had been engaged 
in these terrible enterprises, it is true — it would be the utmost affecta- 
tion and folly on my part to deny it — the sympathy of the Nationalists 
of Ireland, for reasons to be found deep down in the centuries of history, 

22 



322 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

has been estranged from this country. Allow me to say that what 
has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. I 
must not touch, and I may be trusted not to touch, on any controversial 
topic. But this I may be allowed to say, that a wider knowledge of the 
real facts of Irish history has, I think, altered the views of the demo- 
cracy of this country towards the Irish question, and to-day I honestly 
believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety 
and sympathy to this country in every trial and every danger that may 
overtake it. There is a possibility, at any rate, of history repeating 
itself. The House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the 
disastrous American War, when it might, I think, truly be said that 
the military power of this country was almost at its lowest ebb, and 
when the shores of Ireland were threatened with foreign invasion, a 
body of 100,000 Irish Volunteers sprang into existence for the purpose 
of defending her shores. At first no Catholic — ah, how sad the reading 
of the history of those days is ! — was allowed to be enrolled in that 
body of Volunteers, and yet, from the very first day the Catholics of the 
South and West subscribed money and sent it towards the arming of 
their Protestant fellow-countrymen. Ideas widened as time went on, 
and finally the Catholics in the South were armed and enrolled as 
brothers in arms with their fellow-countrymen of a different creed in 
the North. May history repeat itself ! To-day there are in Ireland 
two large bodies of Volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in 
the North. Another has sprung into existence in the South. I say to 
the Government that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their 
troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland will be defended 
from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed 
Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms 
with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. Is it too much to 
hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be 
good not merely for the Empire, but good for the future welfare and 
integrity of the Irish nation ? I ought to apologize for having in- 
tervened, but while Irishmen generally are in favour of peace, and 
would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors 
of war, while we would make every possible sacrifice for that purpose, 
still if the dire necessity is forced upon this country we offer to the 
Government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that 
if it is allowed to us, in comradeship with our brethren in the North, 
we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country. 

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald : I should, had circumstances permitted, 
have preferred to remain silent this afternoon. But circumstances do 
not permit of that. I shall model what I have to say on the two 
speeches we have listened to, and I shall be brief. The right hon. 
gentleman, to a House which in a great majority is with him, has 
delivered a speech the echoes of which will go down in history. The 
speech has been impressive, but however much we may resist 
the conclusion to which he has come, we have not been able 
to resist the moving character of his appeal. I think he is 
wrong. I think the Government which he represents and for 



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 323 

which he speaks is wrong. I think the verdict of history will be that 
they are wrong. We shall see. The effect of the right hon. gentle- 
man's speech in this House is not to be its final effect. There may be 
opportunities, or there may not be opportunities, for us to go into 
details, but I want to say to this House, and to say it without equivoca- 
tion, if the right hon. gentleman had come here to-day and told us that 
our country is in danger, I do not care what party he appealed to, or 
to what class he appealed, we would be with him and behind him. If 
this is so, we will vote him what money he wants. Yes, and we will 
go farther. We will offer him ourselves if the country is in danger. 
But he has not persuaded me that it is. He has not persuaded my 
hon. friends who co-operate with me that it is, and I am perfectly 
certain, when his speech gets into cold print to-morrow, he will not 
persuade a large section of the country. If the nation's honour were 
in danger we would be with him. There has been no crime com- 
mitted by statesmen of this character without those statesmen appeal- 
ing to their nation's honour. W^e fought the Crimean War because 
of our honour. We rushed to South Africa because of our honour. 
The right hon. gentleman is appealing to us to-day because of our 
honour. There is a third point. If the right hon. gentleman could 
come to us and tell us that a small European nationahty like Belgium 
is in danger, and could assure us he is going to confine the conflict 
to that question, then we would support him. What is the use of 
talking about coming to the aid of Belgium, when, as a matter of fact, 
you are engaging in a whole European war which is not going to 
leave the map of Europe in the position it is in now ? The right hon. 
gentleman said nothing about Russia. We want to know about that. 
We want to try to find out what is going to happen, when it is 
all over, to the power of Russia in Europe, and we are not going to go 
blindly into this conflict without having some sort of a rough idea 
as to what is going to happen. Finally, so far as France is concerned, 
we say solemnly and definitely that no such friendship as the right 
hon. gentleman describes between one nation and another could ever 
justify one of those nations entering into war on behalf of the other. 
If France is really in danger, if, as the result of this, we are going 
to have the power, civilization, and genius of France removed from 
European history, then let him say so. But it is an absolutely 
impossible conception which we are talking about to endeavour to 
justify that which the right hon. gentleman has foreshadowed. I not 
only know but I feel that the feeling of the House is against us. I 
have been through this before, and 1906 came as part recompense. It 
will come again. We are going to go through it all. We will go 
through it all. So far as we are concerned, whatever may happen, 
whatever may be said about us, whatever attacks may be made 
upon us, we will take the action that we will take of saying that this 
country ought to have remained neutral, because in the deepest parts 
of our hearts we believe that that was right and that that alone was 
consistent with the honour of the country and the traditions of the 
party that is now in office. 



MANIFESTOES 

(a) 

August 4 

Message of the President of the Republic addressed to the 

Chambers. 

{Read to the Chamber and the Senate on August ^th.) 

Gentlemen, — France has just been the object of a brutal and 
premeditated aggression, which is an insolent defiance of the law of 
nations. Before a declaration of war had yet been addressed to us, 
even before the Ambassador of Germany had handed in his passports, 
our territory had been violated. The German Empire has only this 
evening given the real name to a state of fact which it had already 
created. For more than forty years the French, in their sincere love 
of peace, had repressed in their breasts their desire for legitimate 
reparation. They had given to the world the example of a great 
nation which, definitely rehabilitated from its defeat by goodwill, 
patience, and industry, has used its renewed and rejuvenated energy 
only in the interests of progress and for the good of humanity. When 
the Austrian ultimatum opened a crisis which threatened the whole of 
Europe, France decided to follow and to recommend to all a pohcy of 
prudence, of wisdom, and of moderation. No one can impute to her 
any act, any gesture, any word which was not pacific and conciliatory. 
At the moment of the first encounters she has the right solemnly to 
make this claim for herself — that she made up to the last moment the 
strongest efforts to avert the war which has just broken out and of 
which the German Empire will have to take the crushing responsibility 
throughout history. 

On the morrow of the day in which our allies and ourselves ex- 
pressed publicly the hope of seeing the negotiations begun under the 
auspices of the Cabinet of London peacefully carried on, Germany 
suddenly declared war upon Russia. She has invaded the territory of 
Luxemburg, she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation, our 
neighbour and our friend, and she has endeavoured treacherously to 
surprise us in the midst of diplomatic conversations. But France was 
watching, as alert as pacific. She was prepared, and our enemies will 
meet on their path our brave covering troops who are at their posts. 



MANIFESTOES 325 

and under whose shelter the mobilization of all our national forces will 
be methodically completed. Our fine and brave army, which France 
to-day accompanies with motherly thought, has arisen eager to defend 
the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. 

The President of the Republic, who voices the unanimity of the 
country, expresses to our troops who will fight by land and sea the 
admiration and confidence of all Frenchmen. Closely united in one 
feeling the nation will maintain the sangfroid of the possession of which 
she has given daily proof since the beginning of the crisis. France will, 
as ever, combine the most generous impulses and the most enthusiastic 
spirit with that self-command which betokens lasting energy and the 
best guarantee of victory. In the war upon which she is entering 
France will have on her side that right which no peoples, any more 
than individuals, may despise with impunity — the eternal moral power. 
She will be heroically defended by all her sons, whose sacred union in 
face of the enemy nothing can destroy, and who to-day are fraternally 
bound together by the same indignation against the aggressor, and by 
the same patriotic faith. She is faithfully supported by Russia, her 
ally, she is upheld by the loyal friendship of England, and already from 
all parts of the civilized world come to her sympathy and good wishes, 
for she represents once more to-day before the world, Liberty, Justice, 
and Reason. Haul les cceurs, et vive la France ! ! ! 



(b) 

August 2 
Manifesto of the Tsar. 

By the Grace of God, we, Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of All 
the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., to all 
our faithful subjects make known that Russia, related by faith and 
blood to the Slav peoples and faithful to her historical traditions, has 
never regarded their fates with indifference. The fraternal sentiments 
of the Russian people for the Slavs has been awakened with perfect 
unanimity and extraordinary force these last few days, when Austria- 
Hungary knowingly addressed to Servia claims inacceptable for an 
independent State. 

Having paid no attention to the pacific and conciliatory reply of the 
Servian Government, and having rejected the benevolent intervention 
of Russia, Austria made haste to proceed to an armed attack and began 
to bombard Belgrade, an open place. Forced by the situation thus 
created to take the necessary measures of precaution, we ordered the 
army and navy to be put on a war footing, while using every endeavour 
to obtain a peaceful solution of the pourparlers begun, for the blood 
and property of our subjects are dear to us. 

Amid friendly relations with Germany and her ally Austria, contrary 
to our hopes in our good neighbourly relations of long date and 



326 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

disregarding our assurances that the measures taken were in pursuance 
of no object hostile to her, Germany began to demand their immediate 
cessation. Having been rebuffed in this demand, she suddenly declared 
war on Russia. To-day it is not only the protection of the country 
related to us and unjustly attacked that must be carried out, but we 
must also safeguard the honour, dignity, and integrity of Russia and 
her position among the Great Powers. 

We believe unshakably that all our faithful subjects will rise with 
unanimity and devotion for the defence of Russian soil, that internal 
discord will be forgotten in this threatening hour, that the unity of the 
Tsar with his people will become still more close, and that Russia, 
rising like one man, will repulse the insolent attack of the enemy with 
profound faith in the justice of our work and with humble hope in 
omnipotent Providence. In prayer we call God's blessing on Holy 
Russia and her valiant troops. 

(Signed) Nicholas. 

(C) 

August 3 

Announcement of Declaration of War by Germany against 

France, 

Berlin, August 3, 7.42 p.m. 
Up till now German troops, according to the order issued to them, 
have not crossed the French frontier. On the other hand, since 
yesterday French troops, without a declaration of war, have been 
attacking our frontier posts. They have, although a few days ago the 
French Government had agreed to keep within an unoccupied zone of 
10 kilometres, crossed the German frontier at different points. Since 
last night French companies have occupied German villages. Aviators 
throwing bombs have come since yesterday to Baden and Bavaria, and 
under an infringement of Belgian neutrality over Belgian territory into 
the Rhine Province, and have tried to destroy our railways. With this 
France has opened the attack upon us and has brought about a state of 
war. The safety of the Empire compels us to resist. His Majesty has 
given the necessary orders. The German Ambassador in Paris has been 
ordered to demand his passports. 

(d) 

August 6 

Manifesto of the German Emperor to the German 

Army and Navy. 

After forty-three years of peace, I call upon all Germans capable of 
bearing arms. We have to defend our most sacred possessions — the 
Fatherland and the home— against the reckless assault of enemies on 
all sides of us. That means hard fighting. Great sacrifices await us. I 



MANIFESTOES 327 

am confident that the ancient and warlike spirit still lives in the German 
people — that powerful warlike spirit which attacks the enemy wherever 
it finds them, regardless of the cost, and which already in the past has 
been the dread and terror of our enemies. 

I have confidence in you, German soldiers, in each and all of you. 
The ardent and indomitable will for victory is living in each and all of 
you, and I know that if it is needed each and all of you will die like 
a hero. Remember our great and glorious past. You are Germans. 
God help us ! 

(Signed) William. 



PRESS CORRESPONDENCE 

(i) 

Austrian Complicity in the Serajevo Murder 

Lf Toiips leading article for July 24th says : — 

The Austro-Hungarian authorities are not the people to lay suspicion 
on the Servian authorities. Who singled out Cabrinovich, one of the 
authors of the Servian assassination, as a dangerous man ? It was the 
Servian Government. Who called for the expulsion of this dangerous 
Austrian subject? It was the Servian Government. Who opposed 
this precautionary measure ? It was the Austro-Hungarian Consul at 
Belgrade. And whose opinion did he invoke ? The Austrian authority 
at Serajevo, who are the guarantors of the man who some days after 
threw the bomb at the Archduke. If justice does not condemn Austrian 
pretensions, this suffices to discredit them, and to put the question 
whether the crime of June 28th is not after all a tragic pretext for a 
political move. Russia has shown the utmost forbearance since 1908. 
The Triple Entente has constantly sacrificed its more important 
interests to the peace of Europe. Has Austria been counting upon 
certain circumstances which are favourable to her, such as the 
assembling of the Italian Reservists, the death of M. Hartvig, the 
absence of his French colleague at Belgrade, Greco-Turkish difficul- 
ties, the troubles in Ulster, the absence of M. Poincare and M. Viviani? 
It is possible. But that is all the more reason why the Powers of the 
Triple Entente should prove by their decisions that these contingencies 
will not affect their energies. 

(ii) Times. 

Attitude of Germany on the Austrian Note 

Berlin, 'July 24///. 

The severity of the Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia has caused 
surprise here, but Austria- Hungary has the full support of the Govern- 
ment and of the greater part of public opinion, because she cannot now 
go back. Until yesterday I understand that the German Government 
was not aware of the details or of the tone of the Note, although it had 
received confidential ir.formation as to its "scope." At an earlier stage 
Austria- Hungary secured from Germany a general promise that she 

328 



PRESS CORRESPONDENCE 329 

would receive her support. The extent of the demands to be made to 
Servia was, however, left entirely to the discretion of Vienna, and advice 
was neither asked for nor offered officially. The German Government 
is fully aware of the delicacy of her relations with her ally, and would 
do nothing to limit her freedom. Far less has she encouraged Austria- 
Hungary to go to extreme lengths. The Note has therefore caused surprise, 
and the Cliauvinists, of all people, are indignant that Berlin was not asked 
for advice and was not given full details of the Austrian demands. 

At the same time it may safely be said that European complications 
are at present not thought probable. This seems to be the opinion of 
the Foreign Office, and it is the opinion of most newspapers. The 
Foreign Office bases its view upon the belief that Servia is morally 
isolated, and that although the Austrian demands are hard, the evidence 
of Servian complicity in the Serajevo crime is convincing. 

(iii) Daily Telegraph. 

Germany on the Austrian Note 

Berlin', Sunday night, July 26th. 

It has been suggested that Germany is in part responsible for the 
contents and tone of the Austrian Note. She has even been accused 
of occasioning or at least inspiring that document. This imputation 
she absolutely repudiates. The actual degree of her complicity in the 
Austrian action was stated to me this morning by an authoritative 
official to be as follows : — 

The result of the investigation of the Serajevo murders was com- 
municated to the German Government by her ally. All the depo- 
sitions and other material pointing to the guilt of official persons in 
Servia were submitted for examination. It was represented that the 
evidence clearly proved the existence of a state of things in Servia 
which Austria could not continue to tolerate without forfeiting, not 
merely her dignity and self-respect, but her national security as well. 
Austria aimounced that she had determined to exact drastic reparation 
for the wrong which she conceived had been done her, and to adopt 
such measures as should effectively prevent the Pan-Serb movement 
from again becoming a danger to her. 

She asked whether she could depend upon the support of her ally in 
taking these steps, and the German Government, having weighed the 
proofs submitted in substantiation of the Austrian indictment, and satis- 
fied itself of their validity, replied in the affirmative. That, so it is stated, 
is the full extent of Germany's complicity in the Austrian Note. From 
the time of the handing in of her answer she had no further cognizance 
of the matter till the document came to the knowledge of all the Govern- 
ments of Europe. Reports to the contrary having become current both 
in this country and abroad, she has circularized her diplomatic represen- 
tatives, instructing them to deny these rumours to the Governments to 
which they are accredited. They are to state that Germany had no earlier 



330 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

information as to the terms of the Note and no more influence upon its 
formulation tlian any other country. Af the same time, they are to point 
out that, Austria having decided on her o-ivn initiative what her course 
was to be, Germany could not, consistently with her general treaty obliga- 
tions and her specific promise of support, do or say anything calculated to 
embarrass her ally or detract from the effectiveness of the latter' s action. 

Such, in brief, is the account given by authoritative lips of Germany's 
share in bringing about the present crisis. 

(iv) 

Alleged German Threat to France 

{Reuter.) 

Berlin, Sunday, July 26th. 

In regard to reports published by the Paris newspapers regarding 
the conversation which took place between the German Ambassador 
and the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, it is semi-officially 
declared that the German Government has not used language in Paris 
different from that employed towards other Cabinets, especially those 
of St. Petersburg and London. The German Government has in every 
case made it known that it regards the conflict between Austria- 
Hungary and Servia as the concern of those two States alone, and that 
it must, therefore, be localized. The endeavours of Germany are 
directed towards inducing other Powers to accept this standpoint, so 
that the peace of Europe may be preserved. 

(v) Daily Telegraph. 

Germany as Instigator 

St. Petersburg, July 26th. 
The idea is strong here that Russia is being aimed at through Servia, 
and that the labour troubles here are not only regarded as indicating 
a favourable moment for attack, but that these troubles have been 
actually fomented by German emissaries for the express purpose of 
creating the necessary conjuncture in connection with the paralysed 
condition of England under the influence of the crisis in Ireland. 

(vi) Rheinisch- Westphdlische Zeitung. 

Germany on the Austrian Note 

Berlin, July 26th. 

Austria would be right in acting thus if she had given proofs of the 
justice of her accusations. Up to now nothing has been proved. No 
impartial tribunal has established that the Servians have prepared at 



PRESS CORRESPONDENCE 331 

Belgrade the murder of the Archduke or that any Servian agent has 
stolen bombs or revolvers to arm the assassins. 

The Pan-Servian propaganda in Bosnia has no need of being 
favoured by Belgrade ; it has been kept up and fed by the Hapsburg 
dynasty. 

It is really ridiculous for the people of Vienna and Budapest to 
imagine that Europe and our whole planet have given them the sacred 
mandate to avenge the dead Archduke. 

Unluckily, it would be the German army that would be charged with 
this task. It is scandalous that our Government should not have 
demanded to be minutely informed of the details of the Austrian 
demarche before it was made. 

We ought to declare to-day that we are not obliged to aid Austria in 
its policy of conquests. We have nothing to gain in a war against 
Russia. 

(vii) Di^ Post. 

Germany on the Austrian Note 

Berlin, July z^th. 

Every sentence is a blow of the fist in the face of the Servian 
Government. We fully understand and appreciate the deep indigna- 
tion and the incurable pain which dictated these sentences. We are 
also completely convinced of the bona fides of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government that the murder of Serajevo is to be traced to the Servian 
intrigues. But we must still ask ourselves once more : on what does 
the Austro-Hungarian Government really base these serious accusations ? 
Even if the assertion that a Servian major was concerned in the plot 
and that also Servian frontier officials had been bribed and were 
concerned in this terrible action, it is nevertheless going very far to 
accuse a whole people or the Government as the representative of the 
people of the murder. For that is done quite clearly and unmistakably 
in the Note. We are glad that the Austro-Hungarian Government at 
the moment when it handed the Note in at Belgrade has made it known 
to the whole world. By this act it has got rid of much foolish and 
useless conjecture. But why has it kept back the proofs that it must 
have in its hands ? Why does it not come out before the whole world 
with the clear, unmistakable evidence that its accusations can be 
upheld, that they are in no way influenced by excitement and by the 
need for revenge, but that they are naked, unmistakable facts which 
prove the greater Servian plot against the Monarchy ? The short 
statement which it makes is doubtless very compromising for Servia, 
but one must also hear the Servian Government in this affair. . . . 
Servia cannot agree to everything, if it is not to make itself despicable 
before the whole of Europe. Austria, on the other hand, is clever and 
experienced enough to know that it is asking the impossible from 
Servia. Why is it, then, forcing the situation to a crisis ? 



332 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

(viii) Times. 

Germany and the Austrian Note 

{Berlin Correspondent^ 

July 7']th. 

The situation is regarded here to-day with really remarkable 
optimism. It is believed that the peril of great international complica- 
tions is about to disappear, and it is even believed that notwithstanding 
the Austro- Hungarian mobilization and other preparations, an armed 
conflict with Servia is not absolutely inevitable. As regards the 
Austro-Servian issue the situation is extraordinary. It was given out 
that the Servian reply was unsatisfactory, and that is all. 

Until this morning, nobody in Berlin knew what the reply was, and 
it has not yet been published here. Even the German Foreign 
Secretary, and more extraordinary still, even the Austro- Hungarian 
Ambassadors here were unaware of the contents until the Servian 
Charge d' Affaires, whose telegram had taken more than twenty-four 
hours to transmit, communicated it to the Foreign Office to-day. 
Notwithstanding the contemptuous comment issued to-day by the 
Austrian semi-official telegraph agency, it will ultimately have to be ad- 
mitted that the reply is extremely conciliatory. The German authorities 
who have been examining the reply to-day may well have considered 
wliether, if Vienna insisted upon maintaining her present course, 
it would be possible for Germany to maintain her attitude that she 
supports Austria- Hungary through thick and thin, although refusing 
to interfere with, or in any way to prejudice, the actions which her ally 
sees fit to take. If there is still hope as regards the Austro-Servian 
issue, there is confidence about the European issue. There is reason 
to suppose that the British Government has, with the necessary tact, 
made it plain enough that there can be no European war with 
England left out. There is also reason lo suppose that Germany has, with 
the necessary tact, made it plain enough that Germany would give at least 
as good advice in Vienna as France might give in St. Petersburg. Germany 
is certainly and no doubt sincerely working for peace. The only remark 
that one need make about the prevailing optimism is that the pen- 
dulum has swung back so fast and so far that it is not unUkely to 
swing forward again before the crisis reaches the solution for which 
everybody hopes. 

(ix) Bai/y News. 

Four Power Mediation 

St. Petersburg, Monday, July 27/A. 

The breathing-space secured by the friends of peace, headed by 
England and Germany, has perceptibly relieved the situation. It is 
understood that these Powers, co-operating with Russia, will draw up 
a formula to safeguard the sovereign rights of Servia on condition that 



PRESS CORRESPONDENCE 333 

she insists on a thorough cleansing of all quarters associated with the 
Serajevo assassination, which, it is understood, the Tsar again described 
as an abominable crime. 



(x) Manchester Guardian. 

Germany and the Austrian Note 

Berlin, Monday, July 2yth. 

Despite innumerable rumours and an absence of authentic news, 
Berlin shows a decided tendency this evening to see the crisis in a 
calmer light. As before, all is felt to rest with Russia, but it is hoped 
that the moderating influence of both England and France will prevent 
intervention. 

Special satisfaction is shown at the understanding between Berlin 
and Paris, and over the good offices which England and Italy are said 
to be exercising in Vienna and Belgrade. The combined action of 
these two Entente and AUiance Powers is thought to be the most 
likely means of securing Austrian moderation and Servian submission. 

Clearly, Germany was unaware of the text of the Austrian Note 
before it was presented. I am assured on reliable authority that the 
Government disapproves the excessive sharpness of the tone employed. 
Openly, Germany must support Austria, but, according to my further 
information, the Government is not only striving to localize the conflict, 
but is also urging Austria to display the greatest possible moderation. 

(xi) Daily Chronicle. 

Germany and the Austrian Note 

Berlin, July 27///. 

There is no doubt that the German Government ardently wishes that 
the conflict may be localized, but, on the other hand, it has stated with 
unmistakable distinctness that, if Russia comes to the help of Servia in 
any material form, it will fultil to the very utmost the duties devolving 
on it. 

Germany is bound by the terms of her alliance with Austria to 
support the latter Power with the whole force at her disposal if Austria 
is attacked by Russia, and she declares that help given by Russia to 
Servia in the present circumstances is an attack on Austria. 

Germany undoubtedly wants peace, but her view of the situation is 
that Austria cannot now withdraw a step before she has obtained full 
satisfaction from Servia. Any attempts towards securing peace that 
leave this point out of the question will be cordially supported by the 
German Empire. 

The general feeling in Berlin official circles is, however, optimistic 
rather than pessimistic. 



334 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 
(xii) Times. 

German Attitude to Four Power Proposal 

Berlin, July 2W1. 

As you will already be aware, Germany has refused Sir Edward 
Grey's proposal of a Four Power Conference. England's good inten- 
tions are recognized, but it is indicated that a " conference " is too 
formal a business for the present situation, and that it will be better to 
continue " negotiations " between Government and Government. The 
whole crux of the matter is whether Germany is privately exercising a 
sufficient infltie^ice in Vienna. I can give no adequate assurances on this 
point. Although the conversations held at the Foreign Office yesterday and 
to-day are not in themselves satisfactory, it is reasonable to hope that 
Germany is doing more than she can afford to admit. 

(xiii) Times. 

Germany and the Austrian Note 

Paris, July 28/A. 
The declaration of war between Austria- Hungary and Servia does 
not necessarily or immediately involve a general European war. / 
have reason to believe that Germany has given more proofs of her desire 
for peace than have yet become knoivn to the French. 

(xiv) Daily Telegraph. 

Germany and the Triple Alliance 

Paris, July 28th. 

The one certain thing is that, if Austria goes beyond a certain point 
in her attack upon Servia, Russia must and will intervene. That means 
an invasion of Galicia by Russia, with Roumania almost probably 
attacking next door. That means Germany compelled, not only by 
treaty but in self-defence, to take up arms for Austria. The first stroke 
in the defence of Austria by Germany must, of course, be an attack 
upon France. The German plan is a violent and sudden attack upon 
France, after which, it being assumed that the attack is overwhelm- 
ingly successful, Germany will just be in time to turn round upon 
Russia, always slow in her mobilization. 

Finally, all this means the British fleet making a swift dash to 
annihilate the German. In short, the conflagration once lit, no one 
knows where it will stop. 



PRESS CORRESPONDENCE 335 

(xv) Times, 

Germany and the Austrian Note 

Berlin, July zgih. 

The political atmosphere is very oppressive here to-day, and the 
prolonged anxiety and unrelieved uncertainty are telling on all but 
the strongest nerves. Judging by the tone in very well informed 
quarters this evening, there is little to show for the incessant diplo- 
matic conversations. The German official attitude is still that the 
Austro-Servian issue is past interference, that the Austro-Russian issue, 
in so far as there is one, can best be settled by Vienna and St. Peters- 
burg, and that the progress of the Russian mobilization is a grave peril. 
Austria's assurances to Russia that she has no territorial ambitions have 
their counterpart in Russia's assurances that her military movements 
are not offensive. 

Although, however, the German official attitude remains fairly tranquil 
as regards the Russian mobilization, the development of military opinion 
which is now making itself felt may be difficult to control. 

I have received the most explicit assurances of Germany's desire for 
peace, eve^i in terms such as " War would be terrible for us." Unfortunately, 
ti cannot at present be said that Germany shows a disposition to take any 
more definite action herself than in counselling Vienna, as she has repeatedly 
done, to settle matters directly with St. Petersburg. 

There is no diminution of the stiffness of the German attitude with regard 
to Austria's "punishment" of Servia. Germany has not endorsed Sir 
Edward Grey's view that the Servian reply to the Austrian Note should 
at least provide a basis for a settlement, and Germany still appears to 
conceive that her hands are tied so far that no Servian concessions or 
submissions would find support here unless they had first been accepted 
by Vienna. 

(xvi) Westminster Gazette. 

Germany and the Austrian Note 

Berlin, July zgth. 

The belief expressed in some English newspapers that Germany 
and Austria planned the crisis with Servia in order to bring on a 
"preventive war" with the Dual Alliance is ridiculed. The crisis 
is directly traced to the Serajevo assassinations, without which Austria 
would probably have nursed her other grievances with Servia for years. 

The statement made by me that Germany did see the ultimatum 
in advance is correct ; the belief that Germany denied this is due 
to loose reading of a very different German denial. The denial, as 
made to the Exchange Telegraph Agency, was that Germany was 
consulted in the drafting of the ultimatum. This is true and obvious. 
The Berliner Tageblatt statement that " Wilhelmstrasse " saw the 
ultimatum only " at the last minute " is taken as correct. 



336 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 
(xvii) Daily Telegraph. 

Austria refuses Negotiations with Russia 

St. Petersburg, Wednesday night, July 2gth. 

We are given to understand on authority that Russia has done 
everything in her power to preserve peace, but that the Austrian 
Government has refused to continue negotiations any longer on the 
subject direct with St. Petersburg, so that the only remaining hope 
now rests on the mediation of the four disinterested Powers. 

England and Germany are supposed to be still working in this 
direction, and attention is turned towards the news from Paris, accord- 
ing to which Austria pledges herself not to go beyond punishing Servia, 
and suggests an opportunity for the success of mediation after the first 
bout of hostilities, if Russia will meanwhile refrain from interference. 

No explanation is yet forthcoming of the rupture of direct com. 
munication between Vienna and St. Petersburg. 

(XViii) Times. 

German and Austrian Attitude to Russia 

St. Petersburg, July 2gth. 

The prolonged conversations between M. Sazonof and the Ambas- 
sadors of Austria-Hungary and Germany to-day remained friendly in 
tone, but void of any practical results. Count Szapary and Count 
Pourtales, the Austro- Hungarian and German Ambassadors, are alike 
permeated by a theory that the Austro-Servian conflict is no concern 
of Russia, a theory discredited by the consensus of opinion among the 
other Powers and by the logic of facts. The persistent unanimity of 
the bland responses made by Austria- Hungary and Germany to Russia's 
despairing appeal for a hearing compels the unwilling conclusion that 
all this diplomatic effort has been merely by-play to gain time. 

(xix) Times. 

Germany's Demand for Peace 

Berlin, July ^oth. 

With the exception of the military journals, which are beginning to 
clamour for German measures, and of the Clerical Press, which is 
purely Austrian in tone, there is a fairly strong demand for real activity 
on behalf of peace. 



PRESS CORRESPONDENCE 337 

(XX) 

German Socialists on Russia 

{Renter.^ 

Berlin, Thursday, July loth. 

In a leading article to-day the Socialist Vorndrts says : — 

" We have at all times been undisguised opponents in principle of 
the Monarchy, and we have frequently waged an embittered fight 
against the impetuous wearer of the Crown, yet we must unreservedly 
admit to-day, and not for the first time, that William the Second, 
especially in late years, has shown himself the firm friend of the peace 
of the peoples." 

{Central News.) 

Berlin, July ^^st. 

In the event of the negotiations at present in progress between 
Germany and Russia falling through, it is expected that meetings of the 
Bundesrat (Federal Council) and the Reichstag will be called, as the 
Imperial Chancellor is anxious to acquaint the German and European 
public with the efforts made by Germany to prevent the outbreak of a 
world-war. 

The tone of the Berlin Press is extremely grave, but composed, although 
the hope is expressed that war will at the last moment be averted. 

The attitude of the Socialist organ Vorwdrts is well worthy of remark. 
It says that the fearful political crisis has become so acute that the next 
few hours can bring about war. Russia is to blame, and a general war 
will be provoked if Russia comes to Servia's aid, as that will mean the 
participation of Germany. It is necessary to demand from Austria- 
Hungary a clear basis for negotiations, her attitude towards Servia, 
and especially guarantees for the maintenance of Servia's independence. 
Germany must raise a warning voice against her ally, but the warning 
is not only for Germany and Austria, but also and mainly for Russia, 
who, by mobilizing, has brought about a situation which may result in 
the most fearful national murder, but which also may mean the end of 
Tsardom. France must bring her whole influence to bear on Russia, in 
order that France shall not be drawn into the horrors of a European war. 

(xxi) 

Germany's Attitude to War 

Reuter's Agency in London circulated on July 30th the following 
from a well-informed source : — 

Despite any idea to the contrary, Germany is doing her best to prevent a 
European outbreafi. Her position must, however, be taken into account. 
She cannot, as is supposed in some quarters, bring pressure to bear upon 
her ally to stop all action, but she has been giving, and continues to give, 
good advice to Vienna. 

It would be useless to disguise the fact that the partial mobilisation of 
Russia has made the situation as regards Germany, and particularly 
Austria, more difficult. 

23 



338 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR 

Notwithstanding this, there is, in the German view, hope that a 
peaceful settlement can be reached if — simultaneously with the steps 
now being taken by Berlin — advice of moderation and calm is also 
tendered to Russia by France and Great Britain. 

Germany has no desire whatever that anything but a peaceful issue 
shall come about of the present situation, and she will join in any effort 
possible to bring about a solution satisfactory to all parties. 

(xxii) Westminster Gazette. 

Germany's Attitude to War 

Berlin, J^uly 31s/. 

The Imperial Government and the Emperor do not want war, and 
here they are backed by the nation, which shows no sign of chauvinist 
ardour. 

But two considerations will compel a speedy settlement. One is the 
tremendous military advantage reaped by Russia from her ambiguous 
policy. The other is financial and economic pressure, which threaten ruin 
to Europe, and worse ruin to Germany, whose business system, is built on 
credit, and whose banks, as regards liquidity, a} e in a doubtful position. 

(zxiii) 

Russian Military Preparations and England's 

Attitude 

{Renter Foreign Special.) 

St. Petersburg, Wednesday, July 2gth. 

In Russian eyes the die is cast, and only a political miracle can 
avert war. 

A partial mobilization has already been ordered, and there is every 
indication that the whole of the vast military machinery will soon be 
set in motion. 

An Imperial manifesto is awaited to-night. 

Confident of England's support, about which doubts have mostly disap- 
peared, the Russian public is prepared to accept war. 

(xxiv) 

British Action and Effect on Russian Opinion 
{Renter.) 

St. Petersburg, July ^oth. 
The sailing of the British fleet from Portland has created an immense 
impression^ and, coupled with Japan's pacific assurance, has more than 
confirmed Russia's determination to stand to her guns. 



PRESS CORRESPONDENCE 339 

(XXV) Times. 

British Action and Effect on Russian Opinion 

St. Petersburg, August 2nd. 

Truth compels me to say that Russians, high and low, are waiting 
with the intensest anxiety to learn Great Britain's decision. The articles 
0////6 Times Itave done mucJt to inspire hope, but if , contrary to reason- 
able expectation, the British Parliament insists on neutrality, there will 
be a terrible revulsion of feeling here. 

(xxvi) 

Russo-British Amity 

(Reuter.) 

St. Petersburg, August ^rd. 

Crowds of thousands of people made demonstrations to-day before 
the British Embassy here. Sir George Buchanan, the Ambassador, 
appeared at the window and addressed the crowd. Amid frantic 
cheering he declared England's perfect sympathy with Russia. The 
Secretary of the Embassy, standing beside the Ambassador, then 
raised cheers for Russia. 



INDEX 



Afghanistan, Anglo-Russian Con- 
vention, II, 279 

Agadir incident, 12 

Albert, King of the Belgians, his 
speech to Parliament, 298 

Algeciras, Act of, 11 

Anglo-French Convention, 10 ff., 
274-7 

Anglo-French Entente, 13 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 9 

Anglo- Russian Convention, 11, 
277-82 

Archduke Franz Joseph, murder 
of, 3 

Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., Prime 
Minister : on British foreign 
obligations, 282-3 ! statements 
on the crisis, 320-1 

Austria : rivalry with Russia in the 
Balkans, i ff. ; and Balkan Alli- 
ance, 2 ; treaty of alliance with 
Germany, 5, 273 ; negotiations 
(July 23rd to August 5th), 16-93 ; 
ultimatum to Servia, 3 ff., 16-39, 
90 ; Servia's reply, 23, 39 ; re- 
fuses Four Power Ambassadorial 
Conference, 40, 90 ; breaks off 
discussion with Russia, 40, 90 ; 
declares war on Servia, 40, 90 ; 
further discussions with Russia, 
59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 70, 71 ; dispute 
with Russia settled, 72, 74, 80, 
81, 92 ; partial mobilization, 28, 
64,66, 90, 111-12; commences 
hostilities against Servia, 43 ; 
general mobilization, 69, 92, 
1 12-14; declares war on Rus- 
sia, 89,92 ; her attitude described 
by M. Hanotaux, 65, 93 ; White 
Paper, 197-202 

Austro- Hungarian Empire, racial 
difficulties, 2 



Balkan Alliance, 2 ; Russian in- 
fluence in the, 2 

Balkan crisis (1913), 15 

Balkan War, 2, 15 

Balkans, Austro-Russian rivalry, 
2 ff., 15 

Belgium : neutrality of. Note by 
Belgian Foreign Minister, 19 ; 
army placed on advanced peace 
footing, 43 ; Germany and Bel- 
gian neutrality, 61, 68, 76-9 ; 
German assurances to, 68, 83 ; 
France and Belgian neutrality, 
65, 68, 86, 89, 92 ; England and 
Belgian neutrality, 67, 68, 76-9, 
82, 83, 86-8 ; mobilization, 68 ; 
declares intention of upholding 
neutrality, 80 ; Germany's first 
ultimatum, 83, 92, 266 ; Bel- 
gium's reply, 86, 267 ; France 
offers armed assistance, 86 ; 
Germany's second ultimatum, 
89 ; German troops enter, 89 ; 
speech by King, 89, 298 ; 
Grey Book, 203-48 ; treaties 
relating to neutrality, 270, 
271-3 

Bethmann- Hollweg (German 
Chancellor), speech in Reichs- 
tag, Germany's case, 87, 291-6 ; 
reception of the British ulti- 
matum, 88 ; refers to "scrap 
of paper," 88 ; message to 
German Ambassador in Vienna, 
51. 251 

Boer War, 8, 9 

Bosnia, 2, 3, 4 

Britain, see England 

Bulow, Prince, 9 

Byles, Sir W., M.P., questions 
Premier on foreign obligations, 
282 



341 



342 



INDEX 



Cecil, Lord Hugh, on British 
foreign obligations, 282 

Chamber of Deputies, French 
Premier's speech in, 284-91 

Chancellor, the German : his 
speech on Germany's case ; 
says Germany must " hack her 
way through," 87 ; reception 
of British ultimatum, 88 ; refers 
to " scrap of paper," 88 

China, 9 

Croatia, 3, 4 

Denkschrift, German, 115-55 
Dillon, Dr., on Austro-Servian dis- 
pute, 4 
Duma, the Russian : speech of 
President at Winter Palace, 
300 ; speeches and declarations 
in, 302-18 ; speech of President, 
302 ; President of Council of 
Ministers, 303-5 ; Foreign Min- 
ister, 305-9 ; declaration of 
Labour party, 309 ; Poles, 310 ; 
Lithuanians and Letts, 311 ; 
Jews, 312 ; Cadets, 312 ; German 
colonists, 313; Nationahsts, 314; 
Central Groups, 314; Right, 
314; Tartars, Chovashes, and 
Cheremeks, 315 ; Social Demo- 
crats, 317 ; resolution carried, 
316 

Egypt, 10 

England : policy of isolation, 8 ; 
and Germany, 8 ff. ; and Japan, 
9 ; Convention with France, 
10 ff., 274-7 ; Convention with 
Russia, II, 277-82 ; Entente and 
strategic understanding with 
France, 13 ; alleged naval agree- 
ment with Russia, 14 ; negotia- 
tions (July 23rd to August 4th), 
16-92 : fleet not to disperse, 
38 ; German offer for her neu- 
trality, 45 ; offer rejected, 58 
61, 91 ; further German pro- 
posals rejected, 77-80, 85, 92 ; 



sends ultimatum to Germany, 
87, 92 ; declares war on Ger- 
many, 89-92 ; offers armed aid 
to Belgium, 89 ; official docu- 
ments not in White Paper, 
251-7,259-63 ; speeches in Par- 
liament, 318-22. {See also Four 
Power mediation, France, Grey, 
Russia) 
Entente between England and 
France, 13 

Fez, French expedition to, 12 
Four Power mediation proposals 
of Sir E. Grey, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 
39, 90 ; modified, 33, 91 ; re- 
jected by Germany, 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 41, 42, 90 ; and by 
Austria, 40, 90 ; accepted by 
Russia, 37, 90 ; by France, 37, 
90 ; by Italy, 39, 90 ; again 
modified, 43, 91 ; Germany's 
further reply, 45, 46 ; Russia 
willing to return to former pro- 
posal, 46, 47, 91 ; Sir E. Grey 
makes fresh proposal, 67 
France : and England, 8, 10 ff., 
274-7 ; and Morocco, 10 ff. ; 
negotiations (July 24th to August 
4th), 18-89; British support of, 
12, 13, 20, 26, 36, 45, 49, 50, 58, 
67, 79, 82, 85, 91 ; accepts B'our 
Power proposals, 37, 90 ; and 
Belgian neutrality, 65, 68, 86, 
89, 92 ; mobilization, 104-6 (re- 
ferred to in negotiations, 73, 
90) ; suggested neutrality in a 
Russo-German war, 71, 74-6,82, 
92 ; speech by Premier, 284-91 ; 
President's manifesto, 324 ; Ger- 
man declaration of war, 84, 92, 
326 
Franco-German Convention, 12 
Franco-Russian AUiance, 6 

George, King : telegram from 
Prince Heinrich, 251 ; his reply, 
252 ; telegram from Kaiser, 253 ; 



INDEX 



343 



reply, 253 ; telegram to Tsar, 
254 ; reply, 255 
Germany : and Balkan Alliance, 
2 ; historical and treaty rela- 
tions with Austria, 5, 273 ; his- 
torical relations with Russia, 6, 
15 ; historical relations with 
England, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14; 
and Morocco, 11, 12 ; negotia- 
tions (July 24th to August 4th), 
18-89 ; rejects Sir E. Grey's 
Four Power proposal, 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 41, 42, 90 ; exerts pressure 
on Austria for peace, 7, 35, 36, 
40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 
52, 53. 54. 55. 57. 60, 90, 91 ; 
makes offer for British neu- 
tralit)', 45, 91 ; England's posi- 
tion not clear to, 48, 49, 53 ; her 
offer rejected by Sir E. Grey, 
59, 61, 91 ; Sir E. Grey on 
British attitude towards, 67 ; 
further proposals for British 
neutrality rejected, 76-80, 84-5, 
92 ; and question of France's 
neutrality in a Russo-German 
war, 71, 74-6, 82, 92 ; mobiliza- 
tion, 1 07-1 1 (referred to in nego- 
tiations, 62, 70, 73, 92) ; sends 
ultimatums to France and 
Russia, 62, 65, 92 ; declares war 
on Russia, 73, 92 ; declares war 
on France, 84, 92, 326 ; sends 
first ultimatum to Belgium, 83, 
92 ; second ultimatum to Bel- 
gium, 86, 92 ; overtures to Bel- 
gium through Holland, 93 ; 
Denkschrift, 115-55 ' other 
official documents, 251-3, 256-9, 
263-9 ; speeches in Reichstag, 
291-8 ; Kaiser's manifesto to 
army and navy, 326 
Great Britain, see England 
Grey Book, Belgian, 203-48 
Grey, Sir E,, on Anglo-French 
relations, 13 ; on foreign obli- 
gations and alleged naval agree- 
ment with Russia, 14, 283 ; 



negotiations (July 23rd to 
August 4th), 16-89 ; speech in 
Commons (August 3rd), 12, 85 ; 
replies to Lord Robert Cecil on 
German proposals, 259 ; replies 
to Mr. Keir Hardie, 262 ; other 
speeches in Commons, 318, 320. 
{See also Four Power mediation, 
Germany) 

Haase, Herr, speaks for Social 
Democrats, 297 

Hanotaux, M., on Austria's atti- 
tude, 65, 93 

Hardie, Keir, questions Sir E. 
Grey, 78-79 

Hayashi, Count, and Anglo-Jap- 
anese Alliance, 9 

Heinrich, Prince, telegram to 
King George, 251 ; King's reply, 
252 

Herzegovina, 2, 4 

Italy : to be asked to mediate, 31 ; 
accepts Four Power mediation 
scheme, 39, 90; declares her 
neutrality, 80, 92 

Japan and England, 9 

Kaiser, the : telegram to King 
George, 253 ; reply, 253 ; further 
telegram to King George, 257 ; 
reply, 257 

Law, Mr. A. Bonar, M.P., speech 
in Parliament, 321 

Luxemburg, Sir E. Grey on viola- 
tion of, 82 ; German Note to, 
83 ; German troops enter, 83, 
92 ; protests against violation of 
neutrality, 84; France will re- 
spect neutrality of, 84 ; treaty 
guaranteeing neutrality of, 271 

Macdonald, Mr. Ramsay, speech 
in Parliament, 322 

Manifestoes, official French, Rus- 
sian and German, 324-7 



344 



INDEX 



Military preparations and mobi- 
lizations, terms defined, 94 ; 
narrative, 95-114. {See also 
under names of Powers) 

Morocco, 10 ff. 

Orange Book, Russian, 156-96 

Pan-Serb propaganda, 3, 4 

Pan-Slavism, i 

Parliament, British, speeches in : 
Sir E. Grey, 318, 320; Mr. 
Asquith, 320, 321 ; Mr. Bonar 
Law, 321 ; Mr. J. Redmond, 
321 ; Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, 
322 

Persia, Anglo- Russian arrange- 
ment concerning, 11, 278 

Poincare, President, his manifesto, 

324 
Press correspondence, 328-39 
Redmond, J., speech in Parlia- 
ment, 321 
Reichstag, speeches in, 291-8 
Russia : rivalry with Austria in the 
Balkans, i ff. ; and Bulgaria, i, 
2 ; and Servia, 2, 5 ; and Balkan 
Alliance, 2 ; and Austrian ulti- 
matum to Servia, 5 ff. ; and 
Germany, 6, 15 ; strained rela- 
tions with England, 8 ; Anglo- 
Russian Convention, 11, 14, 277- 
-82 ; negotiations (July 23rd to 
August 4th), 16-87; accepts Four 
Power proposal of Sir E. Grey, 
37, 46, 47, 90, 91 ; partial mobili- 
zation, 95-103 (referred to in 
negotiations, 26, 32, 36, 41, 43-5, 
46, 47, 50, 52, 53-6, 73) ; general 
mobilization, 102-3 (referred to 
in negotiations, 55, 59-62, 64, 66, 
69, 70) ;British support of, 20, 
26, 29, 36, 48, 81, 84, 90 ; tries 
to induce Austria to respect 
Servian sovereignty, 54, 91 ; 
makes modified proposal to 



Austria, 63, 91 ; dispute with 
Austria settled, 72, 74, 80, 81, 
92 ; Orange Book, 156-96 ; 
other official documents, 254-6 ; 
speeches at the Winter Palace, 
299-301 ; speeches in the Duma, 
302-17 {see also Duma) ; Tsar's 
manifesto, 325 

Serajevo murder, 3 

Servia, 2 ; before the war, 2 ff. ; 
negotiations (July 23rd to 
August ist), 16-80 ; Austrian 
ultimatum to, 3 ff., 16-39, 90 ; 
Austria declares war on, 40, 90; 
war begun, 43. {See also Pan- 
Serb propaganda) 

Slavs, Southern, i, 2, 3, 5 

Socialists : German, their attitude 
stated by Herr Haase, 297 ; Rus- 
sian, their attitude stated by 
M. Khaustoff, 317 

Spain and Morocco, 11 

Speeches in Parliaments of Eng- 
land, France, Russia, and Ger- 
many, 284-323 

Thibet, Anglo-Russian arrange- 
ment, II, 281 

Treaties : neutrality of Belgium, 
270,271-3 ; neutrality of Luxem- 
burg, 271; Austro - German 
Alliance, 273 ; Anglo-French 
Convention, 274-7 ; Anglo- Rus- 
sian Convention, 277 ; questions 
in House of Commons, 282-3 

Tsar, the : telegram from King 
George, 254 ; reply, 255 ; 
speeches at Winter Palace, 299, 
301 ; manifesto, 325 

Turkey and Balkan Alliance, 2 

Viviani, M., French Premier, his 
speech in Chamber, 284-91 

White Paper, Austrian (extracts), 
197-202 



UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED, THE GRESHAM PRESS, WOKING AND LONDON 



[Crot07i Copyright Reserved. 

GREAT BRITAIN 



AND THE 



EUROPEAN CRISIS. 



CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS 
IN PARLIAMENT, TOGETHER WITH AN 
INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. 




LONDON: 

PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S ST^.TIONERY OFFICE 

By HAZELL. WATSON & VINEY, Ld.. London and Ayli-sbury, 

Printers by Appointment to His Majesty the Xing. 



To be purchased, either directly oi- through any Bookseller, from 

WYMAN & SONS, Ltd., 29, Breams BuiLniNcs, Feiter Lane, E.G., and 

54, Pt. Mary Street. Cardiff ; or 

H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch), 23, F«rth Street, Edinburgh • or 

E. PONSONBY, Ltd , 116, Grafton Street, Dublin; ' 

or from the Agencies in the British Colonies :ind Dependt-ncies, 

the United States of America, the Continent of Europe and Abroad of 

T. FISHER UNWIN, London, W.C. 

1914. 

Price One Penny. 



CONTENTS. 



Introductory Nan-ative of Events ••• 

Table of Contents of Correspondence laid 

Parliament 
List of Principal Persons mentioned in the 

spondence, showing tlieir official positions 

Part I.— Correspondence laid before Parliament 
Part II.— Speeches in the House of Commons : — 

(1) Sir Edward Grey (Anoust 3, 19U) 

(2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) 

(3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, li)14) 
(1) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914) 
(o) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914) 





ragc 




iii. 


before 






xi. 


Corrc- 






xxvi. 




1 




89 




97 




97 




98 




98 



INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. 



(1.) 

Ox the 23rd June, 1914. the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the 
Emperor of Austria, 'Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, 
left Vienna to attend array manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, 
the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress 
through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. AVhile 
passing througli the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both 
the Archduke and Duchess were killed. 

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout 
Europe ; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austi'ia was universal. 
Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support 
her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to 
take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices. 

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, 
that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the 
responsibility for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have 
encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in 
these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had 
swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection 
against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating 
in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when 
Austria 'took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of 
Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation 
should not "detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan 
over these provinces."' Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly pro- 
claimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the 
annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of 
cathedral bells, amid scenes of ofl5cial rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian 
nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government 
protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the 
feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude, 
coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, 
nearly brought about a European war ; but after six months of extreme tension 
she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising 
to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, 
however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 
— successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial 
expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened. 

(2.) 

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept 
Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It v/as a 
feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its 
exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives. 

But the dangers to European peace v.'hich it involved were immediately 
evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb 
riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in 
the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries 
of " Servian assassins.'' Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. 
The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled lan- 
guage, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs 



tliiit tlio iK)[)nliir resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the 
Austrian Government. Botli the British and also the German Government 
knew that the peace might be disturbed. 

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested 
Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would 
reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public 
opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the inten- 
tions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The 
Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British 
and llussian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to 
make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Aiistria 
and Hungary, Avhich had just taken place, was only concerned with the question 
of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 
8th July tlie Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific 
speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of 
the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at 
Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the 
Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian 
ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated 
in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious 
turn of events was necessary or even probable. 

His Majestj''s Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. 
It was known that the Situation might become serious, but it was also known 
that Servia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands com- 
patible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the 
opinion of the Russian and French — and also of the German — Governments was 
that the iServian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that 
Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which 
had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated in part on Ser- 
vian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. 
He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian 
Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual 
evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory' had in fact been made 
the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial 
had been set vip at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The 
Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Govern- 
ment to commimicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investi- 
gations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the assassins 
implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian 
Government had informed the Servian Government, in leply to enquiries, that 
one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remem- 
bered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Ser- 
vian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian 
courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before 
Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against 
Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th 
July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon 
some case that would be known ; but, as a matter of fact, His ]\Iajesty's GoA'ern- 
ment did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had 
founded her idtimatum till the 7th August. 

It was, theiefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could 
be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was 
nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element 
which Austria could not take into full consideration. "Whatever she did. she 
would know acciu-ately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance 
and the Triple Entente remained as they had always been. We had been quite 
recently assured that no new secret element had l)een introduced into the former, 
and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th .Jinie that 
the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's 
interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd 5iay the Russian 
>Jinister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the 
"Balkans for the Balkans," and it Mas known that any attack on a Balkan 
State by any great European Powei* would be regarded as a menace to that 
policy. If Servia was, as the Au.strian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 
29th July, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Servia 



was to be luimiliated ; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It 
was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburgh, but 
of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan popiuations bred in the Russian 
people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as 
Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, 
"a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of 
the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and 
retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, l)ut the 
product of years could not be pushed aside in a day. 

13.) 

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On 
the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade 
and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed 
towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was 
hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and 
literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the 
Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation 
of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified 
men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation 
of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of 
these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on tlie 
front page of the " Official Journal " a prescribed statement, which amounted 
to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A 
very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of 
the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent 
nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation. 

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between 
Great Britain and Germany- there vvas an interval of only twelve days. In the 
whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and 
ponder. At the oirfcset, tlierefore, it may be well to explain definitely the 
British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum. 

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular 
movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the 
Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no 
interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and pro- 
gressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently 
used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the 
Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of sti'engthcning a 
State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient ; the devotion and confidence 
of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia 
did not necessarily affect that interest; it was a dispute between two Govern- 
ments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, 
consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute ; that he had no title 
to intervene between Austria and Servia ; that he woidd express no opinion on 
the merits of the idtimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute 
affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake; and, 
from the first. Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see 
how Russia, interested as she was in Servia, could take any but a most serious 
view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe 
must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said 
to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of 
forl)earance, patience, and self-sacrifice " — by a " loyal spirit of give and take 
on the jiart of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this 
spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis. 

(4.) 

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ulti- 
matum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that 
"there would be something in the nature of a time limit."' He immediately 
expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was 
handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He 



V) 

coufessod to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for deiiiicra- 
tion, lie felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence 
Servia. 

At this critical moment everything; depended on Germany. As the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was 
to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the 
German Minister for Foreign Airairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum ; 
officially, the German Government called it "equitable and moderate," and 
said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone 
desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassa- 
dors in St. Petersburgh, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, 
and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French 
Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be in- 
evitable under th.e terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian 
Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifierent to the 
Austro-Scrvian conflict. The next evening troops in V^ienna had to be called 
out to guard the Russian Embasriv from hostile crowds. " Localisation " was 
a good plirase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, 
and with surprise had come universal alarm. 

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. 
Before all things, the time-iimit of the ultimatum bad to be extended. Great 
Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to 
join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was 
to "pass on" the message to Vienna. 

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of con- 
ciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia declared lievself ready; 
Germany said she had no objection, " if relations betv.-ecn Austria and Russia 
became threatening." 

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and Britisli representatives at Belgrade were 
instructed to adv-ise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. 

But it was too late. The time-limit, wbu^h Austria would not extend, had 
exi^ired ; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the afternoon of 
Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an 
acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays 
necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject 
to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to 
the participation of Austro-Hnnoarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. 
The reply went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted 
— had ever tliought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at 
Vienna reported tliat the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that 
a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on 
liis mind was that the Austrian note v,-as so drawn uj) as to make war inevitable. 
In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian i\[inister left 
Bolerade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation. 

But an outline of the Servian reply hod been communicated to Sir E. Grey 
an hour or two before it was delivered. He immcrliately expressed to Germany 
the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented 
itself with " passing on " the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through 
the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so pa^s'^d on may be 
gue?:sed from the fact Ihat the German Ambassador t^^ld the Eriti'^li .'Vmbassador 
direcHy afterwa'ds that Servin liad only made a pretence of giving way, and 
that her concessions were all a sharn.. 

(5.) 

During the next four days, 26th to '29t]i July, there was oTily one question 
before Europe — how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? 
It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop 
short of the absolute rum of the Servian State, if siie once actually attacked 
it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy ; the 
])opular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed pro- 
fessed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from 
Servia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of 



violent popular entliusiasni. They said themselves tliat they would bo swepL 
from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a confiiet with Servia. 
Would this poi)ular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition 
against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that she 
would have to intervene if Servia were attacked ; but she promised Austria 
on the 27th that s!ie would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the 
Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria 
to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, 
saying it was too late. She declared war on Servia on the 28th. Russia 
ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th. 

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had jDroposed that the German, Italian, 
and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means 
towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted ; Russia said she 
was ready to stand aside ; but Germany refused. She did not like what she 
called '"a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations 
between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have 
seen in the last paragraph, hut they were cut short by the Austrian declaration 
of war against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment 
for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss the 
Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what 
Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E. 
Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had 
originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would 
consent to work for a settlement. 

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. 
Prussia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops 
were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming 
from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed 
unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, 
was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had 
said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make 
representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the 
evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador 
that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. On the strength 
of this assurance and shnilar assurances made by the German Ambassador in 
London on the 29tli, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accord- 
ance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Govern- 
ment, if they chd not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form 
he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he 
said, " was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought 
possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace." 
The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29tli. 

(6.) 

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About 
midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He 
had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided 
Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. 
He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, 
but ho promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory w'ould be taken 
from her. 

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, ])ut he added an exhortation 
and* an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the 
only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would 
prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly 
welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two 
nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come. 

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, some 
initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. 
But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was 
changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on the 
frontiers of Servia and Austria; the only fear of further war luul lain in the 



relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's deHarations w<^re pacific ; Russia 
had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal 
dov-clopmcut ; Franco would not fight except to help her ally. Tlioro luid 
seemed no insuperable diiiiculty m keeping the peace; it was only a question 
of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. But 
now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew 
that Geiraaay was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The 
independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one 
of the strongest means of sernruig the peace of Europe. Their position and 
the nature of tbe country rendered thero the natural battlefield of Northern 
Euiope. If it was made inmossible for a Great Power to invade them, war 
would become increasiiigly diucult and dangerous. With the growth of the 
idea of a fixed systeni of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality 
of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, 
it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, 
and recognised Iiy two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of 
Europe was our one objer^t, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear 
out the main rivet of that peace. 

Germany's position must bp understood. She liad fulfilled her treaty obliga- 
tions in the p;Tst ; her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme 
military importance in a war with France ; if such a war oeeiirred. it wouki be 
one of life and death ; fJerniany feaied that, if she did not oecnjiy Relgmm, 
France might do so. [n fact^- of this suspicion, there was only on(j thing to rlo. 
The neutrality of Belgium had not be^n de^^ised ^s a pretext for wars, but to 
pi'event the nutbn^ak of wars. The Powers must ipaffiruj Relgian neutrality in 
order tn prevent the war now threatene/i. The nnti.sh GovcM-nment. therefor*;, 
OH Friday, the 81st 'uly. asked thp German find Kr^Tich fiovpinnipnts for an 
engagement to respect Belgium's neijtralitv, a.n<l the Belgian fi<ivernment for 
an eiigag"'ment to uplinld it. France gave the neee«sjirv engagement the sanio 
day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Hence- 
forward there could be no doubt of German designs. 

Meanwhile, on the 3t>tb and 31st Tiegi^tiations continiiM*! between Russia and 
Austria. On the 29th nermnny bafi suggested to Austria that she should stop 
as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. I. ate mi the same night Russia 
offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria wmild rec'iguise that the 
conflict with Serena had become a 'piestuin o^ genera! Furopean mtere.st, and 
would eliminate from her altimatum the point.s whieh involved a violation of 
the sovereignty fif Servia. As the n>siilt nf this offer. Russia was able tr\ inform 
His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria bHil at last agreeiH to do 
the very thing she had refused to do in the first Hays of the er'sis. namely, to 
di!icus.s the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia. Russia asked the British 
Government to assume the direction of these discussions. For a few hours 
there seemed to be a hope of peace. 

At this moment, on Friday, the Slst. Germany suddenly despatched an 
ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation 
within twelve hours. Every ailowanee must be mnile for the natural ni-rv-ius- 
ncss Y.'hich, as history has repeatedly shon-n. overtakes nations when mobilisa- 
tion is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information 
in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the 
time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, aJthough general mobilisation 
was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day. the 1st August. 
France also began to mobilise on that day. The German S-pcrctary of State 
refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Ger- 
many, France, .and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the 
afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh presented a declaration 
of Avar. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st. Russia assured Great Britain 
that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross 
the frontier, and Franco declared that her troops would be kept H miles from 
lier frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very e^irly 
on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a 
-small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers 



with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. 
War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable. 

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Govern- 
mcnt failed in' their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now 
remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearh^ 
set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, 
which are contained in this volume,* and no additional explanations are needed 
here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia 
first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise 
of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined 
to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained 
that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose 
influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge 
that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He 
refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of 
force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, 
and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July, and 
to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a 
European conflagration took jjlace. We gave no pledge to our present allies, 
but to Germany we gave three times— on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 
1st August — a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our atti- 
tude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of 
Belgium. 

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, 
the Tsar telegraphed to His ^Majesty the King as follows : " In this solemn hour 
I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." 
It is right to say that His JMajesty's Government believe this to be a true state- 
ment of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the 
other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the 
response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the 
peace of Europe. 

Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914. 

* See Part XL 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

OF 

CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT. 



NOTE. 



(1) Documents Nos. 1-159 have been published as a White Paper, 

Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) [Cd. 7467]. 

(2) Document No. 160 has been published as a White Paper, 
Miscellaneous No. 8 (1914) [Gd. 7445]. 

(3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper, 
Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) [Gd. 7596]. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 




To Sir II. Ruiiibold | July 20 j Conversation with German Ambassador respecting 

disquieting situation between Austria-Hungary and 
Servia. Sir E. Grey assumes tliat Austria-Hungary 
will publish her case against Servia before taking 
any action, and thus facilitate Russia counselling 
moderation at Belgrade 



2 Sir II. Riunbold .. 
(Telegraphic! 



To Sir M. de Bunson 



4 i Communicated by 
A u.stro - Hungarian 
Ambassador 

ft To Sir M. de Bun.sonj 
(Telegraphic) 



6 Sir G. Buchanan ... 
I (Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bunsen ... 

(Telegraphic) 



Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Telegraphic) 



Gcrnuin Ambassador 



10 To Sir F. Bertie 



To Sir H. Rumbold 
(Telegraphic) 



12 



To Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 

(Telegraphic) 



22 



23 



24 



Attitude of German Government. Secretary of State 
prefers not to interfere, and considers that Austria- 
Hungary has shown great forbearance towards 
Servia in the past 

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador re- 
specting note to be sent to Servian Govermnent. 
Objections urged to insertion of time-limit. Dangers 
of European conflagration 

Text of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia 



21 ! Austro-Hungarian note to Servia. Conversation with 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. Sir E. Grey de- 
precates Austrian demands as inconsistent with 
maintenance of Servian independent sovereignty ... 



24 



24 



24 



24 



24 



24 



24 



Conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs respecting results of M. Poincare's visit to 
St. Pctersburgh Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
French Ambassador urged that His Majesty's 
Government should proclaim solidarity with them. 
Former hoped in any case His Majesty's Govern- 
ment would express strong reprobation of Austro- 
Hungarian action ... ... 

Views of Russian (jharge d'Affaires on situation as 
expressed to Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 

Servian Prime Minister hopes that His Majesty's 
Government will use influence in moderating Austro- 
Hungarian demands ... ... ... 

Views of German Government on situation. German 
Government defend attitude of Austria-Hungary 
towards Servia, and consider matter concerns tho.sc 
States alone 

Conversation with French Ambassador respecting 
Austro-Hungarian note and possibility of mediation 
by the four Powers ... ... 

Conversation with German Ambassador, who justified 
Austro-Hungarian action and demands, and urged 
localisation of conflict. Question of using influence 
at St. Pctersburgh and Vienna in favour of modera- 
1 tion. Ambassador says Servian reply must not bo 
a mere negative 

Suggests lines of Servian reply to Austi-ia-Hungary. 
'To consult with Russian and French colleagues as 
to giving advice to Servian Government. Favour- 
able reply should be given on as jnany points as 
possible ... ... ... ... ... 



TABLE OF COWTENTS. 



XIU 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject, 



J3 



14 



15 



16 



17 



18 



10 



20 



21 



22 



23 



21 



Communicat-ed by 
Russian Ainbassa- 
dor 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 
„ Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 

Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir H. Rumbold 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir R. Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 

Sir M. de Bunsen ... 

(Telegraphic) 



Mr. Crackanthorpe 

(Telegraphic) 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



To Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir H. Rumbold 

(Telegrai>hic) 

To Sir M. de Bunsen 
(Telegraphic) 



1914 
July 25 



25 



25 



Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request 
extension of time-limit allowed to Servia, and to 
urge that Austria-Hungary should inform Powers 
of basis of accusations against Servia. Recommends 
similar instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador ... 

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has stated that step 
taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum. Austro- 
Hungarian Government did not threaten actual mili- 
tary operations. To inform Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 

French Government have given Servia advice similar 
to that advocated by His Majesty's Government (see 

Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests 
that moderatmg advice bo given at Vienna as well 
as at Belgrade 

Russian Government consider that, in view of early 
j expiry of time-limit, it is too late to counsel modera- 
tion at_ Belgrade Russia prepared to stand aside if 
j mediation of four Powers is accepted. Minii^tor for 
I I'orcign Affairs urges that Great Britain should 
I act with France and Russia Situation v/ill be dos- 
j peratc unless Germany can restrain Austria-Hungary 

j German Secretary of State admits intention of Austria- 

j Hungary to take military action against Servia. 

j His Excellency considers crisis might be localised. 

He disclaims all previous knowledge of terms of 

Austro-Hungarian note 

I Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs says Austria- 
Hungary will only be satisfied with unconditional 
I acceptance of her note 

Austro-Hungarian pre.ss comments show that Servian 
surrender is neither expected nor desired Austro- 
Hungarian Minister will leave Belgrade failing un- 
conditional acceptance of note by 6 p m. to-day 

Brief summary of projected Servian reply 



Russian and French representatives still without in- 
structions. In view of thi.s and of proposed con- ! 
ci latory Servian reply he has abstained from i 
advising Servian Government. Probable that Russia j 
has already urged utmost moderation on Servian 
Government 

25 Departure of Austro-Hungarian Minister Govern- ! 
nient has left for Nish with diplomatic representa- I 
tives i 



Refers to No. 6. Approves statement as to attitude ' 
of His Majesty's Government Latter cannot do j 
more, but are anxious to prevpnt war Suggests j 
that tour other Powers should mediate at Vienna ' 
and St. Petersburgh if Austria-Hungary and Russia 
mobilise. German co-operation essential 



25 



25 



Conversation with German Ambassador respecting 
question of mediation between Austria-PIungary and 
Russia. Ambassador thinks Austria might accept it 

Russian communication to Austria-Hungary, asking 
for an extension of time limit of ultimatum to 
Servia, and enquiring data on which Austria bases 
her demands. He should support his Russian 
colleague ... 



14 



15 



15 



15 



15 

16 
17 

17 
17 



17 



18 



18 



TABLE OP CONTENTS. 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 




1014. 
To Rii- F. Bortio ... July 25 
,, Sir H. Riinibolfl ! 
', Sir G. liuchanani 



FNil-l 

To Sir R. Rodd 



To Mr. 
tliorpo 



Crackan- 



Sir M. flo Buiisen ... 

(TclegraphiL-) 



(Telpgraplii'') 

Sir n. Rtimbold ... 

(Telegraphic) 



{Telegraphic) 



35 !Sir R. Rodd 

I (Telegraphii-) 



.30 I To Sir F. Bertie ... 
j ., Sir H. Rumbold 
! „ Sir R. Rodd ... 
(Telegraphic) 



37 iTo Sir F. Bertie 



;iH !Sir R. Rodd 



31) I Commniiicated by 

I Servian Minister 
I 

40 iSir M. de Bunsen ... 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 

4- jSir V. Bertie 
" I (Telegraphic) 



4;5 ' Sir E. Goschen 

I (Telegraphic) 



25 



25 



26 



26 



26 



26 



26 



23 



27 



26 



27 



27 



27 



Has informed German Ambassador of projected Ser- 
vian reply (see No. 21), and expressed hope that 
Germany will influence Austria-Hungary to receive 
it favourably ... ... ... 

Has informed Italian Ambassador of statements made 
to German Ambassador (see No. 25). His Excel- 
lency states that Italy is anxious to see war avoided 

Conversation with Servian Minister. Although ready 
to meet any reasonable demands of Austria- 
Hungary, Servian Government could not agree to 
abandon certain political ideals ... 

Servian reply considered unsatisfactory. War regarded 
as imminent 

Reports conversation with Gorman Ambas.sador. 
Latter considers that Russia will remain inactive ... 

Reports sudden return of Emperor to Berlin. Gorman 
Under-Secretai-y of State of opinion that Russia 
will not move unless Servian territory is annexed ... 

German Ambassador at Vienna instructed to pass on 
to Austro-Hnngarian Government hope of His 
Majesty's Government that they will take favourable 
view of Servian reply. German Government cannot 
go beyond this 

Minister for Foreign Affairs v^elcomes proposal for 
conference, and Italian Ambassador at Vienna will 
bo instructed accordingly 

To ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs will 
agree to a conference in London, and to ask that 
French, German, and Italian representatives at 
Vienna, St. Petersburg!!, and Belgrade should 
urge on respective Governments that, pending deci- 
sion, all active military operations should bo sus- 
pended ... 

It is important to know if France will agree to sug- 
gestion that the four Powers should urge moderation 
at Vienna and St. Petcrsburgh 

Conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who considers gravity of situation lies in conviction 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government that their 
prestige is involved 

Text of Servian reply to Austro-Huiigaiian note 



Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russian 

Government will not press for more time. Russia 

cannot possibly remaiji indifferent if Servia is 
attacked 

Considers that Austria-Hungary is fully determined 
on war with Servia 

French (jlovernment accept proposals respecting con- 
ference. Necessary instructions sent to French repre- 
sentatives at Berlin, Belgrade, Vienna, and St. 
Petcrsburgh 

German Seo'etary of State is opposed to British pro- 
posal for a conference. In favour of direct exchange 
of views between Vienna and St. Petcrsburgh. Ger- 
many's position in the event of Ru.ssian mobilisation. 
Secretary of State more hopeful 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



XV 




44 jSir G. Buchanan ... 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 

Jul V 27 



45 



(Telegraphic) 



4C To Sir E. Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 



47 I To Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir M. de Bimsen 



49 To Sir R. Rodd 



50 ;Sir M. de Bunsen ... 

51 iSir F. Bertie 

52 (French Ambassador' 



Communicated by 
Russian Ambassa- 
dor 



54 



55 Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) | 



28 



27 



27 



28 



28 



Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversation 
with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting note 
to Sorvia. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that 
Entente Powers should present solid front to 
Germany 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided to 
propose direct conversation between Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh 

German Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grej- desires 
to keep in touch with Germany so long as the latter 
works for peace. Germany should urge moderation 
at Vienna. Servian reply might form basis for dis- 
cussion 

Russian Ambassador informed of British attitude. 
Question whether Russia would take action if 
Austria-Hungary agreed not to annex Servian 
territory ... 

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, 
who reviewed Servian question at length. Sir E. 
Grey expressed surprise at Austrian attitude towards 
Servian reply, which seems already to involve deep 
humiliation of Servia. British fleet will be kept 
assembled, but this is no more than proof of anxiety 
felt in country ... ... ... 

Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who agrees in 
proposal for conference. His Excellency will recom- 
mend to German Government that Austria-Hun- 
gary, Russia, and Servia should suspend military 
operations j^ending conference ... '. 

Text of declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against 
Servia 

French Government agree to proposals of His 
Majesty's Government for conference between the 
four Powers in London 

French Government in favour of Britisli proposal for 
conference, and are ready to send instructions 
accordingly ... ... ... 

Communicates telegram from Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Govern- 
ment arc in favour of British proposal for confer- 
ence, failing commencement of direct Austro-Rus- 
sian conversations 

Communicates telegram received from Russian Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs to effect that German Govern- 
ment appear to have taken no measures to induce 
Austria-Hungary to modify attitude towards Servia, 
and suggesting His Majesty's Government approach- 
ing the German Government. Key of the ritustion 
really at Berlin ... 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all his 
influence at Belgrade to induce Servia to give satis- 
faction to Austria, but Servian territorial integrity 
must be guaranteed and sovereign rights be re- 
spcctecl. He has proposed direct conversations with 
Austria, but would be perfectly ready to stand 
aside if idea of conference accepted 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



N". 



Name. 




Subject. 



1914. 

Sir M. i\o Buu^on ...i July 27 

(To«!ograpliic) 



57 I Sir R. Rodd 

(Tol^ographic) 



>s jsir F. Bertio 



50 



iTolegraphic) 



(iWgraplnc) 



('0 Sir E. Goschcu 

(To'.ographic) 



CI Sir M. do Bnnson ... 
1 (Telegraphic) 



c.n 



C4 



(15 



>](■> I 



(Tolograpliic) j 



Sir R. Rodd 

(Telogrn.phic) 



(Telegrapliifl 



Mr. CraekaiUliorpc.. 
(Telegraphic] 



(T(^lographio) 

7 [To Sir E. Go.sehon... 
(Telegraphic) 



G8 



(Telegraphic) 



Reports conversation between Russian Ambassador 
and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. Russia will be nnablc to localise 
war. Russia will restrain Scrvia as long as possible, 
in order to give time for a settlement. Russian Am- 
bassador urged that conversations should ho con- 
tinued at St. Pctersburgh ... 

27 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs" views as to eon- 
ferenco and suspension of hostilities. Possibility of 
Servia accepting Austrian note in its entirety on 
recommendation of four Powers ... 

28 Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E. 
Grey's observatioiis to Gorman Ambassador will 
tend towards peace ... 

Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His 
Majesty's Government. German Ambassador has 
informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria- 
Hungary would respect inlegrity of Servia, but gave 
no as.-iiuancc respecting her independence 

28 Refers to No. 43. German Secretary of State lias 
used similar language to French and Italian Ambas- 
sadors. Agrees witli his tuo colleagues in thinking 
that Gorman Govcrnniont object only to form of 
proposal respecting conference. Suggests Herr yon 
Jagow might himself be induced to suggest lines 
of co-operation 

Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Austria cannot 
delay proceedings against Scrvia, and would decline 
any negotiations on basis of Servian reply. Nothiiig 
could now prevent conflict 

28 Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, who says that war will bo declared 
to-day, and that no mediation could be accepted. 
Has appealed to him to place peace of Europe fust 
and quarrel with Servia second ... ... ... 

28 Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Aff'airs of 
substance of No. 27. He is telegraphing similar 
instructions to Berlin and Vieima 

Informs of conversation between Servian Charge 
d'Affaires and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Servia might still accept whole Austrian note if 
certain explanations were given her. Such explana- 
tions should be given to tin; Pov\-ers, who should 
then advise Servia to accept without conditions ... 

28 i Has urged greatest moderation on Servian Govein- 
I mcnt pending result of efforts for peaceful solution 

28 1 Declaration of v,ar by Austria-Hungary against 
Servia 

28 I Refers to No. 45. Proposed conference would not 
I be arbitration, but private and informal discussion 
to find a settlement. Agrees that direct con- 
versations betvveen St. Petcrsburgh and Vienna 
would be preferable 



28 



Ready to propose that German Secretary of State 
shoidd suggest method of mediation by four Powers. 
Will keep the idea in reserve till result of Austro- 
Russian conversations is seen 



.39 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Sa'iiject. 



t:9 [To Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



ComniunicatPcI by 
Count Bcnckoai- 

dorff 



71 



1914. 
July 28 



29 



Sir E. Goschon -..| 
iTclegraphic) i 



7"2 Sir G. Buchanan ...' 
(Tclegrapliic) ; 



73 S'ir M. do Bunseu ... 
(Telegraphic) 



74 



(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschcn 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



77 1 To Sir E. Gc6chen...i 
(Telegraphic) ! 



78 



Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) 



79 [Sir M. <le Bunsen ...j 
(Te'egrapliic) : 



28 



28 



28 



29 



29 



29 



29 



29 



Refers to No. 55. Expresses sati.sfaction at prospect of 
direct Austro-Russian conversations. Enquires fur- 
ther as to proposed action at Belgrade 

Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Pais- 
sian Government will amiounco partial mobilisation 
on the 29th July ; that Russian Ambassador at 
Vienna has not been recalled; and that mediation 
by His Majesty's Government is most urgent 

Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who ex- 
pressed anxiety to work in concert with England. 
Roa.sons for German refusal to support proposed con- 
ference. As Russia had mobilised, he could no 
longer urge moderation at Vienna. General opinion 
at Berlin that Russia is unprepared for war 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for Sir 
E. Grey's language to Gorman Ambassador (see 
No. 46). If Austria crossed Servian frontier Russia 
would mobilise. Has informed German Ambassador 
that Germany should use her influoicc at Vienna ... 

Informs of Austrian declaration c/f war against Servia 



Russian Ambassador states that Austio-Hungarian 
Government have declined Russian Government's 
suggestion of direct discussion between Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambas- 
sador at St. Potorsburgh. Russian Ambassador con- 
siders conference in London of less interested Powers 
the only solution 

Chancellor states it is too late to act on British sug- 
gestion that Servian roplj^ might form basis of dis- 
cussion. German Government had informed Aus- 
trian Government that they quite Huderstood that 
latter could not rest satisfied unless guaranteed that 
den)ands on Servia should be carried out in their 
entirety; Austrian Government had been advised 
to say openly that hostilities had that exclusive 
obj(;cfc 

German Secretary of State states that any appearance 
of pressing moderation on Austria would probably 
precipitate matters. His Excellency is troubled by 

• reports of military measures in Russia, and France 

Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates laiiguage of Chan- 
cellor, and will be very grateful if he can save the 
peace of Europe. This country will continue to make 
every ciTort in that direction 

Partial Ru.ssian mobilisation ordered. Has communi- 
cated .substance of No. 68 to Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. Mobilisation only directed against Austria. 
As Austria has definitely declined direct conversa- 
tions. Minister for Foreign Affairs will suggest to 
German Ambassador return to idea of conference. 
Views of Mini-ster for Foreign Affairs on Italian 
proposals (sec Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador 
says his Government are continuing to exert friendly 
influence at Vienna 

French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no steps 
can now bo taken to stop war with Servia. Italian 
.\nibassador thinks that Russia might remain quiet 
if Austro-Hungarian Government gave _ binding 
engagement to Europe not to acquire Servian terri- 
tory or destroy independence of Servia 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 




81 



83 



84 



85 



8G 



87 



Sir R. Rorlfl 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir R. Rodd ... 

(Telegraphic) 



Mr. Beaumont 

(Telegraphic) 



Mr. Crackenthorpe... 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir R. Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



1914. 
July 29 



29 



88 To Sir E. Goschen. 



29 



29 



29 



29 



29 



29 



29 



29 



29 



Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that 
German Secretary of State might propose formula, 
and that this might be concomitant with direct 
Austro-Russian conversations 

Understands that Austria will not accept any form 
of mediation between Austria and Servia. Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at Berlin 
and Vienna 

Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably 
beyond the sanjak and the punitive occupation _ of 
Servian territory. Expected assistance for Austrian 
army from Mussulman population in Servia 

Has been asked by Servian Prime Minister to convey 
his thanks for statement in the House of Commons 
on the 27th July 

German Ambassador states that Chancellor is endea- 
vouring to mediate between Austria and Russia. His 
Majesty's Government urge that Germany should 
suggest some method by which the four Powers 
could preserve the peace between Austria and Russia 

German Secretary of State offers that in return for 
British neutrality German Government would give 
every assurance that they would make no territorial 
acquisitions at the expense of France. He was 
unable to give similar assurance as regards French 
colonies. If neutrality of Holland were respected by 
Germany's adversaries, Germany would give_ assur- 
ances to do likewise. Operations of Germany in Bel- 
gium depend on action of France, but at end of war 
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not 
sided against Germany 

In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is passed for 
further discussions on basis of Servian note. _ His 
utmost hope is that Germany will influence Vienna 
to prevent or moderate any further Austrian 
demands on Servia ... ... 

Conversation with French Ambassador respecting 
policy of Plis Majesty's Government. Has told M. 
Cambon of intention to warn German Ambassador 
that His Majesty's Government will not necessarily 
stand aside if efforts for peace fail. On the other 
hand, the present case is different from that of 
Moiocco a few years back, and if France becomes 
involved His Majesty's Government, who are free 
from engagements, will have to decide on their 
attitude in the light of British interests 

Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro- 
Hungarian declaration of war having rendered direct 
conversation botw'oen Vienna and St. Potei-sbui-gh 
impossible, it is most important, in the event of 
German Chancellor failing in his efforts at media- 
tion, that Germany should propose some method 
of co-operation between the four Powers 

Has warned German Ambassador of possibility of 
British intervention in certain eventualities 

Has communicated to German Ambassador text of 
Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto (sec 
Nos. 64 and 81). Discussion of question of mediation 



TABLE OF CONTEXTS. 



XJX 




91 [To Sir M. de Bunscn i July 29 j Conversation with _ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, 

who attempted to justify attitude of his Government 
in spite of readiness of Powers to assist in obtaining 
satisfaction from Servia 



92 ,To Sir R. Rodd 



Communicated by ' 

Count Boncken- 

dorflt 



30 



9-1 I Sir M. de Bunsen ... 
(Telegraphic) 



95 



96 



(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



30 



97 'Sir G. Buchanan ... 
I (Telegraphic) 



98 



Sir E. Goschen ...I 
(Telegraphic) | 



30 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



30 



Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian Govern- 
ment suggest that German objections to mediation 
might be met by some change in procedure 

Commimicatcs telegraphic correspondence between 
himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
and Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (1) Austro- 
Hungarian Government have been ui-ged by 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna to be moderate 
towards Sei'via ; (2) negotiations with German 
Government thi'ough Russian Ambassador at 
Berlin ; (3) Austro-Hungarian Government decline 
direct conversations with Russian Government 

In present temper of Austria-Hungary, irrevocable 
steps may be taken unless Germany with the other 
three Powers can mediate at once. Russian Ambas- 
sador fears effect on Russian opinion if serious 
engagement takes place before agreement is reached. 
Reports interviews between the Russian and French 
Ambassadors and the German Amba.ssador 

Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia could 
not see Servia crushed, but would acquiesce in mea- 
sures that would safeguard Austria-Hungary's Slav 
provinces from further hostile propaganda. Extreme 
anti-Servian and anti-Russian sentiments of German 
Ambassador to whom text of Austro-Hungarian 
note vras probably known beforehand 

Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has 
informed Russian Ambassador that, as Russia 
had mobilised, Austria must do likewise. No threat 
meant. No objection to direct Austro-Hungarian 
conversations being continued at St. Petersburgh. 
Russian Ambassador more hopeful , 

German Ambassador has informed Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs that his Government would 
guarantee that Austria should respect Servian in- 
tegrity. Russia could not, however, agree to vas- 
salage of Servia to Austria. Formula of conditions 
subject to which Russia would stop military pre- 
parations 

German Government have asked Austrian Govern- 
ment whether they would accept mediation on ba.sis 
of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and 
issue of conditions from there. Could His Majesty's 
Government induce Russia to agree to above basis 
for an arrangement? German Secretary of State 
says that Russian mobilisation has increased diffi- 
teulties of situation. German Government have 
made no special military prejjarations 

Conver.^ation with President of the Republic regard- 
ing German communication to St. Petersburgh as 
to Russian mobilisation. Russia consents to demo- 
bilise subject to assurance from Austria to respect 
sovereignty of Servia and submit certain point,.< in 
the Austrian note to international discussion. Peace 
depended on attitude of His Majesty's Government. 
Pacific attitude of France. A British declaration to 
support France would prevent Germany going to 
war. Explained difficulty of such a declaration 



XX 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



No. 



Name. 



100 1 Sir R. 



Rofld 
(Telegraphic) 



101 jTo Sir E. Gosrhen... 
I (Tolographic) 



Date. 



1914 
JulyoO 



30 



Subject. 



102 



(Telegraphic) 



lO.S I To Sir G. Buchanan 
i (Telegraphic) 



104 !To Sir F. Berlie ... 
j (Telegraphic) 



•It : .Sir ft. Rarld 

' (Telegraphic) 



'07 Sir E. Go.9chen 

(Telegraphic 



10- 



iO:: 



(Telegraphic! 



(Telegraphic 



no To Sir G. Buchanan 

! (Telegraphic) 



30 



German Amba.ssador at Rome think.? Germany could 
prevent Austria frona making exorbitant demands 
if Sorvia would submit on occupation of Belgrade ... 

Replica to No. 85. His Majesty's Government cannot 
entertain German proposals to secure British neu- 
trality. For many reasons .such a bargain with Ger- 
many at the expense of France would bo a disgrace 
to CJreat Britain. His Majesty's Government cannot 
bargain away her obligations regarding Belgian 
neutrality. His Majesty's Government must pre- 
serve full freedom of action. Best way of main- 
tiiining good relations with Great Britain is for 
Germany to work Viith her for the preservation 
of peace 

Has ^^•arl)ed German Ambassador that Germany must 
not count on Groat Britain standing aside in all 
circumstances 

Gorman Ambassador states that German Govcinmcnt 
would advise Austria not to advance beyond Bel- 
grade and adjoining territories, whilst Powers urged 
Scrvia to ^ive satisfaction sufficient to placate 
Austria. Earnest hope that this may be agreed to. 
Suggests change in the formula proposed by Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (sue No. 97) in order 
to meet existing situation ... 

To inform Minister for Foreign .Affairs of telegram 
to Sir G. Buchanan (see No 103). Trusts that 
French Ambassador at St. Potersburgh will be able 
to induce Russian Govciinnenfc not to precipi- 
tate a crisis 

Conversation with French Am'oa.ssador respecting atti- 
tude of Great Britain in event of conflict between 
France anti Germany ; encloses copies of notes ex- 
changed with French Ambassador in 1912, and dis- 
cusses their scope. Cabinet to nioct to-morrow 

Austria has declined to continue direct convei-sations 
with Russia. Germany believed io be more dis- 
posed to give conciliatory advice at Vienna owing 
to likelihood of British support for Russia and 
France. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in 
favour of working with His Majesty's Government 
even if idea of discussions between four Powers 
is impossible 

Has asked German Secretary of State if ho can sug- 
gest any course of action. Latter replied that he' 
was in connuunication with Vienna to save time. 
ChancoUor was '"pressing the button" at Vienna 
to utmost of his power, and feared he hati perliaps 
gone too far ... 

Gcriiian CJhancellor states that owing to Russian 
mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. These 
proceedings had come just when the Czar had ap- 
pealed to the Emperor and when the latter was 
about to mediate at Vienna 

Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His 
Majesty's Government to his appeal for British 
neutrality (sec No. 101). Chancellor desires time 
ta reflect on it ... ... 

German Ambassador states that Austro-Russian con- 
ver-sations have been resumed at Vienna and St. 
Potersburgh. German .Ambassador lias asked that ! 
Russia should suspend militai-y preparations in mean- 
while. Has informed his Flxcellcncy that His j 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 




To Sir E. Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen' 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 

,, Sir E. Goschen... 

(Telegraphic) 

To Sir F. Villiers ... 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 
(Telegraphic) 



117 I Sir F. Bertie 

I (Telegraphic) 



118 ;Sir 'SI. do Biuisen ... 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



120 Sir G. Buchanan ... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goselien 

(Telegrapiiic) 



1914 



July 31 



31 



31 



31 



31 



31 



31 



31 



31 



31 



31 



Majesty's Government cannot ask Russia to do this 
unless Austria consents to limit advance of her troops 
into Servia. Expresses satisfaction at resumption of 
conversations 

If settlement cannot be reached by direct Austro- 
Russian conversations, suggests that four Powers 
should undertake to obtain full satisfaction of Aus- 
trian demands from Servia, provided hitter's 
sovereignty and integrity remain intact. Has in- 
formed German Ambassador that if Austria and Ger- 
many could bring forward any fair proposal, His 
Majesty's Government would support it strongly 
at Paris and St. Petersburgh 

German Government are about to pioclaim "Kriegs- 
gefahr," to be followed by immediate mobilisation. 
Germany preparing for all emergencies 

Russian' general mobilisation ordered, owing to 
Austro-Hungarian movements of troops against her. 
Germany also making military preparations. Russia 
cannot allow Germany to get a start ... 

Enquires whether Franco and Germany will eng;ige 
to respect neutrality of Belgium 



To inform Belgium Government of No. 114. Sir E. 
Grey assumes that Belgium will do her utmost to 
maintain her neutrality 

French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's 
Government cannot undertake definite pledge to 
intervene in war, but that situation will be recon- 
sidered in presence of any new development 

Informs of German ultimatum to Russia. Gorman 
Ambassador demands answer from French Govern- 
ment by 1 r.ii. to-morrow as to French attitude ... 

Under-Secretary of State says that mobilisation was 
not necossai"ily a hostile act. Austria-Hungary re- 
sents Ru.ssian intervention on behalf of Servia. Rus- 
sian Ambassador states that his Government have 
advised Servian compliance with Austrian demands 
so far as compatible with independence 

Has denied to French Amba.-sador that His Majesty's 
Government had given Gennan Government the 
impression that they would remain neutral. His 
Majesty's Government could not, however, at the 
present moment give France any pledge, though fur- 
ther developments might justify intervention 

New formula proposed by Russian Government. Rus- 
sian Government will maintain waiting attitude if 
Austria agrees to stop advance of her troops and 
to allow consideration by Great Powers of satisfac- 
tion to be given by Servia to Austria-Hungary with- 
out prejudice to her independence. Czar has under- 
taken that no Russian soldier will cress frontier 
so long as conversation with Austria continues 

German Government appreciate Sir E. Grey's efforts 
to maintain peace, but cannot consider any pro- 
po.sal pending Russian reply to ultimatum presented 
by Germany relating to Russian mobilisation 



xxu 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 




No. 



1-22 



1-23 



1 -n 



lib 



12G 



128 



12'.» 



130 



131 



i;{2 

lo!! 



134 



Sir E. Go?"hori 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Goschen. 



Sir F. Bertia 

(T<>leKraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



(Tclf-graphio) 



Sir M. de Bunson ... 
(Toilosraphic) 

Sir F. Villiera 

(Telegraphic) 



Lu.Komhurg Minister] 
of StatA I 



To Sir E Go.of^hftn... 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 

(Telegraphic) 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Teilegraphic) 



1914 
July 31 



Aug. 1 



July 31 



51 



Aug. 1 



Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 114. Secretary of 
State cannot reply to British request until he has 
consulted Emperor and Chancellor. He doubts, 
however, whether German Government can give 
any answer. German Government alleges commis- 
sion of hostile acts by Belgium 

Conversation with German Ambassador respecting the 
possible cft'ect on British public opinion of any 
violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Any pro- 
mise that His Majesty's Goverrmient should stand 
aside definitely refused 

German ultimatum to Russia. French Government 
anxious to know at once attitude of His Majesty's 
GovernnKiut 

Neutrality of Belgium (see No, 114). French Govorn- 
m<^nt .are resolved to n-spect neutrality of Belgium 
unless compelled to act othei-wise by reason of 
violation at the hands of another Power 

G»rnian Ambassador has been informed that French 
Gnvornmnnt fail to understand reason for German 
communii-ation respecting attitude of France in the 
event of a Russo-(^ermaa war (see No. 117) Ger- 
man Ambassador will see Minister for Foreign 
Affiiirs in the evening 

Mobilisation of Austrian army and fleet 



Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium ex- 
pects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality, 
which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her 
power ... 

Gorman Govoriiment hav« informed Luxemburg that 
the Gfrman mil>t.ary measures in that eountry 
do not constitute a hostile act. but are only to insure 
against attack from Franco 

British merchant ship.'» have been detained at Ham- 
burg To request imnif'diate release Points out 
deplorable effect on British public opinion if deten- 
tion continued ... 

Russian Government report rpadiness of Austria to 
discuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation 
not open lo objections raised in regard to original 
Russian formul.a (see No 971 Hopes that German 
Government may bo able to make use of Russian 
communication in order to avoid tension 

Russia consent.*" to British formula for basis of media- 
tion (seo No. 103) 

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian 
Government that Austro-Hungarian Government 
are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum 
to Servia. Riusian Government hope that these 
discussions will take place in London with partici- 
j pation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's 
I Government will assume direction of them ... 

I Conversation with President of Republic. German 
I Govcrii'Dent are trying to saddle Russia with the 
i responsibility for present situation. President jus- 
I tifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobi- 
I lising, so France must also. French troops are kept 
10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made 
! incursions into French territory. French Govern- 
1 ment do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war 



TABJ.E OF CONTKNTS. 




1914. 

Sir G. Buchanan Aug. 1 
(Telegraphic) 



13(] Sir F. Bertie ...| 

(Telegraphic) 

137 To Sir M. do Buiisen 

I (Telegraphic) 



13« jSir E. (Josrhra 

(Telegraphic) 



131' j Sir G. Buchanan 

I (Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 



HI I Sir M. <!<> Bunson ... 
I (Telegraphic) 



]-i2 ] Sir E. Goschcn 

! (Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 
(Telegraphic) 



Subject. 



Has received reliable information that Austria-Hun- 
gary has informed German Government that she 1 
would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation j 
betv.een Austria-Hungary and Servia. Militai-y 
action would continue against Servia for present, 
but Russian mobilisation and Austro-Hungarian 
counter measures would cease. He should inform | 
Minister for Foreign Affairs ... ... ... 09 

General mobilisation in France ordei'ed owiiig to Ger- 
man military measures. French troops have left a | 
zone of rO kilom. between them and the frontier . 



Auslro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance 
that Austrians v.'ill respect territorial integrity 
of Si?rvia, and will not occupj' sanjak. Austria has 
)iot "banged the door" on further conversations 
with Russia ... ... 

UoJiversation with German Secretary of State. Gci'- 
nian Government have ordered mobilisation. .Ab- 
sence of reply to German ultimatum musb bo re- 
garded as creating a state of war. Ru-sian Govern- 
ment will be so informed ... 

Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German 
and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar 
and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs saj's that 
Austrian domination of Servia would vitally affect 
Russia, and that ho is weary of his ceaseless efforts 
to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment and German preparations have forced Rus- 
sian Government to order mobilisation, and mobi- 
lisation of Germany has created desperate situation. 
M. Sazouof wotild adhere to fornuda contained in 
No. 120, if its acceptance could bo secured before 
the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia 
commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration 
in the Balkans 

French Minister for War has impressed on British 
military attache that only way of securing peace 
was for Great Britain to take military action. Mini.s- 
ter of War maintains tliat France has, by with- 
drawing from frontier, given proof of her desire to 
absti'.in from any provocative act ... 

Conversation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna 
respecting German ultimatum to Russia. His Ex- 
cellency thinks that German Government desired 
war from the first. Explains nature of Russian 
mobilisation, and says that Russia had no intention 
of attacking Austria. French Ambassador to speak 
earnestly to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Anxiety as to attitude of Great Britain 

General mobiiisation of Gerinau army and navy 



Uctention of Biitish steamers. German Secretary of \ 
State has promised to send orders to release steamers i 
without delay i 73 

German Secretary of State says that, owing to certain 
Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany 
and Russia are in a statu of v.ar 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 




Sir E. Gosohen 

(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Villiors 

(Telegraphic) 

Luxemburg Minister 
of State 

(Tclegra.phic) 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Goschen. .. 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 

Sir F. Villieirs 

(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



To Sir E. Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Villiers 

(Telegraphic] 



To Sir F. Villiers 



To Sir E. Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 

Communicated by 

Gorman Ambassa- 
dor 

(Telegraphic) 

Sir F. Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
Aug. 2 



Orders sent last night to allow British ships detained 
in Hamburg to proceed. This as a special favour 
to His Majesty's Government. Reason of detention 
was that mines were being laid and other pre- 
cautions taken 

Belgian Government confirms report that Gorman 
force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg 

Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory are 
manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand 
Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867. 
Protest has been made to the German representa- 
tives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary 
of State 

Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting 
protection by British fleet of French coasts or ship- 
ping subject to consent of Parliament. Question 
of despatch of British force to assist France. Effect 
of violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality ... 

Detention of British steamers. Sugar unloaded by 
force from British vessels at Hamburg and detained. 
Should inform Secretary of State that His INIaje.'^ty's 
Government trust that order already sent for release 
of British vessels covers also release of cargoes (see 
No. 143) 



Detention of British steamers, 
information available 



Refers to No. 149. No 



French Government have offered five army corps to 
Belgian Government. Belgian Government reply 
that whilst sincerely grateful they do not propose 
to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers, and will 
decide later on their action 

Communication of French Ambassador to effect that 
Italy does not consider casus fccdei-ia has arisen 

Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government have 
been informed that Gorman Government have pro- 
posed to Belgium fri(mdly neutrality entailing freo 
passage through Belgian territory, and of German 
threat in case of refusal. Belgian Government have 
declined offer. Should ask for immediate assurance 
from German Government that they will not pro- 
ceed with threat or violate Belgian territory 

Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In view of Belgian 
reply, German Government have threatened to carry 
out their proposals by force 

To inform Belgian Government that His Majesty's 
Government expect that they will resist attempt to 
infringe their neutrality. His Majesty's Govern- 
ment prepared to join with Russia and France in 
assisting Belgian Government to resist German 
aggression and to guarantee independence and in- 
tegrity in future years 

To demand immediate release of British ships 
detained in German ports ... ... ... 

Assurance that Germany will in no case annex Belgian 
territory. Germany forced to disregard Belgian 
neutrality owing to knowledge of French plans ... 



German troops have entered Belgian territory. Liege 
summoned to surrender 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



XXV 



Name. 



Date. 



Subjj.t. 



159 



160 



161 



To Sir E. Goech^n... 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Gosohcn 



Sir M. de Buusen ... 



1911. 
Aug. 4 



Sept. 1 



Belgian neutrality throatener] by Germany. Unless 
German Gnvernnient prepared to give assurance by 
12 midnight to respect neutrality of Belgium, His 
Majesty's Ambassador is to ask for passpurts and 
to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound 
to take all steps in their power to uphold thoir 
treaty obligations 

Reports lina! negotiations at Berlin. Records depar- 
ture from Berlui and journey to England 

Reviews negotiations with Austro-Hungarian Govorn- 
HK^nt at_ Vienna, and incidents upon rupture of 
diplomatic negotiations Reports departure from 
Vienna upon declaration of war 



77 



81 



Vxvi 

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE COR- 
RESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS. 



GREAT BRITAIN. 

Hccrctarij i>f :<t(itr for I'',)7rif/n A(fairs 
Permanent Under >'<crretfnj of Staf 

I'orcu/7i A (fairs 
French Anibasmdor ... 
Biisstian Ambass(!(Uir ... 



German Avihasnador ... 

A ustro- ILi ngaria n A m Oassailcr 

Behjian Minister 

Serinan 3Unister 



' for 



Sir Edward Grey. 

Sir A. Nicolson. 

Monsieur Paul Cambon. 

Couut Beuckendorff . 

Monsieur de Etter (^Counsellor 

I-jinbasgy). 
Prince Lichnowsky. 
Couut Mciisdorl'f. 
Count Lalaing. 
Monsieur Boschkovitcli. 



of 



FRANCE. 

Pns'i(1cntofthelt.ej)>ihlic- 

Fretiidcnt of the Council and Minisster for 

I' ore! f/n A /fairs 

Minister of Justice and Acting 3rinisferfor 

Foreign Affairs 
Sritish Ambassador ... 
Russian Ambassador ... 
German Amhassador ... 
Auitrian Amhassador... 



Monsieur Poincare. 

Monsieur Viviani. 

Monsieur Bienven u-Martin. 
Sic Francis Bertie. 
Monsieur Isvolsky. 
Baron von Sclioen. 
Count Scozsen, 



RUSSIA. 

Minisierfor Foreign Ajfairs 

British Amhassador ... 
French Amhas.uiddf ... 
German Amhassador ... 
Austro- Hungarian A vihassador 

GERMANY. 

Imjjerial Chancellor ... 
Secretary of State 
Under Seer eta rg (f St a fr, 
British Ambassador ... 



Bussian Ambassador ... 
French A m basso dor ... 
Austro- 1 Innga rian Ambassador 



Monsieur Sazonof. 
Sir George Buchanan. 
Monsieur Palrologue. 
Count Pourtales. 
Count Szapary. 



Dr. von Bethmann-Hollvveg. 

Ilerr von Jagow. 

Herr von Zinnnermann. 

Sir Edward Goschen. 

Sir Horace Kumbold {CounseJlor of 

Embassg). 
Monsieur Swerbsiev. 
Monsieur Jules Cambon, 
Count Szogycuy. 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Secretarg of State for l[ireign 
Under Secretaries of State 

Affairs 

British Ambassador ... 
Frvnch Ambassador ... 
Miissian A inbas ador ... 
German A mbassado r ... 

ITALY. 

M nisterfor Foreign Affairs... 
British Ambassador ... 

BELGIUM. 

British 3Iinisler 

SERYIA. 

Prime Minister 

British Minister , 

Austro-IIungaria n Minister 



Affairs ... Count Bercbtold. 
for Foreign | Baron Macchio. 
... 1 Couut Forgach 
.. Sir Maurice do Bunsen. 
... nionsieur Dumaiiie. 
... ISIonsicur Schebeko. 
... Herr von Tscbirscky. 



Marquis di ^an Giuliano. 
Sir Kennell Rodd. 



Sir Francis Villiers. 



Mon.-iieur Pasliitch. 

INIr. dcs Graz. 

Mr. Crackautliorpe {First Secretary'). 

Baron Giesl. 



PART L 

COPtEESPONDENCE LAID BEFOPE 
PAPLTAMENT. 



No. 1. 
Sir Edward Grc)/ to Sir H, Tiunibold, British Oharnc: d'J^I/air.j.i at Berlin. 

Sir, Yorcign Office, July 20, 1914. 

I ASKED the G Pima 11 Ambassador to-day if lie had any news of what 
was going on in Vienna witli regard to Servia. 

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some 
step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. 

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count 
Berchtold,* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had 
deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that 
it should be cleared up. 

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing 
if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. 

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do 
anything until they had first disclosed to the pTiblic their case against 
Servia, founded presumably upon what tliey had discovered at the trial. 

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act 
upon some case that would be knov. n. 

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel 
moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand 
within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce 
for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing tilings 
over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that 
any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable. 

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. 

I am, <tc., 

E. GREY. 
* Austro-Hungarian Miaibtci- for Foreign Affairs. 



No. 2. 

Sir H. Jiumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to 

Sir Edward Grey. — [Received July 22.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 1914. 

L:ST night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming 
Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the 
conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this 
step on Austria's part w^ould have been made ere this. He insisted that 
question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and 
that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between 
tliose two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the 
Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Govern- 
ment on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation 
with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro- 
Servian relations should be put on a proper footing. 

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude 
adopted towards Servia by Austria bad, in his opinion, been one of great 
forbearance. 



No. 3. 

Sir Edirard Grey to Sir M. de linnsen., Jiritish Ambassador at Vienna. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 23, 191 1. 

Count Mensdobfb'* told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow 
morning to let me have officially the communication that lie understood was 
being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then exi^lained privately what 
the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all 
be set out in the pajxT that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary 
to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the com- 
plicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia. 

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make 
any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me 
probably a matter on whirh I should not be able to make any comment at 
first sight. 

But, when Count MensdorfE told me that he supposed there would be 
something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an 
ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time- 
limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by 
giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement 
and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was 
no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that 
a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; tliat if the demands were 
made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian i)ublic opinion might 
be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian 
case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government 
would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply 
from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last 
resort, after other means had fieen tried and failed. 

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since 
the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her 
own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said 
in a note that she intonded to Uve on terms of good neighbourhood with 
Austria ; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation 
the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary 
for Austria to protect herself. 

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff 
had told mo this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful 
consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been 
expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but 
also by others, as to, what might happen, and it had been represented to me 
that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh 
should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had re])lied that the 
amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how 
reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that 
Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible 
consequeuco-i of the i)resent situation were terrible. If as many as four Great 
Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany — were 
engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so 
vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would 
be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and 
industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state 
of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in 
the war, many things might be completely swept away. 

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible con- 
sequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon 
Russia. 

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just 
as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, 
ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if 
there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance 
to discuss them directly with each other. 

* Austro-Hungariiin Ambassador in London. 



Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this -would be possible, but he was 
under the impression that the attitude in St. Petorsburgh had not been very 
favourable recently. I am, etc., 

E. GREY. 



No. 4, 

Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, 
Austrian Ambassador in Loudon. — [Communicated by Coiuit Menidorf, 
July 24, 1914.) 

(Translation.) 
The Austro-Hungarian Government 
felt compelled to address the following 
note to the Servian Government on 
the 23rd July, through the medium of 
the Austro-Hiingarian ^linister at Bcl- 
ijrade : — • 



Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
s'est vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de 
CO mois, par I'entremise du Ministre 
Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note 
suivante au Gouvernement Royal de 
Serbie : 

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de 
Serbie a Viennc a fait, d'ordre de son 
Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Im- 
perial et Royal la declaration sui- 
vante: — 

'■ ' La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a 
pas ete .ntteinte dans ses droits 
par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie- 
Herzegovine et qu'elle se confor- 
mera par consequent a telle de- 
cision que Ics Puissances prenclront 
par rapport a I'article 25 du Traite de 
Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des 
Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage 
des a present a abandonner I'a-ttitude 
de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle 
a observee a I'egard de I'annexion de- 
puis Tautomne dernier, et elle s'en- 
gage, en outre, a changer le cours de 
sa politique actuelle envers I'Autriche- 
Hongrie jiour vivre desormais avec 
cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon 
voisinage.' 

"Or, I'histoire des dernieres annees, 
ot notamment les evenements dou- 
loureux du 28 juin, ont demontre 
I'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement 
subversif dont le but est de detacher 
{\q la IMonarchie austro-hongroise cer- 
taincs parties de ses territoires. Ce 
mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les 
ycux du Gouvernement serine, est 
arrive a se manifester au dela du terri- 
toire du royaume par des actcs de ter- 
roisme, par une serie d'attentats et 
par des meurtres. 

" Le Gouvernement Royal scrbe, loin 
de satisfaire aux engagements formels 
contenus dans la declaration du 31 
mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour sui> 
primer ce mouvement : il a tolere 
I'activite criniinello des differentes 
societes et affiliations dirigees contre 
la Monarchic, le langage effrene dc la 
presse, la glorification des auteurs 
d'attentats, la participation d'officiers 
et dc fonctionnaires dans les agisse- 



"On the 31st March, 1909, the 
Servian Minister in Vienna, on the in- 
structions of the Servian Government, 
made the following declaration to the 
Imperial and Royal Government :— 

" ' Servia recognises that the fait 
accompli regarding Bosnia has not 
affected her rights, and consequently 
she will conform to the decisions that 
the Powers maj' take in conformity 
with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. 
In deference to the acjvice of the Great 
Powers, Servia undertakes to re- 
nounce from now onwards the attitude 
of protest and opposition which she 
has adopted v.ith regard to the annexa- 
tion since last autumn. She under- 
takes, moreover, to modify the direc- 
tion of her policj' with regard to 
Austria-Hungary and to live in future 
on good neighbourly terms with the 
latter.' 

" The history of recent years, and in 
particular the painful events of the 
2Sth June last, have shown the exist- 
ence of a subversive movement with 
the object of detaching a part of the 
territories of Austria-Hungary from 
the Monarchy. The movement, which 
had its birth under the eye of the 
Servian Government, has gone so far 
as to make itself manifest on both 
sides of the Servian frontier in the 
shape of acts of terrorism and a series 
of outrages and murders. 

"Far from cari-ying out the formal 
undertakings contained in the declara- 
tion of the 3lKt iVIarch, 1909, the 
Royal Servian Government has done 
nothing to repress these movements. 
It lias permitted the criminal machina- 
tions of various societies and associa- 
tions directed against the Monarchy, 
and has tolerated unrestrained lan- 
gxuxge on the part of the press, the 
glorification of the perpetrators ot 



ments subvorsifs, ime propa<2;ancle iiial- 
saino dans rinstruction piif>liquo, tolere 
enfin toiites les muiiifestations qui 
poiivaient induire la popidatiou serbe 
a la haine de la Aronarchic et au mepiis 
do ses itistitiitions. 



" C'otte tolerance coiipablo du Gou- 
vernement Royal do Serbie n'avait pas 
ccsse au niomoiit on Ic.s evenemonts du 
28 juin dcinior en ont demontre au 
nionde entier les consequences funestes. 

"II resulte des depositions et aveux 
des autcurs ciiminels de I'attentat du 
2-i juin que le mcuftre de Sarajevo a 
ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et 
explosifs dont les meurtriers se trou- 
vaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes 
par des officiers et fonctionnaircs 
serbes faisant partie de la ' Narodna 
Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en 
Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes 
a ete organise et efFectue par des chefs 
du service-frontiere serbe. 

"Les resultats mcntionnes de I'in- 
struction ne permettent pas au Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal de poiu-- 
suivre plus longtemps I'attitude de 
longanimite oxpectative qu'il avait 
observee pondant des annees vis-a-vis 
des agissements concentres a Belgrade 
eb propages de la sur les territoires de 
la Monarchie ; ces resultats lui ini- 
V)Osent au contraire le devoir de mettre 
fin a des menees qui torment une 
menace perpetuelle pour la tranquiliite 
de la iVIonarchie. 

"C'est pour atteindre ce but que le 
Goiivernement Imperial et Royal se 
voit oblige de demander au Gouverne- 
ment serbe I'enonciation officielle qu'il 
condamne la propagande dirigee contre 
la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est- 
a-dire 1' ensemble des tendances qui 
aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de 
li Monarchie des territoires qui en 
font partie, et qu'il s'engage a sup- 
primer, par tons les moyens, cette pro- 
pagande criminelle et terroriste. 

" Afin de donner un caractere solen- 
nel a cet engagement^ Ic Gouverne- 
ment Royal de Serbie fera publier a la 
premiere page du 'Journal officiel ' en 
date du 13/26 juillet I't-nonciation sui- 
vante : — 



outrages, and the participation of 
. officers and functionaries in subversive 
agitation. It has permitted an un- 
wholesome propaganda in public in- 
struction, in shortj it has permitted rll 
manifestations of a nature to incite 
tlie vServian population to hatred of the 
Monarchy and contempt of its institu- 
tions. 

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal 
Servian Government had not ceased at 
tlie moment when the events of the 
28th Jime last proved its fatal conse- 
quences to the whole v.orld. 

" It results from the depositions and 
confessions of the criminal perpetra- 
tors of the outrage of the 28th June 
that the Serajevo assassinations were 
planned in Belgrade ; that the arms 
and explosives with which the mur- 
derers were provided liad been given 
to them by Servian officers and func- 
tionaries belonging to the Narodna 
Odbrana ; and finally, that the passage 
into Bosnia of the criminals and their 
i'.rms was organised and effected by the 
chiefs of the Servian frontier service. 

" The above-mentioned results of the 
magisterial investigation do not permit 
the Austro-Ilungarian Government to 
pursue any longer the attitude of ex- 
pectant forbearance which they have 
maintained for years in face of the 
machinations hatched in Belgrade, and 
thence propagated in tlie territories ot 
the Monarcliy. The results, on the 
contrary, impose on them the duty of 
putting an end to the intrigues which 
form a perpetujil menace to the tran- 
quillity of the Monarchy. 

"To achieve this end the Imperial 
and Royal Government see themselves 
compelled to demand from the Royal 
Servian Government a formal assurance 
that they condemn this dangerous propa- 
ganda against the Monarchy ; in other 
words, the whole series of tendencies, 
the ultimate aim of which is to detach 
from the Monarchy territories belong- 
ing to it, and that they undertake to 
suppress by every means this criminal 
and terrorist propaganda. 

" In order to give a fornnil character 
to tliis undertaking the Royal Servian 
Government shall publish on the front 
page of their ' Official Journal ' of the 
13/2() July the following declaration :— 



" ' Le Gouvernement Royal de 
Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee 
contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire 
I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent 
en dernier lieu a detacher de la 
Monarchie austro-hongroise des terri- 
toires qui en font partie, et il deplore 



" ' The Royal Government of Servia 
condemn the propaganda directed 
against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the 
general tendency of which the final aim 
is to detach from the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy territories belonging 
to it, and they sincerely deplore tho 



Eincerement les conseqiicncos funcstcs 
dc cos agissonicnts crimiiicls. 

" ' Le Gouvcinement Royal regrette 
que dcs officiers et iouctionnaires 
serbes aient participe a, la propagande 
susmentionneo et compromis par la les 
relations de lion voisinage auqiiel le 
Goiivernoment Royal s'etait solcnnelle- 
ment engage par sa declaration du 31 
mars, 1909. 

" ' Le Gouvcrnemcnt Royal, qui des- 
approuvc et repudie tonte idee on ten- 
tative d'immixtion dans les destinees 
dos lialtitaiits de quelqne partie de 
rAutriche-Hongrie que ce soit, con- 
sidere de son devoir d'avertir fornielle- 
nient les officiers, les fonctionnaires et 
tonte la population dn royaiime que 
dorenavant il procedera avec la der- 
niere rigneur contre les personnes qui 
se rendraient coupables de parcils 
agisscments qu'il mettra tons ses efforts 
a prevenir et a reprimer.' 

" Cette enonciation sera portee simul- 
tanement a la connaissance de I'Armee 
Royale par nn ordre du jour de Sa 
Majeste le Roi et sera publiee dans le 
'Bulletin officiol ' de Tarmee. 

''Le Gouvernoment Roj'al serbe s'en- 
gage en outre : 

" 1° a supijrimer toute publication 
qui excite a la haine et au mepris de 
la Monarcliie et dont ia tendance 
generale est dirigee contre son inte- 
grite territoriale ; 

"2° a dissoudre immediatenient la 
societe dite ' Narodna Odbrana,' a con- 
Csquer tons ses moyens de propagande, 
et a procedcr de la menie maniere 
contre les autres societes et affiliations 
eu Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propa- 
gande contre la Monarcliie austro-lion- 
groise; le Gouvernement Royal pren- 
dra les mesnres necessaires pour que les 
societes dissoutes ne puissent pas con- 
tinuer leur activite sous un autre nom 
et sous unc autre forme; 

" 3° a eliminer sans delai de I'instruc- 
tion publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui 
concerne le corps enseignant que les 
moyens d'instruetion, tout ce qui sert 
on pourrait servir a fomenter la propa- 
gande contre FAutriclie-Hongrie ; 

"4° a eloigner du service militaire 
et de 1 'administration en general tons 
les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables 
de la propagande contre la jMonarcliie 
austro-hongroise et dont le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal se reserve de 
comniuniquer les noms et les faits au 
Gouvernement Royal ; 



fatal consequences of these criminal 
proceedings. 

" ' The Royal Government regret that 
Servian officers and functionaries parti- 
cipated in the above-mentioned propa- 
ganda and thus compromised the good 
neighbourly relations to Avhich the 
Royal Government were solemnly 
pledged bv their declaration of the 31st 
March, 1909. 

" ' The Royal Government, who dis- 
approve and repudiate all idea of inter- 
fering or attempting to interfere with 
the destinies of the inhabitants of any 
pnvt whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, 
consider it their duty formally to warn 
officers and functionaries, and the 
whole population of the kingdom, that 
henceforward they will proceed with 
the utmost rigour against persons who 
may be guilty of such machinations, 
which they will use all their efforts to 
anticipate and snpi^ress.' 

" This declaration shall simulta- 
neously be communicated to the Royal 
army as an order of the day by liis 
Majesty the King and shall be pub- 
lished in the ' Official Bulletin ' of the 
Army. 

" The Royal Servian Government 
further undertake : 

" 1. To suppress any publication 
which incites to hatred and contempt 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and the general tendency of which is 
directed against its territorial in- 
tegrity ; 

" 2. To dissolve immediately the 
society styled ' Narodna Odbrana,' to 
confiscate all its means of propaganda, 
and to proceed in the same manner 
against other societies and their 
branches in Servia which engage in 
propaganda against the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy. The Royal Govern- 
ment shall take the necessary measures 
to prevent the societies dissolved from 
continuing their activity under another 
name and form ; 

" 3. To eliminate without delay from 
public instruction in Servia, both as 
regards the teaching body and also as 
regards the methods of instruction, 
everything that serves, or might serve, 
to foment the propaganda against 
Austria-Hungary ; 

"4. To remove from the military 
service, and from the administration 
in general, all officers and function- 
aries guilty of propaganda against the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose 
names and deeds the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government reserve to them- 
selves the right of communicating to 
the Royal Government ; 



"5^ a accepter la collaboration en 
Scrbie des organcs du Gouvcriieuiont 
Imperial et Koyal dans la suppression 
du mouvcment suhversif dirigo contre 
I'intcgrite territoriale de la Monarchie; 

"6° a ouvrir luic enquete judiciaire 
contre les partisans du complot du 28 
juin se troiivant sur territoire serhe ; 

" des organes, delegues par le Gou- 
vcrnement Imperial ct Royal, pren- 
dront part aux rechorches y relatives ; 

" 7° a proceder d'urgence a I'arresta- 
tiou du Conunaiidant Voija Tankosic et 
(lu nonimc Milan diganovic, employe ile 
riitat serbe, compromis par les resul- 
tats de I'instruction de Sarajevo; 



"8° a empeclicr, par des mesures 
efficaces, le concours des autorites 
serbes dans le trafic illicito d'armes et 
d'explosifs a travers la frontiere ; 

"a liccncicr et punir severement les 
fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de 
Scbabatz et de Loznica coupables 
d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de 
Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage 
de la frontiere ; 

"9° a donner au Gouvernement Im- 
perial ot Royal des explications sur les 
propos injustifial)les de hauts fonction- 
naires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a 
I'etranger, qui, malgre leur position 
officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres I'atten- 
tat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des 
interviews d'une maniere bostile en- 
vers la iMonarchie austro-hongroise ; 
en fin 

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal de I'exe- 
cution des mesures comprises dans les 
points precedents. 

" Lc Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
attend la reponse du Gouvernement 
Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 
25 de ce mois, a 6 hcures du soir. 

" Un memoire conc'crnant les resul- 
tats de I'instruetion de Sarajevo a 
regard des fonctionnaires nientionnes 
aux points 7 et 8 est annexe a cette 
note." 

J'ai riionneur d'inviter votre Excel- 
lence de vouloir porter le contenu de 
cette note a la connaissance du Gou- 
vernement aupres duquel vous etes 
accredite, en accompagnant cette com- 
munication du commentaire que voici : 

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement 
Royal serbe a adresse a I'Autriche- 
Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est 
reproduit ci-dessus. 

Le lendemain memc de cette declara- 
tion la Serbie s'cst ongagec dans une 
politique tendant a inspirer des idees 



"5. To accept the collaboration in 
Scrvia of representatives of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government for the sup- 
pression of tlic subversive movement 
directed against the territorial in- 
tegrity of the Monarchy ; 

"(i. To take judicial proceedings 
against accessories to the plot of tho 
28tli Juno who are on Servian terri- 
tory ; delegates of the Anstro-Hun- 
garian Government will take part in 
the investigation relating thereto ; 

" 7. To proceed without delay to 
the arrest of Major A^oija Tankositcli 
and of the individual named Milan 
Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, 
who have been compromised by the 
results of the m.agisterial enquirj' at 
Serajevo ; 

"8. To prevent by efPective measures 
the co-operation of the Servian autho- 
rities in the illicit traffic in arms and 
ex[)losives across the frontier, to dis- 
miss and punish severely the officials 
of the frontier service at Schabatz and 
Lo/nica guilty of having assisted the 
perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by 
facilitating their passage across the 
frontier ; 

"9. To furnish the Imperial and 
Royal Government with explanations 
regai'ding tlie unjustifiable utterances 
of high Servian officials, both in Scrvia 
and abroad, who, notwithstanding 
their official position, liave not hesi- 
tated since the crime of the 28th June 
to express tliemselves in interviews in 
terms of hostility to the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government ; and, finally, 

" 10. To notify the Imperial and 
Royal Government without delay of 
the execution of the measures com- 
prised under the preceding heads. 

"The Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment expect tho reply of the Royal 
Government at the latest by 6 o'clock 
on Saturday evening, the 26th July. 

"A memorandum dealing witli the 
results of the magisterial enquiry at 
Serajevo with regard to the officials 
mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is 
attached to this note." 

I have the honour to request your 
Excellency to bring the contents of 
this note to the knowledge of tho 
(government to which you are 
accredited, accompanying your com- 
munication with the following o))ser- 
vations : — 

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal 
Servian Government addressed to 
Austria-Hungary the declaration of 
wliicli the text is reproduced above. 

On the very day after this declara- 
tion Servia embailced on a policy of 
instilling revolutionarv ideas into the 



subversives aiix ressortissants serbes do 
la Monarchie austro-hongroise et a i)re- 
parer ainsi la separation des torritoires 
austro - hongrois, limitroplios a la 
Serbie. 

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agi- 
tation criminelle. 

Des societes et affiliations no tar- 
derent pas a se former qui, soit ouver- 
tement, soit clandestinenient, etaient 
destinees a creer des desordres sur lo 
territoire austro-liongrois. Ces societes 
et affiliations comptent parmi leurs 
mcmbres des generaux et des diplo- 
mates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des 
juges, bref les sommites du mondo 
officiel et inofficiel du royaumo. 

Le journalisme serbe est presque en- 
tiercment an service de cetto propa- 
ganda dirigee contre rAiitricbe-Hon- 
grie, et pas un jour ne pas*e sans que 
les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent 
leurs lecteurs a la liaine et au mepris 
do la Monarchie voisine on a des atten- 
tats diriges plus on moins ouvortement 
contre sa surete et son integrite. 

Un grand nom'jre d'agents est appele 
a soutenir par tous les moyens I'agita- 
tion contre I'Autriche-HoHgrio et a cor- 
rorapro dans les provinces limitroplie.. 
la jeunesse do ces pays. 

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens 
serbes, esprit dont les annales du 
royaume portent les sanglantes eni- 
preintes, a subi une recrudescence de- 
puis la derniere crise balkanique; des 
individus ayant fait partie des bandcs 
jusque-la occupees en IMacedoine sont 
venus se mettre a la disposition de la 
propagande terroriste contre 1" Autriclie- 
Hongrie. 

En presence de cos agissemonts, 
auxquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est ex- 
posee dei^uis des annees, le Gotivorne- 
ment de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir 
prendre la moindrc mesure. C'est 
ainsi que lo Gouvernenient serbe a 
manque au devoir que lui imposait la 
declaration solennelle du 31 mars, 
1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en 
contradiction avec la volonte de 
1' Europe et avec rengagement qu'il 
avait pris vis-a-vis de I'Autriche- 
Hongrie. 

La longanimite du Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal a Togard de I'atti- 
tudo provocatrice do la Serbie etait 
inspiree du desinteressement territorial 
do la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de 
I'espoir quo lo Gouvernement serbe 
finirait tout de memo par apprecier a 
sa juste valour I'amitie do I'Autriche- 
Hongrie. En observant uno attitude 
bienveillante pour les interets poli- 
tiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal esperait que lo 



Serb suI)jocts of the Austro-Hungaria i 
MonarcJiy, and so preparing for tli • 
separation of the Austro-Hungaria \ 
territory on the Servian frontier. 

Sorvia became the centre of a 
criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the formation 
of societies and groups, whose object . 
either avowed or secret, was tl.^ 
creation of disorders on Anstro-Hun- 
garian territory. These societies and 
grou])s count among their member;^ 
generals and diplomatists, Governm.ent 
officials and judges — in short, men at 
the top of off.cial and unofficial society 
in the kingdom. 

Servian journalism is almost entirely 
at the service of this propaganda, 
which is directed against Austria-Hun- 
gary, and not a day passes without 
the organs of the Servian press stirring 
up their readers to hatred or contempt 
for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to 
outrages directed more or less openly 
against its security and integrity. 

A large number of agents arc era- 
ployed in carrying on by every means 
the agitation against Austria-Hungary 
and corrupting the youth in the fron- 
tier pro\'inces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis there 
has boon a recrudoscence of the spirit 
of conspiracy inherent in Servian 
politicians, which has left such san- 
guinary imprints on the history of the 
kingdom ; individuals belonging for- 
merly to bands employed in Macedonia 
have come to place themselves at the 
disposal of the terrorist propaganda 
a gain st Austria-Hunga ry . 

In the presence of tliese doings, to 
wiiich Austria-Hungary has been ex- 
posed for years, the Servian Govern- 
ment have not thought it incumbent 
on them to take the sliglitest step. 
The Servian Government have thus 
failed in the duty imposed on them by 
the solemn declaration of the 31st 
Marcli, 1909, and acted in opposition 
to the will of Europe and the under- 
taking given to Austria-Hungary. 

The patience of the Imperial and 
Royal Government in tlio face of the 
provocative attitude of Servia was in- 
spired by the territorial disinterested- 
ness of tlie Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy and the lio))e that the Servian 
Government would end in spite of 
everything by ajipreciating Austria- 
Hungary's friendship at its true value. 
By observing a benevolent attitude to- 
wards the political interests of Servia. 
the Imperial and Royal Government 



8 



royaimic so decidorait finalcment a 
siiivre de son cote une li}z;nc de con- 
duite analof^ue. L'Autrifho-Hongrio 
s'attendait surtout a une parcille evo- 
lution dans les idees politiques en 
Serbic, lorsqne, apres les evenements 
de I'annee 1912, le Gonvernement Im- 
perial ot Royal rendit possible, par une 
attitude desinteressee et sans rancune, 
lagrandissement si considerable de la 
tSerbie. 

Cette bienveillance manifestee ^par 
rAutriohc-Hongric a I'egard de I'Ktat 
voisin n'a cependant aucnnement mo- 
difie les precedes dn royaume, qui a 
continue a tolerer sur son territoire 
une propagande, dont les funestes con- 
sequences se sont manifestees au 
monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour 
ou I'heritier presomptif de la IMonarchie 
et son illustre epouse devinrent les vic- 
times d'un complot trame a Belgrade. 

En presence de cet etat de choses le 
Gonvernement Imperial et Royal a du 
se decider a entreprendre de nou- 
velles et pressantes demarches a Bel- 
grade afin d'amener le Gonvernement 
serbe a arreter le mouvement incen- 
diaire mena9ant la surete et I'integrite 
de la ]Monarchie austro-hongroise. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
est persuade qu'en entreprenant cette 
demarche il se trouve en ploin accord 
avec les sentiments de toutes les 
nations civilisees, qui ne sauraient ad- 
mettre que le regicide devint une arme 
dont on puisse se servir impunement 
dans la lutte politique, et que la 
paix europecnne fiat continuellement 
troublee par les agissements partant 
do Belgrade. 

Cest a I'appui de ce qui precede que 
le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal 
ticnt a la disposition du Gouvernement 
Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier 
elucidant les menees serbes et les rap- 
ports existant entre ces menees et le 
meurtre du 28 juin. 

Une communication identique est 
adressee aux reprcsentants Iniperiaux 
et Royanx aupres des autres Puis- 
sances signatairos. 

Vous etes autorise de laisser une 
copie de cette depeche entre les mains 
de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres. 

Vienne, h 24 juillct, 1914. 



hoped that the kingdoui would finally 
decide to follow an analogous line of 
conduct on its own side. In particu- 
lar, Austria-Hungary expected a de- 
velopment of this kind in the political 
ideas of Servia, when, after the events 
of 1912, the Imperial and Royal 
Government, by its .disinterested and 
ungrudging attitude, madq such a con- 
siderable aggrandisement of Servia 
possible. 

The benevolence which Austria-Hun- 
gary showed towards the neighbouring 
State had no restraining effect on the 
proceedings of the kingdom, which 
continued to tolerate on its territory 
a ])ropaganda of which the fatal con- 
sequences were demonstrated to the 
whole world on the 28th June last, 
when the Heir Presumptive to the 
Monarchy and his illustrious consort 
fell victims to a plot hatched at Bel- 
grade. 

In the presence of this state of 
things the Imperial and Royal 
Government have felt compelled to 
take new and urgent steps at Belgrade 
with a view to inducing the Servian 
Government to stop the incendiary 
movement that is threatening the 
security and integrity of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. 

The Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment are convinced that in taking this 
step they will find themselves in full 
agreement with the sentiments of all 
civilised nations, who cannot permit 
regicide to become a weapon that can 
be (nnployed with impunity in political 
strife, and the peace of Europe to be 
continually disturbed by movements 
emanating from Belgrade. 

In support of the above the Imperial 
and Royal Government hold at the 
disposal of the British Government a 
fl'issier elucidating the Servian in- 
trigues, and the connection between 
these intrigues and the murder of the 
28th June. 

An identical communication has been 
addressed to the Imperial and Royal 
representatives accredited to the other 
signatory Powers. 

You are authorised to leave a copy 
of this despatch in tlie liands of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 24, 1914. 



Annexe. 

L'instruction criminclle ouverte par 

le Tri1)ui)al de Sarajevo centre Gavrilo 

Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat 

et de complicite y relative — crime com- 



Annex. 

The criminal enquiry o))ened by the 

Court of Scrajevo against Gavrilo 

Princip and his accessories in and 

before the act of assassination com- 



9 



mis par eux le 28 juin dornier— a jus- 
qu'ici abouti aux constations hui- 
vantes : 

1°. Le coinplot ayant pour but 
d'assassiner, lors de son sejour a Sara- 
jevo, do I'Archiduc Francois-Ferdi- 
nand fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo 
Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic le 
nonime Milan Ciganovic' et Trifko 
Grai)ez, avec le concoiirs du comman- 
dant Voija Tankosic'. 

2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pis- 
tolets Browning avec munition, moyen- 
nant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont com- 
mis I'attentat, fiirent livres a Bel- 
grade a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez 
par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le 
commandant Voija Tankosic. 

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades ii 
la main provenant du depot d'armes do 
I'armee serbe a Kragujevac. 

4°. Ponr assurer la reussite de I'at- 
tentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, 
Cabrinovic et Grabez la maniere de se 
servir des grenades et donna, dans un 
foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, 
des lecons de tir avec pistolets Brown- 
ing a Princip et Grabez. 

5°. Pour rendre possible a Princip, 
Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la fron- 
tiere de Bosnie-Herzegovine et d'y in- 
troduire clandestinement leur contre- 
bande d'armes, un systeme de trans- 
port secret fut organise par Ciganovic. 

D'apres cette organisation Tintro- 
diiction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des 
malfaiteurs et de leurs amies fut 
operee par les capitaines-frontieres de 
Chabac ^Rade Popovic) et de Loznica 
ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj 
Grbic de Loznica avec le concours de 
divers particuliers. 



mitted by them on the 28th June last 
iia.s up to tlie present led to the loUow- 
ing conclusions: — 

1. The plot, having as its object the 
assassination of the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand at the time of his visit to 
Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by 
Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko O'abrinovic, 
one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko 
Graljez, with the astistance of Com- 
mander Voija Tankosic. 

2. The six bombs and the four 
Browning pLstols and ammunition 
witli which the guilty parties com- 
mitted the act were clelivered to 
Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez by 
the man Milan Ciganovic f.nd Com- 
mander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade. 

3. The bombs are hand-grenades 
coming from the arms depot of the 
Servian Army at Kragujevac. 

4. In order to ensure the success of 
the act, Ciganovic tanght Princip, 
Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the 
bombs, and gave lessons in firing 
Browning pistols to Princip and 
Grabez in a forest near the shooting 
ground at Topschider. 

'>. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, 
and Grabez to cross the frontier of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in 
their contraband of arms secretly, a 
secret system of transport was orga- 
nised 03' Ciganovic. 

By this arrangement the introduc- 
tion into Bosnia-Herzegovina of crimi- 
nals and their arms was effected by 
the officials controlling the frontiers at 
Chabac (P.ade Popovic) and Loznica, 
as Vi'ell as by the customs officer 
Rudivoj Grbic, of Loznica, Avith the 
assistance of various individuals. 



No. 5. 

tSir Edirard Grey to Sir J/, de Bvnsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.) Fore'yn Office, Juhj 24, 1914. 

Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reason-s 
leading up bo it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.-^ 

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it .seemed 
to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at 
that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder 
of the Archduke and some of tlie circumstances respecting Servia quoted in 
the note aroused sympathy v.-ith Austria, as was but natural, but at the same 
time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State 
a document of .so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly 
consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent .sovereignty if it 
were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be 
invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the 
frontiers of Servia. 

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern my.self 
with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of 
Europe. The merits of the dispute between A.ustria and Servia were not the 
concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above 
were not made in order to discuss those merits. 

* Aastro-Hungarian Ambassador in r^ondon. B 2 



10 

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views 
with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could bo 
done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. 

Count Mensdorff* replied that the present situation might never have 
arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke ; 
Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks 
had already elapsed since the murder ; a time liinit, said his Excellency, was 
essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part. 

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could 
have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian 
reply had been dictated by Austria, Avho had not been content to limit herself 
to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its 
presentation. 

* Austro-Hungarian Anib'asstulor in London. 



No. 6. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 8t. PetershunjJi, to Sir Edusard 
Grey. — [Received July 24.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Fetershunjh, July 24, 19U. 

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof* to the effect that 
the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him. 

His Excellency added that a reply within fortj^-eight hours was demanded, 
and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as 
Austrian step clearly meant that Avar was imminent. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provoca- 
tive and immoral ; she would never have taken such action unless Germany 
had first been consulted ; some of her demands were quite impossiljle of 
acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to 
proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. 

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all 
the obligations entailed b.y her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides 
supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. 

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies 
had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's 
Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of 
solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional 
engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. 
Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a Avar on behalf of that country 
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof 
replied that Ave must not forget that the general European question Avas 
involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great 
Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems noAV at issue. 

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from Avhat he said 
that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making 
a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in 
the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria 
nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite 
of our representations, Avas it the intention of the Russian Government forth- 
Avith to declare war on Austria? 

M. Sazonof" said that he himself thought tliat Russian mobilisation Avould 
at any rate have to be carried out ; but a council of Ministers Avas being held 
this afternoon to consider the Avhole question. A further council Avould be 
held, probably to-morroAV, at Avhich the Empercr Avould preside, Avhen a decision 
would be come to. 

I said that it seemed to me that the important point Avas to induce Austria 
to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence 
to bear on Austria Avith that end in view ; French Ambassador, hoAvever, 
thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she 
Avas bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting Avar Avas for 
us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there Avas time to 
carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable 
that Ave should knoAV just hoAv far Servia Avas prepared to go to meet the 

* Russian Minister for Foreign Aflairs. 



11 

demands foir.uilated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must 
iirst consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the 
Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia. 

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press nie for a 
declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French 
and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible 
that you might iierhaps be v.illing to make strong rei^resentations to both 
German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by 
Austria upon Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you 
might see your way to saying to them that such action on the i>art of Austria 
would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve Franco and 
Germany, and tbat it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if tho 
war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that wo would sooner or 
later be dragged into war if it did break out ; wo should have rendered war 
more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause Avith his country 
and with France ; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would 
express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria. 

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach 
France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as 
though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their uUiraatum. 

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even 
if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong 
stand. 



?^o. 7. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, Britislt Ambassador at Vienna, to >Sir Edward, 

Crfiy. — {Received Jidy 24.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, Jidij 24, 1914. 

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Aml)assador 
that any action taken by Au str ia to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia 
indifferent. 

"«?"Riissian Charge d'Affaires was received this morning by jNIinisler for 
Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note 
was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and 
that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign 
Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leavo Bel- 
grade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. to-morrov.-. 
His Excelloncy added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at 
stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the 
country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could bo 
raised by any Power. 



No. 8. 

Mr. CrackantJiorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Bihjradr, to 
Sir Edtcard Grey.' — {Received July 24.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914. 

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian 
Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see tbeir 
way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them. 

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, wlio returned 
early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clenrly 
very anxious as to developments tliat may arise. 



No. 9. 

jYote comtiiunicatid by German Ambassador, July 24, 1!'14. 

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning tJie 
circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive* 
and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the 
Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it enrploys to realise 
them. Tlie facts now made known must also do away M'ith the last doubts 



12 

thai the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards 
the detachment of tlie Southern Slav pi-ovinces I'rom the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found 
in L'elgrade, and is at work there v.ith at least the connivance of members 
of Government and army. 

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially 
marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the 
llosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching sell-restraint and 
moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic inter- 
Ference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria- 
ilungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good 
ronduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time 
has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of 
official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in 
(xtension and intensity ; to its account must be set the recent crime, the 
threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it 
v>ould not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of 
this movement on the other side of the trontier, by which the security and the 
integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circum- 
stances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, 
the attitude which public opinnm as well as the Government in Servia have 
recently adopted docs not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Govern- 
ment might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves 
io be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The 
Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon 
Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain 
the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong 
pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means 
having to be left to them. 

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the 
present case there is only question of a matter to he settled exclusively between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers onglit seriously to 
enleavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial 
Go'-ernment desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every 
interference of another Power would, ov>-ing to the different treaty obligations, 
he followed by incalculable consequences. 

No. 10. 
iSir Echrard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

Sir, For,'i^n Offir"., July 24, 1914. 

After teMing M. Canibon* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, 
which I hari received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count 
Mensdorfit upon it yesterday. 1 told M. Cambon that this afternoon I u-as to 
^ee the German Ambassador, who some days. ago had asked me privately to 
exorcise moderating influence m St. Petersburgh. 1 would say to the Ambas- 
sador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not 
lead to trouhle between Austria and Hussia. we nerd not concern ourselves about 
it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultinifitum, which it seemed to 
me that anx Power interested m Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, 
in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. 
I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating 
influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, 
wlio had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of 
peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 

M. Cambon said that, if there w;>s a chance of mediation by the four Powers, 
lie had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it ; but he 
pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russia had 
oypressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, 
Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept 

* French Aiiibussador in London. 

t Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 



13 

the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her publie opinion to 
take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, onco tho 
Austrians had attacked Servia, it would bo too late for any mediation. 

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg!! 
until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. 
I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, 
it would bo possiblQ for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, 
and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential 
for any chance of success for sucli a step that Germany should participate 
in it. 

M. Cambon said that it would be too lato after Austria had once moved 
against Servia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. 
Tlio best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany shoidd proposo 
it to the other Powers. 

I said that by this ho meant a mediation between Austria and Servia. 

Ho replied that it was so. 

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on tho 
subject. 

I am, iHic. 

E. GREY. 

No. 11. 
/Sir Edward Grcij to Sir H. Iiui/ibold, British Chimfa d' Affaires at Bf.rli)i. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German 
Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the Gei-man 
Government is making tho same communication to the Powers. 

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble 
betv/een Austria and Russia I had no concern with it ; I had heard nothing yet 
from St. Petersburg]!, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would 
take of tho situation. I reminded tho German Ambassador that some days 
ago ho had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour 
to exorcise moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in 
view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness 
of the time allowed, and tho wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt 
quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power 
could exercise influence alone. 

Tho only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being 
effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, 
should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour 
of mo:leration in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becom- 
ing threatening. 

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into 
Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should marcli to help 
Servia ; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military 
action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this 
direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at 
Vienna. You should inform Sexjretary of State. 

Prince Lichnowsky* said that Austria might be expected to move when tho 
time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of 
Austrian dem.ands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that 
a negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia ; a reply favourable 
on some points must- be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate 
action might be afforded to Austria. 

'•■" Gorman Aiijbassudor in Loiidiii. 



No. 12. 

tSir Edward G'ret/ to Mr. Crackaiitla.rpe^ Bri-i.-jh C/iayt' d' Affaires at 

Belgrade. 

(Telegraphic.) _ _ Forrirjn Office, July 24, 1914. 

Sehvia ought to piomise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however 
subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at 



14 

Serajovo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought 
to express concern and regret, For the rest, Servian Government must reply 
to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests. 

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit 
expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her de- 
mands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and 
replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows. 

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will 
express their views, but T cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than 
I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing Avhat 
is being said at Bel>j;rade by French and Russian Governments. You should 
therefore consult your French and Rnspian colleagues as to repeating what my 
views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government. 

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate 
railitarv action. 



No. 13. 

NoU coriiinuiticated hy Russian Ambassador. July 25. 

(Translation 1 



M. Sazonof telegraphic an Charge 
d'Affaires de Russic a Vienne en date 
du 11 ('24) juillct, 1914: 

"La communication du Gouverue- 
ment austro-hongrois aus Puissances 
le lendemain de la presentation de 
r ultimatum a Belgrade ne laisse aux 
Puissances qu'un delai tout a t'ait m- 
suffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il 
soit d'utile pour I'aplanissemt^nt des 
complications surgies. 

"Pour prevcnir les consequences in- 
calculables et egalement nefast^s pour 
toutes les Puissances qui peuvent 
suivre le mode d'action du Gouvprne- 
ment austro-hongrois, il nous parait 
indispensable qu'avant tout le delai 
donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit 
prolonge. L'Autriche-Hongm^, se de- 
elara^nt disposee a informer les Puis- 
sances des donnees de Tenquete sur 
lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal base ses accusations, devrait 
leur donner egalement le temps de s"en 
rendre compte. 

"En ce cas, si les Puissances se con- 
vainquaient du bien-fonde de cprtames 
des exigences autrichiennes, elles se 
trouveraient en mesure de faire par- 
venir au Gouvernement serbe des cou- 
seils en consequence. 

" Un ref us de prolonger le terme do 
r ultimatum priverait de toute portee 
la demarche du Gouvernement austro- 
hongrois aupres des Puissances et so 
trouverait en contradiction avec les 
bases meme des relations intcrna- 
tionales. 

"Le Prince Koudachef est charge de 
communiquer ce qui t)recede au Cabi- 
net de Vienne." 

M. Sazonof espere que le Gouverne- 
ment de Sa Majeste britannique ad- 



M. Sazonof telegraphs to the 
Russian <Miarge d Affaires at Vienna 
on the llth (24th Ti.ly, 1914- 

"The comumnieation made by 
Austria-Hungary to the Powers the 
day after the prpspntation of the 
ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period 
to the Powers which is quite insuffi- 
cient to enablo them to take any steps 
which might help to smooth away the 
difficulties that have arisen. 

"In order to prpvpnt the conse- 
quences, equally incalculable and fatal 
to all the Power*;, which may result 
from the course of action followed by 
the Anstro-Hunganan Government, it 
seems to us to be abovp all es.sent'al 
that the period allowed for the 
Servian r^pl.y .should be extended. 
Austi'ia-Hungary, having declan^d 
her rpadiness to inform the Powers of 
tlie results of the enquiry upon 
which the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment ba>;e their acr-usations. should 
equally nilow them sufficient time to 
study them. 

"In this case, if the Powers were 
convinced that certain of the Austrian 
demands were well founded, they 
would be in a position to offer advice 
to the Servian Government. 

"A refusal to prolong the term of 
the ultinntum would render nugatory 
the proposals made by the Austro- 
Hungarian Government to the Powers, 
and would be in contradiction to the 
very bases of international relations. 

" Prince Kiidachef is instructed to 
communicate the above to the Cabinet 
at Vienna." 

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic 
Majesty's Government will adhere to 



15 

hercra an point de vue expose, et il the point of view set forth above, and 

exprime I'espoir que Sir Edward Grey he trusts tliat Sir E. Grey will see his 

voudra bien munir I'Ambassadeur way to furnish similar instructions to 

d'Angleterre a Vienne d'instructions the British Ambassador at Vienna, 
con formes. 



No. 1-1. 

,Sir Echmrd Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to 
Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step 
taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a lUinarche with a time limit, 
and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit 
the Austro-Huiigarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and 
begin military preparations, not operations. 

In case Austro-Hnngarian Government have not given the same informa- 
tion at Paris (St. Petersburgh), yon should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs 
as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute. 



No. 15. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edicard Greij. — 
(P'ceived July 25.^ 
(Telegraphic.) Parh, July 25, 1914. 

I LEAKN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government 
have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government con- 
tained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Servian 
Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram 
to Belgrade of yesterday .t 

■■■ See No. 14. f Soo No. 12. 

No. 16. 

Sir F. Bertie, British A/nbassador at Paris, to Sir Edivard Gre)/. — 
{Received Jidy 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Pari&, July 25, 1914. 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that 
moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. He hopes 
that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be 
sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian 
Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia 
if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety. 



No. 17. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersbunjh, to Sir Edivardj 
Grey. — [Received Jidy 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Fcteisburoh, July 25, 1914. 

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated 
to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this 
afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassa- 
dor suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your 
telegram of yesterday to Belgrade. t 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the 
explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the 
information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the 
latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too 
late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening. 

The Minister for Foreign Affair.s said that Servia was quite ready to do as 
you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no inde- 
pendent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had 
been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a couversa- 

■' See No. 14. t See No. 12. 



16 

tion which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event 
of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon 
Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the 
same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour 
of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an 
international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which 
reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but 
to the Powers. 

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to 
stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, 
and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit 
the question to arbitration. 

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not i^recipitate war 
by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, 
his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she 
would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in 
reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status 
quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not 
believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by 
ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no 
war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we viould in the 
end be dragged into war. 

I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna 
to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, 
might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself 
Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany Avas 
convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. - 

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
arid warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content Avith 
mere niobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably 
declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow 
Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, 
and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of 
war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, 
but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as 
desperate. 



No. 18. 

Sir H. liuinhoJd, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

Your telegram of the 24th July* acted on. 

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning 
from German Am-bassador at London, he immediately instructed German 
Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency 
about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtoldt is at 
Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would 
be delay and difncnlty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State 
said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but 
he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give 
the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also 
admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro- 
Hungarian demands. 

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that 
Count Berciitold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told 
him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This 
step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. 
1 asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against 
Sei'via, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said 
he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I 
said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very 
reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He 

* See No. 11. t Austro-Hungarian Miiiistcr for Foreign Affairs. 



17 

said that he had given the Eussian Government to understand that last thinj? 
Germany Avanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to 
prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became 
threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four 
Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much 
to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, 
though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, 
he had in fact had no such knowledge. 

No. 19. 

/Sir K. Uocld, Brliish A/nbassador at Jio7iii:, to /Sir EdvKird Grey. — 

{Iieceivtd July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome. July 25, 1914. 

I SAW the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the 
suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna 
and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria 
and Servia become menacing. 

In his opinion Austria v.ill only be restrained by the unconditional accept- 
ance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information 
that Austria intends to seize tlie Salonica Railway. 

No. 20. 
f^'ir M. de Bunsen, British Amhass 'dor at Vifnna. to Sir Edward 
Grey. — [Received Jidy 25 ) 
(Telegraph-ic.) Vienna. Jtdy 25. 1914. 

Language of pre.ss this morning leaves the impression that the surrender 
of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced 
that the Austrian Minister is instructad to leave Belgrade with staff of legation 
failing unconditional acceptance of note at G p.m. to-day. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally 
to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes. 



No. 21. 

3fr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade^ to 
Sir Edivard Grey. — [Uectived July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Bplgradr. July 25, 1914. 

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian 
note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that 
it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a 
measure as is possible. 

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply: — 

The Servian Government consent to the publication oi a declaration in the 
"Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian 
Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of 
enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shov/n to be in 
accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute 
those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already 
arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to 
suppress the Narodna Odbraua. 

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government 
want war at any cost, they cannot but be content Avith the full satisfaction 
offered in the Servian reply. 



No. 22. 



Jlr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
Sir Edward Grey.— {Rceivtd July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade. July 25. 1914. 

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Con- 
stantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views. 

They have not yet received instructions from their Governm.ents, and in 



18 

;icw of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I 
Oavc up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government. 

I think it is hi{!;hly probable that the Russian Government have already 
uni;ed the utmost moderation on the Servian Government. 



iNo. 23. 
Jlr. Cra.ckdiif/torjie, JJritish Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
.bij- Edward Grey. — [lieceived Jidy 25.) 
(Teh grapliic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

The Austrian Minister left at C.30. 

The Govcn-nniLMit nave left for Nish, where the Skuptcliina- will meet on 
Llonday, I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is 
remaining in charge of the archives. 

■" The Seivian Parliaiiiont. 



No. 24. 
Sir Edicard (Jrey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 
St. Fetershurgh. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 2o, 1914. 

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude 
of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported 
in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the 
Government. 

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our 
going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the 
development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious 
to prevent it. 

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche 
makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria 
will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of 
peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian 
and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the 
four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg!! to try and arrange matters. 
If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves 
should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate. 

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia 
or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends 
of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential. 

■ Sec No. 6. 



No. 25. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rauihohl, British (Jhargc d' Affaires at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the 
Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit vvould be to break 
off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military 
operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it inter- 
liosed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which 
1 had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should noAV soon 
be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance 
of peace, if this did happen, Avould be for Germany, France, Russia, and 
ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to 
cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters 1)etween 
them . 

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign 
Oflfice saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had 
no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note 
to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. 
Prince Lichnowsky* said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation 

"' GcnnaTi Anibassutlor iu London. 



19 

lietut-en Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. 
Ho expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion. 

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to inter- 
vene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as 
between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we 
must all take a hand. 

I impressed upon the Amha&sador that, in the event of Russian and 
Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any 
diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Govern- 
ment were travelling at the moment, and 1 had had no time to consult them, 
and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the 
German Government agreed vvith my suggestion, to tell the French Govern- 
ment that I thought it the right thing to act upon it. 



No. 2G. 
S'ir Edicard Greu to Sir M. de Bimsen, British Ambassador at Viemm. 

(.Telegraphic.) Foreign Offire, July 25, 1914. 

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram 
which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with 
instructions to communicate it tc the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs: — 

"The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are 
prevented from, taking any steps to avert the complications which are 
threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government 
will prolong tlie time limit, and as the latter have declared their vrillim^ness 
to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on 
Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished 
in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they kiund that some 
of the Austrian requests were well foumded, they would be m a position to 
advise the Servian Government accordingly- If the Austrian Government were 
indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against 
international ethics, but they v.-ould deprive their communication to the 
Powers of any ijractical meaning." 

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian 
colleague. 

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna »as sent, it has 
been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were 
taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to 
military preparations, and not operations. I trust therefore, that if the 
Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit 
they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by 
Russia before taking any irretrievable ste])s'. 



No. 27. 
Sir Edward Or y to Sir F. Berfie. British Aiyihassador at Paris, Sir II. 
Eu'inbold, British C'han/e d,' Affair s at Btrhn, a7id Sir G Hnchanun, 
British. Ambassador at St. Fete7'sburgh. 

(Telegraphic.) Fore'gn Office, July 25. 1914. 

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian 
reply contained in Mr. Crackaiithorpe's telegram of to-dny." I have said that, 
if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope 
the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government 
to take a favourable view of it. 

• See No. 21. 



No. 28. 
[Nil.] 



20 

No. 29. 
Sir Juiicurd Grey to Sir R. Jiodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 
Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

The Italian Anibassailor came to see me to-day. I told liim in general terms 
\\liat I Jiad said to tlic (ierman Anibaissador tins morning. 

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of 
tlie fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. 

I am, itc. 

E. (iREY. 
• 

No. 30. 
Str Kdu-ard Ur'';i to Mr. Crac'canthurpe, British Chartje d' Affaires at 

Behjrad'i. 
Sir, Forc'gn Office, July 25, 1914. 

The Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson* 
ou the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary. 

He said that his (Jovernmeut were most anxions and disquieted. They 
were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so 
long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of 
the enquiry at Serajevo — an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and 
secrecy— disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or 
organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite 
ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction ; but if Austria trans- 
ported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, 
being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must 
abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit 
to such dictation. 

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian 
subjects — Bosniaks ; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian 
autliorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desn-ed to expel him, 
but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected 
him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual. 

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitcht his opinion on the 
whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though 
it was to l)e hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the 
Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 
* Biitif-h I'ndoi- Secretary of State for Foieign Affairs. 
t Servian Minister in Lo.udoii. 

■ No. 31. 
Sir M. de Jhins n, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edumrd Grey. — 

{Received July 26.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, Jxdy 25, 1914. 

Servi.^n reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satis- 
factory, and the Atistro-HungarJan ^Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought 
to be imminent. 



No. 32. 

Sir M. de Bans' /I, British Ambassador at Vizaua, to Sir Edicard Grey. — 

{Received, Jidy 2G.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep 
quiet during chastisement of Servia, v.-hich Austria-Hungary is resolved to 
inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory Avill be annexed 
by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government 
jnight not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred 
nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Avho could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure 
of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in 
Russia were over raid that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister 



21 

for Foreign Affairs would not, his ExcdJency thought, be so imprudent as to 
take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which 
Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian 
questions being brought into the m.elting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a 
condition for facing a war. 

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other 
Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. 
One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, 
if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, 
however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak efifectively 
in any other way to Servia. Servia vvas about to receive a lesson which she 
required ; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign 
countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over 
Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very 
well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. 

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday 
to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the 
Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I 
had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been 
niade by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically 
every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that 
Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that 
they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary 
by the fact that before making her offor she had ordered mobilisation and 
retirement of Government from Belgrade. 



Xo. 33. 

Sir H. Rumhold, British Charge (V Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edii-unl 
Grey. — [Rfceivfd Jidy 2G.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Jxihj 2G, 1914. 

Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that 
Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. 
They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excite- 
ment. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at 
St. Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory 
Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion 
that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territorv. 



No. 34. 

Sir H. Ruvibold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edv-ard 
Grey. — [lieceived July 26.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Juhj 2G, 1914. 

Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to m.e to say that German 
Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Huno-arian 
Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian replv 
if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.'* 
Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communi- 
cation to Austro-Hungai'ian Government implies that they associate themselves 
to a certain exten.t with your hope. German Government do not see their way 
to going beyond this. 

* See No. 21. 

No. 35. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Eda-ard Grey. 

{^Received Jtdy 26.) 
(Telegraphic.) ^ Rome, -July 26, 1914. 

^Minister for Foreign Affairs v.-elcomes your proposal for a conference and 
will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly. 

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian (Government this evenino- tliat 
Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply dechrration 
of war. 



22 

No. 36. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. 
Rumbold, British CJuirge d' Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British 
Ambassador at Rome. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Oificc, July 26, 1914. 

Would IVIiiiister for Foreign Affairs be dispor-cd to instrnct Ambassador here 
to join with ropi-esentatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet 
here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which 
would prevent complic.-itions? Yon should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs 
whether he would do this. If so, avIk^ii bringing the above suggestion to the 
notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at 
Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh shonld be autliorised to request that all 
active military operations should be suspended jiending results of conference. 



No. 37. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. 

Berlin telegram of 25th July.* 

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four 
Powers if necessary. 

* Sec No. . 18. 



No. 38. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rovie, to Sir Edirard Grey. — 

[Received Jidy 27.) 

Sir^ Ttome, Jxily 23, 1914. 

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the 
terms of the communication wliich will be addressed to Servia. Secretary- 
General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the 
view that tlie gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after 
the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, 
to score a definite success. 

I have, &c. 

PENNELL PODD. 



No. 39. 

Reply of Servian Government to Austro- Hungarian Xote. — {C'oiiirnunicated 

by the Servian Minister, July 27.) 

(Translation.) 
Le Gouvcrnement Royal serbe a The Royal Servian Government 

recu la communication dn Gouverne- have received tlie communication of 
ment Imperial et Royal du *10 de ce the Imperial and Royal Government 
mois ct il est persuade que sa reponse of the 10th instant,* and are con- 
eloignera tout malentcndu qui menace vinced that their reply will remove 
de gater les bons rapports de voisinage any misunder.standing which may 
cntre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et threaten to impair the good neigh- 
le Royaume de Serbie. hourly relations between the Austro- 

Hungarian Monarchy and the King- 
dom of Servia. 
Le Gouvcrnement Royal conscient Conscious of the fact that the pro- 

que les protestations qui out apparu tests which were made both from tlie 
tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina tribune of the national Skuptchinat 
nationale que dans les declarations ct and in the declarations and actions of 
les actes des representants respon- the responsible representatives of the 
sables de I'fitat, protestations qui State — protests which were cut short 
furent coupees court par les declara- by the declarations made by the 
tions du GouvermMnent serbe, faites le Servian Government on the 18th* 
*18 mars, 1909, no se sont plus renou- March, 1909— have not been renewed 
* Old style. t The Servian Parliament. 



23 



velees vis-a-vis de la grande Monarchie 
voisine en aucuue occasion et que, de- 
puis ce temps, autant do la part des 
Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont 
succede que de la part de leurs or- 
gaiies, aucune tentative n'a ete faite 
dans Ic but do changer I'etat de cliosos 
politique et juridique cree en Bosnie et 
Herzegovine, le Gouvernement Royal 
constate que sous ce rapport le Gou- 
vernemont Imperial et Royal n'a fait 
aucune representation, sauf en ce qui 
concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet 
de laquelle le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal a recu une explication en- 
tierement satisfaisante. La Serbie a 
de nombreuses fois donne des preuves 
de sa politique pacifique et moderee 
pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, 
et c'est grace a la Serbie et au sacrifice 
qu'elle a fait dans I'interet cxclusif do 
la paix europeenne que cette paix a 
ete preservee. Le Gouvernement Royal 
no i^eut f)as etre rendu responsabla 
pour les manifestations d'un caractere 
prive, tclles quo les articles des jour- 
naux et le travail paisible des societes, 
manifestations qui se produisent dans 
presque tous les pays conmie line chose 
ordinaire et qui echappent, en regie 
generale, au controle officiel, d'autant 
moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors 
de la solution de toutc une serie de 
questions qui se sont jDresentecs entre 
la Serbie et I'Autriche-Hongrie, a 
montre une grande prevenance et a re- 
ussi, de cette facon, a en regler le plus 
grand nombre au profit du progres des 
deux pays voisins. 

C'est po\n-quoi le Gouvernement 
Royal a ete peniblement surpris par les 
affirmations, d'apres lesquelles des per- 
sonnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient 
participe a la preparation de I'attentat 
commis a Sarajevo; il s'attendait a ce 
qu'il soit invite a collaborer a la re- 
cherche de tout ce qui se rapporte a ce 
crime, et il etait pret, pour jirouver 
son cntiere correction, a agir contre 
toutes les personnes a I'egard des- 
quelles des communications lui seraient 
faites, se rendant done au desir du 
Gouvernement luiperial et Royal, est 
dispose a remettre au Tribunal tout 
sujet serbe, sans egard a sa situation 
et a son rang, pour la complicite du- 
quel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des 
preuves lui seraient fournies, et spe- 
cialcment, il s'engage a faire publier a 
la premiere page du "Journal officiel " 
en date du 13 (26) juillet, I'enonciation 
suivante : 



■'Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie 



on any occasion as regards the great 
neighbouring Monarchy, and tliat no 
attempt has been made since that 
time, either by tlie successive Royal 
Governments or by tlieir organs, to 
change the political and legal state of 
affairs created in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, tiie Royal Government draw 
attention to the fact that in this con- 
nection the Imperial and Royal 
Government have made no representa- 
tion except one concerning a school- 
book, and that on that occasion the 
Imperial and Royal Government re- 
ceived an entirely satisfactory explana- 
tion. Servia has several times given 
proofs of her pacific and moderate 
policy during the Balkan crisis, and it 
is thanks to Servia and to tlie sacrifice 
that she has made in the exclusive 
interest of European peace that that 
peace has been preserved. Tlie Royal 
Government cannot be lield responsible 
for manifestations of a private charac- 
ter, such as articles in the press and 
the peaceable work of societies — mani- 
festations which take place in nearly 
all countries in the ordinarj^ course of 
events, and which, as a general rule, 
escape official control. The Royal 
Government are all the less resj^on- 
sible, in view of the fact that at the 
time of the solution of a series of ques- 
tions which arose between Servia and 
Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a 
great readiness to oblige, and thus 
succeeded in settling the majority of 
these questions to the advantage of 
the two neiglibourijig countries. 

For these reasons the Royal Govern- 
ment have been pained and surprised 
at tlie statements, according to which 
members of the Kingdom of Servia are 
supposed to have participated in the 
preparations for the crime committed 
at Serajevo ; tlie Royal Government 
expected to be invited to collaborate in 
an investigation of all that concerns 
this crime, and they were ready, in 
order to prove the entire correctness 
of their attitude, to take measures 
against any persons concerning wliom 
representations were made to them. 
Falling in, therefore, with tiie desire 
of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment, they ai-e i^repared to hand over 
for trial any Servian subject, witliout 
regard to his situation or rank, of 
wliose complicity in the crime of Sera- 
jevo proofs are forthcoming, and more 
especially they undertake to cause to 
be published on the first page of the 
"Journal officiel," on the date of the 
13th (2Gth) July, the following declara- 
tion : — 

"The Royal Government of Servia 



2i 



condamno toiite propagande qui serait 
dirigee centre 1' Autriche-Hongrie, c'est- 
a-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui 
aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la 
Monarchic austro-hongroise des terri- 
toires qui en font partie, et il deplore 
sincerement les consequences funestes 
de ces agissements criminels. Le Gou- 
vernement Royal regrette que certains 
officiers en fonctionnaires serbes aient 
participe, d'apres la communication du 
Gouvcrnement Royal et Imperial, a la 
propagande susmentionnee, et compro- 
mis par la les relations de bon voisi- 
nage auxquelles le Gouvernement 
Royal serbe etait solennellement en- 
gage par sa declaration du 31 mars, 
1909,* qui desapprouve et repudie 
toute idee on tentative d'une immix- 
tion dans les destinees des habitants de 
quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie 
que se soit, considere de son devoir 
d'avertir formellement les officiers et 
fonctionnaires et toute la population 
du royaume que, dorenavant il proce- 
dera avec la derniere rigueur centre les 
personnes qui se rendraient coupables 
de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra 
tous scs efforts a prevenir et a re- 
primer." 

Cette enonciation sera portee a la 
connaissance de I'armee Royale par un 
ordre du jour, an nom de Sa Majeste 
I'l Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le 
Prince heritier Alexandre, et seia 
publie dans le prochain bulletin officiel 
de I'armee. 

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en 
outre : 

1. D'introduire dans la premiere con- 
vocation reguliere de la Skoupchtinat 
une disposition dans la loi de la presse, 
par laquello sera punie de la maniere 
la plus severe la provocation a la haine 
et au mepris de la jNlonarchie austro- 
hongroise, ainsi quo contre toute publi- 
cation dont la tendance generale serait 
dirigee contre I'integrite territoriale de 
I'Autriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors 
de la reA'ision de la Constitution, qui 
est prochaine, a faire introduire dans 
I'article 22 de la Constitution un 
amendement de telle sorte que les 
publications ci-dcssus puissent etre 
confisquecs, ce qui actuellement aux 
termes categoriques de Particle 22 de 
la Constitution est impossible. 

2. Le Gouvernement ne possede au- 
cune preuve et la note du Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal ne lui en four- 
nit non plus aucune que la societo 



condemn all propaganda which may bo 
directed against Austria-Hungary, 
that is to say, all such tendencies as 
aim at ultimately detaching from the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy terri- 
tories which form part thereof, and 
they sincerely deplore the baneful 
consequences of these criminal move- 
ments. The Royal Government regret 
that, according to the communication 
from the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment, cei'tain Servian officers and 
officials should have taken part in the 
above-mentioned propaganda, and thus 
compromised the good neighbourly re- 
lations to which the Royal Servian 
Government was solemnly engaged by 
the declaration of the 31st March, 
1909,* which declaration disapproves 
and repudiates all idea or attempt at 
interference with the destiny of the 
inhabitants of any part whatsoever of 
Austria-Hungary, and they consider it 
their duty formally to warn the 
officers, officials, and entire population 
of the kingdom that henceforth they 
will take the most rigorous steps 
against all such persons as are guilty of 
such acts, to prevent and to repress 
which they will use their utmost 
endeavour." 

This declaration will be brought to 
the knowledge of the Royal Army in 
an order of the day, in the name of 
His Majesty the King, by his Royal 
Highness the Crown Prince Alex- 
ander, and will be published in the 
next official army bulletin. 

The Royal Government further 
undertake : — 

1. To introduce at the first regular 
convocation of the Skuptchinat a 
provision into the press law providing 
for the most severe punishment of in- 
citement to hatred or contempt of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for 
taking action against any publication 
the general tendency of which is 
directed against the territorial in- 
tegrity of Austria-Hungary. The 
Government engage at the approacli- 
ing revision of the Constitution to 
cause an amendment to be introduced 
into article 22 of the Constitution of 
such a nature that such publication 
may be confiscated, a proceeding at 
present impossible under the categori- 
cal terms of article 22 of the Constitu- 
tion. 

2. The Government possess no 
proof, nor does the note of tlie Im- 
perial and Royal Government furnish 
them with any, that the " Narodna 



New style. 



t The Servian Parliament. 



25 



"Narodna Oclijrana " et antres societes 
similaires aient conimis, jnsqn'a oe jour 
qiielques act.es- criminels de ce genre, 
par le fait d'un de leurs membres. 
Neanmoins, le Gonvernement Royal 
acceptera la demande dn Gonverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal et dissondra 
la societe "Narodna Odl)rana " et tonte 
autre societe qui a,<i;irait contre 
I'Aiitriche-Hongriei 

3. Le Goiivernement R«yal serbe 
s'engage a eliminer sans delais de I'in- 
struction pnbliqne en Serbie tout ce 
qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter 
la propagande contre rAutriclie-Hon- 
grie, quand le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal lui foiu-nira des faits et des 
preuves de cette propagande. 

4. Le Gouveinement Royal accepte 
de meme a eloigner du service mili- 
taire ccux pour qiii I'enquete judi- 
ciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont coupables 
d'actes diriges contre I'integrite du 
territoire de la Monarcliie austro-lion- 
groise, et il atteu-d que le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial et Royal lui com- 
munique ulterieurement les noms et les 
faits de ces officiers et fonctionn aires 
aux fins de la procedure qui doit s"en- 
suivre. 

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit 
avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement 
compte du sens et de la portee de la 
demande du Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal que la Serl)ie s'engage a accepter 
sur son territoire la collaboration des 
organes du Gouvernement Imi:)erial et 
Royal, mais il declare qu'il admettra la 
collaboration qui repondrait aux prin- 
cipes du droit international et a la 
procedure criminelle ainsi qu'aux Itons 
rapports de voisinage. 

G. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va 
de soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir 
une enquetc conti'c tons ceux qui sont 
ou qui, eventuellement, auraient ete 
meles au complot du 15" juin, et qui 
se trouveraient sur le territoire du 
royaume. Quant a la participation a 
cette enquetc des agents ou autorites 
austi'o-liongrois qui seraient delegues a 
cct clfet par le GouA'ernement Imperial 
et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne 
pent pas I'accepter, car ce serait une 
violation de la Constitution et de !a loi 
sur la procedure criminelle ; cependant 
dans des cas concrets des communica- 
tions sur les resultats de I'instruction 



Odbrana '' and other similar societies 
have committed up to the present any 
criminal act of this nature through the 
proceedings of any of their members. 
Nevertheless, the Royal Government 
will accept tiie demand of the Imperial 
and Royal Government, and will dis- 
solve the " Narodna Odbrana '' Society 
and every other society wliicli may be 
directing its efforts against Austria- 
Hungary. 

3. The Royal Servian Government 
undertake to remove without delay 
from their public educational estab- 
lishments in Servia all that serves or 
could .serve to foment propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary, wlienever 
the Imperial and Royal Government 
furnish them with facts and proofs of 
this propaganda. 

4. The Royal Government also 
agree to remove from military service 
all such persons as the judicial enquiry 
may have proved to be guilty of acts 
directed against the integrity of the 
territory of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, and they expect the Im- 
])erial and Royal Government to com- 
municate to them at a later date the 
names and the acts of these officers 
and officials for the purposes of the 
proceedings which are to be taken 
against them. 

•J. The Royal (Government must 
confess that they do not clearly grasp 
the meaning or the scope of the de- 
mand made by the Imperial and Royal 
Government that Servia shall under- 
take to accept the collaboration of the 
organs of the Imperial and Royal 
Government upon their territorj-, but 
they declare that they will admit such 
collaboration as agrees Avith the prin- 
ciple of international law, with crimi- 
nal procedure, and with good neigh- 
bourly relations. 

6. It goes without saying that the 
Royal Government consider it their 
duty to open an enquiry against all 
such persons as are, or eventually may 
be, implicated in the plot of the loth* 
June, and who happen to be within the 
territory of the kingdom. As regards 
the participation in this enquiry of 
Austro-Hungarian agents or authori- 
ties appointed for this purpose by the 
Imperial and Royal Government, the 
Royal Government cannot accept such 
an arrangement, as it would be a viola- 
tion of the Constitution and of the 
law of criminal procedure ; neverthe- 
less, in concrete cases communications 



* Old .slvlo. 



26 



en question pourraient etro dennees 
aux agents aiistro-liongrois. 

7. Le Gouvernemcnt Royal a fait 
proceder, des le soir meme do la remise 
de lii note, a ranestation dn Com- 
mandant Voislav Tankossitch. Quant 
a Milan Zigaiiovitch, qui est sujet de 
la Monarchie aiistro-liongroise et qui 
jusqu'au 15* jiiin etait employe 
(conime aspirant) a la direction des 
chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore 
etre arrete. 

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est 
prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme ac~ 
coutumee, faire connaitre le plus tot 
possible, les presomptions de culpa bilite 
ainsi que les preures eventnellevS de 
leur culpabilito qui ont ete recueillies 
jusqu'a ce jour par I'enquete a Sara- 
jevo, aux fins d'enquete ulterieure. 

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renfor- 
cera et etendra Ics masures prises pour 
cmpecher le trafie illicite d'armes et 
d'explosifs a travers la frontiere, II 
va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une 
enquete et punira sevei-ement les fonc- 
tionnaires des frontieres sur la ligne 
Scbabatz-Loznitza qui ont manque a 
leurs devoirs et laisse passer les au- 
teurs du crime de Sarajevo. 

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera 
volontiers des explications sur les 
propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en 
Serbie qu'a I'etranger, ont eu apres 
I'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, 
d'apres raffirmation du Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal, ont ete bostiles 
envers la Monarchie, des que le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal lui aura 
communique les passages en question do 
ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre 
que les propos employes ont, en effet, 
ete tonus par lesdits fonctionnaires, 
quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui- 
meme aura soin de recueiUir des 
preuves et convictions. 

10. Le Gouvernement Royal infor- 
mera le Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal de I'execution des mesures com- 
prises dans les points precedents on 
tant que cela n'a pas ete deja fait par 
la presente note, aussitot que cbaque 
mesure aura ete ordonnce et execut»e. 

Dans le eas oii le Gouvernement Im- 
perial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait 
de cottc reponse, le Gouvernement 
serbe, considerant qu'il est de Tin- 
teret commun do ne pas precipiter la 
solution de cette question, est pret 
comme toujours d'accepter une en- 



as to the results of the investigation 
in question might be given to the 
Austro-Hungarian agents. 

7. The Royal Government pro- 
ceeded, on the very evening of the 
delivery of the note, to airest Com- 
mandant Voislav Tankossitch. As re- 
gards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a 
subject of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and who up to the loth* 
June was employed (on probation) by 
the directorate of railways, it lias not 
yet been possible to aiu'est him. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government 
are requested to be so gootl as to 
supply as soon as possible, in the cus- 
tomary form, the presumptive evi- 
dence of guilt, as well as the eventual 
proofs of guilt which have been col- 
lected up to the i^resent, at the enquiry 
at Serajevo for the purposes of the 
later enquiry. 

8. The Servian Government will 
reinforce and extend the measures 
which have been taken for preventing 
the illicit traffic of arms and explosives 
across the frontier. It goes without 
saying that they will immediately 
order an enquiry and will severely 
punish the frontier officials on the 
Scbabatz-Loznitza line who have failed 
in their duty and allowed the authors 
of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Royal Government will 
gladly give explanations of the re- 
marks made by thmr officials, whether 
in Servia or abroad, in interviews 
after the crime which according to 
the statement of the Imperial and 
Royal Government were hostile to- 
wards the Monarchy, as soon as the 
Imperial and Royal Government have 
communicated to them the passages in 
question in these remarks, and as soon 
as thej' have shown that the remarks 
were actually made by the said officials, 
although the Royal Government will 
itself take steps to collect evidence 
and proofs. 

10. The Royal Government will in- 
form the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment of the execution of the measures 
comprised under the above heads, in 
so far as this has cot already been 
done by the present note, as soon as 
each measure has been ordered and 
can-ied out. 

If the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment are not satisfied with this reply, 
the Servian Government, considering 
that it is not to the commmi interest to 
precipitate the solution of this ques- 
tion, are ready, as always, to accept a 
pacific understanding, either by refer- 



* Old Stylo. 



27 

tente pacifiqiie, soit en remettaut cette ring tliis question to the decision of 

question a la decision du Tribunal in- the International Tribunal oi The 

ternational de La Haye, soit aux Hague, or to the (Jreat Powers which 

Grandes Puissances qui ont pris jiart a took part in the drawing up of the 

I'elaboration de la declaration que le declaration made by the Servian 

Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) Government on the 18th (31st) March, 

mars, 1909. 1909. 

Belgrade, h 12 (25) juilkt, 1914. BehjnuJe, July 12 (25), 1914. 



No. 40. 
8ir M. de Bunsen, Bnlislt, Ambassador at Vienna, to /Sir Edirard Grey. — 

{Receive I Jxdy 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) • Vienna, Juhj 26, 1914. 

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hun- 
garian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia 
to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the 
sense of j'our telegram of the 2otli instant* (last paragraph). 

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Parist arrived, 
I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed 
great satisfaction with its contents, \ihicli I communicated to them. They 
doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party 
entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute 
would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government. 

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the 
request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postiJoned. 
They arrived, however, too late for anj' useful action to be taken. 
■* See No. 26. t See No. 36. 



No. 41. 

Sir M. de Buusen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(Received Jidy 27.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

I HAVE had convei-sations with all my colleagues representing the Great 
Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note 
was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ; that the Austro-Hungarian 
Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia ; that they consider 
their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment 
has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals 
of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war Avith 
Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great 
disappointment. 

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express 
to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's 
Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency 
whether he cannot suggest a way out even now. 



No. 42. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received Jidy 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) I'avis, July 27, 1914. 

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted 
by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there 
this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent 
to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague 
as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. 
Necessary instructions have also been .sent to the French representatives at 
Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersbnrgh, but until it is known that the Germans 
have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British 
Ambassadors to do so. 

"" Nos. 36 and 37. 



28 

No. 43. 

Sir E. Goschen, Jh'itish Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edicard Grei/. — 
{Received July 27.) 

(Telc[vrai)liic.) Berlin, Jxdy 27, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 26th July.* 

Secretary of State says that conl'ereiiee you suggest would practically 
amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called 
together except at the request of Austria aiul Russia. He could not tlierefore 
fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the 
maintenance of peace. 1 said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do 
with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not 
directly interested sliould discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous 
situation. He maintained, however, that sucli i^ conference as you proposed 
was not pra-.:ticable. He added that news he had just received from St. 
Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonoft 
to exchange views with Count Berchtold.J He thought that this method of 
l^rocedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before 
doing anything else, to aAvait outcome of the exchange of views between the 
Austrian and Rus-ian Governments. 

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet 
Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Ger- 
many latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by 
"mobiUsing against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, 
Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would 
have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that 
it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germ.any would there- 
fore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. 

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had caused 
him to take more hopeful view of tlie general situation, 

■■• Sea No. 36. 

t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

t .\i!.stro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign AiFairs. 



No. 44. 

Sir 0. Buchanan, Brldsh Ambassador at St. Peter sburyli, to Sir Edward 

Qvey. — [^Received Jvly 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Si. Feter.'ibiirgh. July 27, 1914. 

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which ho had yesterday 
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features 
of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister 
for Foreign Affairs poiniod out that, ahhongh he perfectly understood Austria's 
motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be 
accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands wei-e 
reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put 
into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian 
laws, bub were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent 
State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, 
in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In 
order, however, to put an end to tne present tension, he thought that England 
anr'l Italy might be willing to collaborate v/ith Austria. The Austrian Ambas- 
sador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government. 
On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had 
corre'^tly defined the attitude of Hi? Majesty's Government in my conversation 
v/ith him, which I ]e))or>ed in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that 
you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was 
mi=;taken if ho believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our 
tolling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well 
as with Russia and France if they sujjported Austria by force of arms. Their 
attitude vv'ould merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce 
her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the 
capa'^ity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency murt 
not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to pi'ecipitate a conflict. 

* See No. 6. 



29 

In these circumstaDces I trusted that the Russian Government would defer 
mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed 
to cross the frontier even when it was issued. 

In reply the- Minister for Foreign Affairs told mo that until the issue of 
the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and 
the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete 
lier military preparations if it was deferred too long. 

No. 45. 
A'/y ii. BucJianan, British Ambassador at St. Pdershur/jk, to Sir Edicard 
Grey. — [Received Jahj 27.) 
(Telegraphic.) ,S'f. Feicrwuruh, July 27, 1914. 

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Alfairs, as reported 
in my telegram of to-day,* I understand that his Excellency has proposed 
that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the 
subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petcrsburgh. 

■" Sec No. 44. 



No. 46. 
Sir Edtcard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
Creleg-raphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in 
principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, 
of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He lias also 
been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petcrsburgh to localise 
the war and to keep up the peace of Europe. 

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been 
expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has him- 
self said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could 
hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have 
gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at 
Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now 
required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and 
marched into Servia, it meant tliat she was determined to ci'ush Servia at all 
costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply 
should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German 
Government should urge this at Vienna. 

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the 
situation if tlie war could not be localised, and observed tliat if Germany 
assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to 
the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. 
Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between 
Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be 
the biggest ever known ; but as long as Germany would U'ork to keep the peace 
I would keep closely in toucli. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was 
at Vienna that some moderation niuht be urged. 



No. 47. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir G. Buchaaan, British Ainbassador at St. Pv.tersbv/r<jh. 

(Telegraphic.) FoveUjn Office, Jubj 27, 1914. 

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen." 

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian 
circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His 
Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. 

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to bo dispelled by the orders 
we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, f.s it happens, at 
Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Ru.ssian 
Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything 
more than diplomatic action was promised. 

We hear from German and Austrian sources that tliey believe Riis.-ia will 

* Soo Xo. 46. 



30 

take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I 
pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more 
Servian than the llussians in our dealings with the German and Austrian 
Governnionts. 



No. 48. 
Sir IJ. Grey to Sir M. de Bimsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 

Sir, Foreiga Office, July 27, 1914. 

COUNT MENSDORFF' told me by instruction to-day that the Servian 
Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government 
were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital 
Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her 
subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier 
territories and their final disruption from the Austrian ^Monarchy. Very 
reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to 
take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of 
enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As th.e British Government knew, the 
Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get ou 
with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for 
them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had 
made clear to everj'one what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda 
had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. 
We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the 
moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees 
for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of 
peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable 
means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last 
appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their 
action, wliicli had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented 
otherv/ise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would 
serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an 
element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high 
sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame 
the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, 
and cleared up their position with a country whoso hostile policy had forced 
upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian 
national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their 
amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a 
fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if 
necessary. 

Count MensdorfF added on his own account that, as long as Servia was 
confronted with Turkey, Austria never took verj' severe measures because of 
her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now 
that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian 
interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self- 
defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria 
had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against 
Servian territory. 

I said that 1 could not understand the construction put by the Austrian 
Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance 
of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning 
about that reply. 

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to 
be satisfactory ; but the Servians had refused the one thing — the co-operation of 
Austrian officials and police — which would be a real guarantee that in practice 
the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria. 

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, 
even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without 
risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia anj 
at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good ; but, if not, the consequences 
would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quote(> this phr.ise fr(>m an 
expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would bo 
expected in St. Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, 

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 



31 

and now, when Kussia found that there was increased tension, the situation 
would become inci-easingly serious. Already the ellcct on Europe was one of 
anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had 
felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at 
this moment, and there was no menace in Avhat we had done about our fleet ; 
but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible 
for us to disperse our forces at this moment, i gave this as an illustration of 
the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already 
involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country 
undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by 
the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 



No. 49. 

/Sir Edivard Gr^jy to Sir R. Rodd, JBrilish Amhassadar at Roiue. 

Sir,^^ Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson* tf)-djiy tluit the Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference 
of four to be held in London. 

As i-egards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Htingary, and Servia to 
suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis 
di San Giulianof would recomm.end the suggestion wai-mly to the German 
Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be 
followed at Vienna. 

1 am, &c. 

E. GREY. 
* Tjfitish TTndcr Scorctaiy of Stale for Foreign Affairs. 
+ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



No. 60. 

Sir M. de Buiissn, British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Rcceiv,'d July 31.) 

Sir, Yip.nna, July 28, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the t»^xt of the Austro- 
Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia. 

I have, &c. 

]\IAURICE DE BUNSEN. 



Enclosure in No. 60. 

Copy of jVot^e vc.rbale, dated Vienrui, July 28, 1914. 

(Translation.) 

POUR mettre fin aux menees sub- IN order to bung to an end the 

vorsives partant de Belgrade et diri- subversive intrigues originating frooi 

gees eontre Tintegnte territorials de lii^lurude and aimed at the territorial 

la ^lonarrhio mistro-hongroise, le Gou- integrity of the A'l^tro-Hungariau 

Tflrnement Imperial "t Roval a fqit par- i\!on;irrhv, tlie Imponai and Royal 

venir a la date du 28 iuillet, 1914. nn Govornniput has dt>|iveied to the 

Gouvernement Royal de Serbie une Royal '^erxnan Gnvprnment a note, 

note dans laquelle se tvouvqit forniulee dated luly 23, 1914, in « Inch a series 

une serie de demaudes pour Taccppta- of demands worn formulated, for the 

tion desquelles un lelai de quar^inte- acceptanee of which a dt^lav of forty- 

buit heure,s a ete accord^ an Gouverne- eight hours has benn granted to the 

ment Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal Royal Government. The Royal Servian 

de Serbie n'avant pas repondn a eette Government not having nnsu-ered this 

note d'une maniere satisfaisante, lo note in a satisfactory manner, the 

Gouvernement Imperial et Royal se Imnerial and Royal Government are 

trouvp dans la necessite de pourvoir lui- themselves compelled to see to the 

Bieme a la sauvegarde de ses droits et sale?uarding of their rights and in- 

interets et do rocourir a cet effet a la terests, and, with this object, to have 

force des armes. recourse to force of arms. 

L'Autriche - Hongric, qui vient Austria-Hungary, who has just ad- 



',\2 



d'adrcssor a la Sorbio ime doclaru- 
tion t'orinollo cont'ornicinent a rarticle 
l'"'" de la (.onventiou du 18 ottohro, 
1907, relative a rouverture des hos- 
tilites, so considere des lors en etat de 
guerre avec la Serbie. 

En portant ce qui precede a la con- 
naissauee de TAmbassade lloyalo de 
Grando-Bretagne le JMinistere des 
Affaires Etrangeres a I'lionneur tie 
declarer que rAutriclie-Honjrrie se 
conformcra au cours des hostilites, sous 
la reserve d'un precede analogue de la 
part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des 
conventions de La Have du 18 octobre, 
1907, ainsi qu'si celles de la Dechiration 
do Londres du 2(5 fevrier, 1909. 

L'Anibabsade est priee de vouloir b'.en 
communiquer, d'urgence, la presente 
notitlcation ii son (Jouvernement. 



dressed to Servia a formal declaration, 
in conformity witli article i of the con- 
vention of the 18th Uctober, 1907, rela- 
tive to the opening of hostilities, con- 
siders herself henceforward in a state 
of v.-ar v.ith Servia. 

In bringing the above to notice of 
His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the 
honour to declare that Austria- 
Hungary will act during the hostilities 
in conformity with the terms of the 
Conventions of The Hague of the IStli 
October, 1907, as also with those of 
the Declaration of London of the 2Sth 
February, 1909. provided an analogous 
procedure is adopted by Servia. 

The emb.issy is requested to be so 
good as to communicate the present 
notification as soon as possible to tlie 
British Government. 



Sir, 



No. 51. 

Sir l'\ Mertlc, Jlritiali Aiitbassador at Fio-is, to iSir Edu-ard Grey. — 
(Rrcehcd Jid>i 28.) 

Farh, Juhi 27, 1914. 



»,J|-^ J. Ml to, U IV. II -I , iC/lT^. 

I HAVE the honou.r to transmit to you herewith copy of a nicmorandum from 
tlie acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steiis to be taken to prevent an 
outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia. 

I have, itc. 

FRANCIS BERTIE. 



Enclosure in No. 51. 
Kotc communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin. 

(Translation.) 



PAR line note en date du 25 de ce 
mois, sou Excellence I'Ambassadeur 
d'Angletorre a fait connaitro au Gou- 
verneinent do la Republique que, 
d'apres Sir Edward Gi-ey, la seule 
maniere d'assurer, si c'etait possible, 
le maintien de la paix dans le cas on 
les rapports entre la Russie et I'Au- 
triche deviendraient plus teiidus serait 
une demarche commune ii Vienne et a. 
Saint-Petersbourg des reprcsentants 
de I'Angleterre, de la France, do 
rAllemagne et do I'ltalie en Autriche 
et en Russie; et il a exprime le desir 
de savoir si le Gouvernement de la I'e- 
publique etait dispose a accueillir 
favorablement cette suggestion. 

Le Ministre dos Affaires Ktrai;- 
geres par interim a riionneur de faire 
connaitro a son Excellence Sir Francis 
Bertie qu'il a invite ^L Jules Cambon* 
a se concerter avec I'Ambassadeur 
d'Angletorre en Allemagne et a ap- 
puyer la demarche qu'ils jugeront op- 
portune de faire aupres du Cabinet de 
Berlin. 

Lo Gouvernement de la Republique 



IN a note of the 25th of this month, 
his Excellency the Britisli Ambassador 
informed the Government of the 
Republic that, in Sir E. Gre3''s 
opinion, the only ijossible way of 
assuring the maintenance of peace in 
case of the relations between Russia 
and Austria becoming more strained 
would be if the representatives of 
Great Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy in Austria and Russia were to 
take joint action at Vienna and at 
St. Petersburgli ; and he exTJressed the 
wish to know if the Government of 
the Republic were dispose'.! to welcome 
such a suggestion. 

The IMinister for Foreign Affairs 
ad interim has the honour to inform 
his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he 
has requested iM. Ju.les Cambon* to 
concert with the Br'tish Ambassador 
in Germany and to support any repre- 
sentation which they may consider it 
advisable to make to the Berlin 
Cabinrt. 

In accordance with the desire ex- 



Frenrh Ambassador in Berlin. 



33 



a, d'autre pait, conformemeiit au desir 
expiime par le Gouvorrioment britan- 
niqiio ot que son Excellence Sir Francis 
IJertie liii a transmis par une note en 
date du 26 de ce mois, autorise M. 
Paul CamJjon* a prendre pait ii la re- 
union proposee par Sir Edward Grey 
pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambas- 
sadeurs d'Allemagne et d'ltalie a 
Londres, les nioyens de resoudre les 
difficTiltes actuelles. 

Le Gouverneinent de la Republique 
est pret egalement a donner aux 
agents framjais a Petersl)ourg, a Vienne 
et a Helgrade des instructions pour 
qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernenients 
russe, autricliien et serbe do s'abstcnir 
de toute operation militaire active en 
attendant les resultats de cotte confer- 
ence. II estirae toutefois que les 
chances de succes de la proposition de 
Sir Edward Grey reposent essentielle- 
ment sur Faction que Berlin serait dis- 
posee a Vienne [sic]. Une demarche 
aupres du Gouvernemcnt aiistro-hon- 
grois pour aniener la suspension des 
operations mihtaires parait vouee a 
Tcchec SI I'influencp de rAliemagne ne 
s'est pas exercee au prealable sur le 
C'aljinet de Vienne. 

Le Garde des Sceaux, President du 
Ctmseil et Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres par interim, saisit cette occasion 
de renouveler, &c. 

Pans, k 27 juillei, 1914. 

* French Ambass 



pressed by the British Government 
and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie 
in his note of the 2Gtli of this month, 
the Government of the llepulilic have 
also authorised M. i'aul Cambon* to 
take part in the conference whicli Sir 
10. Grey has proposed with a view to 
discovering in consultation with him- 
self and the Geiman and Italian 
Ambassadors in London a means of 
settling the present difficulties. 

Tiie Government of the Republic 
is likewise ready to instruct the French 
rej>rcsentativcs at St. Petersburgh, 
Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the 
Russian, Austrian, and Servian Gov- 
ernments to abstain from all active 
military operations pending the results 
of this conference. He considers, how- 
ever, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's 
proposal being successful depends 
essentially on the action which the 
Berlin Government would be willing 
to take at Vienna. Representations 
mode to the Austrian-Hungarian 
Government for the purpose of bring- 
ing about a suspension of military 
operations would seern bound to fail 
unless the German (iovernnient do not 
beforehand exerci.se their influence on 
the Vienna Cabinet. 

The President of the Council ad 
interim takes the opportunity, &c. 



Paris, July 27, 1914. 
idor in London. 



No. o2. 
iVcyj'e communicated hi/ French Embassy, July 28, 1914. 

(Translation.) 



LE Gouvernement de la Republique 
accepte la proposition de Sir Edward 
Grey relative a une intervention de la 
Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de 
FAllemagne et de Fltalie en vue d'evi- 
ter ies operations militaires actives sur 
les frontieres autrichiennes, russes et 
serbes; il a autori.se M. P. Caml>on* a 
prendre part aux deliberations de la 
reunion a quatre, qui doit se tenir a 
Londres. 

L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin a 
re9u pour instructions, apres s'etre 
concerte a%'^ec FAmbas-sadeur d'Angle- 
terre a Berlin, d'appuyer la demarche 
de ce dernier dans la forme et la 
mesure qui seraient jugees opportunes. 



M. Vivianit est pr£t a envoycr aux 
representants fran9ais a Vienne, Saint- 

* French Ambassador in London. 

t French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



THE Government of the Rcpubhc 
accept Sir Edward Grey's propo.saJ m 
regard to intervention by Great 
Britain, France, Germaay, and Italy 
with a view to avoiding active mili- 
tary operations on the frontiers of 
Ar;stria. Russia, and Servia ; and they 
have authorised .M. P. Caml)on* to 
take part in the deliberations of the 
four repre-sentatives at the meeting 
wliich is to be held in London. 

The French Ambassador in Berlin 
has received instructions to consult 
fir.st the British Ambassador in Berlin, 
and then to support the action taken 
by the latter in such manner and 
degree as may be considered appro- 
priate. 

M. Viviani+ is ready to send to the 
representatives of France in Vienna, 



34 



Petersboiirg et Bel<j!;rfide des instruc- 
tions dans le sens suggere par le Gou- 
vcrnement britanniquo. 

Amhcuisade de France, Londres, 
le 27 juillef, 1914. 



St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade instruc- 
tions in the sense suggested by the 
British Government. 

French Emhussy, July 27, 1914. 



No. 53. 



i¥. 



6'azono/, Russian Minister for 1' 
Russian Ambassador in London — 
Jtdi/ 28.) 

Saint-PctevsJiourg, 
le 14 (27) jmlkt, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angloterre est 
venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile 
quo I'Angleterre prenne I'initiative de 
convoquer a Londres uno conference 
des representants do I'Angleterre, la 
France, I'AUeniagne et I'ltalie, pour 
etudier une issue a la situation 
actuelle. 

J'ai repondu a I'Ambassadeur que 
j'ai entame des pourparlers avec I'Am- 
bassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en con- 
ditions que j'espero f'avorablcs. Poiir- 
tant je n'ai pas encore re9u de reponse 
a la proposition que j'ai faite d'une re- 
vision de la note entro les deux 
Cabinets. 

Si des explications directes avec le 
Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient ir- 
realisables, je suis pret a accepter la 
proposition anglaise, ou touto autre de 
nature a resoudre favora))lement le 
conflit. 

Je voudrais pourtant ecarter des 
aujourd'hui un malentendu qui i^our- 
rait surgir de la reponse donnee par le 
Ministre de la Justice fran9ais a I'Am- 
bassadeur d'Allemagne, concornant des 
conseils de moderation a donner au 
Cabinet Imperial. 



'oreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, 
-{Cohimnnicated by Count Benckendorff) 

(Translation.) 

8t. Feiershurgh , 
(Telegraphic.) July 27, 1914. 

THE Britisli Ambassador came to 
ascertain whether we think it desirab'e 
that Great Britain should take the 
initiative in convoking a conference in 
London of the representatives of 
England, France, Germany, and Italy 
to examine the possibility of a way out 
of the present situation. 

I replied to the Ambassador that I 
have begun conversations with the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under 
conditions which, I hope, may be 
favourable. I have not, however, re- 
ceived PvS yet any reply to the proposal 
made by me for revising the note be- 
tween the two Cabinets. 

If direct explanations with the 
Vienna Cabinet were to prove impos- 
sible, I am ready to accept the British 
proposal, or any other proposal of a 
kind that would bring about a 
favourable solution of the conflict. 

I wish, however, to put an end from 
this day forth to a misunderstanding 
which might arise from tlie answer 
given by the French Minister of 
Justioo to the German Ambassador, 
regarding counsels of moderation to be 
sivei) to t!io Imperial Cabinet. 



No. 54. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Fo^'ei'jn Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, 
Russian Ambassador in London. — {(Jommunicated by Count Benckendorff, 
July 28, 1914.) 

<S'a In t-Fcicrsbouvfj, 
le 15 (28) jumet, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

MES entretiens avec I'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne confirment mon impres- 
sion que I'Allemagne est plutot favor- 
able a I'intransigeance de rAutriche. 



Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu 
arreter tout le developpement de la 
crise, parait n'exercer aucune action 
sur son alliee. 

L'Ambassadeur trouve insufBsante la 
reponse de la Serl)ie. 



(Translation.) 

St. F<fcr.ilmrgh, 
(Telegraphic.) July 15 (28), 1914. 

I\1Y interviews with the German 
Ambassador confirm my im])ression 
that Germany is, if anything, in 
favour of the uncompromisiug attitude 
adopted by Austria. 

The Berlin Cabinet, wlin could have 
prevented tlu> whole of this crisis 
developing, appear to be exerting no 
influence on their ally. 

The AmI)assador considers tliat tlie 
Servian reply is insufficient. 



35 

Cetto attitude allomande est tout This attitude of the German Govern- 

particulierement alarmante. luent is most alarming. 

II me semble .que mieux que toute It seems to me that England is in 

autre Puissance I'Angleterre serait en a better position than any other Power 

mesure de tenter encore d'agir a to make another attempt at Berlin to 

Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement induce the German Government to 

allemand a Taction necessaire. C'est take the necessary action. There is no 

a Berlin qu'indu])itablement sc trouve doubt tliat the key of the situation is 

la clof de la situation. to bo found at Berlin. 

No. 55. 

ib'ir G. Bitchancm, British Aiahassador at St. Fetershimjh, to Sir Edward 

Grey. — [Received Jidij 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) 5i. Fetersburgh, July 27, 1914. 

M'lTH reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister for 
Foreign Afl'airs this afternoon and found him very CGncilia,tory and more 
optimistic. 

He Avould, he said, use all his influence at Belgi'ade to induce the Servian 
Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her 
territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State 
respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know 
whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had pro- 
posed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers 
throughout the conversations that would ensue. 

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia 
in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers. 

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the 
four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially 
of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference 
he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had iJroposed. The 
German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed hrs personal 
o))inion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria- 
Hungary. 

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to staud aside if the Powers 
accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep 
in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place. 

* See No. 44. 



No, 56. 

Sir Jf. de Bunscii, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edivard Grey. — 

{Received July 28.) 
(TelegrapTiic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

THE Russian Ambassador bad to-day a long and earnest conversation with 
Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told 
him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well acquainted 
with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public 
opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it 
Mould be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way 
again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the 
annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done 
before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would 
now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in 
which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said 
that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discus- 
sions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his 
Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long 
as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained 
should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a 
satisfactory conversation which the Ru.ssian Mini.ster for Foreign Affairs had 
yesterday with the Au.strian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had 
agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly 
leasonablc, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to 



30 

the guarantees which Servia might reasonably bo asked to give to Austria- 
Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that 
the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg!] sliould be furnished with full 
powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly 
asked of her as an independent Powei-. Baron Macchio promised to submit 
this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

No. 57. 

/Sir 7i, l\odd, Jirilish Ambassador at Home, to Sir Edioard Grey. — • 

(L'eceived Jidy 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Home, July 27, 1914. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will bo 
willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, 
but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact 
of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possi- 
bility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia, 
but he believes that if Servia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, 
and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, 
Austria may defer action. Servia nuiy be induced to accept note in its entirety 
on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would 
enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary 
alone. 

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably 
impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no 
opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and 
after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government 
have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from 
Servia. 



No. 58. 

Sir F. B'yrti'', British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir iJdrvard Greii. — 
{Recfived Jxdy 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) ' Varh, Jidy 28, 1914. 

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this after- 
noon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded 
in your telegram* to Berlin of the 27th July. 

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms 
what ho had h.eard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observa- 
tions to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of 
peace. ' 

•' Sep No. 46. 



No. 59. 

Sir F. Jierli", Jiritisit Amhassador at Paris, to Sir Fdivard Grey. — 
[Received Jidy 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. 

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your 
conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of 
yesterday* to St. Petersburgh. 

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossi- 
bility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves " solidaires " with 
Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condi- 
tion is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take u]) an 
attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German 
and Austrian sources to the Russian Government. 

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity 
of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, 
he gave no assurance. 

* See No. 47. 



3*^ 

• ■• • • ■■■.-.:. 'So. 60. 

fSir E . Go'schen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edicard Grey. — 
{Received July 28.) 

(Tcl-\-rapliic.) Berlin, JuJy 28, 1914. 

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported 
in my telegram of yesterday* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting 
yoiir proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, 
and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all 
of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of 
general ])eace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he 
can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could 
be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us. 

* Sec No. 45. 



No. 61. 

Sir M. de Buiisen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Eelward Grey. — 

{Iicceivcd Jidy 28.) 
(Telegrapliic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. 

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike pro- 
ceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotia- 
tions on basis of Servian reply. 

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent 
conflict. 



No. 62. 

Sir M. de Biinsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

{Received Jidy 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your tele- 
gram of 27th July* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said 
that, as mentioned in your speech, t which he had just read to me, you had 
hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested 
might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would 
accejit as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added 
that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands 
of Austria-Hungary ; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion 
during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian 
Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of 
Servian note ; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific 
character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted 
as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter 
that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. 
I said that yon would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be 
arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the 
peace of Europe. 

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the 
course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from 
his, this would arise, not from want of s.vmpathy with the many just complaints 
which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas 
Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first 
instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question 
would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in 
mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those 
)nii>ending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and Avhich could no 
longer be postponed. 

'•' Seo No. 46. 

t "Han.=ard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Colunnis 931, 932, 933. 



38 

\n. C)?i. 
Sir A*. liodil, British Ambassador at Iloiu,', to Sir Ednmrd Gr<v/. — 
( Krcfivt d Jul)/ 2S.) 
(Telegraphic.) Bowc, JuJn 28, 1914. 

YOUR tele=;i-iim of 2oth July to Paris.* 

I have communicated substance to Minister for foreign Affairs, who 
immediately teiegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna. 

■■■■ S,v> No. 27. 

No. Gl. 

Sir li. lioddy Itritish Arahassador af- Iiotae, to Sir Edirard G^rp.ij. — 
{lieceivrd J>d_'/ 26.) 
(Tclegrnphic.) liomr, -Tuhj 28, 1914. 

AT the reriuesfc of the Ivlinister for ForiMgn Affairs I submit the followiny; 
to you : — 

In a long conversation tiiis morning Servian Charge d'Affaires had said ho 
thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Aut'brian 
agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 0, Servia might 
still accept the whole Austrian note. 

As it was not to he anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to 
Servia, they might bo given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then 
advise Servia to accept without conditions. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long 
official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inade- 
quate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation 
— such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propa- 
ganda — quite childisli, but there was a passage which might prove useful in 
facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian (Charge 
d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Sei-via was 
to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia 
was said to liave wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that 
ground might be cleared here. 

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian 
declaration. 

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate 
beginning of discu.ssion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point 
or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and (iermany 
had been given to Italian Ambassador. 



No. G5. 

Mr. druckaiithor)) ■, British Char^ir. d'Affaires at Jhlgradc, to 
Sir J'Jdirard Ore}/, — [Iieceivpd July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) . Nis^h, July 28, J9II. 

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending 
efforts being made towards a. peacefid .solution. 

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant- 
vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova. 

No. GO. 

Mr. Crackanthorpp., ]>ritish Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to 
Sir Edirard Grey. — [Received Juhj 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Nis^h, July 28, 19U. 

TFiLEGRAIVf received here that war declared by Anstri.-i. 

No. G7. 

Sir Kdirard (In y to Sir E. Gosche», liritish Ambassador at /li'lin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign 0fp.ee,, July 28. 1914. 

p]XPJiANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my 
idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It wotdd not be an arbitration, 

* See No. ^7). 



39 

but a, private and informal cIifc;cussion to ascertain wliat suggestion could bo 
made tor a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not 
previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Eussia, witli whom 
the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective 
allies. 

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between 
Austria and iiussia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree 
that it is the most preferable method of all. 

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed 
a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter 
accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical. 
• It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the 
German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversa- 
tion recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.* 

* Sec No. 46. 



No. G8. 

tSir Edirard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Forc-gn Office, July 28, 1914. 

GERMAN (iovernment, having accepted principle of mediation bctiveen 
Austria and Ru.ssia by the four Powers, if necessary., I am ready to propose 
that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this 
principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we 
see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress. 

No. 69. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at Si. Fetersburqh. 

(Telegraphic.) Forc'(jn Office, July 28, 1914. 

IT is most satisfactoi-y that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views 
between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your teleor-im 
of the 27th July.* 

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, 
but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian IVIinister for Foreign Affairs 
proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in 
an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some sucli 
scheme.'' It might then take more concrete shape. 

* See No. 55. 



No. 70. 

Telegrams communicated by Gount Benckendorff, Russian Amhassalor in. 
London, Jidy 29, 1914. 

(1.) Telegram, from 3f. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated 

Jidy 28, 1914. 

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the 
Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the 
military circon.scriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform 
German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive inten- 
tion against Germany. 

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled wom his post. 

(2) Tclegrara to Count Benckendorff.'''- 
The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct 
communications between Austria and Russia. Action by Lt)iulon C'abinet in 
order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations 
of Austria against Servia is now most urgent. 

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters 
to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia. 

* Riis.?ian Amba-ssador in London. 



40 

No. 71. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
[Received Jidj 29.) 

(Tolograpliic.) Berlin, Jidy 28, 1914. 

AT iuvitiition of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this 
evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that 
Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, 
as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been 
able to accejit your i^roposal for a conference of representatives of the Great 
Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such 
a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an " Areopagus " 
consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two 
remaining Powers; but his inability to accept the proposed conference must not 
be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. 
You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and 
St. Petersburgh to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly 
with cacli other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions 
would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true 
which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army 
corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would 
be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his 
power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, 
who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, 
and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured 
to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my 
mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any 
case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility 
would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian 
note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel 
with Scrvia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to 
do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to 
do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers 
must be avoided " were his last words. 

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, 
as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that 
opinion is shared by many people here. 

No. 72. 

Sir 6'. Buchanan^ Briiiulb Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {Received J idy 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. I'etersburgh, July 28, 1914. 

INiiNiSTEIl for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language 
vou had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram* to 
Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a 
pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news 
from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important 
that we should know the real intentions of the Imiierial Government, and asked 
him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances" which the Austrian 
Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's 
integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for avert- 
ing a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply 
his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied 
with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that 
order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria 
crossed Servian frontier. 

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating 
counsels to the i\liiiistcr for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning T had 
not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now 
in his turn use his rcstraiuitig influence. I made it clear to his Excellency 
that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if 
Servia were attacked by Austria. 

* See No. 46. 



41 

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Anibasrsador had received no 
instructions, and before acting with me tiie French and Italian Ambassadors 
are still waiting for their final instructions. 



No. 73. 

Sir M. dc Hansen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edimrd Gre>j. — 

{^Receive I July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I HAVE received note rerhale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating 
that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July* in a. 
satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to 
provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to 
force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration 
according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening 
of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. 
Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to .stipulations of 
Hague convention.s of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 2Gth 
February, 1909. 

* See No. 4. 



No. 74. 

Sr J/, de ll'unscn, British Ambassador at Vie7ina, to Sir Edward Grcf, — 

{Received Jubj 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, Voli. 

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Govcrnment'.s 
suggestion lias been declined by the xVustro-Hungarian Government. Tho 
suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian 
conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, who should be 
authorised accordingly. 

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of tho less 
interested l^owers, such as you have proposed, offers now tho only prospect of 
preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will 
acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not 
actually come in contact, all hope need not bo abandoned. 



No. 7o. 

" Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edirard Grei,'. — 

{Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) J?crZ(», Jxdij 29, 1914. 

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Ghancellor, who told me that 
he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had 
at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too 
rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your su.ggestion that the 
Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on 
receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained 
that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian 
reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without 
.some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demand.s 
made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in 
vie^\' of tlieir past experience. He had then gone on to say that tlie ho.stilities 
which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive 
object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government 
already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs. 

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view bo correct, 
to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, 
eliminate all possible misunderstandings. 

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna. 

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at 

C2 



42 

Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely 
doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications. 

Tile fact.oi' his communicating this information to you was a proof of the 
confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should 
know he was doing his hest to support your efforts in the cause of general 
peace, efforts wliich he sincerely appreciated. 

No. 7C. 

Sir E. Goschcn, BHtish Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

[Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that 
he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to 
Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause 
them to precipitate matters and present a fait aeannpli. This had, in fact, now 
happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that 
Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of 
war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain 
military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subse- 
quently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him 
that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government 
had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German 
Government had done tliis, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French 
colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it 
seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her 
military prestige, the moTucnt might then be favourable for four disinterested 
Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing 
graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy 
of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference 
proposed by you. 

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Govern- 
ment that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments. 



No. 77. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Oficc, July 29, 1914. 

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram 
of to-dny.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as 
heretofore, to .strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we 
all fear. If ho can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going 
so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to 
his Excellency for having saved the i^eace of Europe. 

• See No. 75. 



No. 78. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershuryh, to Sir Edward 
Grey. — {luceived July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petershurgh, July 29, 1914. 

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day. 

I communicisted the substance of your telegram of the 28th in.stant* to 
Berlin to the jMinister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, 
and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German 
Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had 
already readied his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he 
explained, would only be directed. against Austria. 

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation 
between Vienna and St. Peter.sburgh. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said 
he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. 
He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, 

* See No. 67. 



43 

to urge that a. return .should be made to your proposal for a conference of 
four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the 
three Ambassadors less directly interesteil, yourself, and also the Austrian 
Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by Franco 
and England would bo acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such 
conversations took. No time was to bo lost, and the only way to avert war 
was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors 
cither collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be 
induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank 
and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their 
efforts to maintain peace failed, ho trusted that it would be realised by the 
British public that it was not the fault of the Russian GovernmeJit. 

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in 
Rome telegram of tho 27th July,* which I mentioned to him, were carried out. 
In reply his Excellency' said that he would agree to anything arranged by tlie 
four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia ; he could not, he said, be 
more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations 
would, however, have to bo made in order to tone down the sharj^ness of the 
ultimatum. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram 
of tlie 28th instantt was one of secondary importance. Under altered cir- 
cumstances of situation ho did not attach weight to it. Further, the German 
Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told nie, that his 
Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear 
that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses 
to his own Government tho same language as he did to me to-day. He accused 
the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisa- 
tion, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, 
that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that 
Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service 
to join the colours, tliat Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now 
declared AA-ar on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she 
kncAV that this act Avas ono Avhich it Avas impossible Avithout humiliation for 
Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she Avas in 
earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and Avould 
have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had given me to understand that Russia Avould not precipitate Avar by crossing 
frontier immediately, and a Aveek or more would, in any case, elapse before 
mobilisation Avas completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous 
situation it Avas necessary that we should in the meanAvhile all Avork together. 
* See No. 57. t See No. 69. 



No. 79. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Gru?/. — 

{Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, Jvhj 29, 1914. 

THERE is at present no step which avo could usefully take to stop Avar Avith 
Servia, to Avhich Austro-Hungarian Government are noAv fully committed by 
the Emperor's appeal to his people Avhich has been publi.shed this morning. 
and by the declaration of Avar. French and Italian Ambassadors agree Avith 
me in this vicAv. If tho Austro-Hungarian Government Avould convert into 
a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. 
Petersburgh to tlie effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence 
of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that 
Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambas- 
sador is convinced the Austrian Government Avould refuse to do. 



44 

No. 80. 

Sir K. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edioard Grey. — 

{Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Home, July 29, 1914. 

IN your telegram of the 27th instant^' to Berlin, German Ambassador was 
repo'-ted to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in 
contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instantt from Berlin. 

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that 
German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschcn's telegram of the 
27th Jnly,t but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to 
urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the 
idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secre- 
tary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister 
for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the 
door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburgh fails 
to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be con- 
comitant with such direct communication. 

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Govern- 
ment would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken 
every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Govern- 
ment must lend their co-operation in this. 

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe 
that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for 
f>-ood relations witii ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act 
with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect. 

Even should it prove impossihlo to induce Germany to take part, he would 
still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should 
continue to exchange views. 

* See No. 46. + See No. 43. 



No. 81. 
Sir Edicard Grey to Sir R. Rvdd, British Amhafsador at Rirme. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

"WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.* 

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I 
understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not 
accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have 
heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of 
mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad 
if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make thei-e. 

* See No. 64. 



No. 82. 

3fr. BcamnGiit, British Charge d' Affaires at Constantinojds, to Sir Edioard 
Grey.— (Rioived JuJy 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Consfantinople, July 29, 1914. 

I UNDEUSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably 
beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered 
this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of 
the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and 
of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman 
population discontented with Servian rule. 



45 

No. 83. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charye cV Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward 

Gre>j. — [licceived Jidy 29.) 

(Teleyrtiphic.) xA^/.s/i, J uhj 29, 1914. 

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression 
of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on tlie 27th instant 
in the House of Commons. 



No. 81. 

Sir EdAcard Lire>j to Sir E. Uccscltcn, BritisJi A»ibassador at Berlin. 

(Telegrapiiic.) Forcion Office, Juhj 29, 1914. 

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Cliancellor 
to inform me that ho is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to 
be in constant touch, and lie is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a 
satisfactory form at St. Petersburgh the scope and exteiision of Austrian pro- 
ceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived 
at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I 
u ould press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my 
information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined 
the suggestion of tlie Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at 
St. Petersburgh should bo authorised to discuss directly with the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. 
The press correspondents at St. Petersburgh. had been told that Russian 
Government v/ould mobilise. The German Government had said that they 
were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if 
necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, con- 
sultation or discussion, or even conversations a quafrc in London too formal 
a method. I urged that the Gorman GoA^ernment should suggest any method 
by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to i>revent 
war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole 
idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation 
by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In 
fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany 
thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of 
peace. 



No. 85. 

/S7v E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edtvard Grey. — 
{Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin , July 29, 1914. 

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had 
just returned from Potsdam. 

Ho said that should Austria bo attacked by Russia a European conflagra- 
tion might, ho feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as 
Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain i)eace. He then 
proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutralitj'. He said 
that it was clear, so far as ho was able to judge the main ])rinciple which 
governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow 
France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not 
the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great 
Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Govern- 
ment that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at 
the expense of France should they jirovc victorious in any war that mifht 
ensue. 

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that 
he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards 
Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries 
respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany Mas ready 
to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. 



46 

It dfipendod upon tlie action of France what operations Germany might be 
forced to enter upon in Belgiiuu, but wlion the war was over, Belgian integrity 
would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. 

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor 
the object of his policy had been, as you Avere aware, to bring al)out an 
understanding with England ; he trusted that these assurances might form 
the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind 
a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it 
was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an 
assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present cj-isis might 
Ijossibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire. 

In reply t ) his E.vcellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal 
to you, I said that 1 did not think it probable that at this stage of events you 
would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion 
that you would desiie to retain full liberty. 

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated 
the contents of your telegram of to-day* to his Excellency, who expressed his 
best thanks to you. 

•'■ Sw No. 77. 



No. 86. 

aSVv R. liodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Urcij. — 
(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Borne, July 29, 1914. 

MliNLSTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further 
discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day 
by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes 
for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate 
any further demands on Servia. 



No. 87. 

/Sir Edward Gny to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
Sir, 

AFTER telling M. Cambon^' to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, 
I told him that 1 meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must 
not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false 
security that we should stand aside if ail the efforts to iDreserve the peace, 
which Ave v.'ere now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went 
on to say to M. Cambon* that I thought it necessary to tell him also that 
})ubliG opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different 
poiiit of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years 
ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in Avhich France was 
primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt 
to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the 
subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case 
the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called 
to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and 
Russia Vvc should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. Tt would then be 
a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in 
the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war 
over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became 
involved, we had not made up our minds v>hat we should do; it was a case 
that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into 
a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour 
and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and 
wo should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought 
it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautious 
with regard to our fleet, and I was about to Avarn Prince Lichnowskyt not 

* Krenoh AnUxissa/lar in I^ondon. 
t German Amba-ssador in London. 



47 

to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let 
M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what 
to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise. 

M. Cambon said that I had explained the .situation very clearly. He 
understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy 
between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene ; should other 
issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the 
question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what 
it was necessary for iis to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announce- 
ment, and made no criticism upon it. 

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand 
from Gernuiny tliat France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. 
This assurance France, of course, could not give ; she was bound to help 
Russia if Russia was attacked. 

I am, &c., 

E. GREY. 



No. 88. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
Sir, 

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I 
had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. 
I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff,* that 
the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversa- 
tions between Russia and Austria. 1 said that the hope built upon those 
direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared 
to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of media- 
tion in Vienna and St. Petersburg!!. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, 
it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had 
suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method 
by which the four Powei's should be able to work together to keep the peace 
of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while 
desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations 
against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only 
drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was, of course, too 
late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short 
time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation 
of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring som.e 
mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the 
occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated 
that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to 
mediate between her and Russia. 

Tbo German Ambassador said that lie had already telegraphed to Berlin 
what I had said to him this morning. 

I am, &c., 



Ri^ssian Ambassador in London. 



E. GREY. 



Xo. 89. 
Sir Ed-ward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 




„..- ^- --„ --- -■ -- .. became involved in it, ana 

then France, the issue might be so great that it won?d involve all European 
interests ; and I did not wish liim to be misled by the friendly tone of our 



48 

conversation— which I hoped v.ould fontiniie— into thinking that we should 
stand aside. 

He said that lie quite understood this, but he asked v.hcther I meant that 
wo should, under certain circumstances, intervene? 

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything tliat was like 
a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became 
worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening 
if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we 
knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British 
interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision 
would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. 
I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at 
present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German 
Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep 
the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved i^ractically every European 
interest, 1 did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly 
tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing 
that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been 
so misled, the course of things might have been diffei-ent. 

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said ; indeed, 
he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his 
view of the situation. 

I am, S:c., 

E. GREY. 



No. 90. 
/S'/r Edircrd Grey to ,'^ir E. (Josclfn, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 19U. 

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, 
as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July* to your Excellency, I gave the 
Ambassador a copy of Sir Renncll Rodd'sf telegram of the 28th July+ and of 
my reply to it.§ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete 
acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But 
there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano*!! had said, to be a 
method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, 
they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter 
would give them an opportunity. 1 could, however, make no proposal, for the 
reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for 
information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discus- 
sion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia, As to mediation between 
Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia 
to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length 
she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be 
putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German 
Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could 
not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great 
Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating 
Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation 
of otliers. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria 
might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia. 

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian terri- 
tory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal 
Sej'vian indejjendence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal 
State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans. 

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impos- 
sible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently 
were taking precautions. 

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found 
of preserving the peace of Europe. 

I am, i^'c, 

E. GREY. 

" See No. 8'1. t Briti.^li Aniba-ssador in Rome. t S<>p No. 64. 

§ See No. 81. M Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



49 

No. 91. 
Sir Edirard Grey to Sir M. de Bunnen, British Ambassador at Vienna. 

Sir, Fore fjii Office, July 29, 1914. 

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a loug memo- 
randum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of 
the conduct of Servia towards Austria, and an exi)lanation of how necessary 
the Austrian action was. 

I said tliat I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between 
Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of 
Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for 
Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European 
peace was at stake. 

Count Mensdorff* said that the vvar v-fith Servia must proceed. Austria 
could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and 
again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of 
territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her 
interests were safeguarded. 

I said that it v/ould be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the 
independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a 
sort of vassal State. 

Count Mensdorff* deprecated this. 

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian 
action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, 
before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being in the 
Austrian sphere of influence. 

I am, &c., 

E. GREY. 
* Anstix)-Himgarian Ambassador in London. 



No. 92. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. llodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914, 

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the 
Marquis di San Gniliano* suggesting that the German objections to the media- 
tion of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, 
might be removed by some cliange in the form of procedure. 

I ."^aid that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Govern- 
ment to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation 
between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in 
principle, could be applied. 

I am, &c., 

E. GREY. 
'~' Italian Minist^n- for Forcig-a Affairs. 



No- 93. 

Teleyravis communicated by Count Benclcendoo-ff, Russian Ambassador in 
London, Jidy 30, 1914. 



(1.) 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof/'- 

Vienne, (Translation.) 

le 15 (28) juilld, 1914. r/c?!/ia, July 15 (28), 1914. 

(Telegraphique.) (Telegraphic. ) 

J'AI entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte I SPOKE to Count Berchtoldt 

Berchtoldt dans le sens des instruc- to-day in the sense of your Excellency's 

tions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis instructions. I brought to his notice, 

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affaii's. 

t Aiistro-Hungarian Minietcx for Foreign Affairs. 



50 



observer, en tormcs les plus amicaux, 
combien il etait desirable do trouver 
lino solution qui, en consolidant les 
Ijoiis i-api)oits entre rAutriclie-Hongrie 
et la Russie, donncrait a la, Monarehie 
austro-liongi'oise dos garanties serieuses 
pour ses raiiports futurs avec la 
Serbie. 

J'attirais I'attention du Comto 
Berchtold* sur tons les dangers jjour la 
paix de I'Europo, qu'entrainerait un 
conflit arme entre rAutriclie-Hongrio 
et la Serbie. 

Le Comte Berchtold* me repondit 
qu'il se rendait parfaitemcnt compte 
du serieux de la situation et des avau- 
tages d'une franche explication avec 
le Cal)inet de Saint-Petersbourg. II 
me dit que d'un autre cote le Gou- 
vcrnement austro-hongrois, qui ue 
s'ctait decide quo tres mal volontiers 
aux mesures energiques qu'il avait 
prises centre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus 
ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion au- 
cune des termes de la note austro- 
hongroise. 

Le Comte Berchtold* ajouta que la 
crise etait devenue si aigue, et que I'ex- 
citation de I'opinion publique avait at- 
tcint tel degre, que le Gouvernement, 
le voidait-il, ne pouvait plus y consen- 
tir, d'autant moins, mo dit-il, que la 
reponse memo de la Serbie donne la 
preuve du manque de sincerite de ses 
promesscs jiour I'avenir. 



in the most friendlj' manner, how de- 
sirable it was to find a solution which, 
while consolidating good relations be- 
tween Austria-Hungary and Russia, 
would give to the Austro-Hungarian 
Aloiiarchy genuine guarantees for its 
future relations with Servia. 

I drew Count Berchtold's* atten- 
tion to all the dangers to the peace of 
Europe which woidd be involved by an 
armed conflict between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Servia. 

Count Berchtold* replied that he was 
well aware of the gravity of the situa- 
tion and of the advantages of a fraidv 
explanation with the St. Petersburgh 
Cal)inet. He told me that, on the 
other hand, the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, who had only decided 
much against their will on the ener- 
getic measures which they had taken 
against Servia, could no longer recede, 
nor enter into any discussion aljout the 
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note. 

Count Berclitold* added that the 
crisis had become so acute, and that 
public opinion had risen to such a pitch 
of excitement, that the Government, 
even if they wished it, could no longer 
consent to such a course. This was 
all tlie more impossil)le, he said, inas- 
much as the Servian reply itself fur- 
nished proof of the insincerity of 
Servia's Dromises for the future. 



*•■ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign AfTairs. 



(2.) 

M. Sazoiiitf, Russian Mhiister for Forevj a Affairs, to Count lienckendorff] 

Russian Ambassador in London. 



Sa int-Vctc rshou ig, 
le 16 (29) juiUd, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allenuigne m'in- 
forme, aii nom du Chancelier, que 
I'Allemagne n'a pas cesse d'exercer a 
Vienne une influence moderatrice et 
qu'elle continuera cette action memo 
apres la dechiration de guerre. 
Jusqu'a ce matin il n'y avait aueune 
nouvelle que les armees autrichiennes 
aient f ranch! la frontiere serbe. J'ai 
))rie rAmltassadeur de transmettre au 
Chancelier mes remerciements pour la 
teneur amicale de cette communica- 
tion. Jc I'ai informe des mesures mili- 
taires prises par la Russie, dont au- 
eune, lui dis-je, n'etait dirigee centre 
I'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne pre- 
jugeaient pas non plus des mesures 
agrcssives centre I'Autriche-Hongrie, 



St. Fetcrsburgh, 
July 16 (29), 1914. 
(Telegraphic.) 

THE German Ambassador informs 
me, in the name of the Chancellor, that 
Germany has not ceased to exercise a 
moderating influence at Vienna, and 
that she will continue to do so even 
after the declaration of war. Up to 
this ujorning there had been no news 
that the Austrian arm}' has crossed 
the Servian frontier. I have begged 
the Ambassador to express my thanks 
to the Chancellor for the friendly 
tenour of this communication. I have 
informed him of the military measures 
taken by Russia, none of which, I told 
him, were directed against Germany; 
I added that neither should they be 
taken as aggressive measures against 
Austria-Hungary, their expla'iation 



51 



CCS mcsures s'expliquant par la mobili- 
sation de la plus graude partie do 
I'armee austro-liongroise. 

L'Ambassadeur se pronon9ant en 
faveiir d'explications directes avec le 
Cabinet de Vienna et nous, je repon- 
dis que j'y etais tout dispose, pour pen 
que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin 
dont il parlait trouvent echo a Vienne. 



En nieme temps je signalais que nous 
etions tout disposes a accepter le projet 
d'une conference des quatre Puis- 
sances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, 
I'Allemagnc ne sympathisait iias en- 
tierement. 

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le 
meilleur moyen pour mettre a profit 
tons les moycns propres a produire vine 
solution pacifique, consisterait en une 
action parallele des pourparlers d'une 
conference a quatre de FAUemagne, de 
la France, de I'Angleterre et de 
ritalie et d'un contact direct entrc 
I'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, a 
I'instar a pen pres de ce qui avait eu 
lieu aux moments les plus critiques do 
la crise de I'an dernier. 

Je dis a rAmbassadeur qu'apres les 
concessions faites par la Serbie, un ter- 
rain de compromis pour les questions 
restees ouvertes ne serait pas tres diffi- 
cile a trouver, a condition toutefois de 
quelque bonne volonte de la part de 
I'Autriche et a condition que toutes les 
Puissances usent de tonte leur in- 
fluence dans un sens de conciliation. 



being the mobilisation of the greater 
part of the Austro-Hungarian army. 

The Aml)assador said that he was in 
favour of direct explanations between 
the Austrian Government and our- 
selves, and I replied that I, too, was 
quite willing, provided that the advice 
of the German Government, to which 
ho had referred, found an echo at 
Vienna. 

I said at the same timo that wc were 
quite ready to accept the proposal for 
a conference of the four Powers, a pro- 
posal witli which, apparently, Ger- 
many was not in entire sympathy. 

I told him that, in my opinion, the 
best manner of turning to accor.nt the 
most suitable methods of finding a 
peaceful solution would be by arrang- 
ing for parallel discussions to be car- 
ried on by a conference of the four 
Powers — Germany, France, England, 
and Italy — and by a direct exchange 
of views between Austria-Hungary and 
llussia on much the same lines as 
occurred during the most critical 
moments of last year's crisis. 

I told the Ambassador that, after 
the concessions which had been made 
by Servia, it should not be very diffi- 
cult to find a compromise to settle the 
other questions which remained out- 
standing, provided that Austria 
showed some good- will and that all the 
Powers used their entire influence in 
the direction of conciliation. 



(3.) 

M. Sazonof, Russian Mivister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, 

Russian Ambassador in L'^ndon. 



Sa i II t-Fcte rshourg, 
le 16 (29) j^iiUet, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

Lors de mon entretien avec I'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon 
telegramme precedent, je u'avais pas 
encore re9u le telegramme du 15 (28) 
juillet de M. Schebeko.* 

Le contenu de ce telegramme consti- 
tue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de 
proceder a un echange d'idees direct 
avec le Gouvernement Imperial. 

Des lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'a 
nous en remettre entierement au Gou- 
vernement britannique pour I'initia- 
tive des demarches qu'il jugera utile 
de ijrovoquer. 



St. Petersburgh, 
July 16 (29), 1914. 
(Telegraphic.) 

AT the time of my interview with 
the German Ambassador, dealt with 
in my preceding telegram, I had not 
vet received M. Schebeko's* telegram 
of the 15th (28th) July. 

The contents of this telegram con- 
stitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet 
to agree to a direct exchange of views 
with the Imperial Government. 

From now on, nothing remains for 
r.s to do but to rely entirely on tlie 
British Government to take the initia- 
tive in any steps which they may 
consider advisable. 



Russian Ambassador at Vienna. 



Xo. 04. 
Sir M. de Bimsen, Briii-iJi. Ambassador at Vienna, io Sir Edtcard Grey. — • 

{Received Jidy 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

1 LEARN that mohilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out opera- 
tions on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian 
Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here lias realised, though somewhat 
late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I 
believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the 
Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless 
mediation, whicli German Government declared themselves ready to offer in 
concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro- 
Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken 
in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that 
Servian aft'aii-s should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and 
French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed 
the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that 
it was inii)ossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the 
present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade 
to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favour- 
able spirit ; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably 
go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at liaving been 
completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settle- 
ment. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which 
opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought 
that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three 
other Powers. 

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid 
of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public 
opinion. I gathered, liowever, that Russia would go a long way to meet 
Austrian demands on Servia. 



No. do. 
Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

(A'eceived JiUy 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

RUSvSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by 
Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted 
re^^arding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Govern- 
ment are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia 
will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is com- 
lielled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from 
the continuance of hostile propaganda from Sei'vian territory. 

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at 
Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government 
against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war. 

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme 
anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to 
plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity. 

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that tho 
German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before 
it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from 
tho (jfMiuan Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it. 



No. 96. 

Sir M. de Bimsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edivard Grey. 

{Received Jidy 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Aml)assador and myself this 
afternoon at the French Embassy, where I hap])ened to be, an account of his 



53 

interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite 
tnendly ±lie Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had 
mobilised Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not 
be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions 
similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had 
■ no objecljion to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh continuing their conversations, although he 
dicl not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply. 

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had beo-un to 
make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that 
Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that some- 
thing may yet be done to prevent war with Austria. 



No. 97. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward 

Grey. — {Received July 30.) 

^^""'^f/p^.n^^ A 1 . ^^- Petersburgh, July 30, 1914. 

J^KEiNLH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this 
morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday 
arternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian 
integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this 
might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal, just as 
in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would 
be a revolution m Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs. 

M. Sazonof* told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian 
Irovernment that Germany was making military and naval preparations against 
Russia— more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. 

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign 
Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was 
inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof* to mako some suggestion which he 
could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof* accord- 
ingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French of 
wnich following is translation : — ' 

"If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character 
of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her 
ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia Russia 
engages to stop all military preparations." 

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal 
is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war Excite- 
ment hero has reached such a piU^h that, if Austria refuses to make a concession 
Russia caiinot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming she 
can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general 
mobilisation. 

• Ru-sdion MinTster for Foreign Affairs. 



No. 98. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. 

{Received July 30.) 

^%'lrRFr^PY . e. . • . , . . ^^'■^'■'^' ^^y 30, 1914. 

biLLRlLlARY of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Pr-'nce 
Lichnowsky's-* telegram recording his last conversation with you he rsked 
Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept media 
tion on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other'point 
and issue their conditions from here. He has up til! now received no reply but 
he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties as 
Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia will probaVlv 
find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succ^-ed 
m getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuadin'r 
her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act o1 

* German Ambassador in London. 



54 

ng^ression against Austria lie still sees some chance that European peace may 
be preserved. 

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view 
of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken 
in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a measure which had been 
officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday — 
Imperial Government had done notliing special in way of military preparations. 
Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and 
v.hen they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted 
this, as he know France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity. 

His Excellency added that telegram* received from Prince l^ichnowskyt 
last night contains inatter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly 
with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty 
with which yon had spoken. 

He also told me that this telegiam had only reached Berlin very late last 
night; had it been received earlier Chanci^llor would, of course, not have 
spoken to me in the way he had done. 

* See No. 102. t Genr.an Aniba;-.^aclo'r in Lonclo:!. 

No. 99. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Amlxtssador at Paris, to Sir Bdward (rreij. — 
yRpc ived Jidij 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Par/.s. Juhj 30, 1914. 

PRESIDENT of the Eepublic tells me that the Russian Government have 
boon iiiformed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her 
mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a farther report, since received 
from St. Petersburgh, states that the German communication had been modi- 
fied, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would 
consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on 
condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the 
sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, 
which Servia has not accepted, to an international discussion. 

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. 
He is convinced that ))eace bettteen the Powers is in the hands of Great 
Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to 
the aid of France in the event of a coJifiict between France and Germany as a 
result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be 
no war, for Germany \^-ould at once modify her attitude. 

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government 
to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would 
be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire 
war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisa- 
tion so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government v.ill keep His 
Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. 
They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round 
Thionvillo and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Con- 
tinent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital 
interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire 
it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany 
fiom going to war. 

No. 100. 
Sir R. liodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Kdtrard Grey.- — 
{Received didji 30,) 
(Telegraphic.) Home, July 30, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would 
be able to prevent Austria from makirig any exorbitiUit demands if Servia 
could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the 
occupation of Belgrade liad been accomplished. 

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formida might 
bo devised by Germany whiclv might be acceptable for an exchange of views. 
I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion. 



55 

No. 101. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British A mhassador at Brrlin. 

(Telegrapliic) Foreign Office, Juhj 30, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 29tii July.* 

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's 
proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. 

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies 
are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French 
territory as distinct from the colonies. 

From the material point of view such a proposal is- un.acceptable. for France, 
without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed 
as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German 
pohcy. 

Altogether apart from that, it would bo a disgrace for us to make this 
bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from whicli tiie 
good name of this country would never i-ecover. 

The Chancellor also in cifect asks us to bargain awny whatever obligation 
or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not 
entertain that bargain cither. 

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prosiieet of 
a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered 
positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands nov\-. We 
must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require 
in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as 
the Chancellor contemplates. 

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most 
earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England 
and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve tiie 
peace of Europe ; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany 
and England vrill, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that 
object His ]\fajesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and 
good-will. 

And I will say tliis : If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present 
crisis safely passed, my ov.n endeavour will be to promote some arrangement 
to which Germany could be a party, by whicli she could be assured that no 
aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by 
France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and 
worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany 
having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has 
hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this 
present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through 
for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction 
which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between 
the Powers than has been possible hitherto. 

' See No. S5. 



No. 102. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Arahassaclor at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky* that Germany must not count upon 
our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the 
telegram from Prince Lichnowsky* to German Chancellor, to which reference 
is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.t 

' German Ambassador in Lcuidor.. f See No. 98. 



No. 103. 

Sir Edivard Grey to Sir G. Buch%nan, British Arabassaior at St. Pettrshuryh. 

(Telegraphic.) Fore'gn Office. July 30, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would 
endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in 
region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured 



56 

to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. 
Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. 
I suggested this yesterday as a possible I'elief to the situation, and, if it can 
bo obtained, I wotdd earnestly hope that it niiglit be agreed to suspend further 
military preparations on all sides. 

Russian Ambassador has told mo of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,* 
as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,t and fears it cannot be modified ; 
but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think 
Russian Minister for Foreign Aflairs' formula might be changed to read that 
the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Al^stria without 
impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence. 

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, 
declares herself read.y, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance 
and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia 
would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military prepara- 
tions, provided that other Powers did the same. 

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest 
if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. 
You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affaira. t See No. 97. 



No. 104. 
Sh' Edirard Greij to Sir F. Brrtie, British Ar,ibassador at Faris. 

(Telegraphic.) 'Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. _ 

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir 
Gr. Buchanan* of to-day, t and say that I know that he has been urging Russia 
not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last sugges- 
tion at St. Petersburgh. 

••■' Bviiidli Anib.a.s:-aclor at St. Petersbivrgli. f Sco No. 103. 



No. 105. 
Sir Edirard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

Sir, Foreign, Office, July 30, 1914. 

M. CAMBON* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him 
two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously 
threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for 
convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's 
reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened 
than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would 
intervene, but he would like me to sny what we should do if certain circum- 
stances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression 
by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, 
showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more 
on the oifensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He 
anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that 
France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage 
to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither 
of these things could France admit. 

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see 
him again to-morrow afternoon, 

I am, itc, 

E. GREY. 
* French Ambassador in T-ondon. 



Enclosure 1 in No. 105. 
Sir Edward Grey to M. Cainhon, French Ambassador in London. 
Mv dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. 

' FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and 
military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood 



57 

that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to 
decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. 
We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to 
be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in 
a contingency that lias not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for 
instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment 
is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave 
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become 
essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed 
assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unpro- 
voked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general 
peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Govern- 
ments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, 
if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If ' these 
measures involved action, tlie plans of the General Staffs would at once be 
taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect 
should be given to them. 



Yours, ttc 



E. GREY. 



Enclosure 2 
M. (Janihoii, Fr,nch Aitihussador 
TyAnthassadr de Frame, 

cc 23 novcniJnr, 1912. 
Cher Sir Edward, 

PAR votre lettre en date d'liier, 22 
novembre, vous m'avez rappele que, 
dans ces dernieres annees, les autorites 
militaires et navales de la France et de 
la Grande-Bretagne s'etaient consid- 
tees de temps en temps ; qu'il avait tou- 
jours ete entendu que ces consulta- 
tions ne restreignaient pas la liberte, 
pour chaque Gouvernement, de decider 
dans I'avenir s'ils se preteraient Fun 
I'autre le concours do leurs forces 
arrnees ; que, de part et d'autre, 
ces consultations entre specialistes 
n'etaient et ne devaient pas etre con- 
siderees comme des engagements obli- 
geant nos Gouvernenients a agir dans 
certains ca,s ; que cependant je vous 
avals fait observer que, si I'un ou 
I'autre des deux Gouvernenients avait 
de graves raisons d'apprehender une 
attaque non provoquee de la part d'une 
tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essen- 
tiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur 
I'assistance armee de I'autre. 

Votro lettre repond h cett« observ.i- 
tion, et je suis autoi'ise a vous declarer 
que, dans le cas ou I'un de nos deux 
Gouvernenients aurait iin motif grave 
d'apprehender soit I'agression d'une 
tierce puissance, soit quelque evene- 
ment mena9ant pour la paix gener;i!o, 
ce Gouvernement examinerait imniedia- 
tenient avoc I'autre si les deux Gou- 
vernements doivent agir de concert en 
vue de prevenir I'agression ou de 
sauvegarder la pnix. Dans ce cas, les 



in No. 105. 

ill London, to Sir Edimrd flrey. 
(Translation.) 
French Emhassy, London, 
Norcmhrr 23, 1912. 
Dear vSir Edward, 

YOU reminded me in your letter of 
yesterday, 22nd November, that during 
the last few years the military and 
naval authorities of France and Great 
Britain had consulted with each other 
from time to time; tbat it had always 
been understood that these consulta- 
tions should not restrict the liberty of 
either Government to decide in "the 
future whether they should lend each 
other the support of their armed 
forces ; that, on either side, these con- 
sultations between experts were not 
and should not be considered as 
engagements binding our Governments 
to take action in certain eventuali- 
ties; that, however, I had remarked 
to you that, if one or other of the two 
Governments had grave reasons to fear 
an unprovoked attack on the part of a 
third Power, it would become essential 
to know whether it could count on the 
armed support of the other. 

Your letter answers that point, and 
I am authorised to state that, in the 
event of one of our two Governments 
having grave reasons to fear either an 
act of aggression from a third Power, 
or some event threatening the general 
peace, that Government would imme- 
diately examine with the other the 
question whether both Governments 
should act together in order to prevent 
tlie act of aggression or preserve peace. 
Tf so, the two Governments would de- 



58 



ckuix Goiivornemonts {leliberoraient sill- 
ies rnosures^qirils soraiont dispOvSes :\ 
prendre en commun ; si ces mesnros 
comportaient iino action, les deux Gou- 
vernenients prendraient aussitot en 
consideration les plans de lenrs etats 
majors et decideraient alors de la suite 
qui devi'ait etre donnee a ces plans. 
Votre sinceremeut devoue, 

PAUL CAISIBON. 



liberate'as to tiie measures wliich they 
would be prepared to take in common.; 
if tliose measures involved action, the 
two Governments would take into im- 
metliate consideration the plans of 
tlieir general staffs and would then de- 
cide as to the effect to be p:iven to 
tliose plans. 

Yours, itc, 

PAUL C AMBON. 



Enclosure 3 in No. 105. 
French }[iiitsk)' for Forevjn Affairs U M. Camhon,, French Ainhasoador 

in London. 



L'AKMltE allemande a ses a\ant- 
postes sur nos liornes-frontieres, hier ; 
par deux fois des patrouilles alle- 
niandes ont penetre sur notre tei'ri- 
toire. Nos avant-postes sont en re- 
traite a 10 kilom. en arriere de la fron- 
tiere. Les populations ainsi abandon- 
nees a I'attaque de I'armee adverse 
protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient 
a montrer a I'opinion publique et au 
Gouvernement britannique que Tagres- 
seur ne sera en aucun cas la France. 
Tout le If/ Corps de Metz renforce par 
line partie du. S'' venu do Treves et de 
Cologne occupe la frontierc de Metz au 
Luxeml)ourg. Le 15" Corps d'Armee 
de Strasbourg a serre sur la frontiere. 
Sous menace -d'etre fusilles les Al- 
saciens-Lorrains des pays annexes ne 
peuvent pas passer la frontiere ; des 
reservistcs par dizaines de millieis 
sont rappeles en Allemagne; c'est le 
dernier stade avant la mobilisation : 
or, nous n'avons rappele aucun reser- 
viste. 

Comme vous le voyez, I'Allemagne 
I'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos in- 
formations concordent pour montrer 
que les preparatifs aliemands ont com- 
mence samedi,* le jour memo de la 
lemise de la note autiichienne. 

Ces elements, ajouti's a ceux contenus 
dans mon telegramme d'hier, vous per- 
mettent de faire la preuve au Gou- 
vernement britannique de la volonte 
pacifique de I'un et des intentions 
agressives de I'autre. 



(Translation.) 

THE German Army had its advance- 
posts on our frontiers yesterday ; 
German patrols twice penetrated on 
to our territory. Our advance-posts 
arc withdrawn to a distance of 10 
kilom. from the frontier. The local 
population is protesting against being 
thus abandoned to the attack of the 
enemy's army, but the Government 
wishes to malce it clear to public 
opinion and to the British Government 
that in no case will France be the 
aggressor. The whole 16th corps from 
Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th 
from Treves and Cologne, is occupying 
the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg 
side. The 15th army corps from 
Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. 
The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are 
prevented by the threat of being shot 
from crossing the frontier. Reservists 
have been called back to Germany by 
tens of thousands. This is the last stage 
before mobilisation, whereas we liave 
not called back a single reservist. 

As you see, Germany has done so. 
I would add that all my information 
goes to show that the German prepara- 
tions began on Saturday,* the very 
day on which the Austrian note was 
handed in. 

These facts, added to those contained 
in my telegram of yesterday, will 
enable you to prove to the British 
Government tlie pacific intentions of 
the one party and the aggressive in- 
tentions of the other. 



* Sic : in original. The actual A'Ato of the preeentat.ion of the Austrian ultimatmii 
was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was da'ed Saturday, July 25, arrd 
it is clearly to the kttpi- document that referenoe is intended. 



No. 106. 
Sir }i. llodd, British Ambassador at li nne, to Sir Edirard Grey. — 
{liecnv d Jidy 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) ' Home, July 30, 1914. 

I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this 
evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct 



59 

exchange of views with the llussiau Government. But he had reason to be- 
lieve that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to 
Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, 
and was most anxious to avoid issue with us. 

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask 
the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views 
between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would 
consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria 
to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a 
guarantee that slie would neither deprive her of independence nor annex 
territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained 
in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that 
might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain 
from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of 
these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still 
time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour 
of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea 
of discussions between the four Powers was impossible. 



No. 107. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey, 
[Received Jidy 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Juhj 30, 1914. 

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Govern- 
ment to the communication* which you made to them through the German 
Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which 
the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and 
Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer 
yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to 
whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the 
Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by com- 
municating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian 
Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been 
returned. 

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" 
as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone 
so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated 
rather than otherwise. 

"• See No. 84. 



No. 108. 

Sir E. Goscheii, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edicard Grey. — 
(Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and modera- 
tion at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation 
against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at 
Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ball- 
platz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was 
being utilised by other Powers ; and if, as he learns is the case, military 
measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would 
be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite 
possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government 
would take some very serious step ; he was, in fact, just on the point of going 
to have an audience with the Emperor. 

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo- 
German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the 
Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at A^ienna, and when 
the Emperor was actually conforming to that request. 



60 

No. 109. 
Sir E. Goschen, British Amhassa lor at Berlin, to Sir Edward Greij. — 
(^/ieceived July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, IDU- 

I RJ'^AD to the Chancollor thi.s morning your answer to his iippeal for 
British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of 
yesterday.* Ilis Excellency u'ns so taken up with the news of the Russian 
measure's along the frontier, referred to in my immediately pi-eceding telegram, 
that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let 
him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he 
would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full 
of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I 
therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that 
it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official 
document. 



His Excellency agreed. 



ScHO No. 101. 



No. 110. 
Sir Edward Gre// to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassad,or at St. Btiershuryh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Officp., July 31, 1914. 

I LE^ARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by 
the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between 
the A.ustrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The 
Austria^n Ambas.so.dor at Sit. Petersburgh has also been instructed that he 
may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should 
give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss sug- 
gestions and any questions directly affectuig A ustro- Russian relations. If the 
Russian Government objeet to the Anstrians mobilising eiglit army corps, 
it might be pointed out that this is not too gre.at a number against 400,000 
Servians. 

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to 
show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations. 

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being 
resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage 
them. 

I informed thf^ German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I 
did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were 
put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. 



No. 111. 

Sir Edu-arxl Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Amhassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

1 iiOlr'E that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria 
and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto 
has beeii Austrian mistrust of Ser^dan assurances, and Russian mistrust of 
A.ustrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. 
It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution 
being found by Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, 
and 1 would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be poss'blc 
for the four disinterested Powers to ofler to Austria that they would under- 
take to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided 
that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian 
territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her 
willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers 
that tiiey would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of 
impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. .\11 Powers would of course 
su.spend further military operations or preparations. 

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal. 



61 

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany coukl get any 
reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria 
were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would 
be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petcrsl)urg!i and 
Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France v/ould not accept 
it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the conse- 
quences ; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became 
involved we should be drawn in. 

You can add this w'lon sounding CliancoHor or Scretaiy of State as to 
proposal above. 



No. 112. 

iSir A\ Goschea, British Aiiihassadcr at Berlin, to Sir Edur.ird (Jrey. — • 
[Received JvJy 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) ' Balm, July 31, 1914. 

ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from 
their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Russian army and fleet are be'ng 
mobilised. Chancellor tells me that " Kriegsgefahr "-^ will be proclaimed at once 
by German Government, as it can only be against Germ.any that Russian 
general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. 
His Excellency added in explanation that " Kriegsgefahr "* signified the taking 
of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations Avith a 
foreign country. 

This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to him to 
put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must 
certainly prepare for all emergencies. 

I asked him whetlior he could not still put pressure on the authorities at 
Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show 
themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied 
that last night he had begged Austria to reply to yoiir last proposal, and that 
he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian ]Minister for Foreign Affairs 
would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter. 

'' " Ininiim^uco of War."' 



No. 113. 

/b'i/' G. JJachaiKin, British Ambassador at St, Pi-.tershur.jh, to Sir Ediroixl 
Grey. — [Received^ Jidy 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Bt. Fetcrshurgh , Juhj '61, iyi4. 

IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation. 

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian 
Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to 
intervention of Powers, and that slie is rioving troops against Russia as well 
as against Servia. 

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military 
preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a ^tart. 



No. 114. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and 
Sir E. Gos::her.f British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of 
mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His I\Lijesty's Governuient, 
in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are 
prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power 
violates it. 

A similar request is being addressed to German (Frencii) Government. It 
is important to have an early answer. 



62 

No. 115. 

Sir Edward Greij to Sir F. ViUi.rs, Uriiish Minister at Bruf^seh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

IN view of existing treaties, j-ou should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French 
and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power. 

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain 
to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other 
Powers to uphold and observe. 

You should inform the Belgian Governmonb that an early reply is desired. 



No. 116. 
Sir Edivard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

(Telegraphic.) Foveiijii Office, Juhj 31, 1914. 

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.* 
Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British 
treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it 
was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly 
involving France, whereas m this case France is being drawn into a dispute 

which is not hers. -, ■ ■ .• , 

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor 

in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. 

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so 

told the French Ambassador, who has nrgcd His Majesty's Government to 

reconsider this decision. 

I have told him that we should not be justified m giving any pledge at the 

present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly 

there is a new development. 

* See No. 99. 



No. 117. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Audnissador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ 
(h'eceived Jidy ol.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

AT 7 o'clock this evening I wa.s sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
When I arrived the German. Ambassador was leaving his Excellency. 

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact 
that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, 
German Govc-rnment have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the 
Kussian Government required that llussian forces should be demobilised. 

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total 
mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within 
twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply 
Avith German demand. 

The Minister for Foreign Afi'airs asks me to communicate this to you, and 
enquires what, in these circumstances, will bo the attitude of England. 

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is 
going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Afl'airs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 v.u. 
in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will 
adopt in the circumstances. 

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. 

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any 
general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place. 



63 

No. 118. 

Sir M. de Biaisen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — 

{Received Jidy 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although 
Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, 
the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you 
that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on cither 
side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and 
the German Emperoi", and conversations were proceeding between Austrian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A 
general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my 
expressing my fear that Germany would raobihse, he said that Germany must 
do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian 
intervention on behalf of Servia, Au.stn.a-Hungary found it difficult to recognise 
such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of 
the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Amba.ssadors the Russian 
Government had stood behind Servia, and that a rompronii.se between the views 
of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although 
he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation n.s desperate, 
I could not get from him any suggestion for a sinnlar compromise in the 
present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian 
Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation. 

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere 
unduly witli Servia ; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the 
pre.sent Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views ; and that, as 
regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to peld to them as 
far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency 
is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace. 



No. 119. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Amhassador at Paris, 

Sir, Forefjn Office. Jxdy 31. 1914. 

M. CAMBON* referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir 
Arthur Nicolsonf this morning from the French Ambassador m Berlin, saying 
that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether w*^ would intervene which 
was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only derlare 
definitely on the side of Rus.sia and France, it would decide the German attitude 
in favour o^jcacc. 

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under 
the impression that we would not intervene. 1 had refused overtures to promise 
that wo should remain neutral. I had not oiUy dpfinitely dfclinwl to say that 
we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far thii- nioruing as to say to the 
German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we 
should be drav.n into it. That, of course, was not thH same thing as taking 
an ongngemciit to France, and I told M. C'amhon of it onl.v to show that we 
had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside. 

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday. 

I said that we had come to the conclus'on, in thf^ Cabinet to-day. that we 
could not give any pledge at the present time. Though wp should have to put 
our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up 
to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that 
any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further develop- 
ments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to 
take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality 
of Belgium might be, 1 would not say a deci.'Jive, but an important factor, in 
determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene 
or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood 
with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that 1 should ask 

* French Ambafsadar in London. 

t British Under Seoretory of St.;it© for Foreign Affairs. 



G4 

both France and Germany wlietlier eatli was prepared to undertake an engage- 
ment that she woukl not be the first to viohite tlie neutrahty of P>elgium. 

M. Cambon repeated his question wiietlier we woukl help i' ranee it Germany 
made an attack on her. 

I said that I couhl only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone 
at present, we could not take any engagement. 

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals 
that might have made for peace, "it could not be to England's interest that 
France should bo crushed by Germany. Wo should then be in a very diminished 
l)osition with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mi.stake in 
allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be 
repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question 
to the Cabinet again. 

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was 
some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could 
give was that wo could not undertake any definite engagement. 

I am, Sec, 

E. GREY. 



No. 1-20. 

*SVV G. Buchanan, J>rltisli Ambassador at ISt. PetershunjI), to Sir Edimnl 
(,'n'i/. — {luccioed Au'jnst 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) /S'f. rdcrshunjh, JuJu 31, 1914. 

Ml^'iSTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and 
asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best 
calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July* 
with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.t He trusted it would 
meet with your approval: — 

"Si I'Autriche consentiru a arreter marclie des ses troupes sur le territoire 
serbe, si, reconnaissant que lo conflit austro-serbe a assume le caractere d'une 
question d'interet europeen, clle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent 
la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche- 
Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte a ses droits d'litat souverain et a son 
indi'peudauce, la Kussie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante.''+ 

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor 
by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor 
ISii-holas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for 
the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His jNIajesty had then 
proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggres- 
sive character was concealed behind Russian military preparaticSs. So long 
as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that 
not a single man should bo moved across the frontier ; it was, however, of course 
impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already 
in progress. 

M. Sazonof^ said that undoubtedl.y there would be better prospect of a 
peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, 
where the atmosi)here was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that 
you woidd see your way to agreeing to this. 

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's 
Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely 
due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, 
and the Russian perMle wt;uld never forget the firm attitude adopted by 
Great Britain. 

* Sw No. 103. t See No. 97. 

+ TuANSi.ATiON. — "If Ai;sfcri.a will agroe to chock the advance of her troops on 
Servian territory ; if, rooognisiiig that the dispute between Ai'stria and Servia has 
assumed a character of Euroix'a.n intorest, sho wih allow the Great Powor.s to look 
into the matter and determine whe'ther Servia could sati-sfy the Austro-Himg-ariaii 
Governniont without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or lier indeiXMidence, 
Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." 

§ Rusc>ian Mmister for Foreia-ii Affairs. 



65 

No. V21. 
Sir /;'. (.,'<:schen, British Amhassador at Berlin, to Sir Edicard Grey. — 
{Ii'eceived Auijust 1.) 
(Tclv.'^rapliic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

iOUK telegram of 31st July.* ' 

I spent an hour witn Secretary of State urging liim most earnestly to 
accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe 
of a European war. 

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and 
appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impos- 
sible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had 
received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this com- 
munication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, 
unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government witliin twelve hours that 
she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and 
Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once. 

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult 
for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise m south as well. He 
replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation 
was only directed against Austria. 

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he 
thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and 
in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he 
repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had 
sent in their answer to the German demand. 

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the 
Emperor of Russia, ana the German Foreign Office had even up till la.st night 
been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussi(His — and tele- 
graphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising 
nature — but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything. 

» See No. 111. 



No. 122. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Amhassador at Berlin^ to Sir Edward Grey, — 
[Received August 1.) 
(Telegraphic.) Tiprlin, July 31, 1914. 

NEUTRALilTY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to 
Sir F. Bertie.* 

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the 
Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possilily answer. 1 gathered from 
what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose 
a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, 
and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer 
at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request. 

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that 
certain hostile acts have ah'eady been committed by Belgium. As an instance 
of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed 
under an embargo already. 

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, 
but the proipect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote. 

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany 
would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French 
Government. 

• See No. 114. 



No. 123. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Sir, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply* of the German 
Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very 

* See No. 122. 



great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. 
If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had 
been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and 
tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality 
of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be ex- 
tremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this coun.try. I said that we had 
been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised 
to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. 

He asked mc whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium 
neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. 

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were still free, and we were 
considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude 
would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality 
of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think 
that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. 

The Ambassador pressed me as to vrliether I could not formulate conditions 
on which we would remain neutrai. He even suggested that the integrity of 
France and her colonies might be guaranteed. 

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral 
on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. 

I am, &c., 

E. GREY. 



No. 124. 

Sh- F: Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, io Sir Edimird Grey.— 

{Received August 1.) 

^Telegraphic.) Farn, Juhj 31, 1914. 

ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent 
a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received 
me at 10.30 to-night at the .Elysee, where a Cabinet Clouncil was being held. 
He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality 
of Belgium which you instructed me to make. 

He told me tliat a communication had been made to you by the German 
Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobili- 
sation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious 
as to what the attitude of England v/ill be in the circumstances, and begs 
an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment 
possible. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is 
packing up. 

*■- Sop No. 114. 



No. 125. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edirard Grey. — 
[^Received' Atig^ist 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Prti/.s-, JuJ]) 31, 1914. 

MY immediately preceding telegram.* 

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as 
follows : — 

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and 
it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality 
that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence 
of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been giv^en several 
times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, 
and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance 
to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. 

* See No. 124. 



No. 12(5. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edu-ard Grey. — 
{Receiv.ul Awjnst 1 ) 

(Telegraph if.) Parf.s, Awjud 1, 1914. 

I HAVE had conversation witli the Political Director, who states tliat the 
German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the 
reason wliieli i))-omi)ted his communication of yesterday evening. It was 
pointed ont to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not 
been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that 
the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. 
It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the 
fact that Russia and Austria wei'e ready to converse, tlie Germ.an Government 
should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg!! 
requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at 
issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made 
a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested 
an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations 
and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. Tho Ambassador was in- 
formed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary 
))rocecding. 

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated 
that he had packed up. 



No. 127. 

Sir M. de Bunseii, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edirard Gh'ey. — 
[Beceived August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. 

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet. 



No. 12S. 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Ed/ward Grey. — 
[Received August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) 'Brussels, August 1, 1914. 

BELGIAN neutrality. 

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of jesterday* have been acted 
upon. 

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold 
her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. 
In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of 
the violation of the neutrality of their territorj', they believed that they were 
in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between 
Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect 
their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against 
emergencies. 

-» Sco No. 115. 



No. 129. 

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — [Received August 2.) 

(Translation.) 

Luxanhourg, 2 aout, 1914. Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. 

(Telegraphique.) (Telegraphic.) 

MINISTRE d'fitat du Luxembourg The Luxemburg Minister of State, 

Eyschen vient de recevoir par I'inter- Eyshen, has just received through the 

mediairo du Ministro d'Allemagne a German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de 

Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un tele- Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor 

gramme du Chancclicr de I'Empire of the German Empire, Bethmann- 



G8 

allemand Bctlimann-Hollweg disaut Holhveji;, to tlie effect that tlie niiiitary 

que les mesures niiiitaires a Luxem- measures taken in Luxemburg do not 

bourg ne constituent pas un acte hos- constitute a hostile act against Luxeni- 

tile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont burg, but are only intended to insure 

uniquement des mesures destinces h against a possible attack of a French 

assurer contre attaquc cventuelle d'une army. Full compensation will be paid 

armee fran9aisc. L'exploitation des to L\ixeml)urg for any damage caused 

voies ferrces affermees a I'Eminre l)y using the railways which are leased 

Luxembourg recevra comiilL-te indem- to the Empire, 
nite pour dommagos eventuels. 



No. 130. 
Sir EduHird Gretj to Sir E. Gosclici), Jlritiali Amha -sador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foicion Offlcc, August 1, 1914. 

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained 
steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant- 
ships. 

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been 
ordered. 

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that 
they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion 
here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on 
their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, 
and the German Government Avill, I hope, be equally careful not to take any 
step which would make the situation between us impossible. 



No. 131. 
Sir Edirard, Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ant-Jisscidor at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1911. 

I STILL believe that it might be possi|)le to secure peace if only a little 
resi:)ite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war. 

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria 
to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of med'a- 
tion which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which 
Russia originally suggested. 

Things ought not to bo hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready 
to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use 
of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. 
His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may 
precipitate matters. 



No. 132. 
Sir Edirard Greij to Sir E. Goschen, Byritish AmJtassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) I'oie'gn Office, AxtgiLst 1, 1914. 

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof* to Count Benckendorfft of the 
31st July communicated to me to-day: — 
" (Urgent.) 

'' Formule amendee conformement a la proposition anglai.se : ' Si Autriche 
consent a arreter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, recon- 
naissant que le conflit austro serbe a assume le caractere d'une question d'intcret 
europcen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que 
la Serbie pourrait accordcr au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter 

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
t Ruesian Amba.?3ador in London. 



69 

atteinte a ses droits d'litat souverain et a son independance, la Rnssie s'engage 
a conserver son attitude expectante.' "* 
(Above communicated to all the Powers.) 

Translation. — "Formula amended in accxwdance with the English proposal: 'If 
Aiistria consents to .stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising 
that the Austro-.Scrvian conflict hiis assumed the character of a question of European 
interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia 
can accord to the Austxo-Hungarian Goveriunent without injury to her sovereign rights 
as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.' " 



No. 133. 

/SVr Edirard Grey to iSir E. G'oschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) ^ Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

M. DE ETTER* came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram 
from M. Sazonof,t dated the 31st July, which are as follows: — 

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Govern- 
ment to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof 
replied by expressing his .satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the dis- 
cussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great 
Powers. 

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction 
of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It 
would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally 
to her military action on Servian territory." 

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) 

* Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London. 
t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



No. 134. 

6'ir E. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to iSir Edward Greij. — 
{Received Atujitit 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. 

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government 
were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility ; that it was only after a 
decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of 
Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which 
the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisa- 
tion, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will 
become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours 
behind Germany as regards German military preparations ; that the French 
troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 
10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, 
whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French 
frontier and have made incursions on it ; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, 
the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversa- 
tions with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace ; that 
French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the 
preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible 
to avoid war. 



No. 135. 

,S'ir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersbitryh. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian 
Government have informed German Government that though the situation has 
been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of 
the efforts of Engljind for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favour- 
ably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of 



76 

this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against 
Servia would continue lor the present, and that the British (lovcrnment would 
urge upon Kussian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed 
against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally caueei those delenstve 
military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by 
llussian mobilisation. 

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the con- 
sideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stoi» 
mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably 
the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian 
Government. 



No. 13G. 
iSh- F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edirard Grey. — 
[Received August 1.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, Augiisf 1, 1911. 

MINISTER of War informed military attache tliis afternoon that orders 
had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the Frencli Army. This 
became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system 
of " Kriegszustand,"* the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes 
are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining 
three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is 
mobilisation under another name. 

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps 
on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore 
of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been 
left between the French troops and Germ.an frontier. The French troops will 
not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained 
that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purpo.ses. 

* "State of war." 



No. 137. 
tSir Edward C>re]/ to Sir M. de Jyunsen, British, Amhassadm' at Vienna. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied 
me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs liad sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram 
his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial 
aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to 
inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the 
report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary 
intended to occupy the sanjak. 

CJount Mensdorff* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed 
me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at 
St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold,+ and gave me the substance. 

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom lie 
sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in 
St. Petersburgh that the "door had been banged " by Austria-Hungary on all 
further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promi.sed to do this. Count 
Berclitold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance 
wliieh had already been given at St. Petersburg!), to the effect that neither 
an infraction of Servian sovereign riglits nor the acquisition of Servian territory 
was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary. 

Special attention Avas called by Count ^lensdorff* to the fact that this tele- 
gram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh 
had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary. 

* ,\ustro-Hungairian .Ambas-ador in London. 

t Aiistro-Hungarian Minister for Foroign Affair;?'. 



71 

No. 138. 

;S'm' E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ 

{Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. 

YOUK telegram of to-day.* 

I have comiiuinicatcd the substance of tlie above telegram to tlie Secretary 
of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that tlie chief dispute was 
between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's 
ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss 
matters and Giermany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to mo 
only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a 
peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss 
was tlie result of German influence at A'ienna, and, had not Russia mobilised 
against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from 
answering Germany's demand that .she should demobilise, had caused Germany 
to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily 
imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months 
without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed 
and Russia had the numbers, and tiie safety of the German ICmpire forbade that 
Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all partf 
of her wide dom.inions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial 
Government had alloAved her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia 
had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the 
German representative at St. Petersburgh had been instructed within a certain 
time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must 
regard their lefusal to an ansvier as creating a state of war, 

'- Spc No. 131. 



No. 139. 

iSir G. BycJianan, British Ambassador at St. Fetcrshurgli , to Sir Edh-nrrd 

Grey. — [Received, Aur/ust *2.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Vetersburgh, Augv.xt 1, 1914. 

MY telegram of 31st July.* 

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the 
German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No 
progress whatever v.as made. 

In the evening M. Sazonoff had an interview with the Austrian Ambassa- 
dor, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to 
deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between 
An.stria-Hiingfuy and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. 
In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these 
relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were 
perfectly satisfactory ; but the real question which they had to solve at 'this 
moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the 
status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent 
State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the 
abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was 
a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question 
could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impos- 
sible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually 
unfortified town, to bombardment. 

. M. Sazonoft informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning 
of his conversation Avith the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that 
during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government 
that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. 
It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia 
as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. 
It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The ^lolicy of Austria 
had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she. 
could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German allv. 

* See No. 120. 

t Russian Minister for Foreign Affaira. 

D 



72 

Similarly the policy of Germany had been a-.-i equivocal and donblc-facoa policy, 
and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not 
know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was thi t her 
intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed unti. the 
moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany iwas 
unfortunate m her representatives in Vienna and St. Petcrsburgh : Jie 
former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had 
reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof* 
was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had mndc to avoid a war. 
No suggestion held out to him had been refused. Ho had accepted the pro- 
posal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for 
direct conversation between Austria and Russia ; but Germany and Austria- 
Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace inefiective by evasive 
rejilies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government 
to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate 
situation. 

M. Sazonof* added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my 
telegram of 31st .Tuly,t had been forwarded by the Russian Government to 
Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the 
frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hos- 
tilities first. 

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agree- 
ment of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised 
on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to 
do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. 

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
t See No. 120. 



No. 140. 

>Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edvard Greij. — 
(^Received Auijust 1.) 
(Telrgraphic.) Tarii^, Augnaf 1, 1914. 

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attache this evening, as 
he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress 
on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the 
French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by 
peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act. 



No. 141. 

Sir M, de Bimsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edvxird Grey. — • 
{Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, Avgnsf 1, 1914. 

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Aifairs. This after- 
noon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been 
informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that 
Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield 
to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Ger- 
many would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at 
Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too 
expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says 
that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that 
Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. 
There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than 
there is between Austria and Russia. Russia Mould, according to the Russian 
Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity 
and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. 
He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight 
concession. This time Russia v.ould fight to the last extremity. I agree with 
his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the 



first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. 
The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also 
desirod war from the first. 

14 is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the 
Mirister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, 
an., to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter 
are being considered. There is great anxiety to know wjiat England will do. 
I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment^ to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with 
the approval of Germany. 



No. 142. 

Sh' E. Gosc/ien, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
[Beceiiyed August 2.) 

(Telegraphic. ") Berlin, Augud 1, 1914. 

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy 
and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August. 



No. 143. 
Sir E. GoschfR, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grei/. — 
(Received Avjjust 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Aiirjust 1, 1914. 

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg. 
Your telegram of 1st August* acted on. 

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has 
promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed \vithout delay. 

* See Xo. 130. 



No. 144. 

Sir E. Goschen, Jtrifish Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grefj. — - 
{Received Atvgust 2,) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Avgxist 2, 1914. 

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian 
troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war. 



No. 145. 
Sir E. Gosch-'n, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
{Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. 

MY telegram of 1st August. ^^ 

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allotv 
British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must 
be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other 
foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines 
were being laid and other precautions being taken. 



See No. 145. 



No. 146. 
Sir F. J'illiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — 
[Received Atigust 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brusseh, August 2, 1914. 

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxembur; 
kas been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government. 

d2 



74 



No. 147. 
Minister of , State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) 

(Translation.) 



Luxembourg, Jc 2 auut, 1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

J'AI I'honneur do porter a la con- 
naissance de votre Excellence les laits 
siiivants : 

Dimanche, 2 aout, do grand matin, 
les troupes allemandes, d'apres les in- 
formations qui sont parvenues au Gou- 
vernement Grand ducal a I'heure ac- 
tuelle, ont peueHre sur le territoire 
luxembourgeois par les ponts de Was- 
serbillig et de Remichj so dirigeant 
specialement vers le sud du pays et vers 
la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du 
Grand Duche. Un certain nombre de 
trains blindes avec des troupes et des 
mimitions ont etc achemines par la 
voie de chemiu de for de Wasserbillig a 
Luxembourg, ou I'on s'attend de les 
voir arriver. D'un instant a I'autre, 
ces faits impliquent des actes mani- 
festement contraire a la neutralite du 
Grand Duche garantie par le Traite de 
Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement 
luxembourgeois u'a pas manque de 
protester energiquement centre cette 
agression aupres des representants de 
Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'Allemagne a 
Luxembourg. Une protestation iden- 
tique va etro transmise tel^graphiquc- 
ment au Secretaire d'fitat pour les 
Affaires Etrangeres a Berlin. 



Luxemburg, 
(Telegraphic.) August 2, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to bring to 
your Excellency's notice the following 
facts : — 

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very 
early, the German troops, according to 
the information which has up to now 
reached the Grand Ducal Government, 
penetrated into Luxemburg territory 
by the bridges of Wasserbillig and 
Remich, and proceeded particularly 
towards the south and in the direction 
of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand 
Duchy. A certain number of armoured 
trains with troops and ammunition 
have been sent along the railway line 
from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, 
where their arrival is expected. These 
occurrences constitute acts which are 
manifestly contrary to the neutrality 
of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by 
the Treaty of London of 1867. The 
Luxemburg Government have not 
failed to address an energetic protest 
against this aggression to the represen- 
tatives of His Majesty the German 
Emperor at Luxemburg. An identi- 
cal protest will be sent by telegraph to 
the Secretary of Stato for Foreign 
Affairs at Berlin. 



No. 148. 
Sir Edii-ard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914. 

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon* the following memo- 
randum : — 

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into 
the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against 
French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its 
power. 

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding 
His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of 
action by the German fleet takes place." 

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difticult issues to 
consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to 
declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and 
Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose 
fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make 
their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore 
thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to 
war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it 
did give a security to Frnnce that would enable her to settle the disposition of 
her own Mediterranean fleet. 

M. Cambon* asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told liim the 

* French Ambassador in London. 



75 

doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. 
He asked me what wo should say about the violation of the neutrality of 
Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter ; we were considering 
what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow— in effect, whether 
we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told iiim 
what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point. 

No. 149. 
Sir Echrord (IrPij to Sir E. Coschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Forcigp. Office, Avejust 2, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 1st August.* 

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the 
British steamship "Sappho " at Hambui-g and detained. Similar action appears 
to have been taken with regard to otlier British vessels loaded with sugar. 

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my tele- 
gram of 1st August, t I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to 
Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of 
their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified. 

* Sci^ No. 143. + So-c No. 130. 



No. loO. 

Sir E. Goscheii; Britislt Arahassadm' at Berlin, to Sir Edirard Grey. — 

{Received Augitst 3.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Augusl 3, 1914. 

YOUK telegram of 2nd August* : Detention of British ships at Plamburg. 

No information avniliiblc. 

■■• See No. 149. 



No. 151. 

Sir E. Villiers, British Alinister at Brussels, to Sir Edtrard Greij. — 
{Received Atigust 3.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brussrl.% Aurjust 3, 1914. 

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attache the 
sui^i^ort of live French arm3- corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply 
has been sent to-day : — 

"We are sincerely gra,t<?fu} to the French Goverjiment for offering eventual 
support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal 
to the guarantee of the Poweis. Belgian Government will decide later on the 
action which they may think it necessary to take." 



No. L32. 
Sir Edirard (Jrey to Sir E. Bertie, British Ambassador at Boris. 

Sir, Foreign Office, Awjust 3, 1914. 

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the ioliowing communi- 
cation : — 

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact t!iat ulti- 
matums had been presented to France and Russia, and to tlie question as to 
what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano* replied: — 

" ' The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might 
result, had, in the w-ords of the German Ambassador h.imself, an aggressive 
object. Both were tiierefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of 
the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.' " 

In making this communication, M. Cambont was instructed to lay stress 

* It<alian Miiiidter for Foreign Affair.s. 
T Fronch Ambassador in London. 



76 

upon tlic It.ilian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an 
aggressive war, and that, for this reason, tlie casus foderis under the terms of 
the Triple Alliance did not arise. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 



No. 153. 
/Sir Echrard Grey to Sir E. Gosclien, British Ainlassador at Berlin. 

(■Telegraphic.) Foreign Ofjicc, August 4, 1914. 

'J'riE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His ilajesty the King 
for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms: — 

" ilemembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that 
of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof 
of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the 
diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the 
integii y cf Belgium." 

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government 
have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality 
entail'ng free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain 
the independence and integrity of tiie kingdom and its ))ossessions at the con- 
clusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. 
An answer was requested within twelve hours. 

We also understand that Belgium has categoricalh' refused this as a flagrant 
violation of the law of nations. 

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a 
treaty to which Germa.ny is a party in common Vv'ith themselves, and nuist 
i-equcst an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be pro- 
ceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should 
ask for an immediate reply. 



No. 154. 

S'ir F. ViUicrs, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edicard Grey. — 
[Received August 4.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign. 
Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned 
IJroposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply 
to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the 
measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces. 



No. 155. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir F. VilHcrs, British Minister at Brussels. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

YUU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them 

by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality. His Majesty's Gcvern- 
X !j- j.i,_j. ii .„;ii „ ,•„* u„ «.,„ ..^,^„.,„ ;., *u^,., -"j xk_^ tx- 



if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for 
the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee 
to maintain their independence and integrity in future years. 

No. 156. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin . 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

I COjN'TINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the 
detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This 



77 

action on the part of tlie German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in 
direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your 
Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate 
release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given. 



No. 157. 
Geniian Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnoiosky , German Amhassudor in 
London. — (Commtmicated hij German Emhassy, Attjnst 4.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 4, 1914. 

PLEASE dispel any mistrust tliat may subsist on the part of the British 
Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal 
assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, 
under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this 
declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland 
strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably 
annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial 
acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that 
German army could not be exi^osed to French attack across Belgium, which 
was ijlanned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany 
had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of 
life or death to prevent French advance. 



No. 158. 

iS'ir F. Villlers, JJritisJi. Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edivard Greij. — 
{Receivedj Avgust 4.) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

MILITARY attache has been informed at War Office that German troops 
have entered Belgian territory, and that Liege has been summoned to 
surrender by sm^all party of Germans who, however, were repulsed. 



No. 159. 
Sir Edward Gren io Sir E. Gosc/ten, Jjritish Ambassador at JJerlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign- Office, August 4, 1914. 

WE hear that Germany lias addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if 
. necessarj', by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. 

Wo are also informed that Belgian territory' lias been violated at 
Gemnienich. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to 
give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply 
to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that 
request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this 
morning* be received hero by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed 
to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound 
to take all steps in their jiower to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the 
observance of a treaty to v.hicii Germany is as mucli a partj' as our.seIvcs. 

- Sre No. 153. 



No. ICO. 

Sir E. Goschen, iiritish Ambassador in Berlin, to tSir Edward Grey. 

Sir, London, August 8, 1914. 

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 
4th instant"' I called upon the Secretarj' of State that afternoon and enquired, 
in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government 

* See No. 153. 



78 

would refrain from violating Bcltriau neutrality. Herr von Jagow* at once 
replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in conse- 
quence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian 
neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the 
reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, 
namely, that thoy had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest 
way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour 
to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and 
death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could 
not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the 
fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great 
loss of time. This loss ot time would have meant time gained by the Russians 
for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was 
the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of 
troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow tiiat this fait accompli of the violation 
of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation 
exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw 
back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. 
He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it uas now impossible for 
them to draw back. 

Daring the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,t 
and, in complip.nce with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded 
to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless 
the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night 
that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier 
and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and 
inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have 
to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the 
observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves. 

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other 
answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the 
safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops 
should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of 
your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time 
when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, 
in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not 
possible even at the last moment that then- answer should be reconsidered. 
He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or move, his 
answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my 
passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversa- 
tion which ensued Herr von Jagow* expressed his poignant regret at the 
crumbling of his entire pob!cy and that of the Chrmcellor, which had been to 
make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer 
to France. I said that this sudden end to my v/ork in Berlin was to me also 
a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that 
under the circumstances and in view of our engagomonts, His Majesty's Govern- 
ment could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done. 

I then said that I should like to go and sec the Chancellor, as it might be, 
perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing Ir.m. He begged 
me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agit.ated. His Excellency at once 
began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. Ho said that the 
.step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree ; just for a 
^yQi.(j — " neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — 
just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make v.-ar on a kindred 
nation who desired nothing better than to bo friends with her. All his efforts 
in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the 
policy to which, as I knew, ho had devoted himself since his accession to office 
had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; 
It was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against 
two assailants. Ho held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events 
that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said 
that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow* wished me to undorstand 
that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to 

* Gei-man Secretary of State, 
t See No. 159. 



79 

advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish 
him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of " life and death " for 
the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do 
her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact 
simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements 
given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what 
price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought 
of that? " I liinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of conse- 
quences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engage- 
ments, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news 
of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding 
fuel to the flame by further argument. As 1 was leaving he said that the blow 
of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up 
to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and 
supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said 
that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just 
at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and 
cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts 
to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had 
brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, 
we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation 
from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one 
regretted this more than I. 

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew 
up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at 
the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that 
office, but apparently never despatched.* 

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, 
came to sec me. After expressing iiis deep regret that the very friendly official 
and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually 
whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said 
that such an authority on international law as he vvas known to be must know 
as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. 1 added that there were 
many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, 
war had not ensued ; but that in this case he would have seen from my instruc- 
tions, of which I had given Herr von Jagowt a written summary, that His 
Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock 
that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced 
to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann+ .said 
that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could 
not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night. 

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermanni left me, a flying sheet, issued 
by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had 
declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the 
assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's 
Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy 
was soon overpov.'ered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. 
We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, 
but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing- 
room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting 
unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happen- 
ing. Herr von Jagowt at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate 
force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the 
street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct 
unpleasantness occurred. 

After order had been restored Herr von Jagowt came to see me and expressed 
his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour 
of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to 
expre.ss. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that 
the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the 
Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he 
thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly 

* This telegram never roachcxl tho Foreign Office. 

+ German Secretary of State. 

+ German Under-Secretary of State. 



80 

not, until the morning." It was in consequence of bis decision to that effect that 
only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, 
as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract 
attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the " pestilential ' Tage- 
blatt,' " which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calcula- 
tions. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by 
gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but lie feit sure that 
that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no founda- 
tion whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes 
which had taken place. He feared that I would take home \yith me a sorry 
impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology 
could have been more full and complete. 

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His 
Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message : — 

" The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret 
for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you 
will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respect- 
ing the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old 
allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs tliat you will tell the King that he 
has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but 
that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself 
of those titles." 

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner 
of its delivery. 

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this 
trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow* and the 
officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same 
morning Count Wedel handed me my passports — Avhicli I had earlier in the day 
demanded in writing — and told me that he had been instructed to confer witli 
me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said 
that he had understood that I preferred the route via tlie Hook of Holland to 
that via Copenhagen ; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the 
former route, only I should liave to wait till the following morning. I agreed 
to this, and he said that 1 might be (luite assured that there would be no 
repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions 
would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have 
a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. 
He also brought me a charming letter from Ilerr von Jagow couched in the 
most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time 
allowed. 

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong 
force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while 
the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. 
We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted 
out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us 
at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that 
all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. 
A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier 
and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which 
thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us ; 
but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures 
we had really niathing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch 
frontier. 

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlii\ I should like 
to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of 
my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they 
worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the 
cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attaches, secretaries, 
and the two young attaches buckled to their work and kept their nerve with 
often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring 
for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and 
feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and su])])ort, often 
exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheer- 
fullv gave to me. 

I should also like to mention the gi-eat assistance rendered to us all by 

* German Secretary of State. 



81 

my American colleajiue, Mr. Gerard,* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting 
and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving 
the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could 
holii us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. 
He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some per- 
sonal risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in 
dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection 
of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and 
able hands. I have, &c. 

W. E. GOSCHEN. 
* American Ambassador in Berlin. 



No. ICl. 

/Sir J/, de Buiisoi, British A/nbasMilor 171 Vienna, to Sir Edtcard Grey. 
Sii'j London. September 1, 1914. 

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the 
outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than 
record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments. 

The delivery at Belgrade on the 2ord July of the Austrian note to Servia 
was {ireceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von 
Tschir-cky,* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words 
of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On 
the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Bumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews 
with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 
by whom he was left under tlie impression that the words of warning he had 
been instructed to sneak to the Austro-Huugarian Government had not been 
unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to 
contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. 
At the second of those interviews he was not even informed that the note was 
at that very moment being i^resented at Belgrade, or that it would be pub- 
lished in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under- 
Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same 
day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the 
time we were speaking. 

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was pre- 
paring that ho actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 
20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him 
to return. It nneht have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the 
allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh 
complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence 
of Count Berchtoldt during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency 
was left completely in the dai'k. As for myself, no indication was given mo by 
Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source 
that I received on the 15th Julv the forecast of what was about to happen 
which I telesraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this 
time the " Neue Freie Pressc " and other leading Viennese newspapers v.ere 
using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official 
'• Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, 
the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink 
from courses calculated to involve lier in grave European complications. 

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common 
con.sent it was at once stvled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia 
was neither expected nor desired, and wb.en, on the followinn; afternoon, it was 
at first rumnured in Viei^na that it had bc^n unco^ulitionally accepted, there 
was a mom-'nt of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, 
and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had 
lieen rejpct'Kl nnd tint Boron G'cslt hnd broken off rel'^tions at Belrjrade. 
Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and 
singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning. 

The dem'^nstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of 
organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry 
of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the 

* German Ambassador at Vienjia. 

+ A us tro -Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

:J: Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. 



82 

Rusiian Embassy were frustrated by the strong- guard of police which held the 
approaches to the principal embassies during tliose days. The demeanour of 
tlic people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities 
of tlic, Moiiarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, 
and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian 
;:tatesmen by wliom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, 
and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except i)resumably 
in pcrtions of tlie provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much 
disappointment in many quarters at tlie avoidance of war with Servia during 
the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan 
war. Count Bcrchtold's* ijeace policy had met with little sympathy in the 
Delegation. Now the flood-gates weie opened, and the entire people and press 
clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated 
Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the 
alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation 
at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few 
s:emed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans 
must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause 
of Aiistria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any 
country sliould place itself in her liath, or that questions of mere policy or 
prestige sliould be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had 
arisen to exa^t summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction 
had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that 
Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, 
influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort 
should have lieon made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the 
acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of 
the Servian c[ucstion by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and 
intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this 
cour,5c the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable 
conscciuence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and 
declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against 
Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and 
Russia again responded with results which h.ave passed into history. The 
fate of the i^roposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the pre- 
servation of peace is reeorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis. + 
On the 28th July I saw Count Eerchtold and urged as strongly as I could that 
the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commonst 
on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful 
settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a tele- 
frraohic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far ; Austria 
was" that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the confer- 
ence which you had suggested should take place between the less interested 
Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which 
must be settled directly between the two parties immediatciV concerned. 
I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that 
liostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to 
European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with 
Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed 
out that whereas Austria seemed to be making tliese the starting point of her 
])olicy. His Majesty's Government were bound to look at tlie question prhiiarily 
from'the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way 
the two countries might easily drift aiKirt. 

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the 
question in sight. He thoueht, however, tbat Russia would have no right to 
intervene after receiving liis assurance that Austria sought no territorial 
ngornndisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversa- 
tion that, thousrh. lie had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the 
s'^ttlement which had resulted from tlie ambassadorial conferences in London 
duriuf' the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the nermanency 
of that settlement, which was necessarily of a higldy artificial character, 
inasiiiuch as the interests which it sought to harmoni.se were in themselves pro- 
foundlv divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour 

* Austro-Hungariau Minister for Foreign Afl'airs. 

t "'Miso.€lla.nc-oa;.s. No. 6 (1914)." 

;■ Sec Haneard, Vol. 65, No. 107, colninns 931-933. 



83 

throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination 
of the Au.stro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia. 

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour 
to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr 
von Tsc'hirscky* abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French 
and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that eifect, and 
I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from tlie Austro- 
Hungarian Governni<>nt. 1 was, however, kept fully informed by JM. Schebeko, 
the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. 
M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian 
• Government to furnish Count Szaparyt with full powers to continue at St. 
Petersburgh th.e hopefid conversations which had there been taking place 
between the latter and M. Sazonof.+ Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, 
but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially 
mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko|j again, in a perfectly 
friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations 
at St. PetersbiH-gh. I^'rom now onwards the tension between Russia and Ger- 
many was muc'i greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the 
latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was 
informed by M. Schebekoll that Count Szapary+ had at In.-^t conceded the main 
point at issue by announcing to M. Snzonoft that Austria would consent to 
submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible 
with the maintenance of Sei-vian independence. M. Sazonof.I M. Schebekoil 
added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from 
the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that 
she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the 
communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,^ to the 
effect that Austria had neither "banged the door " on compromise nor cut oft 
the conversations."* M. Schebekoll to the end was working hard for peace. 
He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, § and he 
informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,t+ had responded in the 
same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would 
hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by 
negotiation, and M. Schebekoll repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept 
any reasonable compromise. 

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut 
short by the ti'ansfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct 
conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July 
by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ulti- 
matums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany 
declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. 
A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the 
greatest calamities in history. 

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M Srhpbekoll had been 
instructed to remain at his post till war should actually bu declared against 
her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th 
Augu.st when Count Berchtold§ informed the foreign missions at Vienna that 
"the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed 
to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of 
Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Ru.ssia had commenced 
hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war 
with Russia." 

M. Schebekoll left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro- 
Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be 
conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that h^? might be able to proceed to his 
own country, but was taken instead to the Smiss frontier, and ten days later 
I found him at Berne. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the i2th August. On the 
previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that 

* German Ambassador in Vienna. 

t Austro-Himgarian Ambiissador at St. Petersburgh. 

t Russian Mlnist-cr for Foreign Affairs. 

§ Austro-Huntrarian Minis-ier for Foreign Affairs. 

II Russian Ambassador in Vienna. 

H Aiistro-Hunfjariaii Ambassador in London. 

** See No. 137. 

tt Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 



84 

Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully 
cleared up Avhen I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received 
from Count IJerchtold* the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were 
being moved to Alsace. Tlie next day tliis statement was supplemented by a 
further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had 
no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none 
were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a 
way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two 
statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to 
him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from liis Government. The French 
Ambassador's d(>parture was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but- 
his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by 
the Cliief IJurgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of 
the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a 
revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated. 

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by 
special editions of the newsjiapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract 
of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's 
speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as 
the text of the German idtimatum to Belgimn. Otherwise few details of the 
great events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse " was violently 
insulting towards England. The " Fremdenblatt " was not offensive, but little 
or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the 
violation of lielgium neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alterna- 
tive but to take part in the war. 

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, luit scarcely 
mentioned in the newspapers. 

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the 
previous day pi'cparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, 
but adding that, Austria l)eing iniderstood to be not yet at that date at war 
with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make 
any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You 
stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected 
Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required ))y 
diplomatic usage. 

On Thui-sday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your 
telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count 
Mensdorff,t at the request of the French Government, tiiat a complete rupture 
had occurred ])etween France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had 
declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that 
Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a 
direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France 
in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in con- 
clusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist 
between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August. 

After seeing Mr. Penfteld, the United States Ambassador, who accepted 
immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would 
take charge pi'ovisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the 
unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with iNlr. Theo Russell, 
Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold* 
received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did 
not seem to be luiprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count 
Mensdorfft had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His 
Excellency received my commu.nication Avitli the courtesy which never leaves 
him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good 
friends as Austria and England into Avar. In point of fact, he added, Austria 
did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations 
with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how cir- 
cumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict ui)on us. We both avoided use- 
less argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration 
the case of ihe numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and 

* Austro-Hiuigariiiu Minister for Foreign .'Vffairs. 
f A'jslro-Hungarian Amba.ssarlor in London. 



85 

other places throughout the country. I had ah-eady had some correspondence 
with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and 
promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of 
mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to IMr. Phillpotts, till 
then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being 
left by me at the Embass.y in the capacity of Cliarge des Archives. He pre- 
sumed a similar privilege would not ))e refused in England if desired on behalf 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with 
sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite 
nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his 
Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects 
to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that 
His IMajesty would pass through these sad times with nnimpaired health and 
strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message. 

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed 
the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the 
arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course 
of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take 
leave of Ladj' de Bunsen at the embassy. We left tho railway station by special 
train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count 
Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The 
journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We 
reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. 
At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on 
the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was 
caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample 
measures had been taken to x^reserve us from molestation as well as to provide 
us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had 
desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable con- 
ditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of 
consideration due to His INIajesty's representative. I was accompanied by my 
own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and 
efficient help in trj-ing times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss 
Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation 
during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, 
on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by 
the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy 
conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd 
August. 

I have, &c., 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN, 



PART il. 



SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 



(1) Sii' Edward Gicy (August 3, 1914) 
(*2) Sir Edward Grey (Auo-ust ?>, 1914) 

(3) Mr. Asqiiilli (August. 4, 1914) ... 

(4) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914) 

(5) Mr. Asquith (Augu.st G, 1914) ... 



Page 

89 
97 
97 
98 
98 



PART II. 

SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 



(1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 

AUGUST 3, 1914. 

Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for tliis 
country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly 
that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state 
of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Eurojie cannot be preserved. Russia 
and Germany, at auy rate, have declared war upon each other. 

Before I procet'd to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would 
like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our 
attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under 
what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming 
to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have 
consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, 
to preserve peace. The House maj^ be satisfied on that point. We have always 
done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are con- 
cerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Through- 
out the Balkan crisis, by general admission, Ave worked for peace. The co- 
operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace 
in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in 
adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion 
bpfore they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace 
was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble ratiier 
than accentuate differences rapidly. 

In the ])reseut crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe ; 
because there has 1)een little time, and there has been a disposition — at any 
rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell — to force things rapidly to 
an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the 
result of that is iJiat the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally 
are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on tliat, and to comment 
on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in 
favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because 
I would like the House to apiiroach this crisis in which we are now from the 
l)oint of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free 
from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved. 

We shall publish ])apers as soon as we can regarding what took place last 
week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published 
I luive no doul.'t that to every human being they will make it clear how 
strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that 
they will <>nabl(> i)'H)])le to form their own judgment as to what forces were at 
work which operjsti'd against peace. 

I conij first, now, to the (juestion of British obligations. 1 have assured the 
House — and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once — that 
if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons 
and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British 
attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement Avhich we should 
spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into 
that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will 
deal with that point to clear the ground first. 

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and 
what came to be called the Triple Eiitetitc, for some years past. The Triple 
Entcn'c, was not an alliance — it was a diplomatic group. The House will 
remember that in 1908 there was a crisis — also a Balkan crisis — originating in 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tlie Russian Minister, M. 
Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit 
wai planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being 
a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this 
country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic 



90 

support. More was nover askod from us, more was never given, and more was 
never promised. 

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of 
anything more than diplomatic support — up till yesterday no promise of more 
than diplomatic support. Now 1 must make this question of obligation clear 
to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was 
the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great 
difficulty to His Maje.■^ty's Government when a general election was in progress, 
and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I — spending three days a 
week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign UfHce — was asked the 
question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and 
Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise 
nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole- 
hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my 
opinion, if war was forced upon Franco then on the question of Morocco — a 
question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country 
and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides — that if out of 
that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public 
opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France. 

I gavf- no promise, but I exp- essed that opinion during the crisis, as far as 
I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the 
German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats ; 
but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the Frencli 
Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, 
"If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, 
should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed 
support which j'ou cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give 
that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some 
conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." 
There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to 
take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed 
beween military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict 
in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would 
give that support when the time arose. 

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in 
prospect ; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. 
It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister ; I consulted, I remember. 
Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War ; and the present 
Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the 
most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that 
it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact 
that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later 
on — I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to 
be of importance — but later on it ^'n^; 1)rought to the knowledge of the Cabinet. 

The Agadir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — and throughout that I 
took precij^ely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, 
in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that 
we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in 
the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were 
not binding upon the freedom of either Government ; and on the 22nd of 
November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will 
now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms 
in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will 
be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between 
militarv nnd naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the 
Governments : — 

" My dear Ambassador, 

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and 
military expprts have consulted together. It has always been 
understood that su'^h consultation does not restrict the freedom of 
eitlier Government to deride at any future time Avhether or not to 
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation 
lietueen experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engage- 
ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency 
that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for 



91 

instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present 
moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 
" You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave 
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might 
become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon 
the armed assistance of the otlier. 
" I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an 
unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened 
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other 
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggres- 
sion and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would 
be prepared to take in common." 
Lord Chaiirs BeresfonL— What is the date of that? 

Sir E. t.'rri/.— The 2:2nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for 
the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear 
that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly 
justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line 
sliould be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the 
Government remained perfectly free, and a fortiori, the House of Commons 
remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view 
of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of 
Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, 
and say v.hat I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do 
not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic 
relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the 
Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the 
freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should bo. 

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the 
present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In 
the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France — 
a dispute Vihich concerned France and France primarily — a dispute, as it 
seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and 
France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France 
diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic 
support ; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to 
stand with France diplomatically in that question. 

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with 
regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything witli which we 
had a special agreement with France ; it has not originated with anything 
which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between 
Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence — no 
Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute 
with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. 
They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite 
alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that 
obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not jDarties 
to the Franco-Ilussian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that 
alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground 
with regard to the question of obligation. 

I now conie to what we think tlie situation requires of us. For many years 
wc have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the 
feeling in the House — and my own feeling— for I spoke on the subject, I think, 
when the late Government made their agreement with France — the warm and 
cordial feeling resulting from the fact tliat tliese two nations, who had had per- 
petual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away ; I remember 
saying, I think, tliat it seemed to me that some benign influence liad been at 
work to iiroduce the cordial atmosphere that had made that i)ossil)le. But how 
far that friendship entails obligation— it has been a friendship between the 
nations and i-atified by the nations — how far that entails an oI)ligation, let every 
man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of 
the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish 
to TU'ge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they 
should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively-, may 
judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my 
own feeling in the matter. 

The French fleet is now in th.o JMediterranean, and the northern and westc-n 



92 

coasts of France are absolutely undef ended. The French fleet being concen- 
trated in the Mediterranean, the situation is A'ery different from what it used 
to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has 
given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. 

The 1^'rench coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the 
Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the 
feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. 
JMy own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not 
sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English 
Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we 
could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, 
Avith our arms folded, looking on disi)assionately, doing nothing. 1 believe that 
would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if 
these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which Avould spread 
with irresistible force throughout the land. 

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point 
of view of British interests, and it is on that that 1 am going to base and justify 
what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this 
moment, what is France to do v/ith her fleet in the JNIediterranean i" If she 
leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her 
northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German 
fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life 
and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet 
is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We arc in the presence of a European 
conflagi-ation ; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of 
it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, 
saying, " No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this con- 
flict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; 
and let us assume that the consequences — which are already tremendous in v>'hat 
has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace— in fact, equally 
whether countries are at peace or at war— let us assume that out of that come 
consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in 
defence of vital British interests, we should go to war ; and let us assume — which 
is quite possible— that Italy, who is now neutral — because, as I understand, she 
considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a 
defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise — let us assume that consequences 
which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own 
interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we 
are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight — what then will 
be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical 
moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes 
in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country. 

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any parti- 
cular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. 
What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean 
which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Medi- 
terranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships 
to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this countrj' from our nega- 
tive attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from 
the point of view of British interests. Wo feel strongly that France was entitled 
to know — and to know at once — whether or not in the event of attack upon her 
unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British sup- 
port. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday 
afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the follo\\ing statement : — 

" I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into 
the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile opera- 
tions against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give 
all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject 
to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of 
Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His ^Majesty's Govern- 
ment to take any action until the above oontingency of action by the 
German fleet takes place." 
I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as 
entailing immediate ag^^ressive action on our part, but as binding us to take 
aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly 
from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal 



93 

way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we 
would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack 
the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came 
to the House, but it is far too narrov/ an engagement for us. And, Sir, there 
is the more serious consideration— becoming more serious every hour — there is 
the question of the neutrality of Belgium. 

T shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in 
regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a 
treaty with a historj'— a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was 
war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium 
arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck 
gave an assurance to Belgium that— confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in 
writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty 
in existence— that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the 
neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would 
be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition 
in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacrcdness of these treaty rights. 

What was our own attitude .f^ The people who laid down the attitude of the 
British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. 
Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, 
used these words. He said : — 

" We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that 
we could not think this country was bound either morally or inter- 
nationally, or that its interests were concerned in the nmintenance 
of the neutrality of Belgium ; though this course might have had 
some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, 
though it might liave saved us from some immediate danger, it is a 
course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to 
adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the 
country's honour or to the country's interests." 
Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later : — 

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor 
would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the 
nature of the obligations of that treaty ; but I am not able to sub- 
scribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what 
plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence 
of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether 
of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when 
the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authori- 
ties upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, 
such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palnierston, never to my knov.ledge 
took tliat rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable 
view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an 
existing guarantee in force is, of necessity, an important fact, and 
a weighty element in the case, to which we arc bound to give full 
and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, 
the force of whicli v/c must all feel most deeply, and that is, the 
common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any 
Power whatever." 
The treaty is an old treaty — 1839 — and that was the view taken of it in 1870. 
It is one of those treaties Vv'hich are founded, not only on consideration for 
Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who 
guarantee the lieutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, 
as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less 
serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than 
was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870. 

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When 
mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important 
element in our policy — a most important subject for the House of Commons. 
I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to 
say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German 
Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect 
the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French 
Government this reply :— 

" The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power 



94 

violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the 
necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act other- 
wise. This assurance has been given several times. The President 
of the Republic spolce of it to the King of the lielgians, and the 
French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance 
to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day." 
From the German Government the reply was : — 

■' The Secretary of State for Foreign Ahairs could not possibly give an 
answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.' 
Sir Edward Goschen, to whom i had said it was important to have an answer 
toon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German 
Minister for i'oreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that 
he ratiier doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might 
give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of dis- 
closing, to a certain extent, part of tlieir plaji of campaign. I telegraphed at 
the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following 
reply from Sir Francis Villiers : — 

" Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her 
neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so 
informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the viola- 
tion of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a posi- 
tion to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium 
and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their 
intentions ; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against 
emergencies." 

It now appears from the news I have received to-day — wliicli has come quite 
recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate 
form — that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object 
of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition 
that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. 
Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, 
I do not wish to say all tliat one would say if one were in a position to give 
the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were 
sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee Avere given 
that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content 
us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obliga- 
tions we had in Belgian neutrality. 

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following 
telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King — King 
George : — 

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and 
that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 
1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I 
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your 
Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 
Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can 
diplomatic interveiition do now? We have great and vital interests in the 
independence — and integrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium is 
compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the 
situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her 
neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States 
in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they 
should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, 
not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be inter- 
fered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of 
those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its 
neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever 
the integrity may be, the independence will be gone. 

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought 
about the independence of Belgium. It W'ill be found in "Hansard," volume 
203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the 
context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any 
difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said: — 

" We have an interest in the indei)endence of Belgium which is wider 
than that which we may have in the literal operation of the 
guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under 



95 

the circiimstaiicos ol the case, this countrj'. endowed as it is witli 
iiiHucnce and power, would qiiieily sta,nd by and witness the perpe- 
tration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, 
and thus become participators in tlie sin." 
No, Sir, if it bo the ease tiiat there has been anytliing in the nature of an 
ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, 
whatever may have been ottered to her in return, her independence is gone 
if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will 
follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider 
what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of lile and death, 
beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to 
the will and power of one greater than herself — consequences which I do not 
anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself 
with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so oftcn-- 
still, if that weie to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating 
influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Glad- 
stone s words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common 
interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power? 

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, 
and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it 
intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point 
of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of 
honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever 
material force we niiglit have at the end, it would be of very much value in 
face of the respect that we should liave lost. And do not believe, whetjier a 
great Pov.'er stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at 
the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, 
which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to 
protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more 
than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. 

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are 
in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because 
the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. 
Continental nations engaged in war — all their populations, all their energies, 
all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle — they cannot carry on the 
trade with us that they are carrying on in times of i^eace, whether we are 
parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that 
at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be 
in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what 
had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of 
Europe opposite to us — if that had been the result of the war — falling under 
the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position 
would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put 
the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure 
of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at 
present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its 
utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will l^ad if they are 
undisputed. 

I have read to the House the only engagem.ents that wc have yet token 
definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to 
say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expedi- 
tionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken 
place; mobilisation of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no 
engagement, because I feel that — in the case of a European conflagration such 
as this, unprecedented, w^ith our enormous responsibilities in India and other 
parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown 
factors — wo must take very carefully into consideration the use which wc make 
of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know hov.- we 
stand. One thing I would say. 

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ir.l.and. The 
general feeling throughout Ireland— and I v/ould like this to bo clearly under- 
stood aliroad — does not make the Irish question a consideration which wo feel 
we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far \rc have at 
present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and 
I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition 
of the neutrality of Belgium. 

What other policy is there before the Honse? Tliere is hut one way in v.hich 



96 

tlie Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside 
tliis war, and tiiat would be that it should immediately issue a iiroclamation of 
unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment 
to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We 
have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any uncon- 
ditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satis- 
factory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the iw«e of all the forces 
in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing what- 
ever to do with this matter " under no conditions— tiie Belgian treaty obliga- 
tions, the possible i:>osition in the Mediterranean, with damage to British 
interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France — 
if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and 
to say we would stand aside, we sliould, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good 
name and reputation before the world, and shoidd not escape the most serious 
and giave economic consequences. 

iMy object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place 
before tlie House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after 
M'hat I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have 
given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we 
are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have 
at any moment — we know not how soon — to defend ourselves and to take our 
part. AVe know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have 
announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort 
to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use 
of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, 
we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First 
Lord of the Admiraltj^ have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the 
efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and 
never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the iiov.er of the 
navy to i^rotect our commei'ce and to protect our shores. The thought is with 
us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no countiy in Europe 
will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The 
amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to ou.r trade is infinitesimal, 
comparetl with the amount of harm that must be doiie by the economic con- 
dition that is caused on the Clontinent. 

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding 
what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to 
the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which 
we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prejiared to face 
that situation, and that shoidd it develop, as probably it may develop, we w^ill 
face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last 
moment. How hard, how i^ersistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace 
last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it. 

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now 
face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to 
unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the Hoiise at large in pro- 
ceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be 
forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe 
the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time 
to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria 
and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of 
the quarrel l)etween Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany wo know are 
at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany 
is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been 
happening on the French frontier. AVe do not know that the German Ambas- 
sador has left Paris. 

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the con- 
dition of the war, it is most difficult to descrii»e what has actually happened. I 
wanted to bring out tlie underlying issues which would affect oiu' own conduct, 
and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before 
the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, 
to take our stand upon those issues, then I })eUeve, when the country realises 
what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending 
dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavom-ed to describe to the 
House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, 
but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the 
whole country. 



97 

(2) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE 
HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914. 



Germany and Belgium. 
I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which 
was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is 
information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to 
the following effect : — 

" Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to 
Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian terri- 
tory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom 
and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, m case of 
refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours 
was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack 
on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of 
nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacri- 
fice the honour of a nation. Conscious ot its duty, Belgium is 
firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means." 
Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into 
grave consideration the information which it has received. I make no further 
comment upon it. 



(3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME AflNISTER IN THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914. 

Mr. Bonar Law.—l wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any 
statement that he can now make to the House? 

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asqiiitli). — In conformity with the statement of 
policy made here by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a 
telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. 
It was to this efl'ect : — 

" The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King 
for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's 
Government are also informed that the German Government has 
delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly 
neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territoi'y, and 
promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the king- 
dom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening m 
case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was 
requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium 
has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of 
nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against 
this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common 
with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand 
made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her 
neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an 
immediate reply." 
We received this morning from our Minister at Brvissels the following 
telegram : — 

"German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government 
have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the 
Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be 
comiJelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures 
considered indispensable in view of the French menaces." 
Simultaneously — almost immediately afterwards — Ave received from the 
Belgian Legation here in London the following telegram: — 

"General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich 
(near Aix-la-Chapelle).'^ 
Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has pene- 
trated still further into Bf-lgian territory. We also received this morning from 
the German Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign 
Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms : — 
"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British 
Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most posi- 



08 

tively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with 
Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian 
territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that 
we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her 
neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgic 
territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions 
at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that 
German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, 
which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable informa- 
tion. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, 
it being for b.er a question of life or death to prevent Frencii 
advance." 
I liave to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government: We cannot 
regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply 
t ) it, ro])eat:>d the request we made last week to the German Government, that 
they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was 
given to us and to Belgium by France last week. We have asked that a reply 
to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this morning — 
which I have read to the House — should be given before midnight. 



(4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF 
C0M;\I0NS, AUGUST 5, 1914. 
Mr. Bcniar Law. — May I ask the Prime IMinister if he has any information 
he can give us to-day? 

Tlic rriiiic Mini.ilrr. — Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 
7 o'clock last evening, and s'nce 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed 
between Germany and ourselves. 

We have loceived from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram : — 
"I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs" 
—that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs— 

"a note of which the following is a literal translation: — 
" ' Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Govern- 
ment that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into 
Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty. 
'•' ' Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all moans in their 

power. 
"'Belgium appeals to Great Britain and Franco and Rus.'^ia to co- 
operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory. 
" ' There would be concerted and common action with the object of 
resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Bel- 
gium, and at the same time of guarding the maintenance for future 
of the independence and integrity of Belgium. 
" ' Belgium is happy to be able to declare that slie will assume defence 
of her fortified places.' " 
We have also received to-day from tlie French Ambassador here the follow- 
in" telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at 
Brussels : — 

"The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the 

French military attache to prepare at once for the co-operation and 

contact of French troops Avith the Belgian army pending the residts 

of the appeal to the guaranteeuig Powers nov/ being made. Orders 

have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to 

regard movements of French troops as a violntion of the frontier." 

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House. 

but I take tlie opportunity of p;iving notice that to-morrow, in Committee of 

Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of 100,000,000/. 



(5) STATE.MENT BY THF. PRIME IVHNISTER IN THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, AUCxUST (>, 1914. 
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding 
£100,000,000. be granted to His Majesty, beyond tlie ordinary grants of Parlia- 
ment, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending 
March 31st, 191o, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the 



99 

country, for the conduct of Naval and ^Military operations, for assisting the food 
supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business com- 
munications, .whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or other- 
wise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the 
existence of a state of war." 

The I'rime Minister {Mr. Asquith). — In asking the House to agree to the 
resolution which Mr. (Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, 
because I do not tliink it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again 
which was covered by my right hoii. friend the Foreign Secretary two or tliree 
nights ago. He stated— and I do not think any of the statements he made are 
capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered — the grounds upon 
wliich, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His IMajesty's 
Government have been conipelled to put this countiy in a state of war with 
what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. 
But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which 
are now in the hands of hon. jNIembers, will, I think, show how strenuous, how 
unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to 
have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe 
an lionourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which 
occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the 
acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend 
that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers 
are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, 
unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, 
and I will add i^osterity and history, will accord to him what is, after all, the 
best tribute that can be paid to any statesman : that, never derogating for 
an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he 
has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest 
interest of all countries — universal peace. These papers which are now in the 
hands of hon. Members show something more than that. They show what were 
the terms whicli were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that 
not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will 
read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which 
passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The 
terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the com- 
munication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 
29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper.* I think I must i-efer to them for 
a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and 
Russia, Sir Edward Goschen goes on: — 

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neu- 
trality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the 
main principle which govei-ned British policy, that Great Britain 
would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict 
there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Ger- 
many aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were cer- 
tain, every assiu'ance would be given to the British Government that 
the Imperial Government " 

Let the House observe these words — 

"aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should 
they prove victorious in any war that might ensue." 
Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question:— 

"I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies " — ■ — 

What are the French colonies H They mean every part of the dominions and 
possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe — 

" and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that 
respect." 
Let me come to wha.t, in my mind, personally, has always l)een the crucial, and 
almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States :— 
" As regards Holland, however. His Excellency said that so long as Ger- 
many's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the 
Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government 
an assurance that she would do likewise." 
Tlion we come to Belgium :— 

"It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might 
bo forced to enter upon in Belgium, l)ut, when the war was over, 
Belgian integrity would lie respected if she had not sided against 
Germany." 

* See Part II, No. 85, page 64. 



100 

Let the House observe the distinction l)et\veen tliose two cases. In regard to 
HoHand it was not only independence and intcgritj' but also neutrality; but in 
regard to JJelgium, tliere was no mention ot neutrality at all, nothing but an 
assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity ot' Belgium would 
be respected. Then His Excellency added : — 

"Ever since he had been Chancellor the ol)ject of his policy had been to 
bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these 

assurances '' 

the assurances I have read out to the House — 

"might form the basis of that understanding which he so much 
desired." 
^Vhat does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the 
object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling 
against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the 
British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount toH In 
the first place, it meant this : That behind the back of France— they were not 
made a party to these communications — we should have given, if we had assented 
to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful vyar, 
the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What 
did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in 
these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of 
her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have 
given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, with- 
out her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our 
obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country 
has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most jjathetie appeal addressed 
by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy tiie man who can read that appeal 
with an luimoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What 
would have lieen the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spec- 
tacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to 
get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obliga- 
tions? What are we to get in return? A promise — nothing more ; a promise 
as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed 
— I am sorry to haA'e to say it, but it must be put upon record— given by a Power 
which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own ti-eaty 
and inviting us to do the sanu^. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, 
we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we 
slioidd have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I 
am glad, and I tliink the country will be glad, to turn to the reply Avhich my 
right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more 
salient passages. This document. No. 101 of my Paper,* puts on record a week 
ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British 
people. My right lion, friend says : — 

"His ^Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chan- 
cellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on 
sTich terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while 
French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany 
does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From 

the material point of view '' 

My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language: — 

"such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further terri- 
tory in Europe being taken from her, could be so (-rushed as to lose 
her position as a Great Pov.-er, and become subordinate to German 
policy." 
That is the material aspect. But ho proceeded :^ 

" Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this 
bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from 
which the good name of this country would never recover. The 
Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away v.'hatever obligation 
or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgiu.m. We could 
not entertain that bargain either." 
He then says :— 

"We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem 
to us to require."' 
And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate: — 

"You should . . , add most earnestly that the one way of main- 
taining the good relations between England and Germany is that 

* Sec Tart II, No. 101, pago 77. 



101 

thcv should continue to work together to preserve the peace of 
Europe. , '. .. For that object tliis Government will work in that 
way with all siiicenty and good will. 
If tho peace cf Euro^^e can bo preserved and the present crisis safely 
passed, mv own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to 
wliich Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that 
no aggressive or hostile pr.licy would be pursued against her or licr 
allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately, i 

have desired this and worked for it" 

The statement was .never more true — 

"as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany 

having a corres- ending object, our relations sensibly improved. 

The idea has K ..erto been too Utopian to form the subject of 

definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute 

than anv that Europe has gone through for generations, be sately 

passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow 

may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the 

Powers than has been possible hitherto." 

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing 

language the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to 

appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it ; can 

anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great 

provocation — and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we 

might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer — 

can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, 

wjio had already earned the title — and no one ever more deserved it — of Peace 

Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that 

beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose? I am entitled to say, and I do 

so on behalf of this country — I speak not foi a party, I speak for the country 

as a whole — that we made every efl'ort any Government could possibly make for 

peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? 

Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible 

incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and 

especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There 

is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days — more trying 

perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass 

through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that 

time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, 

even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the 

moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to 

posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we 

took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility 

which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if — in spite of all our efforts to 

keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the 

result, if the issue be decided in favour of war — we have, nevertheless, thought 

it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House 

may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will 

believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause. 

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the 
first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it 
had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, 
would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which 
no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are 
fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material 
force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the develop- 
ment of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nation- 
alities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the 
arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any 
nation ever entered into a great controversy — and this is one of the greatest 
history will ever know — with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that 
it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish 
interest, but that it ia fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of 
which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only 
of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challengo 
this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that 
all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of 
which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object 
may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee — to 
make the very unusual demand upon it — to give the Government a Vote of 
Credit of 100,000,000/. I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not 
wish it. into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supple- 



102 

mentary Estimates and all tlie rarities and refinements which arise in that 
connection. There is a much higliei point of view than that. If it were neces- 
sary, 1 could justify, upon'purely technical grounds, the course we propose to 
adopt, hut I am not going to do so, hecause I think it would he foreign to the 
temper and disjjosition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do 
call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the 
past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military opera- 
tions, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confi- 
dence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this 
money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not 
only for strictly naval and militai\y operations, but to assist the food supplies, 
promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications — 
whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise — for the 
relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of 
a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to 
extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. 
It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for 
it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the 
House. I think it would be a great pity — in fact, a great disaster — if, in a 
crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision — provision far 
more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that ])revailed in the 
old days — for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure 
which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must 
entail on any one of them. 

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War — a position 
which I held until this morning — for a Supplementary Estimate for men for 
the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on 
that personal matter that I took ujion mjself the office of Secretary of State for 
.War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in 
the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of 
things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an 
end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case ; in fact, 
I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in wliich the 
spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in 
the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that 
office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair 
to th.e Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should 
divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that the 
First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments 
and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cal)inet, should 
give, as he coidd only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army 
in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and 
administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that groat public spirit 
and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped 
into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His 
association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose 
must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political 
opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public 
call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the 
most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confi- 
dence of all ]iarties and all opinions. 

I am asking on his luOialf for the Armv, power to increase the number of 
men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 
500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are 
encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the 
necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send 
ns certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, 
spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their 
possibilities, both in men and in monev, every help they can afford to the 
Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, 
while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from 
the outlying members of her family. 

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. 
In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our 
case or in my general desorintion of the provision we think it necessary to make, 
beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not mv purpose — it is not the purpose 
of any patriotic man — to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite inter- 
rational animosities. Tlie occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great 
duty to ])erforTn, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that 
Parliament and the country will enable us to do it. 



UA7.ELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD., LONDON AND AYLESBURY. PRINTRRS ttV APPOIMTMENT TO 
HIS MAJESTY THE KING. — ^ 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper pi 
Neutralizing agent: MagnesiOm Oxic 
Treatment Date: ^uki 

PreservationTechnok 

A WORLD LEADER IH PAPER PRESER' 

111 TTiomson Park Ofive 
Cranberry Township. PA 160 
(724t 779-2111 



